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This thesis critically analyses the law of promise. It does so for the purposes of 
identifying potential solutions to practical and doctrinal problems in the Thai law of 
promise. Scots law is chosen as the main point of comparison because, inter alia, 
both jurisdictions are mixed jurisdictions. Scots promissory law was influenced by 
the Canon Law and was part of the ius commune tradition. Scots law was not 
influenced by English law in this area.  Scots law has developed its own promissory 
obligation as a free standing legal entity outwith contract. Thai promissory legal 
principles were derived from both Civilian and English sources. Consequently, 
promissory language is used both in the sense of a unilateral obligation and a 
contractual promise. Moreover, the Thai drafters did not acknowledge the different 
attitude towards a unilateral promise of French law (where a promise must be 
accepted in order to be binding) and German law (where particular types of unilateral 
obligations are recognised). This thesis argues that the flaws in promissory 
provisions under the Thai Code stem from the fact that, inter alia, the drafters did not 
understand the difference between unilateral and bilateral obligations. 
 
This thesis argues that the Scots promissory approach presents a more efficient 
structure of the law of obligations than the Thai approach. It encounters fewer 
problems than Thai law because a promise is deemed to be a standalone obligation. 
This thesis further analyses the practical applications of promise, arguing that a 
promissory analysis is useful in conceptualising practical circumstances. Adopting a 
promissory approach is beneficial, making doctrinal analysis clearer in comparison 
with the offer and acceptance approach. 
 
This thesis takes into account the role given to promise in the DCFR. The notion of a 
unilateral undertaking in the DCFR illustrates that the most recent model rule of 
European private law recognises the importance of a unilateral obligation. This 





situations in which a person unilaterally intends his/her undertaking to be bound 
without acceptance. 
 
It is concluded that the Scots approach of regarding a promise as an independent 
obligation separate from contract could be adapted to Thai law. There are certain 
resemblances between Scots and Thai law in promissory theories and the obligational 
nature of a promise. Therefore, Thai law is not unfamiliar with the notion that a 
declaration of wills can unilaterally create an obligation. The proposed approach 
provides a number of advantages e.g. eradicating an overlap between a promise and 
an offer; clarifying the legal status of promise; and making the legal status of a 
promise to make a contract compatible with a promise of reward. In particular, this 
thesis postulates that promise has a substantive role to play in governing an offer 
specifying a period of acceptance. This particular observation has, to date, not been 










A one-sided promise is legally binding in some legal systems, i.e. a person who 
makes a promise is bound to keep it. The law of promise is critically analysed in this 
thesis. The enquiry is inspired by the problems encountered with the application of 
promise in Thai law. There are two major legal traditions in the world, namely the 
Continental European and the English legal traditions. The concept of promise in 
Thai law was derived from both Continental European and English sources. 
However, the attitudes towards a one-sided promise between these two legal 
traditions differ. The fact that Thai law derived its law of promise from both sources 
results in confusion over the usage of the term “promise”. The drafters of the Thai 
Code used the term “promise” both in the sense of one-sided obligation (similar to 
German law) and two-sided obligation or contract (similar to English law). 
Therefore, Thai law lacks clarity on what defines a promise as a promise. 
 
Scottish law is chosen for this comparative study because the Scottish law of promise 
appears to function effectively at a theoretical level. It has been discovered that the 
Scottish approach to the application of a promise is more efficient. It encounters 
fewer problems than Thai law because, among other things, a promise is deemed to 
be an independent obligation separate from a contract. This thesis further addresses 
practical applications of a promise and it has been found that the concept of promise 
is useful in conceptualising day-to-day transactions. The approach of regarding 
transactions as a promise is particularly useful when it concerns transactions related 
to customers where the law wishes to provide more protection to customers or less 
powerful parties. 
 
Reference is also made to a model rule for European private law, namely the Draft 
Common Frame of Reference (DCFR). Like Scottish law, the DCFR recognises a 
one-sided promise as an independent obligation separate from a contract. This 
reflects the fact that there are certain situations in which a person intends his/her 





appropriately deal with this kind of situation, since it requires the acceptance of the 
other party. 
 
It is concluded that the Scottish approach of regarding a promise as an independent 
obligation separate from contract could be successfully adapted to Thai law. There 
are similarities between Scottish and Thai law in terms of the underlying basis of 
promise.  Therefore, the approach of regarding a promise as an independent 
obligation would not be a total change for Thai law. The new approach would do 
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(1) Backgrounds and reasons for the enquiry 
 
Some jurisdictions recognise a unilateral binding obligation generally known as 
promise or unilateral promise.1 This thesis critically analyses this type of voluntary 
obligation. The enquiry is inspired by Thai private law in which the application of 
promise has been facing difficulties. 
 
Under Thai law, there are two main types of promises. First, promises without a 
specific promisee (public promises) comprise advertisements of reward and prize 
competitions. Second, promises with a specific promisee can be divided into four 
main groups, namely (i) promises to pay a penalty for not performing an obligation, 
(ii) promissory notes, (iii) promises to pay remuneration and (iv) promises to enter 
into a contract.  
 
There are ambiguities regarding the juristic nature and legal effects of promise. For 
example, as the Thai Code only has provisions in relation to promises to enter into a 
contract in certain specific contracts, namely sale and gift, it is doubtful whether an 
individual can make promises which will constitute other types of contract other than 
those specified under the Code. 2  Moreover, the lack of general concepts and 
definitions of a promise results in confusion over its legal characteristic. It is 
questionable whether a promise is a unilateral juristic act or a unilateral contract 
(bilateral juristic act).3 Also, the issue as to whether or not a promise is required to be 
communicated to the promisee remains unsettled. 4  Another issue concerns the 
                                                 
1 See the introductory paragraph of Chapter I. 
2 This is discussed in Chapter V, B. THEORIES AND DOCTRINES RELATING TO PROMISE IN 
THAI LAW, (4) Will theory in Thai law, (a) Will theory from the perspective of an analysis of 
voluntary obligation. 
3 This is discussed in Chapter V, B. THEORIES AND DOCTRINES RELATING TO PROMISE IN 
THAI LAW, (2) Promissory theory as explained by Thai writers, (a) Controversies over legal status of 
promise. 





distinction between a promise to enter into a contract and an offer. The common 
view suggests that a promise to enter into a contract is per se an offer, resulting in a 
difficulty in distinguishing them. 5 
 
As the problems and controversies regarding promise under Thai law still exist and 
there have been only few studies in this field6, this thesis aims to study Thai legal 
principles by comparison with other legal systems or legal models which have more 
obvious concepts of promise.  
 
This thesis chooses Scots law for the purpose of a comparative study because both 
Scots and Thai law are mixed jurisdictions. Moreover, the promissory obligation is 
recognised in Scotland and appears to function effectively at a conceptual level. 
Additionally, the law of promise in both Scots and Thai law derives in part from 
Civilian sources. The differences, however, may be as to how they have been 
developed and applied. Scots law has developed its own promissory obligation as a 
free standing legal entity. Thailand could learn from Scots law in applying and 
developing the law of promise from this comparative analysis. This may help to 
suggest the satisfactory solutions for the problems experienced under Thai law. It is 
hoped that this comparative analysis could benefit Thai law in producing a better 
approach to the law of promise. Similarly, there may be some aspects of Thai law 
from this comparative analysis which can be useful to Scots law.  
 
Additionally, this thesis refers in passing to promise under the Draft Common Frame 
of Reference (DCFR). There has been co-operation in creating legal models for 
European contract law. A reference to those legal models could also benefit Thai law 
on the grounds that Thai contract/promissory law mainly derived its principles from 
                                                 
5 This is discussed in Chapter VI, A. THE NATURE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF PROMISE, (2) 
Thai law, (c) Binding characteristics of a promise. 
6 According to the database of the National Library of Thailand, there are three Master’s Theses in 
respect of the law of promise, namely (1) ค ามัน่ (Promises) by P Sugandhavanij (1983), (2) ค ามัน่เกี่ยวกับการ
เช่าอสังหาริมทรัพย์ (Promises to Lease Immoveable Properties) by P Lengeaw (1998) and (3)  ค ามัน่จะท าสัญญา: 







the Civil Law.7 The DCFR is chosen because it is the latest legal framework seeking 
to harmonise the principles of European private law, and it recognises the concept of 
unilateral obligations.8 Accordingly, the principles under the DCFR are very modern, 
and are worthy of study. In addition, since the DCFR has been drafted by leading 
scholars throughout Europe, it may be assumed that it contains the best, or most 
appropriate, rules of contract/promissory law. Consequently, the DCFR could be a 
useful model from which to draw in order better to understand the law of promise.  
 
(2) Scope of the study 
 
This thesis focuses on the law of promise used in a Civilian sense, namely a 
unilateral binding obligation. It is not the law of promise as traditionally recognised 
in the Common Law, where promises are used to define a contract. This thesis also 
deals with the law of contract because in Thai law promises are not standalone 
obligations, but exist as an aspect of contract law. Thus, theories and doctrines which 
solely deal with the law of promise are of limited use in analysing promise within 
Thai law. Nevertheless, only contractual theories/doctrines which have connections 
with the law of promise will be discussed. This thesis mainly focuses on the Thai and 
Scottish jurisdictions.  Nonetheless, the legal principles in other jurisdictions, such as 
England, France and Germany, are also referred to when it is relevant to the issues 





                                                 
7  See Chapter II, C. THAILAND: A NEWLY DISCOVERED MIXED LEGAL SYSTEM?, (2) 
Reception of foreign laws in Thailand, (b) Reception of the Civil Law. 
8 The DCFR uses the term “unilateral undertaking”, rather than “unilateral promise”. Nevertheless, 
both terms are regarded as expressing the same concept. This can be traced through the Interim 
Outline Edition of the DCFR, in which the words “promise or undertaking” were previously used. For 
example, Art II-1:103 of the Interim Outline Edition states: “A valid unilateral promise or undertaking 
is binding on the person giving it if it is intended to be legally binding without acceptance.” However, 
this was criticised as an unnecessary duplication. Consequently, the word “promise” was removed and 
the word “undertaking” alone is used under the DCFR. (C V Bar et al (eds), Principles, Definitions 
and Model Rules of European Private Law: Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) Outline 







This thesis adopts a common methodology in comparative legal research: it explores 
similarities and differences9 between two legal systems10 in order to critically analyse 
advantages and disadvantages of each system. It does so partly from an historical 
perspective, in order to understand the development of the law of promise in each 
jurisdiction. It examines the reasons behind the legal principles in each system in 
order to deeply understand the nature of those principles, with the aim of providing 
suggestions for improving Thai law. Suggestions are made concerning appropriate 
interpretations of the law as well as legislative revision. 
                                                 
9 G Samuel, An Introduction to Comparative Law Theory and Method (2014) 53-57. 
10 J Husa, “Legal Families”, in J M Smits (ed), Elgar Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, 2nd edn 







General Nature and Requirements of Promise 
 
Some jurisdictions recognise the idea of promise. The Civilian tradition1 regards 
promise as an exception, rather than a general principle. For example, German law 
enforces some promises e.g. promises of reward2 and promises of donation.3 Italian 
law provides that a unilateral promise of performance is enforceable only in specific 
circumstances. 4  The Swiss Code of Obligations contains a provision concerning 
promises of reward. 5 French law recognises some promises, such as promises of 
sale6 and unilateral promises to contract (promesse unilatérale de contrat),7 despite 
the fact that these promises are not unilateral obligations but are created by an 
agreement of two parties. 8  In English law, promises are not generally binding, 
despite exceptions such as a promise made by way of deed or under seal.9 Scots law 
is different in regarding promise as an independent obligation, that is one the 
enforceability of which does not depend on contract.10 
 
As the main purpose of this thesis is to critically analyse the doctrine of promise 
under Scots law and Thai law, the study begins with the historical development of 
the legal obligation of promise. The definition11 of a promise is not discussed due to 
                                                 
1  For the approaches of other European systems to unilateral promises see Commentary on the Draft 
Common Frame of Reference 340-342. 
2 BGB, §657 
3 BGB, §518. 
4 Italian Code, Art 1987. 
5 Swiss Code of Obligations, Art 8 para 1. 
6 Code civil, Art 1589. 
7 J Bell et al, Principles of French Law, 2nd edn (2008) 305; H Beale et all (eds), Cases, Materials and 
Text on Contract Law, 2nd edn (2010) 64. 
8 For further discussion see section A. THE LEGAL OBLIGATION OF PROMISE, (4) Northern 
Natural Law jurists, (b) Grotius’ influence on French law. 
9 Chitty on Contracts para 1-128; Treitel The Law of Contract paras 3-170-171; For case law see Hall 
v Palmer (1844) 3 Hare 532; Macedo v Stroud [1922] 2 AC 330; HSBC Trust Co (UK) Ltd v Quinn 
[2007] EWHC 1543 (Ch).  
10 Stair, Inst 1.10.4. 
11 Although philosophers and lawyers explain the nature and characteristics of promise, most of them 
tend not to give a clear definition of promise. Examples include Atiyah (Atiyah, Promises), Fried 
(Fried, Contract), Kimel (Kimel, Promise), Pratt (Pratt, Promises), Gilbert (M Gilbert, “Is an 
Agreement an Exchange of Promises?” (1993) 90(12) Journal of Philosophy 627 at 627-649), Gordley 
(J Gordley, “Enforcing Promises” (1995) 83 California Law Review 547). Examples of writers who 





space constraints. However, the requirements for a legally binding promise will be 
considered. 
 
A. THE LEGAL OBLIGATION OF PROMISE 
 
(1) Roman law 
 
Since the Civilian systems significantly derive their law of obligations from Roman 
sources, it is appropriate to begin the chapter by considering the Roman law of 
unilateral obligations.  
 
(a) Promises in Roman law 
 
Zimmermann suggests that the concept of pollicitatio12 in the Digest is the nearest 
comparator to the unilateral promise of modern law. 13 Under Roman law, a 
pollicitatio was “an undertaking (promissio) made merely by him who affirms it.”14 
It was distinguished from an agreement (pactum), which was “a consent and 
covenant between two persons”.15 Under Roman law the term pollicitatio was used 
in two different contexts: as an absolute unilateral promise not requiring acceptance; 
as an offer irrevocable before acceptance.16 
 
In the Digest, there were certain circumstances in which a promise, without stipulatio, 
could be binding: (i) as a vow;17 (ii) as a promise of dowry;18 (iii) when given in  
exchange for an office granted to the promisor;19 (iv) if the promisor had already 
                                                                                                                                          
Promises 6; and W R Anson, Principles of the English Law of Contract, 25th edn (1979) 4. (This 
edition is the last edition of this book in which a definition of a promise is provided).  
12  There is no consensus amongst legal scholars in relation to the exact meaning of the term 
pollicitatio. See Zimmermann, Obligations 575-576. 
13 Zimmermann, Obligations 574. 
14 Voet, Commentary on the Pandects 707. 
15 Dig L, 12, 3, (as discussed by Voet, in Voet, Commentary on the Pandects 707). 
16 Voet, Commentary on the Pandects 708-709. 
17 Dig L, 12, 2, in principio and following sections, (as discussed by Voet in Ibid at 708). 
18 Code V, 11, 6, (as discussed by Voet in Ibid at 708). 





performed, or the work already started by a community.20 In these circumstances 
pollicitationes were usually held to be irrevocable offers;21 and (v) if made as a result 
of a natural disaster e.g. a fire, an earthquake or a collapse of a building.22   
 
Consequently, the common opinion is that these circumstances under the Digest 
cannot be equated to the modern doctrine of promise on the grounds that it was used 
only in a public context, and there is no case of pollicitatio in favour of a private 
individual.23  
 
(b) Contracts under Roman law 
 
Not all contracts were recognised as enforceable obligations under the ius civile, but 
depended on whether a transaction fell within a recognised type of contract. 
Contracts “re” were enforceable upon delivery of the subject matter.24 Contracts 
consensu were bilateral, consensual agreements. 25  Some contracts required 
formalities. The most obvious example of a Roman contract with a promissory aspect 
to it was the “stipulatio”, formed by question and answer. The promisee asked 
“spondesne?”26 (Do you solemnly promise?).27 The promisor replied “spondeo”28 (I 
do solemnly promise). 29  Contracts not falling into these categories were called 
“innominate contracts”30, and were unenforceable, unless a party had performed.31 
                                                 
20 Dig L, 12, secs 1-5; and lex 3, in principio and sec 1 of the same title, (as discussed by Voet in 
Voet, Commentary on the Pandects 709). 
21 Ibid.  
22 Dig L, 12, 1, 1; and leges 3, 4 and 7 of the same title, (as discussed by Voet in Voet, Commentary 
on the Pandects 709). 
23 Zimmermann, Obligations 574-575; McBryde, Promises 51. 
24 Buckland, Roman Law 459. As for examples of contract re, see Buckland, Roman Law 459-462, 
479-487, 470-478, and 488-494; Colquhoun, Roman Civil Law 469-472, 467-470, 470-478 and 488-
494; See also Zimmermann, Obligations 153-229. 
25 Buckland, Roman Law 410. Examples of contract contracts consensus can be found in Buckland, 
Roman Law 479-494, 495, 504 and 512-518; See also Zimmermann, Obligations 230-476. 
26 G.3.93, (as discussed by Buckland in Buckland, Roman Law 434). 
27 Translation by W L Burdick, The Principles of Roman Law and Their Relation to Modern Law 
(2004) at 434. 
28 G.3.93, (as discussed by Buckland in Buckland, Roman Law 434). 
29 Translation by W L Burdick (n 27). 
30 “Innominate contract” is the term used by modern scholars. In Roman contexts these contract had 
names. However, they did not fall within any categories of contracts which had names. Buckland, 
Roman Law 518 (at note 9). 






By contrast, all agreements were treated as enforceable obligations under the ius 
gentium.32  Medieval jurists were of the view that a person must keep his word “as a 
matter of "faith", "equity" and the ius gentium, a law binding upon all people”.33 The 
fact that the ius civile34 applied to Roman citizens and the ius gentium35 applied to 
non-citizens rendered them different in practice. Promises made between Romans 
could not be enforced, unless they complied with the necessary formalities. In 
contrast, promises made between Romans and non-citizens or amongst non-citizens 
were binding regardless of the formalities. Thus, it was more flexible to enforce a 
promise in which at least one party was not a citizen than one in which both parties 
were Romans. This reflects the fact that the idea of promise under the ius gentium 
was closer to the notion of promise held by later Natural Law jurists, in that the 
binding obligation of promise arises from the parties’ will.36 
 
(c) Conclusion on Roman law 
 
Although Roman jurists explained that one must keep one’s word (a similar idea to 
promising), this principle was enforceable only in the ius gentium. Under the ius 
civile, there was an action akin to (and usually translated as) promise – the stipulatio. 
Nevertheless, it had the formality of a contract. Not even all bilateral agreements 
were recognised as enforceable obligations under the ius civile. Thus, given the 
absence of any general enforceability of unilateral promises in Roman law, the 
European promissory obligation must have as its source something other than the 
Roman law. 
 
                                                 
32 For full discussion see Gordley, Good Faith 95-100. 
33 See Ibid. 
34 The term “ius civile” is used in two different senses. The first definition refers to the law that was 
applied in the Roman Empire. The second definition had a broader meaning and it was used by the 
classical jurists. See Buckland, Roman Law 52-53. 
35 There is a controversy over the exact meaning of “ius gentium”. Some jurists (e.g. Gaius) treated ius 
gentium as exactly the same as ius naturale. G.1.1. Frag Dos 1. 1, (as discussed by Buckland in 
Buckland, Roman Law 53). However, some (e,g, Ulpain) were of the view that it is different from ius 
naturale. D.1.1.1.4, (as discussed by Buckland in Buckland, Roman Law 53). 
36 E.g. Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis 2.11.4; Stair, Inst 1.10.1; Pufendorf, Duty of Man and Citizen 





(2) Canon Law 
 
The character of Roman law was formalistic. This is seen from the approach to 
obligations, discussed above. The canonists departed from this formalism and 
focused on the actuality of obligations. Although the canonists themselves saw 
breach of promise as a sin, rather than looking to legal enforcement, 37  they 
emphasised the recognition of the principle of keeping one’s word.38 The canonists 
focused on the substance of the obligation, rather than on formality,39 thus becoming 
the first jurists to break away from the formalism of Roman law.40  
 
The notion of enforcing unilateral promises in the Canon Law derived from the 
ethical principle: “ita quoque in verbis nostris nullum debet esse mendacium”41 
(“There ought to be no falsehood in our words”).42 The canonists concluded that God 
made no distinction between sworn promises and man’s words.43 Hence, there should 
be no difference between oaths and simple promises for Christians either.44 This 
advanced the idea that all promises could be enforceable regardless of their 
formalities.45 This principle led to the enforceability of unilateral promises.46 The 
basic contractual principle Pacta sunt servanda was developed from this canonical 
principle.47 In the case of unilateral promises, the principle could be applied to all 
                                                 
37As Astuti observes, “they said little about the matter because, unlike the civilians, their prime 
concern was not whether an agreement was actionable but whether breach was a sin”. Astuti, “I 
prinicipii fondamentali dei contratti nella storia del diritto italino”, Annali di storia del diritto 1 (1957) 
34-37, (discussed by Gordley in Gordley, Good Faith 99 at note 29). 
38 McBryde, Promises 54. 
39 Helmholz, Contracts 50; McBryde, Ibid. 
40 J Roussier, Le fondement de l’obligation contractuelle dans le droit classique de l’Eglise (1933), 
esp 46-97 and F Spies, De l’observation des simples conventions en droit canonique (1928), (as cited 
by Helmholz in  Helmholz, Canon Law of Oaths 162). 
41 Decretum Gratiani C 22 q 5 c 12, in Corpus Iuris Canonici, A Friedberg (ed) (1879), (as cited by 
Helmholz in Helmholz, Contracts 50). 
42 Translation by Helmholz in Ibid.  
43 Decretum Gratiani C 22 q 5 c 12, (as cited by Helmholz in Helmholz, Canon Law of Oaths 162; See 
also Decock, Contract 129). 
44 Ibid. 
45 Gl: ord ad C 12 q 2 c 66 sv promiserint: “Videtur quod aliquis obligetur nudis verbis, licet non 
intercesit stipulation.”, (as cited by Helmholz in Helmholz, Canon Law of Oaths 162); See also 
Helmholz, Contracts 50. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Decretales Gregorii IX X 1.35.1, in Corpus Iuris Canonici, A Friedberg (ed) (1879): “Universi 
dixerunt, pax servetur pacta custodiantur.”, as discussed by Helmholz in Helmholz, Contracts 50. It is 





types of promises,48 such as to stand as surety for a debt, to pay a dowry, to obey 
guild regulations, to complete construction, and to deliver goods.49 Nevertheless, in 
order to restrain ecclesiastical power50, jurisdiction extended solely to cases where 
the promise had been accompanied by an oath.51  The canonical promissory account 
inspired both the late scholastic jurists and Natural Law commentators.52 
 
In short, while the Roman approach was one where promises were only binding in 
limited circumstances, the canonical approach was one where promises were binding 
in broader circumstances. 
 
(3) The late scholastics 
 
During the sixteenth century, the late scholastics in Spain, e.g. Soto, Molina, and 
Lessius, analysed Roman law with Aristotle’s philosophy 53  and Aquinas’s 54 
promissory account. 55 They modified Aquinas’s account, giving promise a central 
role in explanations of contractual liabilities.56 These jurists regarded promises as 
morally binding by the law of nature. They disagreed with Cajetan, who argued that 
it was not immoral not to keep a promise.57 Molina suggested that simple promises 
                                                                                                                                          
of modern contract law.  A complete system of what equivalent to today contract law did not exist 
under the Canon Law. See Helmholz, Contracts 52-53. 
48 Helmholz, Ibid at 50. 
49 Ibid. 
50 An oath is not merely the measure used for carrying litigation within the ecclesiastical courts. An 
oath itself could be a source of obligations. See Helmholz, Canon Law of Oaths 161-164. 
51 Helmholz, Contracts 51; Helmholz, Canon Law of Oaths 164.  
52 Zimmermann, Obligations 568. For further discussion on this point see Chapter III, A. STAIR 
AND THE DOCTRINE OF PROMISE, (1) Canon Law; and (2) ius commune, (a) Debate on the 
binding force of promise. 
53 For Aristotle’s view on promise see Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk IV Ch 7, 1127a – 1127b. 
54 For Cicero’s view on promise see M T Cicero, De Officiis, trans W Miller (1913) Bk I Moral 
Goodness, §32; and see also Bk III §§92-96. 
55 Gordley, Promise 4; Hogg, Promises 118. 
56 For an analysis see Gordley, Contract Doctrine 69-111 esp at 71-77. 
57 Cajetan commented on Aquinas’s Summa Theological that promise is only binding as a matter of 
truth. The promisor does not owe anything as a matter of justice to the promisee, except where the 
promisee suffers as a result of the promisor breaking the promise. Cajetan, Commentaria (Padua, 
1698), to Summa theologica, 11-11, q 88, a 1; q 113, a 1 (as cited by Gordley in Gordley, Contract 
73). For further discussion see Gordley, Contract 73; Gordley, Promise 6; Decock, Contract 199-200; 





are naturally binding regardless of any acceptance.58 Even a non-onerous promise 
such as a gift was binding.59 Similarly, Soto argued that all promises are binding 
even if lacking an acceptance.60 Lessius agreed that gratuitous promises created an 
enforceable obligation, but argued that a promise must be accepted by the 
promisee.61  Therefore, there was a debate amongst the late scholastics on whether a 
promise requires an acceptance.  
 
The late scholastics’ treatment of the moral force of promise was followed by later 
Natural Law commentators e.g. Grotius62, Pufendorf63, and Stair.64 By the end of the 
seventeenth century, most scholars throughout Europe adopted the view that naked 
pactions, derived from a bare agreement between parties, were enforceable.65 As for 
unilateral promises, most commentators, except for Connanus 66  who followed 
Cajetan, regarded them as morally binding.67 In addition, some commentators e.g. 
Grotius68 and Stair69 went further by suggesting that promises should also have legal 







                                                 
58 Molina, De iustitia et iure, tom 2 (De contractibus), tract 2, disp 263, col 47, num 12, (as cited by 
Decock in Decock, Contract 190). 
59 Molina, De iustitia et iure, disp 262, (as cited by Gordley in Gordley, Promise 6). 
60 Soto, De iustitia et iure, lib 3, q 5, art 3 (as cited by Gordley in Gordley, Promise 14).  
61 Lessius, De iustitia et iure, lib 2, cap 18, dub 6, num 34, 219-220, (as cited by Decock in Decock, 
Contract 190). 
62 Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis 2.11.1. 
63 S V Pufendorf, Of the Law of Nature and Nations (1729) 3.5.9. 
64 Stair, Inst 1.10.10. 
65 Sellar, Promise 259. 
66 F Connanus, Commentariorum iuris civilis libri X (1724), I.6.v.1, as cited by Gordley in Gordley, 
Promise 6. 
67 E.g. Stair wrote: “Connanus, lib.1.cap.6, lib.5.cap. 9 holdeth, that promises, or naked pactions, 
where there is no equivalent cause onerous intervening, do morally produce no obligation or action…” 
Stair, Inst 1.10.10. See also Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis 2.11.1. 
68 His important work on promise is De jure belli ac pacis. 









Grotius argued that a promise needs acceptance to be legally binding; 70  before 
acceptance it is revocable because the right has not been transferred to the promisee 
yet.71 Thus, the revocation of such a promise can be made “without the imputation of 
injustice and levity.” 72 It appears that Grotius’ view was inspired by Lessius. As 
noted above, while Molina and Soto suggested that a promise is per se binding, 
Lessius disagreed and argued that an acceptance of a promise is required as a matter 
of both civil and Natural Law.73  
 
A number of jurists followed Grotius e.g. Pufendorf and Pothier. Pufendorf adopted 
Grotius’ approach in distinguishing imperfect and perfect promises.74 He explained 
that both contracts and promises require mutual consent from the parties.75 As long 
as a promise has not been accepted, the promisor may revoke it. 76  Pufendorf’s 
approach is similar to that of Grotius in that a promisee needs to accept the promise 
to acquire a right. As for Pothier, he distinguished contracts from pollicitations,77  the 
latter being “a promise not yet accepted by the person to whom it is made”.78 Pothier 
expressly cited Grotius (lib 2 c 2) in supporting the idea that a promise requires an 




                                                 
70 Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis 2.11.14. 
71 Ibid at 2.11.16. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Lessius, De iustitia et iure, lib 2, cap 18, dub 6, num 34, 219-220, (as cited by Decock in Decock, 
Contract 190). 
74 Pufendorf, Duty of Man and Citizen 1.9.6. For Grotius’ account on perfect and imperfect promises 
see section (c) Grotius’ influence on Stair. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid. 








(b) Grotius’ influence on French law 
 
Grotius’ influence on the Code civil may be observed from two perspectives. First, 
from the sources of the Code civil, Pothier’s commentary (Traite des obligations) 
was a source which the drafters of the Code civil consulted.81 Given that Pothier 
adopted Grotius’ promissory account, it may be inferred that Grotius’ influence on 
promises under the Code civil came through Pothier. 
 
Second, one may note the close resemblance between Grotius’ treatment of promise 
and the promissory approach in the Code civil. It is important to understand that in 
Grotius’ view promises are not entirely distinguished from contracts. Although in the 
De jure belli ac pacis Grotius discussed promises and contracts in separate chapters, 
it appears that he intended the obligatory force of promise to apply to contracts too.82 
This can be inferred from the fact that there was no explanation regarding rights and 
obligations arising from contracts in the Chapter on Contract.83  In addition, in the 
Jurisprudence of Holland Grotius explained that contract is “a voluntary act of a man 
whereby he promises something to another with the intention that such other shall 
accept it and thereby acquire a right against the promisor”.84 In Grotius’ account the 
actual characteristics of binding promises are seen as either “(a) irrevocable offers or 
(b) offers which are presumed by law to have been accepted.”85 He further explained 
that, although it is wrong not to keep a promise, the promisee does not have any right 
to enforce it.86 In short, in Grotius’ account a promise which is legally binding will 
also be regarded as a contract. 
 
The approach adopted in the Code civil is compatible with Grotius’ account. The first 
comparison is the concept of a third-party beneficiary. Under the Code civil, the right 
                                                 
81 G A Bermann & E Picard (eds), Introduction to French Law (2008) 206; E Steiner, French Law: A 
Comparative Approach (2010) 191-192; E Descheemaeker, “Pothier and the French Civil Code”, in E 
Descheemaeker, The Division of Wrongs: A Historical Comparative Study (2009) 107. 
82 Maccormack, Grotius and Stair 163. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Grotius, Jurisprudence of Holland 3.1.10. 
85 TB Smith, “Pollicitatio–Promise and Offer: Stair v Grotius”, in the same author, Studies Critical 
and Comparative (1962) 168 at 172. 





of the beneficiary only comes into existence when the beneficiary declares his/her 
intention that he/she wishes to receive the benefits. 87  This is compatible with 
Grotius’ requirement of an acceptance.88 
 
Secondly, the general attitude of French law towards promise is similar to Grotius’ 
promissory account in that a promise must be accepted in order to be binding. The 
Code civil states: “A promise of sale is the same as a sale, where there is reciprocal 
consent of both parties as to the thing and the price.”89 The foregoing texts suggest 
that under French law “the promise to buy is not obligatory if it is not accompanied 
by the promise to sell and that, reciprocally, the promise to sell is null if it is not 
accompanied by the promise to buy…”90  Although it has been suggested that a 
unilateral promise (engagement unilatéral de volonté), in the sense of a genuine 
unilateral obligation, should be binding in certain limited circumstances, this 
proposition is subject to academic debate.91 For example, a promise of reward, not 
recognised under the Code civil, has been enforced by the French courts.92 However, 
there is a controversy whether a promise of reward is contractual93 or promissory in 
nature.94 In short, as a general rule, under the Code civil, a unilateral declaration of 
will cannot create an obligation, which is similar to Grotius’ promissory account. 
 
                                                 
87 Code civil, Art 1121. 
88 This can be usefully compared with Scots law where JQT is enforceable once a promise is made. 
For further analysis see Chapter V, A. THEORIES AND DOCTRINES RELATING TO PROMISE 
IN SCOTS LAW, (5) The doctrine of third party rights. 
89  Code civil, Art 1589 para 1. (Translated by G Rouhette), available at 
www.legifrance.gouv.fr/content/download/1950/13681/.../Code_22.pdf. 
90 P M Merlin, Répertoire Universel et Raisonné de Jurisprudence, Vente, 5th edn (1828) §VII, V, 85, 
as cited by B Schwartz (ed), The Code Napoleon and the Common-Law World (1998) 131; See also A 
v Mehren, “The French Civil Code and Contract: A Comparative Analysis of Formation and Form” 
(1955) 15(4) Louisiana Law Review 687 at 690-691 (at note 6). 
91 For further discussion see M Fabre-Magnan, Les Obligations (2004) no 30 and Terre et al, Les 
Obligations, 10th edn (2009) paras 53ff (as cited by H Beale et all (eds), Cases, Materials and Text on 
Contract Law, 2nd edn (2010) 64). 
92 Beale, Ibid. 
93 The traditional analysis of reward under French law is a contractual approach: “an offer of a reward 
could not be accepted merely by the doing of the indicated act, in ignorance of the offer.” CF 
Schlesinger (ed), Formation of Contracts at 667, 1255, (as cited by Nicholas in B Nicholas, The 
French Law of Contract, 2nd edn (1992) 144). 





Thirdly, another area of the Code civil which was influenced by Grotius’ promissory 
account is the approach of interpreting an obligation using a subjective test. This 
issue will be discussed later.95 
 
(c) Grotius’ influence on Stair 
 
Grotius influenced Stair in a number of ways. First, there are a number of occasions 
on which Stair expressly cited Grotius in his Institutions. For example, in 1.2.5, he 
explained that man’s liberty is not absolute but bounded by obediential obligations to 
God. He ended the paragraph by referring to Grotius (De jure belli, lib 2 Cap 22 
§12). 96  In 1.1.17, Stair argued that the law is a rational discipline by making 
reference to Duarenus and Grotius.97 
 
Second, there are passages in Stair’s Institutions which, though not openly citing 
Grotius, show some similarities to Grotius’ works. For example, in De jure belli ac 
pacis, Grotius classified “ways of speaking” regarding the future into three types:98 
(i) an assurance of a future intention which the speaker is at liberty to change;99 (ii) a 
future intention in which the speaker indicates that he/she does not intend to change 
his/her mind (“imperfect obligations”),100 such statements creating natural but not 
civil obligations; 101  and (iii) “the perfect obligations of a promise.” 102  Stair 
distinguished three acts of human will, namely desire 103 , resolution 104  and 
engagement. 105  Only the third act of these can create a right, because “the will 
confers a power of exaction in another, and thereby becomes engaged to that other to 
                                                 
95 See C. NATURE AND REQUIREMENTS OF PROMISE, (3) The intentions of the promisor, (b) 
How to measure seriousness of intention? 
96 Stair, Inst 1.2.5.  
97 Stair, Inst 1.1.17. For an analysis of what Stair has taken from Grotius in the account of natural law 
and slavery see J W Cairns, “Stoicism, Slavery, and Law”, in H W Blom & L C Winkel, Grotius and 
the Stoa, 197 at 218-220. 
98 Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis .2.11.2-4. 
99 “For the human mind has not only a natural power, but a right to change its purpose.” Grotius, De 
jure belli ac pacis 2.11.2. 
100 Ibid at 2.11.3. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Ibid at 2.11.4. 
103 “[A] tendency or inclination of the will towards its object…” Stair, Inst 1.10.2. 
104 “[A] determinate purpose to do that which is desired…” Ibid. 





perform”.106 Stair’s treatment is somewhat similar to Grotius’ analysis of modes of 
speaking concerning future intentions, in that intentions are classed into three types 
and only the third one is obligatory. 
 
Thirdly, Stair and Grotius used the same references in some areas of their works.107  
For instance, in 1.10.10 concerning promise, Stair referred to Connanus as an 
example of the opposite view i.e. holding that promises are not obligatory. Grotius 
used the same reference, beginning his promissory chapter by stating that Connanus 
was opposed to his view that an obligation can arise from promise.108 
 
All these similarities between Stair’s Institutions and Grotius’ commentaries show 




Although Stair was influenced by Grotius, he clearly disagreed with Grotius’s view 
that a promise required acceptance to become legally binding. Stair’s view that 
promise is binding without any requirement of acceptance109 was influenced, inter 
alia, by Molina and was said to accord with the ius commune.110 Molina explained 
that, while as a matter of civil law the promisee is required to accept a promise in the 
interest of the common good,111  as a matter of the Natural Law an acceptance is not 
required.112 He reasoned that a promise is per se a source of a promissory obligation 
whereas an acceptance of a promise is not.113 Molina’s view contrasts with that of 
                                                 
106 Stair, Inst 1.10. 2. 
107 For other passages in which Stair and Grotius used the same references see W M Gordon, “Stair, 
Grotius and the Sources of Stair’s Institutions”, in W Gordon, Roman Law, Scots Law and Legal 
History: Selected Essays (2007) 255-266. 
108 Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis 2.11.1. 
109 Stair, Inst 1.10.4. 
110 In 1.10.5 concerning a promise made in favour of a third person, Stair began the passage by stating 
that “[i]t is likewise the opinion of Molina…” Stair, Inst 1.10.5. 
111 Molina, De iustitia et iure, tom 2 (De contractibus), tract 2 disp 266, col 64, num 10, (as cited by 
Decock in Decock, Contract 185). 
112 Ibid. 
113 Molina, De iustitia et iure, tom 2 (De contractibus), tract 2 disp 263, col 47, num 12, (as cited by 





Lessius (who explained that a promise is not per se a source of obligation), as 
previously mentioned.  
 
In short, Stair did not always follow Grotius, as can be seen by reference to the need 
for acceptance of a promise.  
 
(5) Concluding remarks 
 
The general enforcement of promises was absent from Roman law. It was first 
recognised by the canonists, and gained ground during the seventeenth century. A 
number of commentators proposed that promises were not only morally binding but 
also legally binding. These commentators were inspired by the canonical doctrine of 
promise. However, leading commentators took a different approach on the need for 
acceptance and on distinguishing promises and contracts. This legal development is 
analysed, so far as Scotland is concerned, in Chapter III. 
 
B. IS PROMISE DISTINCT FROM CONTRACT? 
 
Contract and promise have a long and tangled relationship.114 Under the influence of 
Aristotle and Aquinas, scholastic theorists and Natural lawyers regarded promise as 
playing a central role in legal obligations and used promise in explaining the law of 
contract.115 Modern philosophers and lawyers, especially those in jurisdictions where 
promise is employed to explain contract law, consider promise as similar to 





                                                 
114 Habib, Promise at heading 6.3. 
115 For an overview of the role of promising in contract law during this period see W Swain, “Contract 
as Promise: The Role of Promising in the Law of Contract. An Historical Account” (2013) 17(1) 
EdinLR 1 at section E.  






(1) An historical point of view  
 
As the late scholastics made an important contribution to the development of modern 
contract law, it is helpful to begin by considering their views on the 
differences/similarities between contract and promise.  
 
Unlike modern scholars, the late scholastics did not directly address whether a 
promise is distinct from a contract. Rather, they recognised the enforceability of 
promise and its utility in explaining the concept of contract.  
 
An appropriate analysis for the discussion here is Oñate’s discussion of the term 
“promise”. 117 Oñate suggested that “promise” has three different definitions. Firstly, 
it refers to an offer of a contract, this being a proposal to do something in favour of 
another with the “intention of obligation even before the other party has accepted the 
offer.”118 It is “part and parcel” of a contract.119 Secondly, a promise refers to the 
blend between an offer and an acceptance “that forms the backbone of contract 
understood both in generic and specific term.”120 Thirdly, a promise is a specific type 
of contract. 121  It can be seen that in this late scholastic view a promise is not 
completely similar to a contract. Rather, it depends on which sense of the meaning of 








                                                 
117 For full discussion see Decock, Contract 177. 
118 Oñate, De contractibus, tom 2, tract 9, disp 29, set 1, num 6, 87, (as cited by Decock in Decock, 
Contract 177). 
119 Oñate, De contractibus, tom 2, tract 9, disp 29, set 1, num 6, 87, as cited by Decock in Decock, 
Contract 177). 
120 (Decock’s translation). Oñate, De contractibus, tom 2, tract 9, disp 29, set 1, num 6, 87, (as cited 
by Decock in Decock, Contract 178). 





(2) Contemporary debates 
 
(a) Promise is a contract 
 
It is widely assumed, notably in the Anglo-American jurisdictions, that contract and 
promise originate from “cognate ideas”.122 Common Law standard textbooks, for 
example, usually explain that a contract is a promise or an exchange of promises.123 
The typical approach of American jurists is that contracts are “the art of enforcing 
promises”124 They believe that contract law is mostly “confined to promises that the 
law will enforce.” 125  Theorists under the so called “contract-as-promise” theory 
explain that the main purpose of the law of contract is to enforce the moral obligation 
of keeping a promise.126   
 
A number of commentators support the foregoing theory. Fried, for instance, 
explains that promise is the moral basis of contract law. Some argue that promises 
entail moral obligations whilst the law of contract is not grounded in morality but is 
more concerned with serious business.127 However, Fried argues that nonetheless it is 
necessary to use promise to explain the basis of contract,128 concluding that “since a 
contract is first of all a promise, the contract must be kept because a promise must be 
kept.”129 
 
Shiffrin supports the approach that contracts are (or should be regarded as) similar to 
promises. She particularly deals with the concept of divergence between the 
                                                 
122 Pratt, Promises 531. 
123  E.g. J Chitty, Chitty on Contracts, 26th edn, by A G Guest (1989) para 1. There are two rival 
theories regarding the definition of contract in English law, namely (i) a contract is an exchange of 
two promises and (ii) a contract is an agreement giving rise to obligations.  The 1989 edition of Chitty 
on Contracts is being referred to as an example of the former. In later editions of Chitty on Contracts, 
the latter theory was adopted. See J Chitty, Chitty on Contracts, 30th edn, by H G Beale (2008) para 1-
002. Nevertheless, in the latest edition, both definitions are referred to. See Chitty on Contracts (32nd 
edn) para 1-016-021. 
124 R Kreitner, Calculating Promises (2007) 1. 
125 Farnsworth, Contracts 4. 
126 The leading scholar of this theory is Charles Fried (Fried, Contract as Promise). See also S A 
Smith, Contract Theory (2004) 56-78. 
127 Fried, Contract 29. He cites J Dawson, Gifts and Promises (1980) 199-207. 
128 Ibid at 38. 





requirements of contract law and the moral norms of promises,130 arguing that the 
legal norms regulating contracts and promises diverge from the applicable moral 
ones. Thus, an aggrieved contractual party is generally granted damages131 and 
cannot enforce specific performance from the other party.132 This contrasts with the 
morality of promising in which a promisor is obliged to perform what was promised 
whenever possible, rather than paying damages.133 Shiffrin argues that the 
divergences between contract law and the morality of promising cause problems 
about, for example, “how the moral agent is to navigate both the legal and moral 
systems.”134 These divergences do not support the attempt by a moral agent to 
behave decently in law. In Shriffin’s view, contracts are rooted in promises, and 
should be treated as similar to promise.  
 
(b) Promise is not a contract 
 
Some scholars view contract as different from, or at least not exactly the same as, 
promise. Kimel, for example, argues that “contract, as a practice, does not possess 
the same intrinsic value as promise.”135 A voluntary undertaking can indicate “a 
certain range of attitudes of the kind that tends to be highly valuable in personal 
relationships.”136 According to Kimel, one main difference between contract and 
promise is that the former is typically a matter of mutual undertakings, whereas the 
latter involves unilateral undertakings of obligation.137 Kimel argues that scholars 
who hold the view that contracts are promises usually do not see promise as existing 
                                                 
130 S V Shiffrin, “The Divergence of Contract and Promise” (2007) 120 HarvLRev 709 at 709. 
131 Ibid at 722-723. 
132  In mixed legal systems like Scotland and Thailand, one can get enforcement of a contract. 
Therefore, the supposed divergence is less evident in those jurisdictions. For further discussion on this 
point see Chapter V, A. THEORIES AND DOCTRINES RELATING TO PROMISE  IN SCOTS 
LAW, (4) Will theory in Scots law, (b) Will theory from the perspective of remedy; and B. 
THEORIES AND DOCTRINES RELATING TO PROMISE  IN THAI LAW, (4) Will theory in Thai 
law, (b) Will theory from the perspective of remedies. 
133 Shiffrin (n 130) 713. 
134 Ibid at 709. 
135 Kimel, Promise 72. 






in isolation.138 Instead, they change the focus from the one-sidedness of promise to 
one where promises are exchanged or are made conditionally.139 
 
Pratt distinguishes contract from promise. He argues that “the commissive speech 
act140 by means of which a contract is formed is not the same speech act as that by 
means of which we voluntarily undertake moral obligations to others”, 141  and, 
contrary to Shiffrin, that the law of contract has no connection with promises. In 
allowing payment of damages for breach of contract, the law does not separate this 
from the moral obligation of promise. Therefore, “there is no divergence between 
contract and promise to be justified”,142 as Shiffrin argues.143 According to Pratt, an 
undertaking creates a moral obligation of promise only if “it is given with the 
obvious intention of creating a moral obligation.”144  
 
(3) The preferred approach 
 
(a) Unilateral nature of promise 
 
It is universally accepted that a contract is made from the intentions of, at least, two 
parties. This is the case in both the ordinary and legal senses of the term. The Oxford 
English Dictionary defines contract as “[a] mutual agreement between two or more 
parties that something shall be done or forborne by one or both…”145   Therefore, a 
layman will generally understand that a contract is made by, at least, two contracting 
                                                 
138 Ibid. 
139 Ibid. 
140 Austin offered a theory that what humans say has three kinds of meaning, namely propositional 
meaning, illocutionary meaning and perlocutionary meaning. (J L Austin, How to Do Things with 
Words [1962]). In addition, according to Austin (1962) and Searle (Speech acts: An Essay in the 
Philosophy of Language, 1969), speech acts are classified into five types, namely assertives, 
directives, commissives, expressives and declarations. Commissive speech acts refer to speech acts 
“whose point is to commit the speaker … to some future course of action”. Promises fall within this 
category. For a comprehensive analysis see J R Searle, “A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts”, in K 
Günderson (ed), Language, Mind, and Knowledge, (Minneapolis Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 
vol 7) (1975) 344-369. 
141 Pratt, Contract 801. 
142 Ibid at 806. 
143 Ibid at 802. 
144 Ibid at 812.  






parties. Where, for example, A proposes to B that he wishes to sell B a pet rabbit, it 
would be reasonably understood that A’s expression is merely a proposal to enter 
into a contract. As for the legal context, A’s proposal is generally deemed to be an 
offer, which can result in a contractual obligation if B accepts it. A contract therefore 
always arises from the wills of two parties. 
 
The English word “promise”, in a general sense, is defined as: 
“A declaration or assurance made to another person (usually with respect to 
the future), stating a commitment to give, do, or refrain from doing a 
specified thing or act, or guaranteeing that a specified thing will or will not 
happen.” 146 
 
A layman would therefore understand this concept as being different from that of a 
contract. Generally speaking, when a person makes a promise, he/she is obliged to 
keep it, and the other party does not need to accept the promise. A promise can thus 
be regarded as unilateral in nature. For example, A assures B that he will give B a pet 
rabbit. A’s proposal is reasonably understood by a lay person as a promise. This is 
also the case in a legal context. A one-side commitment is sufficient to constitute a 
promise.147 From the above example, A’s proposal is regarded as a promise (despite 
the fact that it is enforceable in law or not depending on the rules of each 
jurisdiction).  
 
The unilateral nature of promise can also be observed from an historical point of 
view. Firstly, as discussed earlier, in Roman law a promise was a unilateral 
undertaking made by one person, distinguishable from an agreement or covenant 
between two persons. Secondly, the late scholastics, who used the idea of promise as 
explaining a contractual obligation, did not view a promise as being completely 
similar to a contract. Promise was identical to a contract only when used in the sense 
of the mixture of an offer and an acceptance. In another sense, it referred to a 
                                                 
146 Oxford English Dictionary: Promise, available at 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/152432?rskey=9czB6Q&result=1&isAdvanced=false#eid. 
147 For example, Smith states: “a promise binds only one person, the promisor, while an agreement 
binds two persons…” S A Smith, Contract Theory (2004) 56. However, Smith is of the view that the 
promissory theories can explain the nature of contracts. For full discussion see S A Smith, Contract 





person’s proposal to enter into a commitment in favour of another person, which is 
binding even before any acceptance, this being closer to the nature of promise 
discussed in this thesis (i.e. a unilateral undertaking intended to be legally binding). 
Finally, the distinction between promise and contract can be observed in the notion 
of promise in the Canon Law. Recall that, although in the Canon Law promise and 
contract originated from the same ethical principle, the canonists made a distinction 
between a unilateral promise and promise as a contract (bilateral promises). 
 
(ii) Promise is a future commitment 
 
A promise, in both the ordinary and legal sense, must relate to a performance in the 
future. In the ordinary sense, a promise is generally conceived as “[a] declaration or 
assurance that one will do something or that a particular thing will happen.”148 This 
suggests that a promise must relate to a future event. As for the legal context, it is 
widely accepted amongst contemporary scholars149 that a promise must relate to a 
future commitment.150 
 
In contrast, a contract need not necessarily relate to the future. Some contracts may 
involve merely a present performance. An example is barter. Traditionally, barter is a 
system of “bilateral simultaneous trades in which the goods are used by each side for 
their own purposes.” 151  The bargaining and the exchange can take place 
                                                 
148  Oxford Dictionaries: Promise, available at 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/promise?q=promise. 
149 Atiyah argues that that it is possible to “promise that a fact is so”, or that the promisor has done 
something. P S Atiyah, “Promises and the Law of Contract” (1979) 88 (351) Mind (New Series) 410 
at 413; However, the common view among philosophers and legal scholars is that a promise must 
relate to some future acts. See Fried, Contract 11, 17; Farnsworth, Contracts 4-5; Kimel, Promise 9; 
Hogg, Promises 22-23;J R Searle, “What is a Speech Act?” in J R Searle (ed), The Philosophy of 
Language (1971) 48; V Peetz, “Promises and Threats” (1977) 86 Mind 578 at 578; Hogg, Promises 
22-23. 
150 For example, Fried writes: “A promise invokes trust in my future actions, not merely in my present 
sincerity”, and “a promise binds into the future, well past the moment when the promise is made.” 
Fried, Contract 11, 17; Farnsworth explains that “a promise is a commitment as to future behaviour.” 
Farnsworth, Contracts 4-5; Kimel states “…through promising a person purports to commit herself in 
a special way to a certain course of future action”. Kimel, Promise 9; Hogg indicates that 
“…statements do not relate to the future they are not promises…” Hogg, Promises 22-23 
151 C Humphrey, “How is Barter Done? The Social Relations of Barter in Provincial Russia”, in P 
Seabright (ed), The Vanishing Rouble Barter Networks and Non-Monetary Transactions in Post-





simultaneously.152 The same idea as traditional barter occurs in other spontaneous 
exchange, including sale. In spontaneous exchanges, the parties’ declarations of 
intention do not involve any future commitment because the transaction takes place 
immediately. The parties’ intention therefore cannot be regarded as being a 
promise. 153  However, the transaction between the parties can be regarded as a 
contract because it is an agreement between two parties, creating an obligation which 
is legally enforceable.154  
  
(c) Concluding remarks 
 
 The main distinction between promise and contract is that the former is a one-sided 
commitment whereas the latter is always a bilateral one. Additionally, promise must 
relate to a future performance whereas contract may merely relate to a present 
transaction. Also, as explained by the canonists and some of the late scholastics, 
promise is unilateral and binding without acceptance. Therefore, the view that 
promises are distinct from contracts is supported in this thesis.  
 
C. NATURE AND REQUIREMENTS OF PROMISE 
 
In order to define promise, one must consider what the nature of, and requirements 
for, promise are. This section makes references to both legal and philosophical 






                                                 
152 C Humphrey & S Hugh-Jones, “Introduction: Barter, Exchange and Value”, in C Humphrey & S 
Hugh-Jones (eds), Barter, Exchange and Value: An Anthropological Approach (1992) 1 at 1. 
153 Hogg offers a different view to the effect that a simultaneous transaction can still be deemed an act 
concerning the future. See Hogg, Promises 217; See also S A Smith, Contract Theory (2004) 62-63, 
176-179. 
154 A spontaneous exchange may not be regarded as a contract in the Anglo-American jurisdictions 
according to the promissory theory of contract since in a spontaneous exchange there is no exchange 





(1) Who can be a promisor and a promisee? 
 
It is usually assumed by philosophers that only humans are able to make promises.155 
However, in legal contexts, not only natural persons, but also legal persons can also 
make a promise.156 Both natural and legal persons can be promisees too.157  
 
(2) A promise must be expressed 
 
The late scholastics debated the issue whether a promise must be expressed. Some 
explained that an intention itself sufficiently confers an obligation (in both contracts 
and promises). For instance, Vitoria explained that a promissory obligation already 
exists as a result of “the virtue of the will”.158 The expression of intention adds 
nothing to the obligation, 159  a mere internal mental process of the promisor 
sufficiently creating a promissory obligation.160 Molina suggested that an expression 
of a promise is not necessary. Although positive law always requires an expression 
of the will, the will of the promisor suffices in creating a natural binding 
obligation.161 In contrast, Lessius suggested that an intention to promise must be 
expressed, external signs being necessary because they “have the effect of making 
the inner volition effective and real. Language does not passively convey the act of 
will…”162 
 
                                                 
155 Atiyah, Promises 151-152. 
156 Atiyah, Ibid; Hogg, Promises 5. 
157 Atiyah, Ibid; Hogg, Ibid. 
158 Francisco de Vitoria, Commentarii in IIamIIae, quaest 88, art 1, num 5, in: Comentarios a la 
Secunda secundae de Santo Tomás, edición preparada por V Beltrán de Heredia, tom 4: De Justitia 
(qq 67-88), [Biblioteca de Teólogos Españoles, 5], Salamanca 1934, 329, (as cited by Decock in 
Decock, Contract 183. 
159 Ibid. 
160 Vitoria made a distinction between the case of simple promises and of contracts on this issue. For 
the case of a contract, he argued that it is necessary to communicate the promisor’s intention. See 
Decock, Contract 183. 
161 Molina did not particularly explain whether a promise must be expressed or not. Rather, his 
treatment directly focused on contractual obligation. However, it may be implied that his treatment in 
this case can also apply to the case of promise. See Decock, Contract 184-186. 






Modern legal systems163 and model rules follow Lessius, rather than that Vitoria and 
Molina. For example, under the DCFR, notice of the promise must reach the 
promisee,164 an approach supported in this thesis. 
 
Broadly speaking, in making a declaration of intention, e.g., an offer165,  withdrawal 
of an offer166, or termination of contract167, the person making such declaration must 
express his/her intention by announcing it or communicating it to the other party. An 
internal expression of will is generally insufficient as a declaration of intention. 
Similarly, a mere internal desire of the promisor to make a promise is inadequate and 
is not considered as a promise.168 Consequently, a promisor must express his/her 
intention in some objectively observable way.169 Fried suggests that “a promise is 
something essentially communicated to someone––to the promisee, in the standard 
case”.170 Therefore, a person cannot promise to himself/herself to do something.171 
According to Fried, “[a] promise to oneself adds nothing to the moral grounds for 
making the contribution absent the promise”.172  
 
(3) The intentions of the promisor 
 
The intention of the promisor is the most important requirement. Lessius argued that 
the binding force of a promise lies in intention.173 Lugo suggested that without the 
promisor’s intention, there is no binding promise.174  
  
                                                 
163 This includes France, Austria, Poland and Czech Republic. See Commentary on the Draft Common 
Frame of Reference 340-342.    
164 DCFR Art II-4:301. 
165 Examples are the DCFR and German law. See Commentary on the Draft Common Frame of 
Reference 292 and Markesinis, German Contract Law 67. 
166 E.g. DCFR, Art II-4:202 (1). 
167 E.g. DCFR, Art III-3:507 (1). 
168 Hogg, Promises 10-11; S A Smith, Contract Theory (2004) 57. 
169 Hogg, Ibid. 
170 Fried, Contract 42. 
171 Trying to make an obligation to oneself would engage the doctrine of confusion (confisio) in Scots 
law. See Stair, Inst 1.18.9; Smith, Short Commentary 844; Gloag, Contract 725-730. 
172 Fried, Contract 42. 
173 Lessius, De iustitia et iure, lib 2, cap 18, dub 1, Mi, 6, at 216 (as cited by Decock in Decock, 
Contract 178). 






(a) The promisor must have a serious intention to bind him/herself 
 
The intention of the promisor to bind him/herself must be sufficiently serious. The 
canonists held that promises should be kept if “seriously” intended.175  This was 
emphasised by the late scholastic jurists (Lessius’ view was noted above176).  The 
seriousness of intention is recognised in modern legal systems177 by reference to 
“intention to be legally bound” 178  or “intention to create legal relations”. 179 
Contemporary contractual theorists also suggest that a promise must be seriously 
intended.180 The promisor must realise the legal consequence of the promise at the 
time he/she promised.181  
 
(b) How to measure seriousness of intention? 
 
An important question is how “serious intention” should be measured. There are two 
rival theories, namely the subjective and objective approaches. 
 
(i) Late scholastics and Natural Law jurists 
 
The late scholastics and Natural Law jurists did not deal with this issue by viewing 
promises as an isolated concept. Rather, their analysis of the subjective and objective 
tests applied to both promissory and contractual obligations. There was no consensus 
amongst these jurists. Some were in favour of the subjective approach, Molina, Lugo 
and Oñate, for instance, arguing that the actual intention of the promisor is the only 
                                                 
175 Decretals, lib I, tit XXXV, cap I, (as cited by Sellar in Sellar, Promise 258). 
176 Lessius, De iustitia et iure, lib 2, cap 18, dub, 8 num 59, at 225, (as cited by Decock in Decock, 
Contract 195). 
177 E.g. §118 of the BGB states: “A declaration of intent not seriously intended which is made in the 
expectation that its lack of serious intention will not be misunderstood, is void.” For an explanation of 
this provision see Markesinis, German Contract Law 87. 
178 E.g. PECL, Art 2:102; DCFR, Art II.-4:302. 
179 English and Scots law are more familiar with this term. For English law see Chitty on Contracts 
paras 2-161-192; McKendrick, Contract Law 271-272. For Scots law see McBryde, Contract 5-02-5-
09; McBryde, “The Intention to Create Legal Relations” (1992) JR 274. In Contract Law in Scotland, 
the phrase “intention to create legal obligations” is used. MacQueen & Thomson, Contract para 2.64.  
180 Fried, Contract 38. 
181 Ibid; See also J Searle, Speech Acts: An Essay in The Philosophy of Language (1969) 50-51; 
Armstrong proposes a similar condition for sincerely promising. See D M Armstrong, “Meaning and 





relevant factor.182 Molina further dealt with the case of doubtful promises, explaining 
that the will of the promisor is the sole determinant of whether a promise is 
obligatory merely as a matter of honesty or also as a matter of justice. 183  The 
subjective approach was supported by Grotius, who argued that, if there is a real 
contradiction between the contracting parties, this makes their previous agreement 
void: “no one can design to make contradictory resolutions at the same time.”184 This 
reflects the fact that Grotius applied the criterion of subjective intention of the parties 
in determining whether there is a binding obligation or not. 
 
However, Lessius disagreed with the sole application of the subjective intentions of 
the parties, arguing that an objective assessment should also be used in interpreting 
whether a promise is morally/legally binding or not.185   In the case of doubtful 
promises, he explained that both onerous and gratuitous promises, which are serious, 
are binding on “pain of mortal sin”.186 An illustration given is where a promisee 
suffers because he/she has mistakenly relied on a promise. Lessius argued that the 
promisor, even if he lacked serious intention, is bound to perform the promise “on 
pain of mortal sin”.187  
 
(ii) Modern legal systems 
 
There is no consensus amongst modern legal systems on the approach to be used for 
determining intention. Some jurisdictions favour the subjective approach. French law 
is well-known for applying the subjective intentions of the parties when determining 
the extent of the intention to be legally bound:188  if a person’s actual intention 
                                                 
182 See Decock, Contract 201-202.  
183 Molina, De iustitia et iure, tom 2 (De contractibus), tract 2, disp 262, col 37, num 2, (as cited by 
Decock in Decock, Contract 202). 
184 Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis II.XVI.IV. He explained this approach by referring to contract, 
rather than unilateral promises. 
185 Lessius, De iustitia et iure, lib 2, cap 18, dub 8, num 55, 224, (as cited by Decock in Decock, 
Contract 201). 
186 Decock, Ibid. 
187 Lessius, De iustitia et iure, lib 2, cap 18, dub 8, num 54, 224, (as cited by Decock in Decock, 
Contract 202). 
188 Commentary on the Draft Common Frame of Reference 277; See also W Barnes, “The French 
Subjective Theory of Contract:  Separating Rhetoric from Reality” (2008) 83 Tulane Law Review 





contrasts with his/her declaration, the former is preferred, if it can be certainly 
established.189 This is compatible with Grotius’ treatment, discussed above. Both 
Grotius’ account and the Code civil hold that a binding obligation must reflect a 
party’s actual intention. The subjective approach is followed by some Civilian 
systems such as Luxembourg190 and Portugal.191 
 
Why does French law adopt an approach which, as argued in this thesis, produces a 
less fair outcome?  The subjective theory was supported by Pothier.192 For example, 
when explaining the formation of a contract of sale between parties which are not 
present, he stated:  
“[i]n order that the consent of the parties may take place,…, it is necessary 
that the will of the party, who makes a proposition in writing, should continue 
until his letters reaches the other party, and until the other party declares his 
acceptance of the proposition.”193 
 
Pothier’s commentaries were important sources for the drafters of the Code civil. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that the French draftsmen preferred a subjective 
approach. Moreover, the will theory played a significant role in nineteenth century 
contract law. The philosophical foundation of contract theory is based on the parties’ 
meeting of minds:194 the parties’ wills are key to formation of a contract. Therefore, 
the fact that French law favours the subjective approach is based on it being in 
accordance with the idea of the will. 
 
                                                 
189 Commentary on the Draft Common Frame of Reference 277. 
190 The Commentary states that the French subjective theory of contract (Terré/Simler/Lequette, Les 
Obligations, no. 93, as cited in Commentary on the Draft Common Frame of Reference 277) also 
applies in Luxembourg. See Ibid. 
191 Portuguese Civil Code, Arts 245 and 246. 
192 For further discussion about Pothier’s preference for the subjective approach see J M Perillo, 
“Robert J Pothier’s Influence on the Common Law of Contract” (2004) 63 Fordham University 
School of Law (Research Paper), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=610601. 
193 R J Pothier, Treatise on the Contract of Sale (Translated from the French by L S Cushing) (1999, 
The Lawbook Exchange edition) Art III, §2. 
194 J M Perillo, “The Origins of the Objective Theory of Contract Formation and Interpretation.” 





However, most European legal systems take the objective approach to determining 
intention,195 including English law196 and Scots law.197 The DCFR also adopts the 
objective approach198 for two reasons. Firstly, it is used by the majority of Member 
States.199 Secondly, even in the jurisdictions where subjectivity is preferred, “the 
party will normally be liable on some other basis for having carelessly misled to the 
other party.”200  
 
(iii) The preferred approach 
 
Objectivity is preferable because it provides a fairer outcome. A promissory 
obligation should be legally enforced when a person to whom a promise is made can 
be reasonably expected to acquire a right from it. If a subjective test is applied, the 
promisor can easily deny his/her obligations. For example, A makes an online 
promise that he will give £100 to any person who finds his lost rabbit. However, he 
does not have any serious intention to make such a reward, even if someone finds the 
rabbit. If a subjective perspective is used to determine the seriousness of his 
intention, A will not be bound by his statement, because it was not subjectively 
intended. Moreover, it would be highly difficult for courts to measure the seriousness 
of subjective intention.   
 
In contrast, if the objective theory is applied, A’s intention is deemed serious if a 
reasonable person would expect that A intended to be legally bound. This approach 
provides a fairer outcome to the promisee. While there might be a few situations 
where a promisee is able to know the promisor’s subjective intention, in general a 
promisee will not know the promisor’s internal hidden intention.  
                                                 
195 Examples include Poland, Slovakia, Spain, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Hungary and Bulgaria. See 
Commentary on the Draft Common Frame of Reference 274-277. 
196 Chitty on Contracts paras 2-161-168; B A Hepple, “Intention to Create Legal Relations” (1970) 
28(1) Cambridge Law Journal 122-137. For case law see Smith v Hughes (1871) LR 6 QB 597, 607. 
197 The objective approach is characteristic of Scots law, particularly Scots contract and promissory 
law in general. See MacQueen & Thomson, Contract 77-80. 
198 DCFR, Art II-4:102. 






(4) A promise is an undertaking to perform something in favour of another 
party 
 
As explained by Grotius, a promise is “an intention to convey a peculiar right to 
another.”201 This means that if someone intends to do something to another person 
but there is no right for the latter to acquire, it is not a promise: there must be some 
liability that will occur if a promisor does not perform. For instance, if A promises B 
that he will take action against B, this is not a promise because A does not intend to 
give any enforceable benefit to B. 
 
If one promises to do something which benefits himself/herself alone, this is not a 
promise, even if he/she seriously intends to do so. 202  Suppose that A makes a 
promise to himself that he will stop drinking alcohol, A’s intention is not a promise 
because it does not benefit any other persons.   
   
(5) A promise must relate to a performance in the future 
 
As earlier discussed, a promise is a commitment to a future performance: a present 
transaction which does not involve any future commitment is not a promise. In 
Grotius’ account, there are three ways of speaking concerning the future, and making 
a promise is one of them.203 Thus, a promise cannot be a statement which only 
confirms a state of affairs or merely involves a present performance such as a 
spontaneous transaction.  
  
(6) Concluding remarks 
 
According to the nature and requirements of promise mentioned above, this thesis 
suggests a definition of a promise as follows: 
                                                 
201 Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis 2.11.4. 
202 Hogg, Promises 23. In non-legal contexts, this kind of statement can be regarded as a vow. See 
Hogg, Promises 23, 39-41. 





A promise is a unilateral commitment, made by one natural or legal person to 
another, demonstrating a serious intention of the former to perform, or not to 




The legal obligation of promise was first recognised by the canonists. They broke 
away from Roman law, where promises, although they might be morally binding, 
were not generally enforceable. The canonist approach of enforcing promises 
influenced the late scholastics and Natural Lawyers, whose works had an important 
influence on modern contract and promissory law. 
 
There has been a complex relationship between promise and contract. In the Canon 
Law, the notions of enforcing promise and contract derived from the same ethical 
principle. In the Natural Law tradition, promise was a core idea explaining 
contractual obligation. It is therefore no surprise that promises and contracts are 
conceived by some philosophers and legal commentators as being similar. However, 
this thesis argues that it is more appropriate to treat a promise as distinct from a 
contract. This is principally based on the unilateral nature of promise. A unilateral 
commitment can be regarded as a promise whereas a contract cannot. Also, both in 
the Canon Law, where the idea of promise and contract originated, and in the late 
scholastics tradition, where contract was explained through a promissory concept, 
distinction existed between a bilateral and unilateral promise. In Roman law a 
promise was defined as a unilateral undertaking, which was distinguished from a 
bilateral agreement. This is despite the fact that generally a unilateral undertaking 
was not binding under the ius civile.  Hence, if we accept the idea that there is an 
obligation which is unilateral and binding without acceptance, it should be treated as 
a unilateral promise, distinct from a bilateral obligation of contract. In addition, 
promise must relate to a future commitment, whereas a contract may relate to either a 
past, present, or future event. Henceforth in this thesis the term “promise” will be 






A Common Ground between Scots Law and Thai Law: Mixed Legal Systems 
 
One reason for choosing to compare Scots and Thai law is that they are mixed 
jurisdictions. This chapter considers their mixed characters, focusing on the reception 
of the Civilian and Common Law traditions as well as its relevance to the law of 
promise in both jurisdictions.  
 
A. GENERAL CONCEPT OF MIXED LEGAL SYSTEMS 
 
Although the concept of mixed legal systems has been increasingly well-known, 
there has yet to be an accepted definition among comparative jurists. 1 The factors 
which have been used to describe a legal system as a mixed jurisdiction differ 
according to which theory one chooses. 2  Nonetheless, these theories could be 
grouped into two main groups of theories. 
 
Firstly, the classical (or traditional/conventional) view of mixed legal systems 
defines mixed jurisdictions by reference to private law systems, which are based on 
the Common and Civil Law. 3 Only a number of jurisdictions, including Scotland, 
fall within this category.4 The criticism has been made that this view is too narrow 
and restricted in that it considers only the interaction between the Civilian and 
Common Law traditions.5 Such criticism has led to another theory which considers 
mixed jurisdictions in a wider sense. 
 
                                                 
1  Examples of definitions of mixed jurisdictions can be found in F P Walton, The Scope and 
Interpretation of the Civil Code (1907, reprinted 1980) 1; Evans-Jones, Receptions of Law 228; J 
McKnight, “Some Historical Observation on Mixed Systems of Law” (1977) 22 JR 177 at 177; TB 
Smith, “The Preservation of the Civilian Tradition in "Mixed Jurisdictions"”, in A N Yiannolopoulos 
(ed), Civil Law in the Modern World (1965) 1-5; P Glenn, On Common Laws (2005) 119; Örücü, 
Mixed Legal System 54. 
2 B Andò, “"As Slippery as an Eel"? Comparative Law and Polyjural Systems”, in V V Palmer et al 
(eds), Mixed Legal Systems, East and West (2015) 3 at 6. 
3 Palmer, Mixed Legal Systems 26. See also V V Palmer (ed), Mixed Jurisdictions Worldwide, The 
Third Legal Family, 2nd edn (2012) 7-8 
4 The list of these jurisdictions can be found in J Du Plessis, “Comparative Law and the Study of 
Mixed Legal System”, in M Reimann and R Zimmermann, The Oxford Handbook of Comparative 
Law (2006) 477 at 484; See also Palmer, Ibid at 5-6. 





Secondly, some offer a wider conception of mixed jurisdictions in the so-called 
“pluralist theory”.6 There is only one requirement for being regarded as a mixed legal 
system: “the presence or interaction of two or more kinds of laws or legal traditions 
within the same system…”7 Thus, any interactions of the laws of a different type of 
source are sufficient for them to be considered as mixed jurisdictions.8 
 
The more flexible approach of the pluralist theory is preferred. There are other types 
of legal systems which are distinct and neither fit within the scope of the Civil nor 
Common Law such as Muslim law9 and customary law.10 The concept of “mixed” 
legal system should not be limited merely to those mixed systems which are based 
upon the two major systems. Additionally, considering such mixed legal systems 
within a more flexible approach would promote the idea of mixed legal systems. If 
the pluralist theory is adopted, the number of mixed jurisdictions will be significantly 
increased.11 For example, Japan, where private law is codified, is not regarded as a 
mixed system in the classical theory. However, according to the pluralist theory, it 
could be regarded as a mixed system of the Civil Law and customary law.12 As for 
Thailand, as the later discussion will indicate, it can be regarded as a mixed system 
both in the classical and the pluralist theories. Nonetheless, it is argued in this thesis 
that the pluralist theory is more accurate in explaining the mixed nature of Thai law 
because there are three legal traditions which are constituent parts of the Thai legal 
system, namely the Civil Law, the Common Law and traditional law. 
 
                                                 
6  See Tetley, Mixed Jurisdictions 699-700; Örücü, Mixed Legal System 68, 55, 54, 75; R 
Zimmermann, Roman Law, Contemporary Law, European Law: The Civilian Tradition Today (2001) 
159. 
7 Palmer, Mixed Legal Systems 35.  
8 See Ibid at 36. 
9 JuriGlobe- World Legal System Research Group, Muslim Law Systems And Mixed Systems With a 
Muslim Law Tradition, available at http://www.juriglobe.ca/eng/sys-juri/class-poli/droit-
musulman.php. 
10 JuriGlobe- World Legal System Research Group, Customary Law Systems And Mixed Systems With 
a Customary Law Tradition, available at http://www.juriglobe.ca/eng/sys-juri/class-poli/droit-
coutumier.php. 
11 Palmer concludes that these two rival theories are compatible. See Palmer, Mixed Legal Systems 26, 
47-48. 
12 JuriGlobe- World Legal System Research Group, World Legal System, Civil Law Systems and 






B. SCOTS LAW: A CLASSICAL MIXED LEGAL SYSTEM 
 
(1) Reception of the Civil Law and the Common Law in Scotland 
 
Scots law has traditionally been conceived of as a mixture between the Civil and 
Common Law.13 It is debatable as to when Roman law and English law were first 
received into Scots law, leading to the question when Scots law actually became 
mixed. 14  However, the foregoing question is not directly relevant to the study 
undertaken in this thesis because Scots promissory law neither came from Roman 
nor English law. Nonetheless, it is still helpful to include the discussion of the 
receptions of Roman/Civil law and English law in Scots law. It may provide an 
answer as to whether or not there is (or was) anything of relevance in the reception of 
Roman and English law for the historical development of promise in Scots law.   
 
(a) Reception of the Civil Law 
 
It is important to note that it is not the intention of this chapter to assess which 
proposition regarding the first century that Roman law came to Scotland is correct, 
but to consider all the centuries proposed by legal historians, and assess any 
relevance between Roman law and the Scots law of promise in each proposed 
century. 
 
There has been no consensus among legal historians in relation to the starting date of 
the reception of Roman law in Scotland. It was some time between the thirteenth and 
the seventeenth century. Gordon suggests that the oldest evidence of Roman law in 
Scotland shows that Roman law first came to Scots lawyers through the Canon Law15 
                                                 
13 For example, Evans-Jones describes the Scottish legal system as presenting characteristics of both 
the Civilian and the Common Law traditions. Evans-Jones, Receptions of Law 228; For an analysis of 
the mixed nature of Scots law in terms of language, legal education and legal literature, see Farran, Is 
the Tartan Fading? 18-24. 
14 For an analysis on this point see W D H Sellar, “Scots Law: Mixed from The Very Beginning? A 
Tale of Two Receptions” 2000 4(1) EdinLR 3. 
15 It is important to note that the Canon Law is not entirely different from Roman law. Although some 
of the legal principles of the Canon Law are similar to those of Roman law, it is clear that the canonist 





in the thirteenth century.16  Cairns states that Roman law had some influence on 
Scots law as early as the fourteenth century.17 This view is also shared by Neilson.18 
During the fifteenth century, the reception of Roman law took place in Scotland, 
inter alia, through the French influence. This proposition is suggested by Walker.19 
The reception of Roman law through the French influence shows how Scots law 
resembled the legal systems of Continental Europe. 20 Furthermore, Scots lawyers 
were educated and trained at leading universities in France and some other 
continental European countries. 21  They then returned to Scotland with Civilian 
ideas.22   
 
Although Scots law did not derive its promissory law from Roman sources, this does 
not necessarily mean that Roman law did not have any impact on the law of promise 
between these three centuries. As will be fully discussed, the Canon Law took 
jurisdiction over promises backed by an oath, leaving other ordinary promises to be 
governed by civil law. Moreover, the earliest evidence of a Scottish court enforcing a 
promise was in 1551.23 Therefore, in Scotland such ordinary promises seem not to 
have been enforced before the mid sixteenth century. Therefore, the Roman position 
might have influenced the area of promissory law between the thirteenth and fifteen 




                                                 
16 W M Gordon, “Roman Law in Scotland”, in Evans-Jones, Civil Law in Scotland 13-40; W M 
Gordon, “A Comparison of the Influence of Roman Law in England and Scotland”, in D L C Miller 
and R Zimmermann (eds), The Civilian Tradition and Scots Law: Aberdeen Quincentenary Essays 
(1997) 309 at 313-314. 
17 J W Cairns, “Historical Introduction”, in K Reid & R Zimmermann (eds), A History of Private Law 
in Scotland (Vol 1, Introduction and property) (2000) 14 at 44-47. 
18 G Neilson and H Paton (eds), Acta Dominorum Concilii, ii, 1496-1501 (1918) at lxxvi (discussed in 
Sellar (n 14) 12 [at note 52]). 
19 D M Walker, A Legal History of Scotland / Vol. 3, The Sixteenth Century (1995) 827. 
20 Tetley, Mixed Jurisdictions 689. See also W M Gordon, Roman Law, Scots Law and Legal History: 
Selected Essays (2007) 304-305. 
21 Tetley, Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
23 E.g. Drummond v Bisset (1551) Mor 12381; Regiam Majestatem (Lord Cooper (ed) (1947), Chap 
28; Hope’s Major Practicks (J A Clyde (ed) (1937-1938) 89, (as discussed by McBryde in McBryde, 





Sellar proposes the sixteenth century,24  whereas TB Smith25 and Birks26 point to the 
seventeenth century as the period when Roman law was first received into Scotland. 
During these two centuries, the relevance of the Civilian tradition on the 
development of promise may be observed from the standpoint of attempts at 
codification. There were a number of such attempts at codification, but they were not 
successful. 27  The last attempt was made in 1649 when Stair was one of the 
Commissions for Revising the Law (the 1649 Commission).28  These attempts at 
codification suggest that there had been an increase of Civilian influence during 
these two centuries.29 Although it cannot be precisely predicted what a successful 
Scottish Code would have been like, it is likely that a promissory obligation would 
have been recognised under the completed Code. The 1649 Commission was 
appointed to 
“reveise and considder all the Lawes statuts and acts of parliament of this 
kingdome made & inacted at anie tym bygaine alsweill printed as not printed 
and als to consider all the consuetudes and practises of the kingdome q[uhi]lk 
hav had the force of law and q[uhi]lk hav beine recalled as practiks…”30 
 
As will be discussed in Chapter III, the Canon Law and the ius commune were 
important sources of promise which Stair relied on. Moreover, the Scottish courts 
enforced promissory obligations even before Stair’s period.31 Given that Stair was a 
member of the 1649 Commission, the general concept of obligations under the Code 
drafted by this commission would have been similar to that of Stair’s Institutions. 
Therefore, if the codification had succeeded, the recognition of promise in Scots law 
would have been clearer before Stair published his Institutions in 1681. The 
                                                 
24 See Sellar (n 14) 15-16. 
25 See Smith, Short Commentary 23. 
26 See P Birks, “The Foundation of Legal Rationality in Scotland”, in Evans-Jones (ed), The Civil Law 
in Scotland 81-99; P Birks, “More Logic and Less Experience: The Difference Between Scots Law 
and English Law”, in Evans-Jones, Civil Law in Scotland 167-190. 
27 See J I Smith, “The Transition to the Modern Law 1532-1600”, in An Introduction to Scottish Legal 
History 25 at 31; J W Cairns, “Historical Introduction”, in K Reid and R Zimmermann (eds), A 
History of Private Law in Scotland (2000) 14 at 66-67. 
28 J I Smith, Ibid. 
29 France also attempted to codify its laws during the sixteenth century, but the attempts were not 
successful.  See J P Dawson, “The Codification of the French Customs” (1940) 38(6) Michigan Law 
Review 765. 
30 Warrants of Parliament, Commissione for Reviseing the Lawes 15 March 1649, NAS PA6/9 at 15 
March 1649. 





application of the law of promise by the Scottish courts might have been more 
frequent than it is today, given that the courts in a codified system would commonly 
rely on legal principles under the Code, rather than other legal sources such as the 
doctrine of precedent. In short, the failure of codification may not have had any 
direct impact on the course of the development of promise in Scots law. However, a 
successful codification could have strengthened the notion of promissory obligation. 
 
In the eighteenth century the influence of Roman law declined because, inter alia, the 
Court of Session developed its own jurisprudence.32 Also, Institutional writers had 
commented on Scots law to the point where reference to Continental jurisprudence 
and doctrine became less and less necessary.33 In contrast, the influence of English 
law in Scots law increased in this century, as discussed below. 
 
(b) Reception of English law 
 
The period when the reception of English law in Scotland took place is debatable. 
The common view is that Scots law had been initially influenced by the Civil Law 
before it was influenced by English Law.34 English law was adopted in Scotland 
because of both a strong legal culture and political factors.35 The competing view 
argues that Scots law was open to the influence of English law from an early stage.36 
However, the period when English law was first received into Scotland is not directly 




                                                 
32 Tetley, Mixed Jurisdictions 690. 
33  Tetley, Ibid. This is further discussed in Chapter V, A. THEORIES AND DOCTRINES 
RELATING TO PROMISE IN SCOTS LAW, (2) Promissory theory as explained by Institutional and 
contemporary writers, (b) Later Institutional writers. 
34  This theory is supported by Evans-Jones and Tetley. See R Evans-Jones, “Mixed Legal System, 
Scotland and the Unification of Private Law in Europe”, in J Smits (ed), The Contribution of Mixed 
Legal Systems to European Private Law (2001) 39; Tetley, Mixed Jurisdictions 688-692. 
35 A Rodger, “Thinking about Scots Law” (1996) 1 EdinLR 3 at 18. 
36 This view is supported by MacQueen and Sellar. See H L MacQueen, “Scots Law”, in J Smits (ed), 
Elgar Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, 2nd edn (2012) 789 at 789; H L MacQueen and W D H 
Sellar, “Unjust Enrichment in Scots Law”, in E J H Schrage (ed), Unjust Enrichment: The 





Nonetheless, the same point about the relevance of the relation between codification 
and the development of promise can be considered in the context in the reception of 
English law too. There were attempts at unifying Scots and English law as a result of 
the Union of the Crowns in 1603. 37  The unification of the Anglo-Scottish legal 
project was originally proposed by King James VI and I, who enthusiastically wished 
for a unified law of Great Britain, among other unifications. 38  This attempt 
encountered several problems and eventually it was not successful. 39  TB Smith 
pointed out that the attempt to unify Scots and English law was flawed from the 
beginning.40 The King simply assumed that a unified law of Scotland and England 
could have been easily achieved by “blending abstracts” of the law of the two 
jurisdictions into one common law.41 
 
What is relevant to the discussion here is that if the unification of Scots and English 
law had succeeded, it would have potentially altered the course of the development 
of promise in Scots law. It is more likely that English law would have been 
preferable as a basis for the law of the Union. When a common law between two or 
more jurisdictions is created, the more powerful system would naturally have a larger 
role to play. As TB Smith observed, “[i]n a "British" context there has seldom been 
consideration whether Scots law provided a better solution on the merits than did the 
English law.”42 Since English law does not enforce unilateral promise, it is unlikely 
that promissory obligation would have been accepted by English lawyers as a general 
obligation within a unified English and Scots law. 
 
The assumption that the Scots promissory doctrine is not likely to be accepted by 
English lawyers may be observed from English lawyers’ attitudes towards the 
concept of third party rights. English lawyers were struggling for decades with the 
                                                 
37 See Smith, British Justice; Wijffels, British Ius Commune; B P Levack, “The Proposed Union of 
English Law and Scots Law in the Seventeenth Century” (1975) 20 JR 97; B P Levack, “English Law, 
Scots Law and the Union, 1603-1707”, in A Harding (ed), Law-making and Law-makers in British 
History (1977) 103. 
38 Smith, British Justice 158; Levack, Ibid at 97. 
39 For an overview about the problem of the attempt to unify British law see Levack, Ibid esp at 99-
101. 
40 A Wijffels, British Ius Commune 322. 
41 Smith, British Justice 161. 





concept of third party rights.43 It was not until 1999 that English law enforced the 
right of a third party who had not given consideration to the main contract as a result 
of the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999. 44  If English lawyers were 
preparing to accept Scots law, they could have looked north of the border to Scotland 
as a model. Then they would have discovered that jus quaesitum tertio (JQT), 
traditionally seen as promissory in nature, had been operating functionally for over 
300 years. However, that never happened. Under the 1999 Act, a third party right is, 
of course, seen as contractual in nature. The case of third party rights may reflect an 
attitude of English lawyers towards Scots law in general. Scots law would not be 
preferred by English lawyers if it is fundamentally in conflict with English law.  
 
The assumption that English law is likely to be preferred may also be observed when 
considering this issue from an historical perspective. When the law of the British 
Empire was introduced into native countries, it was always English law that was 
imposed even if Scots law was another legal system that existed under the Empire.45 
As observed by Latham, “…the law that followed citizens of the united realm to 
colonies subsequently founded was invariably the law of England. There is nothing 
in the Acts of Union or elsewhere expressly prescribing this.”46 
 
In the eighteenth century, there was an increasing English legal influence in Scots 
law,47 especially commercial law.48  This is because commerce in Scotland faced 
many new problems for which Scots law could not provide a solution but for which 
English law could.49 The doctrine of precedent was increasingly accepted because of 
                                                 
43 For an overview of the reform of third party rights under English law see Treitel The Law of 
Contract para 14-002. See also para 14-016 for the discussion regarding the development of the 
doctrine. 
44 See Chitty on Contracts para 18-002. 
45 N R Whitty, “"A Token of Independence": Debates on the History and Development of Scots Law”, 
in H L MacQeen et al (eds), Regional Private Laws and Codifications in Europe (2007) 60 at 61. For 
further discussion why Scots law was never introduced into the British colonies see Mr Justice B H 
McPherson “Scots Law in the Colonies” (1995) JR 191. 
46 R T E Latham, The Law and The Commonwealth (1949) 517. 
47 Tetley, Mixed Jurisdictions 690. 
48 It is observed later in this thesis that a possible reason why Institutional writers after Stair did not 
pay much attention in explaining the law of promise is an increase of English influence on Scots law 
during their times. See Chapter V, A. THEORIES AND DOCTRINES RELATING TO PROMISE IN 
SCOTS LAW, (2) Promissory theory as explained by Institutional and contemporary writers. 





the influence of the House of Lords. 50 Scots jurists looked to English case law as 
well as English legal literature.51 As the later discussion will show, it is observed in 
this thesis that a possible reason why Institutional writers after Stair did not pay 
attention in analysing the law of promise is because of an increase in the English 
influence on Scots law at that time.52 Also, as a result of the English influence, the 
Scottish courts tended to follow the English approach by characterising transactions 
using a contractual analysis, even though these could be viewed as being promissory 
in nature. This reflects the increase of the English influence on Scots promissory law. 
 
To conclude, Scots promissory law was not influenced by English law in relation to 
the origin of the doctrine.. The English influence on Scots promissory law occurred 
later. Therefore, the English influence did not affect the underlying basis of Scots 
promissory law as a unilateral obligation because the doctrine was established before 
the English influence occurred. Rather, it affected the attitudes of Scottish writers as 
well as the Scottish courts towards the application of promissory law.  
 
(2) Other legal influences on the Scottish legal system  
 
The Civil and Common Law are not the only legal influences which have had an 
effect on the development of Scots law. Another important legal influence is the 
Canon Law.  As discussed, the canonists were the first who enforced unilateral 
promises. What relevant to the discussion here is that the Canon Law, as a legal 
source, supports the pluralist theory of mixed legal systems. This theory gives us a 
greater understanding of the mixed characteristics of Scots law as a whole. It 
explains that the Civil and Common Law are not the only elements which are 
constituent parts of the Scottish legal tradition, but there are also other traditions such 
as the Canon Law. It offers a more precise analysis of the actual sources of the area 
of the law of promise.  
 
                                                 
50 G C H Paton, “The Eighteenth Century and Later”, in An Introduction to Scottish Legal History 
(1958) 54. 
51 Tetley, Mixed Jurisdictions 691; Farran, Is the Tartan Fading? 16. 
52 See Chapter V, A. THEORIES AND DOCTRINES RELATING TO PROMISE IN SCOTS LAW, 





C. THAILAND: A NEWLY DISCOVERED MIXED LEGAL SYSTEM? 
 
The development of the Thai legal system can be divided into two main periods, 
namely the pre-modern law and the modern law.53 The distinction between them 
derives from the reformation of the modern Thai legal system.54 The pre-modern 
Thai law does not relate to the discussion in this chapter because the law in this 
period has had no effect on promissory law under the Thai Code.55  
 
(1) Reformation of modern Thai law  
 
The reformation leading to the modern Thai legal system has its origins in the 
nineteenth century, during the colonial period. Thailand is the only country in South 
East Asia which was never colonised. Yet, in order to remain independent, Thailand 
was forced to sign some disadvantageous treaties with western countries e.g. the 
Bowring Treaty56 with Great Britain.57 Thailand realised that the Thai legal system 
required reform because Thailand was considered to be an undeveloped legal 
system.58 For example, under European law59 persons are equal before the law, and 
are equally protected by law.60 In contrast, under the old Thai law the system of 
slavery existed and persons were accorded differential treatment on the basis of their 




                                                 
53 Boonchalermvipast, Thai Legal History 50-55. 
54 A summary of pre-modern Thai law can be found in F C Darling, “The Evolution of Law in 
Thailand” (1970) 32:2 Review of Politics 197-202; Kasemsup, Reception of Law 268-276. 
55 Thai private law prior to the existence of the Code had only some basic principles about property 
and obligations. It did not recognise promissory obligations. For further discussion see Chapter IV, A 
CONTRACT AND PROMISE IN OLD THAI LAW. 
56  For a detailed account see BJ Terwiel, “The Bowring Treaty: Imperialism and Indigenous 
Perspective (1991) Journal of the Siam Society 79(2), available at http://www.siamese-
heritage.org/jsspdf/1991/JSS_079_2f_Terwiel_BowringTreaty.pdf. 
57 F B Sayre, “The Passing of Extraterritoriality in Siam” (1928) 22 American Journal of International 
Law 70 at 71. 
58 Boonchalermvipast, Thai Legal History 140. 
59 Kasemsup, Reception of Law 289. 
60 Boonchalermvipast, Thai Legal History 140. 





(2) Reception of foreign laws in Thailand 
 
(a) Reception of English law 
 
As noted, it was merely English law which was introduced to British colonies. This 
is also the case in non-British colonies such as Thailand. Thailand had diplomatic 
and trade relationships with Great Britain. Thailand modernised its legal system by 
borrowing legal principles from Great Britain. Although, officially, this was a matter 
between Thailand and Great Britain, it was merely English law which was received 
into Thai law.  
 
In the Thai language there is no translation into Thai for the term “British”. The 
Thais, both officially and unofficially, use the term “องักฤษ” when referring to both the 
“English” and the “British”. This term (องักฤษ) however literally means England and 
English.62 The British Embassy is officially called “สถานทูตองักฤษ”63 (which literally 
means the English Embassy).64 The people of the United Kingdom are officially 
called “คนองักฤษ”65 (which literally means English people66). These examples may 
reflect the perception of Great Britain and England for Thai people in general. They 
tend to think of Great Britain in the same sense as England, given that even in 
official matters, the terms “British” is used as interchangeably as “English”. Thus, it 
came as no surprise that Thailand did not take Scots law into consideration when 
borrowing legal principles from Great Britain. 
 
English law was received into Thailand during the reign of King Rama V.67 English 
legal doctrines were taught in the Law School of the Ministry of Justice, the first 
                                                 
62 Author’s translation. 
63  GOV.UK, British Embassy Bangkok, available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/world/organisations/british-embassy-bangkok.th. 
64 Author’s translation. 
65  The Royal Institute, หลกัเกณฑ์การทับศพัท์ภาษาอังกฤษ (General System of Transliteration), available at 
http://www.royin.go.th/upload/246/FileUpload/2371_6847.pdf (in Thai). 
66 Author’s translation. 





Thai law school.68 It was established by Prince Rabi, a law graduate of Oxford 
University, who brought the principles of English law into Thai law. Some English 
legal principles were taught in the Law School e.g. the doctrines regarding 
consideration69, bills of exchange70 and trusts.71  
 
English legal principles were adopted in Thailand on a case-by-case basis, rather than 
through the reception of the whole system. 72  The Thai courts initially employed 
English legal principles only if they could not find principles under traditional Thai 
law. 73  However, later when commerce between Thailand and foreign countries 
increased, it was necessary to apply English law to solve commercial disputes. 
Accordingly, if there was no traditional Thai law, the courts would apply English 
law, such as the doctrines regarding wages, estoppel, and trusteeship, directly in the 
cases.74  
 
Although later on Thailand adopted a Code based on the Civil Law model75, English 
law was also used as a source for the drafting of the Code in the areas of 
partnerships, bills of exchange, promissory notes and specific contracts.76 Therefore, 








                                                 
68 Boonchalermvipast, Thai Legal History 199. 
69 H R H Prince Rabi of Rajburi, เลก็เชอร์กฎหมาย (Lectures on Jurisprudence) (1925) 138-140. 
70 Ibid at 18. 
71 Ibid at 158-159. 
72 P Kasemsup, นิติปรัชญา (Philosophy of Law), 3rd edn (1996) 49. 
73 Ibid. 
74 T Kraivixien, “อิทธิพลของกฎหมายองักฤษในระบบกฎหมายไทย” (The influence of English law on the Thai legal 
system) (1974) Vol 1 (2) Chulalongkorn Law Journal 1 at 3-4. 
75 See section (b) Reception of the Civil Law. 





(b) Reception of the Civil Law 
 
After about fifty years of the reception of English law, the Thai government decided 
to create a complete Code of Thai law. 77   In 1908 a Legislative Council was 
appointed to draft the Civil and Commercial Code (the Code). The completed Code, 
Books I and II, drafted by French legal advisors, was promulgated in 1923. 78 
However, it was repealed two years later.79 The 1925 Code also contains two Books, 
but it was drafted along the lines of the Japanese Code, which had been modelled on 
the BGB.80 Later, Book III and Book IV of the Code were promulgated in 1928 and 
1930, and Books V and VI in 1934, respectively.81  The Code was first drafted in 
English and then translated into Thai. Since the draftsmen were foreigners, it was 
believed to be more efficient to draft in English. Some English and French legal 
words were directly translated into Thai e.g. cheque (เช็ค), trust (ทรัสต)์, and aval 
(อาวลั)82. The Code also borrowed legal principles from other Continental European 
countries such as Belgium83, the Netherlands84, France85, Italy86, and Switzerland.87 
                                                 
77 Kasemsup, Reception of Law 293. 
78 Boonchalermvipast, Thai Legal History 235. 
79 Ibid at 236. 
80  The view that the Japanese Code is modelled on the BGB has been commonly accepted by 
comparative jurists. See Watson, “Legal Transplants and Law Reform” (1976) 92 LQR (1976) 79 at 
83; K Zweigert & H Kötz, Introduction to Comparative Law (1998) 298. Also, Thai lawyers generally 
believe that the Japanese Code is based on the BGB e.g. Phraya Manavarajasevi, บนัทึกค าสัมภาษณ์พระยามานว
ราชเสว ี (Transcript of Interview with Phraya Manavarajasevi), Department of Legal Study in Society, 
Philosophy and History, 12 September 1980 at 2-4.  
81 Boonchalermvipast, Thai Legal History 237. 
82 Kraivixien (n 74) 3. 
83 Belgian legal principles were mainly used as sources for the Thai Code in contract of insurance. For 
example, §742, concerning the rights and duties of the transferee of a mortgaged property, was 
borrowed from, among other sources, Art 105of the Belgian Law of 6th December 1841. Index of Civil 
Code 185. 
84 E.g. §742 (dealing with rights and duties of the transferee of a mortgaged property) of the Code is 
inspired, inter alia, by Art 1249 of the Dutch Civil Code. Index of Civil Code 185. 
85 A large number of provisions under the Code are borrowed from French law e.g. §350 (dealing with 
a novation by a change of the debtor) of the Code is inspired, inter alia, by Arts 1274-1277 of the 
Code civil. For further discussion regarding the promissory provisions that were inspired by French 
law see Chapter IV. 
86  A number of provisions under the Code, notably sales, were borrowed from Italian law. For 
example, the definition of sale (§453) was inspired by Art 1447 of the Italian Code. Index of Civil 
Code 165. 
87 A large number of provisions under the Code were borrowed from Swiss law e.g. §§358 (dealing 
with late notice of acceptance) and 361 (dealing with the formation of a contract between persons at a 
distance) of the Code are inspired, inter alia, by Arts 5 and 10 of the Swiss Code of Obligations 





Promissory legal principles borrowed from these Continental European countries are 
explored in Chapter IV. 
 
(c) The reason for change of the model of the Code from French to German law  
 
The reason for the sudden change from a French to a German model was given by 
Phraya Manavarajasevi88, a drafter of the 1925 Code. He recited that France had 
offered to draft the Code for Thailand. As Thailand had a close relationship with 
France, Thailand did not refuse the offer of French help.89  Initially, the French 
drafters proposed a Code containing three Books, like the Code civil. However, the 
process of drafting the Code lasted for several years (1908-1916) without success 
because the draftsmen tried to create an original Code of Thai law, rather than 
modelling the Code on the French system.90  
 
Phraya Manavarajsevi stated that he translated the draft of the 1923 Code from 
English to Thai with difficulty and lack of understanding.91 The translated draft was 
submitted to the King and he did not have a clear understanding of it either.92 
Nevertheless, as France was such a powerful country and Thailand wanted to foster a 
good relationship with France, the King did not complain about the disadvantages of 
the draft.93 The Code was eventually promulgated on 11 November 1923. Judges and 
lawyers indicated that the Code was difficult to understand.94 
 
Accordingly, there was an attempt to revise the 1923 Code. Phraya Manavarajsevi 
suggested that Thailand should use the same approach as Japan in creating the Code 
i.e. modelling it on foreign Codes, rather than creating its own Code as the former 
drafters had done.95 His proposal was adopted, and a new Legislative Council was 
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Manavarajasevi), Department of Legal Study in Society, Philosophy and History, 12 September 1980. 
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appointed. It comprised four drafters, of which three were Thai and one was 
French.96The new Code was drafted on the lines of German law. The BGB was 
chosen because it was a leading Civil Code of the world. However, apart from 
keeping a French drafter in order to keep a good relationship with France, some 
French principles from the 1923 Code were also borrowed.97 Thailand used the same 
method as Japan in drafting the new Code, that is, by borrowing only precise legal 
principles but not ones which seemed to be hard to interpret.98 
 
(d) Effects on the Thai promissory law as a result of the codifications 
 
(i) Effects of the change from the Common Law to the Civilian tradition 
 
The foundations of modern Thai law were based upon English and Civilian legal 
traditions. The fact that Thailand adopted a codified system caused a significant 
change in the historical development of its legal system. It was a change from 
reforming the law on the model of English law to reforming it on the model of the 
Civil Law. The legacy which the Civil Law has left on Thai private law is much 
greater than that of English law as a result of codification. Consequently, the 
structure of Thai private law essentially resembles the Civil Law. For example, there 
are four main types of obligations in Thai private law, namely contract, wrongful act 
(delict), undue enrichment (unjustified enrichment), and management of affairs 
without mandate (negotiorum gestio). 99 This is based on the obligations recognised 
in the Civil Law and Roman law (from which Thai law derives its law of 
obligations).100 The legacy which English law has left on the Thai Code appears in 
the forms of the legal principles involved in some concepts such as bills of exchange 
and specific contracts, as previously noted. 
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Moreover, the shift from the English to the Civil Law model potentially altered the 
course of the development of the law of promise in Thailand. English law had a 
strong influence on modern Thai law at an early stage of the reformation of the Thai 
legal system. Recall that English principles were taught in Thai law schools as well 
as being applied by the Thai courts. This suggests that if Thailand had not codified 
its law, the influence of English law in the Thai legal system would have been much 
stronger than it is today. Thai law is likely to have ended up borrowing the entire set 
of concepts of the English law of obligations and incorporating them into its modern 
law. This would have had the result that Thai private law would not recognise the 
binding force of unilateral promises.   
 
(ii) Effects of the change from French to German models for the Thai Code 
  
The shift of the Thai Code from the French to the German model also changed the 
course of the development of the law on promise under the Code. The 1923 Code 
used the concept of “contract” (similar to French law), whereas the 1925 Code uses 
the concept of “juristic act”101 (similar to German law), as a general principle of 
obligations.102 If the 1923 Code had not been replaced, the idea of a juristic act 
would not have been recognised under Thai law. This would make a difference in 
relation to how promises are regarded under Thai law. Under the wider scope of 
juristic acts, promises can be characterised as unilateral juristic acts which are 
distinct from bilateral juristic acts (or contracts).103 If there were no general idea of 
juristic acts, Thai law would consider a promise as being something which 
constitutes a complete contractual obligation. The Thai approach to promise would 
be more similar to that of French law, in which the scope of recognition of unilateral 
obligations is narrower than that of German law.  For example, Thai law borrowed 
the concept of promise of reward from the BGB. It is a genuine unilateral obligation 
                                                 
101  For further discussion about the concept of juristic acts under Thai law see Chapter V, B. 
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on the basis that it does not require acceptance.104 The Code civil does not recognise 
the concept of promise of reward.105 This is one of the differences between the Code 
civil and the BGB.106 The idea of unilateral obligation was proposed by Siegel who 
attempted to differentiate between the German and French legal traditions, proposing 
that there was a possibility of recognising unilateral promises.107  The notion of a 
promise of reward was adopted by the draftsmen of the BGB.108 Under the BGB, a 
promise of reward is a unilateral act which is binding without acceptance.109 The 
change from the French to the German model of the Thai Code therefore has had a 
significant impact to the development of promise under Thai law. It led Thai law to 
the position that unilateral declarations of will can create obligations. 
  
(3) Traditional Thai law 
 
There are two main reasons for considering traditional Thai law. First, it reflects the 
influence of Buddhism on Thai family law while there is no such influence on the 
law of promise, despite the fact that in Buddhism there is an obligation to keep a 
promise. This makes possible a good comparison with promise in Scots law which, 
historically, originated in Christian beliefs. Second, it supports the approach that 




Utthalum is a Thai legal term which means “unconventional, immoral, ungrateful, or 
against the custom”.111 The concept of Utthalum appeared under the Law of Case 
                                                 
104 This is further discussed in Chapter VI, C. ACCEPTANCE AND REJECTION OF A PROMISE, 
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105 As noted in Chapter I, the French courts enforced a promise of reward. However, it is debateable 
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Admission under the Code of the Three Great Seals.112 Later in the codification of 
the Thai Code, the drafters resolved to derive certain rules of virtue from the Code of 
the Three Great Seals, including the principle of Utthalum.113 This principle prohibits 
a person from raising a case, either civil or criminal case, against his/her own 
ascendants.114 
 
Utthalum was “an internal affair to be solved by family members”.115 Family law is 
considered by traditional Thai law as an “autonomous legal domain” or an 
“autonomous domain of written law”. 116  This norm was based upon “usages, 
customs, morals or even religious teachings”, with which all Thai people were 
familiar and aware of. 117   The concept of Utthalum is influenced by Buddhist 
philosophy. In Buddhism, children are greatly indebted to their parents because 
parents give birth to them as human beings. It is believed that human beings are more 
highly favoured than animals because they have an immediate reason to seek out the 
Dharma,118 whereas the animals cannot. Children are therefore not supposed to be 
ungrateful to their parents. Acting against one’s parents is regarded as an ungrateful 
act. 
 
(b) Duties of children to parents 
 
The Code states: “Children are bound to maintain their parents”.119 Like the concept 
of Utthalum, this rule is inspired by the Buddhist thought that children are indebted 
to their parents. They are morally bound to maintain their parents to repay their 
favours. Children who fail to do so would be considered as ungrateful persons in a 
Buddhist context. 
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(c) The influence of Buddhism on Thai family law in comparison with the law of 
promise 
 
There is a Buddhist moral principle relating to promise, the so-called Sacca. Sacca 
means “truthfulness, keeping to one’s words without breaking promises”.120 Sacca 
does not merely mean speaking truthfully “but fulfilling one’s engagement or 
keeping one’s word, assurance or promise even at the point of death”. 121  The 
Buddhist Sacca shows similarities to an obligation to keep a promise in Christianity.  
 
However, the role of promise in Buddhism on the effect of promise in Thai law is 
different from that of Christian influence on Scots law. In Thailand, where nearly 95 
per cent of population is Buddhist122, there are a number of legal rules regarding 
promise. Those provisions, however, did not derive from Buddhist principles or from 
traditional Thai law. Instead, they are borrowed from European legal principles, as 
the later discussion will indicate.123 In contrast, the binding force of promise in the 
Canon Law has its origin in Christian beliefs. Recall that the church taught that there 
should be no distinction between God’s promises and men’s promises. Hence, there 
should be no difference between oaths and simple promises for Christians either.124  
 
The reason why under Thai law Buddhism does not play any role in the law of 
promise can be explained by considering the role of Buddhism in society. Buddhist 
principles are not seriously regarded as either social rules or law. The Buddha taught 
that individuals should have their own choice to choose religion freely because 
“religion is not a law, but a disciplinary code”.125 People thus should follow it of 
                                                 
120 E Perera available at http://lankarama.com.au/NewSite/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/Lankarama-
Dhamma-School-Text-Class-4-Part-B.pdf. 
121 S Katre, A Comparative Study of the Ten Perfections, PhD Thesis, University of Pune (2010) 157, 
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their own free will, rather than as a result of being forced because “true religious 
principles are neither a divine law nor a human law, but a natural law”.126  
 
Nonetheless, in Thailand Buddhism is not entirely distinguished from law. Some 
Buddhist philosophical concepts have become, or been mixed with, various Thai 
customs and traditional Thai beliefs. Then they have been adopted as domestic law. 
This can be found from the cases of Utthalum and children’s duties to maintain their 
parents, discussed above. 
 
To conclude, the examples of Utthalum and duties of children to parents reflect the 
fact that Buddhist beliefs have a significant influence on modern Thai law because 
they became or were mixed with traditional Thai beliefs. In contrast, the Buddhist 
obligation to keep promises never became a traditional Thai belief. It therefore does 
not have any role to play in modern Thai law. This illustrates that religious beliefs 
only survive in modern Thai private law through traditional Thai beliefs/customs.  
 
(4) Thailand as a mixed legal system? 
 
In Thailand, the concept of mixed legal systems is not well-known. Generally, Thai 
law students are taught that there are two main legal systems in the world127, namely 
Civil Law128 and Common Law systems.129  Other legal systems such as Socialist 
and Muslim laws are only mentioned briefly.130 Although it is taught that the Thai 
legal system has been influenced by both the Civil Law and English law, mixed legal 
systems are not recognised under Thai legal education.131 The main criterion which 
has been used to distinguish between the Civil and Common Law is that a country in 
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which the laws are codified is a Civil Law system.132 A country in which the doctrine 
of precedent is used as the main source of law is regarded as a Common Law. 
Among Thai academics, therefore, the Thai legal system is categorised as a Civil 
Law country.133  
 
Under the legal system classification of the University of Ottawa, Thailand is 
grouped in Civil Law monosystems.134 However, Du Plessis comments that there are 
some systems which also contain mixes of the Civil Law and the Common Law, but 
have not been described as mixed, for example, Cyprus, Malta, Iran, as well as 
Thailand.135 Additionally, some foreign comparative jurists suggest that Thailand 
could be regarded as a mixed legal system on the basis that its legal principles were 
influenced both by the Civilian and Common Law traditions. For example, Palmer 
concludes that the term “mixed” should not be construed restrictively, as certain 
authors have done. 136 Thus, Thailand is categorised as a mixed system of the Civil 
Law and the Common Law.137 Örücü has a slightly different approach in explaining 
the mixed nature of Thai law. She138 describes the Thai legal system as a real mixture 
of sources from foreign countries, and doctrines from Thai customary laws 
(indigenous culture and Hindu jurisprudence) are still found in modern Thai law.139 
Hence, Thailand is regarded as a mixed jurisdiction:  the blend of the Civil Law, the 
Common Law and customary law.140  
 
The author supports the view that Thailand can be regarded as a mixed jurisdiction. 
The study in this chapter has shown that the Civil and Common Law traditions, as 
well as traditional Thai law, are all constituent parts of the modern Thai legal system. 
Therefore, the mixed nature of Thai private law is more accurately explained using 
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the pluralist theory of mixed legal systems. The influence from the Civil Law is 
stronger than the other two legal traditions as a result of the codification. However, a 
Common Law element was also a contributor to modern Thai law. Although its 
influence declined because of codification in Thailand, English law was used as a 
point of reference in drafting the Code. Finally, traditional Thai law, which had its 
roots in Buddhist beliefs, still exists in family law. Consequently, according to the 
pluralist theory, Thailand can be sufficiently regarded as a mixed legal system on the 
basis that its modern legal system has its origins in three sources.  
 
One purpose of comparative law is that it seeks “to place comparable elements of 
two or more legal systems up against each other in order to learn about the relevant 
differences and similarities between them.”141 Therefore, the fact that Thailand is a 
mixed jurisdiction gives this thesis an opportunity to discover the salient differences 
and similarities between Scots and Thai law. There have been a number of 
comparative researches on the relation between Scots law and other mixed legal 
systems such as South Africa142 and Louisiana.143 Although Thailand is a newly 
discovered mixed jurisdiction, it shares some commonalities with Scotland, to be 
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D. SALIENT SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SCOTS LAW 
AND THAI LAWS  
 
It is helpful to summarise salient similarities and differences between Scots and Thai 
law and their relevance to the comparative study of this thesis. This would provide us 
an understanding about the important bases of Scots and Thai legal systems which 
have been discovered in this chapter. In addition, it provides some signposts which 
would potentially benefit the comparative studies in later chapters. 
 
(1) Similarities between Scots law and Thai law and their relevance to the study 
of the law of promise 
 
Although promise is not a main source of obligation, Thai law recognises certain 
types of genuine unilateral obligations such as promises of reward, promises of sale 
and promise of a gift as a result of the German influence. The idea that a declaration 
of wills can unilaterally create an obligation is therefore not completely unfamiliar in 
Thai law. These points suggest that, for example, if Thai law were to adopt the same 
approach as Scots law in recognising promise as a separate obligation from contract, 
there would not be much difficulty in adopting the new approach. 
 
This situation may usefully be compared with the jurisdictions that are not familiar 
with the notion that declaration of wills can unilaterally create an obligation. Suppose 
that English law were to recognise unilateral promises as standalone obligations, the 
new approach would be fundamentally in conflict with the concept of contract that 
exists under English law. The conflict occurs because the structure of obligations 
under English law is fundamentally different from that of Roman/Civil Law. 
Particularly, English law has traditionally explained contract as an exchange of two 
promises145, and a unilateral promise is not generally binding.146 
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(2) Differences between Scots law and Thai law and their relevance to the study 
of the law of promise 
 
While the similarity could benefit comparative study between these two jurisdictions 
for the reasons mentioned above, their differences may also be a disadvantage for the 
study. One obvious difference between the two studied systems is the role that 
religious beliefs play in the law of promise of each system. Historically, promise in 
Scots law was influenced by Christian belief through the Canon Law, whereas 
Buddhist beliefs did not have any significant impact on the Thai law of promise.  
 
Nonetheless, the difference mentioned above is not likely to disadvantage the study 
of promise in these two systems. Instead, the fact that religious beliefs have no role 
to play in Thai promissory law gives Thailand a flexibility in borrowing promissory 
legal concepts from other jurisdictions. This would be different from the cases of 
legal concepts which were derived from Buddhist ideas. For instance, suppose that 
there was a proposition that the legal principle that children are bound to maintain 
their parents should be abolished, on the grounds that it is disadvantageous to 
children and is not compatible with the law in other developed countries. This 
proposition would be negatively responded to by conservative Thai lawyers based on 
the argument that Buddhist beliefs and traditional Thai customs are constituents of 
this legal concept. However, if there was a proposal to amend the law of promise, for 
example, to follow English law in holding that unilateral promises are not legally 
binding, the acceptance or rejection of this proposal would not depend on the fact 
that it contradicts Buddhist beliefs or that it does not do so. The Buddhist concept of 














At first glance, the legal systems of Thailand and Scotland seem to be different from 
each other: the former is codified whereas the latter is not. Nonetheless, within the 
framework of the concept of mixed jurisdictions, both of them could be considered 
as mixed legal systems, despite their differences in terms of the degree of mixture. 
 
There is no doubt that Scots law is a mixed legal system. The study in this chapter 
has shown that there are influences other than the Civilian and Common Law 
traditions which have left a legacy in Scottish legal history. One example is the 
Canon Law, which plays a significant role in the historical development of the notion 
promise. Therefore, the pluralist theory of mixed systems enhances the study of the 
law of promise more than the classical one. The mixed nature of whole areas of Scots 
private law cannot accurately be explained by the classical theory because it neglects 
to consider the influence of the Canon Law in the area of promissory law. Under the 
pluralist theory, one can understand that there are at least three legal traditions, 
namely the Civil Law, the Common Law and the Canon Law, which are constituent 
parts of the Scottish legal system.  
 
Similarly, by considering the history of Thai law, this thesis agrees with the view that 
the Thai legal system is a mixture (to a degree) because it  has been influenced both 
by the Civil Law and the Common Law, as well as traditional Thai law. The mixed 
characteristics of Thai and Scots law are therefore similar in the sense there is an 
interaction of more than two kinds of legal traditions within these two jurisdictions. 
 
Another similarity between Thai law and Scots law relates to the reception of 
commercial law from England. Thailand received the principles of English 
commercial law because it wished to trade with England. English principles were 
necessary to solve commercial disputes since there were no equivalent commercial 
principles under Thai law at that time. This also happened to Scotland. English 






In short, this chapter has proved that both Scotland and Thailand are clearly to be 
regarded as mixed jurisdictions. The pluralist theory is more accurate in describing 
the mixedness of Scots law and Thai law on the grounds that there are legal traditions 
other than the Civil Law and the Common Law which are constituent parts of both 
these systems. The fact that the underlying basis of the doctrines of obligation in the 
studied systems is similar (to a certain degree) suggests that there is a possibility for 






History of Promise in Scots Law 
 
This chapter explores the history of promise in Scots law in order to understand how 
the doctrine has been developed in this jurisdiction. As the historical origins of the 
Scots doctrine of promise lie outwith Scots law, this chapter makes references to the 
Canon Law and the ius commune.  
 
A. STAIR AND THE DOCTRINE OF PROMISE 
 
 Scots law followed Stair’s approach that promise and contract are different concepts.  
Promises were treated as different from pollicitation or offer and from paction or 
contract. 1 There is a debate regarding the meaning of the term “pollicitation” used by 
Stair- whether it was the Roman pollicitatio, or an absolute promise, or an offer.2 
This chapter, however, does not discuss this debate. Whether the term “pollicitation” 
was referring to a promise or an offer, it does not change the fact that Stair treated 
promises as distinct from offers and contracts. 
 
Two important sources, inter alia3, which Stair consulted for his promissory account 
are the Canon Law and the ius commune.  
 
(1) Canon Law  
 
Stair regarded unilateral obligations as being under the influence of the canonical 
obligation to keep one’s word. He referred to passages in the Bible in support of the 
idea that unilateral promise is enforceable. 4  He stated: “every paction produceth 
action”.5 This was devoted to the canonical rule et omne verbum de ore fideli cadit in 
                                                 
1 Stair, Inst 1.10.4. 
2 In the first edition (1681) of Stair’s Institutions the phrase appears as “promise, pollicitation, or 
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debitum. He explained that there was a non-application of the Roman nuda pacta to 
the Canon Law. These pieces of evidence show that Stair derived the promissory 
doctrine from the Canon Law. However, Stair did not cite any source when referring 
to the Canon Law in relation to his attitude to promise. Hogg suggests that the 
reference to the Canon Law was not necessary because Stair may have thought that 
his readers would have been familiar with an obligation to keep one’s word under the 
Canon Law already.6 
 
Nevertheless, it does not mean that it is uncertain whether unilateral promises were 
enforceable under the Canon Law. As discussed in Chapter I, it is clear that unilateral 
promises were enforceable under the ecclesiastical jurisdictions. As the Decretum put 
it, “[t]here ought to be no falsehood in our words”7 Accordingly, formless promises 
(both unilateral and bilateral ones) were binding within the ecclesiastical jurisdiction. 
Therefore, Gratian’s Decretum, dealing with the binding force of promises (e.g. C 22 
q 5 c 12), and later commentaries which followed the Decretum8 are believed to be 
particular sources in the Canon Law which Stair relied on. 
 
Moreover, this can be explained by considering legal sources that Stair would have 
been familiar with. Stair was influenced both by the Spanish scholastics and the other 
members of the Northern Natural Law School such as Molina9 and Grotius.10 As 
noted, during the sixteenth century, promise was treated as playing a central role in 
obligations by the late scholastics. Then it was followed by later Natural Law jurists 
in the seventeenth century. 11  These jurists were also inspired by the canonical 
doctrine of keeping one’s word.12 Furthermore, the influence of the canonical rule of 
enforcing promise in Scots law occurred in the sixteenth century because the 
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9 E.g. in 1.10.5, Stair cited Molina to support his account of JQT. For a general discussion on this 
point see A Rodger, “Molina, Stair, and the Jus Quaesitum Tertio” (1969) 14 JR 34. 
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ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the church courts was taken over by the Scots civil 
courts.13 Accordingly, the practice of enforcing promises was adopted into Scots 
private law.14  Thus, it is perhaps no surprise to find that Stair did not cite any 
reference when claiming that promises were enforced by the Canon Law, given that 
it was widely accepted amongst most scholars in Stair’s time that promise produced 
legal consequences.  
 
To conclude, what Stair’s analysis took from the Canon Law was the idea of a 
general enforcement of unilateral promises. This also explains why Stair regarded 
promises as an independent source of obligations.  
 
(2) ius commune 
 
(a) Debate on the binding force of promise 
 
Stair referred to “the common custom of nations” (ius commune), inter alia, to 
support the enforcement of bare promises and bare contracts: “[w]e shall not insist in 
these [necessary formalities], because the common custom of nations hath resiled 
therefrom, following rather the cannon law…” 15 This passage does not suggest that 
Stair claimed that promises were commonly held to be obligatory amongst European 
nations. Rather, it reflects the notion of enforcing bare agreements as a general idea. 
This contrasts with Roman law, where only particular kinds of contracts were 
enforceable.16 By following the Canon Law, bare agreements, without any 
requirement of formalities, are enforceable amongst European nations. Nonetheless, 
there was a continuing debate about the enforceability of unilateral promises across 
Europe at the time.  As noted, by the end of the seventeenth century a number of 
jurists throughout Europe proposed that promises should have legal force, but they 
disagreed on some aspects of promises. 
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It will be recalled, although Grotius explained that promises are both morally and 
legally binding, he intended the obligatory force of promises to apply to contracts 
too.17 He reasoned that a promise requires an acceptance. Thus, in Grotius’ account a 
promise which is legally binding will also be regarded as a contract.18 This shows 
that Grotius followed the late scholastic approach in explaining contracts using 
promissory obligations as a core idea. Stair departed from the traditional approach by 
viewing a contract as an agreement. In addition, an absolute promise can be binding 
without acceptance. Hence, a promise is per se binding and is entirely distinct from a 
contract in Stair’s account.  
 
(b) Was Stair correct on his promissory account? 
 
One might argue that Stair may have been wrong in claiming that bare promises are 
binding without acceptance. For instance, if Stair was correct, Scotland should not be 
the only European jurisdiction which recognises promise as a standalone obligation. 
 
In assessing whether Stair was correct on this point or not, it is helpful to go back to 
an earlier point of discussion in previous chapters. Recall that the provenance of 
promissory obligation is the Canon Law. Additionally, the canonical obligation to 
keep one’s word led to the legal enforcement of both unilateral promises and 
contracts within the ecclesiastical jurisdiction.19 Although the Romans had enforced 
contracts, they were based on formalities. The general enforceability of all contracts, 
even nuda pacta, was derived from canonical thought. Therefore, in the Canon Law 
there was a distinction between unilateral promises and contracts. 
 
In fact, the foregoing disagreement between Grotius and Stair was not new. In the 
previous century, there had been a debate over this issue amongst the late scholastics. 
As discussed, while Molina20 explained that simple promises are binding regardless 
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of any acceptance, Lessius proposed a counter argument.21 This suggests that while 
Stair relied on the views of Molina to support the enforcement of gratuitous 
promises, Grotius followed Lessius. Also, this shows that Stair was not alone in 
holding that a promise was enforceable without acceptance.  
 
Furthermore, the enforceability of promises and contracts was widely applied in 
Europe during the medieval period. 22  Jurists were familiar with these canonical 
doctrines because they had studied in European universities as well as practised in 
ecclesiastical courts.23 In fact, as pointed out by Helmholz, it was more common for 
the Canon Law to enforce unilateral promises, rather than to enforce contract.24 
 
Given that both Stair and Grotius were influenced by the canonical doctrine of 
promise (as transmitted both through the works of the late scholastics and through 
the influence of the Canon Law itself during their times)25, one can argue that in fact 
Stair was correct  on this point. His promissory account is compatible with the 
canonist approach, which is the root of promissory obligations. It is clear that in the 
Canon Law a promise is a source of obligation on its own. While Grotius was the one 
who ended the distinction between unilateral and bilateral promises which was meant 








                                                 
21Lessius, De iustitia et iure, lib 2, cap 18, dub 6, num 34, 219-220, (as cited by Decock in Decock, 
Contract 190). 
22 Helmholz, Contracts 52.  
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
25 As Zimmermann observes: “For the fundamental category in Grotius’ system of natural law was 
neither contract (or convention) nor consensus, but the (unilateral) promise. This was a heritage of 
scholastic moral theology, where the binding nature of both the promissory oath and the simple 
promise had been emphasized; breach of faith displeases God and is a sinful deviation from the 





(3) The divergence between Scots law and other European systems 
 
Grotius’ approach has had an extremely strong impact on the concept of promise and 
contract in the Civilian tradition. This is because it was the approach adopted by the 
Code civil (through Pothier’s commentary), as discussed in Chapter I. 26 Recall that 
the Code civil does not distinguish between promise and contract as separate 
obligations. A promise which is enforceable is also considered as being a contract 
under the Code civil. For instance, a promise of sale is not a unilateral obligation (in 
the sense that it is understood in Scots law) because it cannot be created by one party. 
Rather, it requires mutual consent between the seller and the buyer.27 This reflects 
the fact that an enforceable promise under the Code civil is similar to Grotius’ 
explanation. The Code civil has influenced the codifications in a large number of 
European countries, particularly as a result of the Napoleonic Wars e.g. Belgium28 
and Italy.29  
 
Yet, the idea of recognising unilateral promises as standalone obligations did not 
entirely disappear from the course of historical development of the law of obligations 
in Continental Europe. During the course of the drafting of the BGB, unilateral 
promises were proposed by Kübel to be recognised as independent obligations.30 
However, Kübel’s proposal was not adopted. Accordingly, the BGB did not 
eventually give rise to unilateral promises as free standing legal institutions. 
Nonetheless, it recognises particular types of unilateral obligations which cannot be 
                                                 
26 See Chapter I, A. THE LEGAL OBLIGATION OF PROMISE, (4) Northern Natural Law jurists, 
(b) Grotius’ influence on French law. 
27 Code civil, Art 1589. 
28 The Belgian Codes were largely influenced by the French Code. For a detailed account see E 
Butaye & G D Leval, A Digest of the Laws of Belgium and of the French Code Napoleon (1918). 
29 The first Italian Code, after Italian unification, was promulgated in 1865. The 1865 Code was 
fundamentally based on the French Civil Code. However, later it was replaced by a new Code in 1942.  
See J M Smits (ed), Elgar Encyclopedia of Comparative Law (2012) 2nd edn 457; For an overview of 
the influence of French law in the Italian Civil Codes see A Triggiano, “Towards A Civil Code: The 
Italian Experience”, Testo delle lezioni tenute all’Università di Valladolid il 14 e 15 dicembre 2009,  
nell’ambito del Corso di Historia del Derecho Privado Europe, available at 
http://www.teoriaestoriadeldirittoprivato.com/media/rivista/2010/contributi/2010_Contributi_Triggia
no_CivilCode.pdf. 





characterised by any other ways, such as promises of a reward.31 This is an aspect in 
which German law is distinct from French law.  A number of European civil codes, 
which are based on the BGB model, also adopted a similar approach e.g. Austria32 
and Italy.33 
 
To conclude, the difference between Scots law and other European systems on the 
notion of unilateral promises diverged from the different approaches between Stair 
and Grotius on acceptance of promise. A large number of European countries 
followed Grotius’ account due to the influence of the Code civil. Although there was 
later an attempt to make promises exist as independent obligations under the BGB, 
this attempt was not successful. Unlike France, Scotland never had a strong political 
power in Continental Europe. Therefore, the Scots law of promise never influenced 
any of the other Civilian systems in the same way as the Code civil did. Nor was it 
used as a model for any of the European civil codes, which was the case with the 
BGB.  
 
B. LATER INSTITUTIONAL WRITERS  
 
This section further considers later Institutional writers’ promissory accounts in order 
to see how the law of promise was developed after Stair’s period. This section also 
makes references to Institutional writers’ views on contract in order to show whether 








                                                 
31 See BGB, §§657-661; See also P Lerner, “Promises of Reward in a Comparative Perspective” 
(2004) 101 Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law 53 at 57-58. 
32 ABGB, Art 860. 
33 The 1942 Italian Code followed the German approach by recognising that a unilateral declaration of 





(1) Mackenzie  
 
MacKenzie,34 who was Stair’s contemporary, followed Stair’s accounts on both 
contract35 and promise.36 However, he only explained the doctrine of promise briefly. 
He wrote:  
“Though verbal promises do by our Law, bind the Promiser, yet because the 
position and import of words may be easily mistaken by the hearers, 
therefore verbal Obligations or Promises can only be proven by Oath of 
party, and not by witness, though the sum be never so small.”37  
 
(2) Bankton  
 
Bankton 38  explained that a conventional obligation arises from the will of the 
parties.39 He considered contract as based upon agreement.40 He wrote: “A Promise 
is, whereby one obliges himself to another, without any mutual obligation or 
valuable consideration”. 41  He noted: “In a general acceptation, Promise may be 
applied to all contracts that are binding upon the part of one of contractors only, 
which is called … unilateral, or binding upon one side only”.42  His explanation 








                                                 
34 Sir George Mackenzie of Rosehaugh, Knt (1638-1691). His primary work is The Institutions of the 
Law of Scotland (1684). 
35 Mackenzie, Inst 3.1.5. 
36 MacKenzie, Inst 3, 2. 
37 MacKenzie, Inst 3, 2. 
38 Andrew McDouall, Lord Bankton (1685-1760). His important work is An Institute of the Laws of 
Scotland (1751). 
39 Bankton, Inst 1.11.1. 
40 Ibid.  
41 Bankton, Inst 1.11.1. 
42 Ibid. 







Erskine44 also considered a contract as an agreement.45 In his Principles, it was stated 
that a promise “is gratuitous, does not require the acceptance of him to whom the 
promise is made.”46 However, in the Institutes, he used the term “verbal obligations” 
to explain obligations “as have no special name to distinguish them by.”47  There are 
two types of verbal obligations, namely promises, “where nothing is to be given or 
performed but upon one part, and which are therefore always gratuitous”48 , and 
verbal agreements, “which require the intervention of two different persons at least, 
who come under mutual obligations to one another”.49 Erskine proposed the doctrine 
of “presumed acceptance.”50 However, critics claim that Erskine’s explanation in 
relation to presumed acceptance is doubtful because it contradicts the theory that a 




Bell52 distinguished between unilateral obligations53 and mutual contracts.54 He only 
briefly dealt with the doctrine of promise, following Erskine’s view regarding 
presumed acceptance. A promise is distinct from an offer, “as being a unilateral 
agreement, to which acceptance is presumed; while an offer is always and in terminis 
conditional, raised into an obligation only by acceptance.” 55  Bell cited Stair as 
authority, though he explained matters in a different manner. It seems that Bell had 
                                                 
44 John Erskine of Carnock (1695-1768). His famous works are Principles of the Law of Scotland 
(1754) and An Institutes of the Law of Scotland (1773) 
45 Erskine, Inst 3.1.16; See also 3.2.1. 
46 Erskine, Princ, 3.2.1. 
47  Erskine, Inst 3.2.1. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Erskine, Inst 3.3.88. 
51 Cross, Bare Promise 147. See also Sellar, Promise 271. 
52 George Joseph Bell (1770-1843). His famous work is Principles of the Law of Scotland (1830). 
53 Bell, Comm I, 351. 
54 Bell, Comm I, 454. 





little interest in analysing promise, given that, in his Commentaries, all reference to 




Forbes57 seemed to suggest that promises were a type of contract. In his Institutes58, 
he defined a contract as “an Engagement betwixt two or more Persons, effectual to 
force Performance by an Action”.59 However, he employed the idea of promise to 
explain verbal contracts, which are a type of contract. He stated:  “Verbal Contracts 
are those, made by the Interposition of Words. Which are either Promises, verbal 
Offers, or Pactions.”60 A promise is “a Contract, whereby one doth verbally engage 
himself to pay, or do something to another, without mutual Agreement. Which is 
binding before the Person, to whom it is made, accept thereof.” 61 
 
The explanations concerning promises in his Great Body62 are, in essence, similar to 
those he gave in his Institutes. However, the manuscripts in the Great Body are much 
richer in details. Additionally, it contains references to the works that he consulted, 
which also appeared in the body texts.63 Like the Institutes, in the Great Body the 
discussion of promise appears in the section of verbal contract. On the section of 
verbal contract, the first part of the Great Body is the same as the first part of the title 
in the Institutes. Thereafter, the texts differ, but the explanations of the Institutes and 
the Great Body are similar. The greater length of the passage in the Great Body is 
attributable to discussion of cases and commentaries. Forbes made reference to 
Stair.64 He also recited the facts and outcomes of a few cases.65 In short, the passage 
                                                 
56 Sellar, Promise 271. 
57 William Forbes. His primary work is The Institutes of the Law of Scotland (1722). 
58  W Forbes, The Institutes of the Law of Scotland (1722 and 1730) reprinted Edinburgh Legal 
Education Trust, vol 3, 2012) 
59 Forbes, Inst 3.1.3. 
60 Forbes, Inst 3.1.5. 
61 Ibid. 
62  A Great Body of the Law of Scotland – Forbes Manuscript, available at 
http://www.forbes.gla.ac.uk/contents/. 
63 For example, when explaining that “a promise is a Contract, whereby one does verbally engage…” , 
he cited Franciscus Connanus as an example of an opponent of the view that promises are morally 
binding. Ibid at 818. 





in the Institutes is more distilled. The treatment of the area in the Institutes is not 
complete, and not systematic.  
 
Forbes’ explanation on promise is rather unsatisfactory because it mixes the concepts 
of contracts and promises together. Forbes appeared to follow Stair that contracts are 
mutual agreements made by two parties, whereas promises are unilateral obligations 
made by one party. However, he categorised promises as a type of contracts. In 
addition, he seemed to suggest that a promise requires an acceptance but it is binding 
before the acceptance. This causes confusion with the legal characteristics of 
promises. It must have been obvious during Forbes’ time that there was a clear 
distinction between unilateral promises and contract in Scots law, following the 
publication of Stair’s Institutions, as well as the decisions of the Scottish courts 
themselves. Therefore, Forbes should have made clearer whether he disagreed with 
Stair or with the practice of the courts. If he argued that promises were a kind of 
contracts, he should have explicitly criticised Stair’s theory. This is what Adam 
Smith did, as discussed below. 
 
(6) Concluding remarks 
 
Most of the Institutional writers’ views on promise offer disappointing insights in 
this area of law. Crucially, the clear distinction between promise and contract made 









                                                                                                                                          
65 He mentioned fraud and circumvention at one point in the Great Body, which is not mentioned in 





C. SCOTTISH MORAL PHILOSOPHERS 
 




Kames67 dealt with promises in a way that is different from that of Stair. Stair wrote 
his Institutions in a more general and traditional way. He explained the general 
concept of obligations first before dealing with particular kinds of obligations. Later 
Institutional writers tended to follow Stair’s method. However, Kames did not set out 
the general concept of obligation as a whole. Instead, he employed the concept of 
equity as the basis of law. All kinds of obligations can be explained using the 
concept of equity. Therefore, Kames’ view concerning promise can be traced through 
his treatment of equity. Kames’ Principles of Equity68 is divided into three books. 
The explanations on the subject of promises are mostly found in Book I, concerning 
powers of a court of equity derived from the principle of justice. 
 
In Chapter IV of Book I, Kames discussed the formation of a covenant or contract 
and how a promissory obligation is created. He categorised acts of wills into five 
types, namely contracts (or covenants), promises, offers, acceptances and deeds. A 
contract arises from the “mutual acts of wills”69 of two persons. A promise is the 
case when only one person “binds himself to another without any reciprocal 
obligation”.70 He also distinguished between offer and promise. An offeror is not 
bound until the offer has been accepted by the offeree.71  
 
                                                 
66 Kames is not always regarded as an Institutional writer. J W Cairns, “Institutional Writings in 
Scotland Reconsidered”, in A Kiarlfy and H MacQueen (eds), New Perspectives in Scottish Legal 
History (1984) 76 at 101. Therefore, in this thesis he is classified as a Scottish moral philosopher. 
67 Henry Home, Lord Kames (1696-1782). His important work is Principles of Equity (1760). 
68 The first edition of Kames’ Principles of Equity was published in 1760. However, the edition used 
as the reference in this chapter is the third edition published in 1778, which was the final authorial 
edition. 







Although the style in which Kames wrote his Institutions is different from that of 
Stair, their views on promise are conceptually similar. Like Stair, Kames clearly 
supported the approach that a promise is an obligation which can be unilaterally 
made and that is binding without an acceptance. The fact that Kames was a judge 
may have been a factor which made him familiar with the doctrine of unilateral 
promise in Scots law. This can be observed from his collection of remarkable 
decisions of the Court of Session between 1730 and 1752, in which one of the 
reported cases was concerned with promise.72 
 
(2) Adam Smith 
 
Adam Smith did not consider promises as another type of voluntary obligation 
separate from contract. He employed the idea of promise in explaining contractual 
obligation. He stated: “obligation to performance which arises from contract is 
founded on the reasonable expectation produced by a promise, which considerably 
differs from a mere declaration of intention.”73 Smith’s explanation is similar to late 
scholastic jurists in that promise is used as a core idea in the explanation of voluntary 
obligation. However, he added the idea of reasonable expectation to explain the 
nature of contract. The idea of reasonable expectation makes Smith’s explanation 
compatible with the modern reliance theory of contract law. The basic idea of the 
reliance theory is that “contractual obligations are obligations to ensure that others 
whom we induce to rely upon us are not made worse off as a consequence of that 
reliance”.74  
 
Smith disagreed with Stair on the point that promises are binding because it was the 
intention of the promisor to bind him/herself. He wrote, “…the obligation to perform 
a promise can not proceed from the will of the person to be obliged, as some authors 
imagine.”75 Here, he made references to Grotius (2.11.2) and Stair (1.10.1).76 This 
                                                 
72 See H Home, Lord Kames, Remarkable Decisions of the Court of Session (1730 - 1752), 2nd edn 
(1799) 175. 
73 Smith, Lectures 533. 
74 S A Smith, Contract Theory (2004) 78. For a detailed account of the reliance theories see at 78-97. 






quotation shows that he clearly disagreed with Stair’s use of the will theory.77 Smith 
reasoned that one cannot be bound by his/her promise if he/she had no intention to be 
bound. Rather, such a person is bound by his/her promise because such a promise 
produces “the same degree of dependance and the breach of them the same 
disappointment as the others”.78 Smith nevertheless acknowledged that in Scots law 
unilateral promises were legally binding as a result of the ecclesiastical courts.79 
 
(3) David Hume 
 
In Hume’s view obligations can mainly arise in two different ways, either artificially 
or naturally. He wrote: “where an action is not requir’d by any natural passion, it 
cannot be requir’d by any natural obligation.”80  A promise is viewed as an artificial 
obligation. 81  Hume explained that promises are not naturally understandable. 82  
When a person makes a promise, there is no act of mind attending to it.83 Humans do 
not naturally desire to keep their promises. 
 
There are conflicts between Hume’s and Stair’s promissory accounts, particularly on 
the point concerning the natural obligation of promise. This comes as no surprise. 
Stair is regarded as a member of the Natural Law tradition.84 It is well-known that 
Hume’s theory on obligations contradicts Natural Law theory.85 While the doctrines 
of the Natural Law taught that humans can find their proper ends by following right 
                                                 
77 Stair’s analysis of promissory obligations draws on natural law, but is also consistent with will 
theory. Stair, Inst 1.1.10 and 1.1.21. This is further explored in Chapter V. 
78 Smith, Lectures 124-125. 
79 Smith, Lectures 122. 
80 Hume, Treatise 3.2.5.6. 
81 Hume particularly discussed promises in Book III, Section V of the Obligation of Promises. Hume, 
Treatise 3.2.5. 
82 Hume, Treatise 3.2.5.1. 
83 Hume, Treatise 3.2.5.2. 
84  Stair wrote: “Law is the dictate of reason determining every rational being to that, which is 
congruous and convenient for the nature and condition thereof.” Stair, Inst 1.1.1. 
85 Modern philosophers tend to suppose that Natural Law theory has been essentially destroyed by 
Hume’s arguments. For example, Lloyd explains that Natural Law was rejected by Hume as “an 
illogical attempt to establish the objective character of what is necessarily normative”. Lord Lloyd of 
Hampstead, Introduction to Jurisprudence, 4th edn (1979) 282; Friedmann states that Hume 





reason,86 Hume argued that reason cannot cause man’s actions. Hence, one cannot 
discover one’s proper ends by following reason. Instead, the passions are the only 
things which can lead man to discover his proper ends. Additionally, it is the 
passions which cause human actions.87 In short, while Stair supported the view that 
promises are morally binding by the law of nature,88 Hume argued that promises do 
not produce any natural obligation. 
 
(4) Concluding remarks 
 
Smith’s and Hume’s accounts of promise are both interesting in that they clearly 
explained their views on promises as well as providing reasons to support their 
arguments. Their promissory accounts contradict that of Stair. While Stair 
distinguished between promises and contracts, Smith used the notion of promise to 
explain the obligation of contracts, and offered another approach in analysing the 
binding force of promise based on expectations. Hume explained the origin of 
promise in a way that is as different from that of Stair. While Stair followed the 
Natural Law tradition in holding that promises are naturally binding, Hume argued 
that we have no natural obligations to keep a promise. Nonetheless, neither Smith’s 
nor Hume’s promissory accounts have had significant impact on the law of promise 
in Scots law today. Both the Scottish courts and legal scholars have followed Stair’s 
approach both in his account which shows that promises are distinct from contracts 
and in his account of the will theory. As for Kames, his promissory analysis is 
interesting in that he provided a doctrinal foundation for principles of equity which 
can be applied to promissory obligations. Additionally, he emphasised the distinction 
between contracts and promises, established by Stair, which also reflects the actual 
legal doctrine in Scotland in his time. 
 
                                                 
86 E.g. Aquinas, Summa Theologica: Latin Text and English Translation, T Gilby (ed) (1964), I-II, Q 
91, a 2. 
87 For further discussion see A T Nuyen, “David Hume on Reason, Passions and Moral” in Hume 
Studies Vol 10 (1984) 26-45, available at http://www.humesociety.org/hs/issues/v10n1/nuyen/nuyen-
v10n1.pdf; See also W Vitek, The Humean Promise: Whence Comes Its Obligation?” in Hume 
Studies, b5 (1986) 160-176, available at http://www.humesociety.org/hs/issues/v12n2/vitek/vitek-
v12n2.pdf. 





D. CASE LAW 
 
(1) Eighteenth century case law 
Unilateral promises had been enforced by the Court of Session at least a century 
before the publication of Stair’s Institutions.89 Therefore, it was not surprising to find 
that promise was regarded by Stair as distinct from contract.90 However, it was not 
until early in the eighteenth century that the question of the legal consequences of 
promises was pointedly raised. Reoch v Young91 in 1712 was a case in which the 
court clearly considered the legal effects of promise.92  A lady who was dying wished 
to give her friend, Mackie, a sum of money in return for his kindness in visiting her. 
The lady expressed her desire to her landlady, the defendant, who informed Mackie 
that she would give him that sum of money if it had not been done in any other way. 
It was averred by the defendant that, although her expression complied with being a 
promise, it did not amount to a binding promise as recognised in law because it 
required an acceptance to be enforceable. The court, however, held that a promise is 
obligatory without acceptance, subject to being proved on oath.93  
The significance of this case is that it was the first case regarding the legal 
consequences of promises after its doctrinal foundations were established by Stair in 
the previous century. In addition, the pursuer of this case relied on Stair as an 
important authority in making a successful claim. This shows that Stair was regarded 
as a high authority in this area of Scots law. After the Reoch v Young case, there were 
a number of cases in relation to unilateral promises in the same century. These 
included a promise converted into a written obligation in 174294; a promise to keep 
                                                 
89 E.g. Drummond v Bisset (1551) Mor 12381; Regiam Majestatem (Lord Cooper (ed) (1947), Chap 
28; Hope’s Major Practicks (J A Clyde (ed) (1937-1938) 89, (as discussed by McBryde in McBryde, 
Promises 56 at note 48). 
90 McBryde, Promises 56. 
91 Reoch v Young (1712) Mor 9439. 
92 Sellar, Promise 273. 
93 The details of the case can be found at Scottish Court of Session Decisions, William Reoch Wright 
in Edinburgh v. Catharine Young Relict Alexander Crawford Residenter There, available at 
http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/1712/Mor2309439-022.html. 





an offer open in 174795; a promise to convey property rights in 174896; a promise 
concerning right in security in 175097; and a promise of marriage in 1771.98 
 
(2) Nineteenth century case law 
 
The number of cases in which the Scottish courts dealt with promissory issues 
appears to have gradually increased during the nineteenth century. For instance, in 
1812, there were two cases of enforceable promises.99 Cases of a promise to give 
money 100   and a promise to pay an annuity 101  appeared in 1821 and 1831, 
respectively. In 1834, there was a case of reward for information which might lead to 
the detection of the author and printer.102 Both the cases in 1836103 and 1839104 
involved promises to guarantee payments under bills of exchange. In 1862, the courts 
considered whether an act was a promise or a mere expression of future intention.105 
In 1864, the court ruled that the statement in the form “We agree to pay you…” was 
a promissory note.106 Cases concerning promises to confer heritage were raised in 
1868107 and 1891.108 In 1882, the court considered whether an expression was a 
promise to keep an offer open for a specified period.109 In 1892, it was held that a 
letter imported a promissory obligation.110 In 1895, a promise of reward made by a 
public body was enforced.111  Finally, in 1899, it was held that a promise to make 
annual instalments to a charity was enforceable.112 
 
                                                 
95 Marshall v Blackwood 1747 Elchies, voce Sale, No 6. 
96 Sir James Ferguson of Kilkerran v Paterson (1748) Mor 8440. 
97  Kinloch v Dempster, 13th June 1750 Kaimes’s Rem Dec Kilkerran voce per and real 293. 
98 Millar v Tremamondo (1771) Mor 12395. 
99  Porteous v McBeath (1812) Hume 98; McQueen v McTavish 3 March 1812 FC, as cited by 
McBryde, in McBryde, Promises 60. 
100 McLachlan v McLachlan (1821) I S 45 (revised ed 49), as cited by McBryde in Ibid. 
101 Duguid v Caddall's Trustees (1831) 9 S 844.  
102 Petrie v Earl of Airlie (1834) 13 S 68. 
103 National Bank v Robertson (1836) 14 S 402 
104 Watt v National Bank (1839) 1 D 827. 
105 Scott v Dawson (1862) 24 D 440.  
106 Macfarlane v Johnston and Others (1864) 2 M 1210. 
107 Goldston v Young (1868) 7 M 188. 
108 Miss Agnes Christina Malcolm v Mrs Agnes Traill or Campbell (1891) 19 R 278.  
109 Littlejohn v Hadwen (1882) 20 SLR 5. 
110 Miss Eliza Harris Shaw and Others v Mrs Caroline Muir (Muir’s Executrix) (1892) 19 R 997. 
111 Campbells v Glasgow Police Commissioners (1895) 22 R 621; (1895) 3 SLT 26. 





(3) Twentieth century case law 
 
In 1901, the court considered whether a letter written by a debtor constituted a 
binding obligation to pay back the debt or merely an honourable understanding.113 
Cases involving promises of donations appeared in 1907114  and 1945. 115  In 1911, 
the court held that a promise (to leave money by will) could not be converted into a 
contract. 116 Promises to leave particular things in a will were enforced in 1916.117 In 
1918, there was case of a promise to guarantee a debt. 118  In 1928, the court 
considered whether a deceased made a promise to make an heir or merely 
representation of intention.119 In 1946, an option to purchase a property was deemed 
to be a promise.120 A promissory note case appeared in 1949.121 In 1957, it was held 
that a contract could not be converted into a promise.122 A case in 1976 concerned a 
promise to pay damages.123 In 1979, the court applied a promissory analysis to an 
option to buy a property.124 In 1990, the court considered whether an undertaking 
made by a council was a promise or an offer.125 A case in 1991126 involved a promise 
to pay for the cost of carrying out some works. Finally, in 1993, the court regarded a 







                                                 
113 Ritchie v Cowan & Kinghorn (1901) 3 F 1071. 
114 Hallet v Ryrie and others (1907) 15 SLT 367. 
115 Denny's Trustees v Dumbarton Magistrates1945 SC 147; 1946 SLT 68. 
116 Smith v Oliver 1911 SC 103. 
117 Cairney v Macgregor's Trustees 1916 1 SLT 357.  
118 Fortune v Young 1918 SC 1; 1917 2 SLT 150. 
119 Gray v Johnston 1928 SC 659; 1928 SLT 499. 
120 Sichi v Biagi, 1946 SN 66. 
121 McTaggart v MacEachern's Judicial Factor 1949 SC 503; 1949 SLT 363.  
122 Forbes v Knox 1957 SLT 102.  
123 Bathgate v Rosie 1976 SLT (Sh Ct) 16. 
124 Stone v Macdonald 1979 SC 363; 1979 SLT 288. 
125 Lord Advocate v City of Glasgow DC 1990 SLT 721. 
126 JW Soils (Suppliers) v Corbett, Court of Session (OH), 12 September 1991. 





(4) Case law since 2000 
 
In 2002, the court determined whether or not a letter given by a business amounted to 
an unqualified promise to pay a sum of money as a result of a sub-consortium 
agreement.128 In 2005, it was considered whether or not a letter issued by a developer 
of projects stating that payment would be made from the joint venture account was a 
unilateral binding undertaking. 129  In 2006, the court deliberated whether a letter 
given by an insurance company acknowledging liability for damages for personal 
injuries was promissory in nature.130 There were three cases relating to promises in 
2007. First, the House of Lords held that an option to purchase certain land amounted 
to a unilateral obligation. 131 Second, the court considered whether or not a statement 
made at a meeting in relation to transfer of share to another scheme’s asset was a 
unilateral undertaking.132 Third, the court considered whether statements in letters 
sent by representatives of the Home Office to a refugee amounted to a binding 
promise that (i) he and his family would be dealt with under a concession in relation 
to asylum claims announced by the Home Secretary, or that (ii) he and his family’s 
application was being reviewed under the concession. 133  In 2009, the court 
considered whether a letter was a promise to indemnify the pursuer or a mere 
admission or statement of fact.134 In 2010, the court was asked to determine if a 
promise to enter into a minute agreement to give the promisee the proceeds of the 
sale of land was an obligation relating to land, in which case a twenty-year 
prescription applied.135 In 2011, the court held that the implied assumption by a new 
partnership in paying the debt of the old partnership was a unilateral promise.136 In 
another case, the Court of Session addressed the issue of whether the nature of a 
relationship between a doctor and a patient in terms of a clinical drugs trial was 
                                                 
128 Krupp Uhde GmbH v Weir Westgarth Ltd 31 May 2002 (CSOH, unreported). 
129 Ballast Plc v Laurieston Properties Ltd [2005] CSOH 16. 
130 Van Klaveren v Servisair (UK) Ltd [2009] CSIH 37 2009. 
131 Simmers v Innes 2008 SC (HL) 137. 
132 Cawdor v Cawdor 2007 SLT 152. 
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promissory or contractual.137 In 2013, the court considered whether a letter issued by 
a bank confirming that it held a deposit on behalf of the owner of a development 
related to the fit-out costs was a unilateral obligation to pay the cost to the addressee 
of the letter (who completed the fit-out work).138  
 
In 2015, although the pursuer did not rely on promissory grounds, the Supreme Court 
held that an assurance by a bank that it would provide funding for both the purchase 
and development when the pursuer applied for it amounted to a unilateral binding 
obligation.139 Most recently, in MacDonald v Cowie's Executrix Nominate,140 it was 
held that the statement “I have promised to give him this house for many years…”141 
did not constitute a binding promise. 
 
(5) Concluding remarks 
 
The Reoch v Young case in 1712 shows that, at an early period, it had not been 
common for individuals in Scotland to rely on promissory grounds, given that it took 
three decades after Stair published his Institutions before the question of the legal 
effects of promise was clearly raised. However, promissory grounds were becoming 
more common in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The statistics show that 
various kinds of promises were enforced in daily life. This begins with a simple form 
of promise made in daily life such as promises to pay a sum of money, promises of 
reward, and promises to guarantee existing debts. Then it moves a more complex 
form of promises used in commercial practice e.g. promissory notes, promises to 
guarantee payments under bills of exchange, and promises granted as an option to 
buy a property. In addition, it appears that the courts had to deal with more complex 
issues of promise later, such as the distinction between promise and other types of 
expression, some of which had legal effect, and some that did not have legal effect. 
Other complex issues included whether a promise could be converted into a contract. 
This illustrates the gradual development of promissory law in Scotland. Cases related 
                                                 
137 Wylie v Grosset 2011 SLT 609. 
138 Regus (Maxim) Limited v The Bank of Scotland Plc [2013] CSIH 12. 
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to promise have continued to be brought in the twenty-first century, particularly since 
2005, when one of the parties raised a promise as the possible ground for a claim 
and/or when the courts dealt with promissory law in more than ten cases. This 
illustrates the revival of the use of promissory obligation. The increase of promissory 
case law reflects the importance of the doctrine in the modern Scottish legal system. 
As the later discussion will indicate, Institutional writers after Stair in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, as well as early modern Scottish writers, such as Gloag, 
paid little attention in analysing the law of promise. This suggests that  these writers, 
did not consider this doctrine to be an important legal concept. Therefore, the fact 
that the number of promissory case law appears to have increased during the past 
decade suggests that there is a greater awareness of the existence of the promissory 
doctrine as a source of voluntary obligation apart from contract. This is why litigants 
alternatively seek to enforce damages through a promissory obligation.  
 
E. CONSTITUTION AND PROOF OF PROMISE 
 
Before 1995, a unilateral promise was provable only by the writ or oath of the 
promisor. 142  In 1771, the court ruled in Millar v Tremamondo 143   that “verbal 
promises did not admit of a proof by witnesses, and could only be established by 
writing or oath of party.”144 This decision was substantially different from that of the 
Canon Law, where the substance of obligations is more important than their form.145 
Proof by witness was deemed to be “the ancient custom of the Commissaries”.146 
The writ and oath of the promisor came to be the measures that were used for the 
proof of promise.147 However, in practice a promissory liability could be enforced 
only if it was in the form of a written document.148  
 
                                                 
142 Bell, Prin, §8. 
143 (1771) Mor 12395; cf Smith v Oliver 1911 SC 103. 
144 (1771) Mor 12395 at 12395. 
145 McBryde, Promises 61. 
146 Wood v Robertson (1672) Mor 12225 at 12226. 
147 Gloag, Contract 50-51; McBryde, Contact para 2-35; M Ross & J Chalmers, Walker & Walker, 
The Law of Evidence in Scotland, 4th edn (2015) para 22.1.3. 





Proof of promise by the writ or oath of the promisor had been thought to be the main 
factor which negatively affected the development of the promissory doctrine in 
Scotland.149  The Scottish Law Commission150 suggested that the rule that promise 
must be proved by writ or oath should be abolished. The Commission151 further 
recommended that there should be a requirement for the constitution of gratuitous 
obligations by writ. 152   This would fundamentally change the legal doctrine of 
promise because the new requirement was not merely concerned with the proof of 
gratuitous obligations but also with the constitution of such obligations. MacQueen 
suggested that a writ should not be required as a constitution of gratuitous 
obligations. 153  MacQueen’s concern was taken into account to some degree. 
Eventually when the new Act 154  governing the requirements of writing for 
obligations was promulgated, there is no absolute requirement for gratuitous 
obligations to be constituted by a writ. 
 
Currently, the form required for contracts and promises is regulated by the 
Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995. The general rule for contracts and 
unilateral obligations is that they do not require writing. 155  However, a written 
document subscribed by the granter(s) is required for the constitution of a contract or 
unilateral obligation for “the creation, transfer, variation or extinction of an interest 
in land”.156 In addition, the Act provides that a written document is required for the 
constitution of a “gratuitous unilateral obligation”, except one undertaken in the 
course of business. 157  However, it does not provide any definition of the term 
“gratuitous”. This causes ambiguities concerning the meaning of “gratuitous” 
amongst legal scholars.158  
                                                 
149 McBryde, Promises 65-66; MacQueen, Constitution and Proof 3; Report on the Requirements of 
Writing (Scot Law Com No112, 1988) 11. 
150 Memorandum, Constitution and Proof of Voluntary Obligations and the Authentication of Writings 
(Scot Law Com No 66, 1985). 
151 Memorandum, Constitution and Proof of Gratuitous Obligations (Scot Law Com No 39, 1977). 
152 Ibid. 
153 MacQueen, Constitution and Proof 1-5. 
154 Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995. 
155 Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995, s 1(1). 
156 Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995, ss 1(2)(a)(i), 2(1). 
157 Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995, ss 1(2)(a)(ii). 
158 For a discussion on this point see Chapter V, A. THEORIES AND DOCTRINES RELATING TO 






To conclude, there have been restrictions on the circumstances in which the 
unilateral obligations can be created and proved from an early period of the 
development of promise in Scots law. Historically, the law provided that proof of 
promise could be done either by the writ or oath of the promisor. Proof of promise by 
oath shows that not only did the notion that a promise is binding without acceptance 
in Scots law originate in the Canon Law, but the proof of a promissory obligation by 
way of an oath was also inspired by the Canon Law. Although later the proof of 
promise by oath or writ was abolished, the law continues to control constitutive 
requirements of form of unilateral obligation, with the exception of promise made in 




The Canon Law is the most important source of Scots promissory law. The canonists 
did not follow the Roman rule regarding nuda pacta. Bare promises were enforced 
within the ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Scots law thus adopted the canonical approach, 
albeit with stricter requirements as to proof. The evidence suggests that unilateral 
promise had been enforced by the Scottish courts since the sixteenth century. It can 
therefore be inferred that the enforcement of unilateral obligations must have been 
common in Scotland during Stair’s own time.  
 
Moreover, Stair’s references to promise lie within a wider context of the ius 
commune. There was a continuing debate amongst leading European Natural Law 
commentators about whether a promise required acceptance. While Stair, under the 
influence of Molina, argued that a simple absolute promise is binding without 
acceptance, Grotius, under the influence of Lessius, suggested the contrary.  
Nonetheless, it has been found in this chapter that medieval jurists throughout 
Europe were familiar with the canonical principles to enforce (both unilateral and 
bilateral) promises. Such principles were put into practice in the ecclesiastical courts.  
Given that the notion of the enforcement of promise had its origin in the Canon Law 





argues that Stair was correct in making a distinction between unilateral promise and 
contract. 
 
This thesis further postulates that the divergences between Scots law and the rest of 
Europe on the subject of promises occurred because of Stair’s and Grotius’ 
disagreements on acceptance of promises. Grotius’ approach was followed by 
Pothier, whose commentaries were heavily consulted by the draftsmen of the Code 
civil. The Code civil later had a strong impact on other European civil codes. 
Although later there was an attempt to recognise a promise as a standalone obligation 
under the BGB, this attempt did not succeed. The German attempt nonetheless shows 
that Scots law has not been entirely alone in enforcing unilateral promise amongst 
the Civilian systems. At least unilateral promises have a role to play under the BGB 
as an exception rule for obligations which cannot be explained by using a contractual 
analysis. Consequently, Scots law is the only system in the Civilian tradition in 











History of Promise in Thai Law 
 
This chapter considers the history of promise in Thai law in order to achieve a 
greater understanding about the development of this controversial doctrine. 
 
A. CONTRACT AND PROMISE IN OLD THAI LAW 
 
Thai private law prior to the existence of the Code had only some basic principles 
about property and obligations.1 It did “not govern the all-inclusive area of human 
relations.”2 A completely coherent system of the law of contract did not exist. Only a 
few particular types of contract such as loan and deposit were recognised.3 In fact, 
the idea of contract under old Thai law is completely different from that in the 
modern law. In modern law contract is perceived as a voluntary obligation which 
arises from the parties’ wills. In contrast, in old Thai law a contractual relationship 
did not arise from the parties’ wills, but rather depended on external factors such as 
formalities or the delivery of the property.4 In the case of promises, they could not be 
enforceable because there could be no requirement of completing formality or 
delivery.5 
 
B. PROMISE UNDER THE THAI CODE 
 
(1) Promise without a specific promisee  
 
Promises without a specific promisee are promises in which the promisor does not 
specify who the promisee is, i.e. they are made to the public. There are two types of 
public promises, namely advertisement of reward and prize competitions (regarded 
as subsets of the wider class of a “promise of reward”).  
                                                 
1 Boonchalermvipast, Thai Legal History 141. 
2 Kasemsup, Reception of Law 277. 
3 Boonchalermvipast, Thai Legal History 141. 
4 Lingat, Thai Legal History 166; S Rattanakorn, ค าอธิบายประมวลกฎหมายแพ่งและพาณิชย์ว่าด้วยหนี ้(Commentary on 
the Civil and Commercial Code: Obligations), 11th edn, (2013) 27. 






(a) Advertisements of reward 
 
There are three provisions regarding advertisements of reward, namely §§362-364. 
This chapter only discusses the sources of §362 because it is the provision dealing 
with the juristic nature of advertisements of reward.6  
 
Initially, during the drafting period, §362 appeared as §359.7  The evidence8 shows 
that this provision finds its origins in Art 529 of the Japanese Code and §657 of the 
BGB. First, Art 529 of the Japanese Code, in the textual forms of this provision in 
force at the time of drafting of the Thai Code, reads:  “A person who advertises that 
he will give a certain reward to whoever shall do a certain act is bound to give such 
reward to any person who does the act.”9 Second, §657 of the BGB, in the textual 
forms of this provision in force at the time of drafting of the Thai Code, states: 
“A person who by public notice announces a reward for the performance of 
an act, e.g., for the production of a result, is bound to pay the reward to any 
person who has performed the act, even if he did not act with a view to the 
reward.”10 
 
During the meeting on 1 October 1925, Phraya Thep Widun, one of the draftsmen, 
indicated that §657 of the BGB contained the phrase “even if he did not act with a 
view to the reward”.11 He then suggested that Thai law should follow the German 
approach to prevent the problems arising from the circumstances where a person 
performs the act as specified in the advertisement without knowing of its existence.12 
His proposal was adopted. Therefore, afterwards the texts of §359 read: “A person 
who  advertises that he will give a reward to whoever shall do a certain act is bound 
                                                 
6 The texts of §§363 and 364 and the foreign sources which these provisions were derived from can be 
found in Appendices Table 1. 
7 รายงานการประชุมกรรมการรางกฎหมาย (Memorandum of the Committee of Codification), 1 October 1925 (B.E. 
2468) 3-4. 
8  Report of the Revised Drafts 236; Index of Civil Code 160; รายงานการประชุมกรรมการรางกฎหมาย 
(Memorandum of the Committee of Codification), 1 October 1925 (B.E. 2468) 3-4. 
9 The texts are from Translation of Japanese Civil Code (1898) 139. 
10 The texts are from Translation of German Civil Code (1907) 144.  







to give such reward to the person who does the act, even if he did not act with a view 
to the reward.”13 
 
Later, in the meeting on 3 October 1925, the Drafting Committee made a few 
changes in terms of wording (without providing any reasons for the changes). First, 
the word “advertises” was changed to “by advertisement promises”. 14  Second, the 
words “the person” were changed to “any person”.15 Finally, the words “if he did” 
were changed to “if such person did”.16 
 
Furthermore, before the Code was promulgated on 11 November 1925, the final 
approval of the drafts of the Code was made by another committee, the so-called 
“Approval Committee”. The Approval Committee changed the number of this 
provision from 359 to 362.17 Eventually this provision appeared as §362, and its texts 
read: 
“A person who by advertisement promises that he will give a reward to 
whoever shall do a certain act is bound to give such reward to any person 
who does the act, even if such person did not act with a view to the reward.”18 
 
It is difficult to find the exact reason why the Thai drafters used the words “by 
advertisement promises” instead of “advertises”. In fact, the English texts of both the 
Japanese and German sources (in the textual forms of these provisions in force at the 
time of drafting of the Thai Code) do not contain any promissory language.19 A 
possible answer is that the change is intended to reflect the importance of promissory 
obligation under the Thai Code. The drafters of the Thai Code might have intended 
these provisions to contain promissory language because they deal with the concept 
of promises of reward.  This is despite the fact that the Thai drafters did not 
                                                 
13 The texts are from Ibid at 7. 




17 Report of the Revised Drafts 236. 
18 The texts are from Ibid. 
19 The current §657 of the BGB contains promissory language: “Anyone offering by means of public 
announcement a reward for undertaking an act, including without limitation for producing an 
outcome, is obliged to pay the reward to the person who has undertaken the act, even if that person did 
not act with a view to the promise of a reward.” Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection, 





differentiate between unilateral and bilateral obligations, as the later discussion will 
show.20  
 
(b) Prize competitions 
 
The rules on prize competitions are contained in §365. In drafting this provision, the 
drafters compared Art 532 of the Japanese Code and §661 of the BGB. Para 1 of the 
Japanese provision, in the textual forms of these provisions in force at the time of 
drafting of the Thai Code, states: 
“If there are several persons who have done the act specified in the 
advertisement, but only the one who has done it best is to receive the reward, 
such advertisement is valid only if a time is fixed therein within which the 
invitation must be acted upon.”21 
 
Para 1 of the German provision, in the textual forms of these provisions in force at 
the time of drafting of the Thai Code, reads: “A promise of reward which has a prize 
competition for its object is valid only if a period of time for the competition is fixed 
in the notice.”22 
 
It was agreed that the German provision was more precise because it contained the 
words “prize competition”. 23  Therefore, in drafting the provision on prize 
competitions, the draftsmen largely followed §661 of the BGB. 24 
 
Initially, the provision on prize competitions appeared as §362. Para 1 of §362 stated:  
“A promise of reward which has a prize competition for its object is valid only if a 
period of time is fixed in the notice.”25 Subsequently, the last word of the text was 
changed from the word “notice” to “advertisement” by the Drafting Committee.26 In 
                                                 
20 See F. Conclusion, (2) Flaws in promissory provisions. 
21 The texts are from Translation of Japanese Civil Code (1898) 140. 
22 The texts are from Translation of German Civil Code (1907) 145. 
23 รายงานการประชุมกรรมการรางกฎหมาย (Memorandum of the Committee of Codification), 1 October 1925 (B.E. 
2468) 4. 
24 Ibid; Index of Civil Code 160. 
25 The texts are from Report of the Revised Drafts 238. 






addition, the Approval Committee changed the number of this provision from 362 to 
365.27 After the promulgation of the Code, para 1 of §365 reads:  “A promise of 
reward which has a prize competition for its object is valid only if a period of time is 
fixed in the advertisement.”28 
  
This final change of the word used from “notice” to “advertisement” is interesting 
because the German provision uses the word “notice”. One possible reason for the 
change is that the word “advertisement” is more precise than the word “notice”. 
Generally speaking, a prize competition refers to an action where a person invites 
others to compete in his/her competition. The winner of such a competition will be 
then given the reward. Hence, the term “advertisement” is more accurate in this 
context because it refers to the means of publishing the competition and making it 
available to others. More specifically, it refers to a public means of notification. 
While a “notice” may be something circulated privately, an advertisement is by 
nature something shared publicly. 
 
(c) Analysis of promises of reward 
 
The legal characteristic of a promise of reward under Thai law shows similarities to 
that of German law29 in that it is a unilateral obligation. This is on the basis that it 
does not require any acceptance.30 The Code clearly states that a promisor of an 
advertisement promise is bound to give the reward to whoever performs the act, even 
if that person does not have an intention to obtain the reward.  
 
However, under the Thai Code the provisions regarding promise of reward are 
contained in Book II (Obligations), Title II (Contract), Chapter I (Formation of 
Contract). One might argue that this is because Thai law does not have a general 
                                                 
27 Report of the Revised Drafts 238. 
28 Ibid. 
29 See Chapter II, C. THAILAND: A NEWLY DISCOVERED MIXED LEGAL SYSTEM?, (2) 
Reception of foreign laws in Thailand, (d) Effects on the Thai promissory law as a result of the 
codification. 
30  For further discussion see Chapter V, A. THE NATURE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF 






promissory provision. Therefore, specific provisions of promise have to appear 
together with the contractual provisions. Yet, this explanation is not satisfactory. If 
Thai law does not regard these promises as contracts, they could appear elsewhere in 
the Book of Obligations, and not in the part on formation of contract.  
 
This could be compared with the provisions regarding promise of reward and prize 
competitions under German law, which the Thai provisions were modelled on. The 
provisions of promises of reward and prize competitions under the BGB (1907 
edition)31 were contained in the Second Book: Law of Obligations, Seventh Section: 
Particular Kinds of Obligations, Ninth Title: Promise of Reward. 32  They were 
divided from the contractual provisions (contained in the Second Book: Law of 
Obligations, Second Section: Obligations Ex Contractu). 33  Therefore, under the 
BGB, there is no conflict in terms of the legal nature of unilateral binding obligations 
and contractual obligations. 
 
The fact that the provisions on promises of reward are regarded as part of the 
formation of a contract suggests that the draftsmen of the Code did not understand 
the actual nature of unilateral binding obligations. It appears that they simply 
followed §657 of the BGB by adding the phrase “even if he did not act with a view 
to the reward” to the Thai provision. There was no discussion among the drafters of 
the fact that, by following the German approach, the juristic nature of promises of 
reward would no longer be regarded as contractual.34 
 
 
(2) Promise with a specific promisee 
 
Promises with a specific promisee are promises which are made to a specific person. 
Therefore, only that specified person can accept and enforce the promise. They can 
                                                 
31 Under the current BGB, the provisions of promise of reward and prize competitions are contained in 
Book 2: Law of Obligations, Division 8: Particular types of obligations, Title 11: Promise of a reward. 
32 Translation of German Civil Code (1907) x-xi. 
33 Ibid at x. 






be divided into four groups, namely promises to pay a penalty for not performing an 
obligation, promissory notes, promises to pay remuneration and promises to enter 
into a contract.35   
 
(a) Promise to pay a penalty for not performing an obligation 
 
The provisions of promise to pay a penalty for not performing an obligation exist 
within the wider concept of “stipulated penalty”. The rules of promise to pay the 
penalty for not performing obligation are contained in §§379-385.  
 
(i) Sources of promise to pay a penalty 
 
In drafting the notion of promise to pay a penalty, the drafters took into account 
English, Indian, French and German law. They were of the view that the German 
concept was the most precise.36 Accordingly, German law was chosen to be the 
model for the drafting. 37  All provisions on the promise to pay a penalty were 
borrowed from German law.38 Due to the limitations of the space available, this 
section only makes reference to §379, which deals with the general concept of this 
type of promises.  
 
During the period of the drafting of the Code, the texts of §379 appeared as: 
“If the debtor promises to creditor the payment of a sum of money in case he 
does not perform his obligation, or does not perform it in the proper manner, 
the penalty is forfeited if he is in default. If the performance due consists in a 
                                                 
35 There are three provisions under the Code mentioning a promise made by a third party to an agent, 
namely §825 (promise made by a third party to an agent in agency law), §847 (promise made by a 
third party to a broker) and §1724 (promise made by a third party to administrator in succession law). 
Nevertheless, this type of promise is seldom mentioned in the area of the law of promise in legal 
literatures because these provisions are not directly concerned with a unilateral binding effect of a 
promise. Therefore, the origins of these provisions are not explored in this chapter due to the limited 
space. 
36 รายงานการประชุมกรรมการรางกฎหมาย (Memorandum of the Committee of Codification), 8 October 1925 (B.E. 
2468) 3. 
37 Ibid. 





forbearance, the penalty is forfeited as soon as any act in contravention of the 
obligation is committed.”39 
 
However, during the final revision, the Approval Committee made two changes to 
this provision by (i) amending the words “promises to creditor” to “promises the 
creditor” and (ii) adding the words “as penalty” after the phrase “the payment of a 
sum of money”.40 After the promulgation of the Code, §379 states (the words that are 
different from §379 during the period of the drafting appear in italic): 
“If the debtor promises to the creditor the payment of a sum of money as 
penalty in case he does not perform his obligation, or does not perform it in 
the proper manner, the penalty is forfeited if he is in default. If the 
performance due consists in a forbearance, the penalty is forfeited as soon as 
any act in contravention of the obligation is committed.”41 
 
This provision derives from §33942 of the BGB. The German provision, in the textual 
forms of this provision in force at the time of drafting of the Thai Code, states:  
“If the debtor promises the creditor the payment of a sum of money as 
penalty in case he does not perform his obligation or does not perform it in 
the proper manner, the penalty is forfeited if he is in default. If the 
performance due consists in a forbearance, the penalty is forfeited as soon as 
any act in contravention of the obligation is committed.43 
 
The final texts of §379 of the Thai Code are exactly the same as the texts of §339 of 
the BGB. This suggests that the amendments made by the Approval Committee were 
not their original ideas. It is likely that the amendments were to make the Thai texts 
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(ii) Analysis of promise to pay a penalty 
 
There is a contradiction between the English and Thai terms that are used in the 
provisions regarding promise to pay a penalty. In §§379-385, the English texts use 
the term “promises”. However, when it is translated into Thai44, the Code uses the 
term “สญัญา” (which literally means “contract” 45) instead of using the term “ค ามัน่” 
(which literally means “promise”46). This differs from provisions of other types of 
promises, e.g. promise of reward, promise of sale, promise of a gift, promise to pay 
remuneration, and hire purchase, in which the term “ค ามัน่”, which literally means 
promise, is used. It is unclear why the term “สญัญา” (contract) is used when the 
provision is concerned with a promise to pay a penalty. There may be an error in 
translation here. As the provisions of promise to pay a penalty are contained in the 
Title of Contract (Chapter III earnest and stipulated penalty), the draftsmen may have 
unwittingly used the term “สญัญา” (contract) in the Thai texts, without realising that 
the term was not a correct translation. 
 
The fact that the drafters translated the term “promise” as “สญัญา” (which literally 
means “contract”) has a significant impact on its legal status. The Thai courts and 
Thai lawyers explain that a promise to pay a penalty is collateral to the principal 
contract. 47  In other words, it depends on the principal contract. In terms of the 
rescission of a contract, the Thai Code states: “If one party has exercised his right of 
rescission, each party is bound to restore the other to his former condition; but the 
rights of third persons cannot be impaired.”48 Thus, Thai commentators explain that 
creditors cannot claim any stipulated penalty as a result of the rescission of a 
contract, because it is collateral to the principal contract, which has also been 
                                                 
44 As noted in Chapter II, the Thai Code was initially drafted in English and then translated into Thai. 
45 The Royal Institute, ศพัท์นิติศาสตร์ อังกฤษ-ไทย ไทย-อังกฤษ ฉบบัราชบณัฑิตยสถาน (Legal Terms: English-Thai, Thai-
English, Edition of the Royal Institute), 6th edn (2006) 672. 
46 Ibid at 506; Similarly, according to the glossary of the edition of the Thai Code which the author of 
this thesis consults, the translation of the term “promise” is “ค ามัน่”. Translation of Thai Code 446. 
47 Supreme Court Decision 2983/1998 (B.E. 2541); Sotthibandhu, Juristic Acts and Contracts 389-
392; K Jongjakapun, เอกสารประกอบการสอน สญัญา ชดุที ่5 (Handout: Contract (Vol 5), available at 
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rescinded.49 However, this seems to be unfair to creditors, who have been promised 
that debtors will be penalised if they fail to perform their obligations. Therefore, 
some propose that creditors should be able to enforce the stipulated penalty. Two 
proposals have been made as to why creditors should be able to enforce the 
stipulated penalty. The first is that creditors can still enforce the stipulated penalty in 
cases where the contract has been rescinded, provided that they reserved the right to 
do so before they rescinded the contract by informing the debtor that they would 
enforce the stipulated penalty.50 The second is based on §391 para 4 (dealing with the 
effect of the rescission of a contract) in which it states that: “the exercise of the right 
of rescission does not affect a claim for damages.” 51  According to this view, a 
promise to pay a penalty is akin to paying damages. Therefore, creditors are entitled 
to claim the stipulated penalty as damages, irrespective of the contract being 
rescinded.52 
 
(b) Promissory notes 
 
There are five provisions, namely §§982-986, under the Code concerning promissory 
notes. The evidence shows that §§983-986 were borrowed from foreign law.53 For 
example, §983 specifies the details which must be contained in the promissory 
note.54 There are several sources in relation to the origins of §983, namely French 
law55, German law56, Swiss law57, Japanese law58, English law59 and Uniform Law.60 
                                                 
49 Sotthibandhu, Juristic Acts and Contracts 484-485. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Thai Code, §391 para 4. 
52  A Sumawong, ค าอธิบายประมวลกฎหมายแพ่งและพาณิชย์ ว่าด้วย นิติกรรม สัญญา (Commentary on the Civil and 
Commercial Code: Juristic acts and Contracts), 6th edn ( 2010) 295. 
53 Index of Civil Code 203. 
54 See Appendices Table 4.  
55 Cour de Paris 23 Mars 1892; French Commercial Code, Art 188. 
56 Byle’s (German Bills). See sub-heading (ii) below for the discussion about the ambiguities of this 
German source. 
57 Swiss Code of Obligations, Arts 838 and 839. These provisions currently appear as Art 1096. 
58 Japanese Commercial Code, Art 525. 
59 Bills of Exchange Act 1882, s 83. 
60 Art 77. This is believed to refer to the Convention Providing a Uniform Law For Bills of Exchange 





However, there is no reference to the source of §982 (dealing with the definition of 
promissory notes).61  
 
(i) Ambiguities regarding sources of §982  
 
It is doubtful why there is only one promissory note provision, namely §982, for 
which the source is not specified. There are two possibilities. Firstly, it was borrowed 
from foreign laws but the draftsmen mistakenly did not record its original sources. 
Secondly, this provision was originally created by the committee who drafted the 
Code.  
 
It is suggested in this thesis that the first possibility is likely to be correct. As noted, 
prior to the existence of the Code, there were only a few particular types of contract 
in Thai law e.g. loan and deposit. This means that there had never been any existing 
system of promissory notes in Thailand before.  
 
Moreover, foreign laws which are used for other promissory note provisions are 
German, French, Swiss, Japanese and English law. Among these five sources, 
English law has a provision dealing with the definition of promissory notes. The 
Bills of Exchange Act 1882 defines a promissory note, in the textual forms of this 
provision in force at the time of drafting of the Thai Code, as: 
“an unconditional promise in writing made by one person to another signed 
by the maker, engaging to pay, on demand or at a fixed or determinable 
future time, a sum certain in money, to, or to the order of, a specified person 
or to bearer.”62 
 
This definition shows similarities to §982 of the Thai Code, which states: “A 
promissory note is a written instrument by which a person, called the maker, 
promises to pay a sum of money to, or to the order of, another person, called the 
payee.”63 
                                                 
61 Index of Civil Code 203. 
62 Bills of Exchange Act 1882, s 83(1) The texts are from W J B Byles & E R Watson, A Treatise on 
the Law of Bills of Exchange, Promissory Notes, Bank-Notes and Cheques, 17th edn (1911) 427.  






Furthermore, the discussion in this chapter shows that that the drafters of the Thai 
Code relied on foreign sources in drafting the Code heavily. It is therefore unlikely 
that they would originally create a provision without consulting foreign sources, 
especially where foreign sources were available. Since English law had specific 
legislation dealing with the definition of promissory notes, the Thai drafters could 
benefit from the English source. In fact, as noted above, s83 of the Bills of Exchange 
Act 1882 was a source of the drafting of §983 (regarding the details of promissory 
note) under the Thai Code. Accordingly, it seems very likely that the Thai drafters 
had seen the definition of promissory notes under UK law. Consequently, given that 
both §982 of the Thai Code and s83 of the Bills of Exchange Act 1882 show 
similarities, this thesis argues that the Thai drafters were likely to have been inspired 
by this UK provision as a source of §982.  
 
(ii) Ambiguities regarding the German source  
 
According to Index of Civil Code, the German source for drafting §983 is specified 
as “Byle’s (German Bills)”.64 However, there is a very famous English source on 
Bills of Exchange that is called “Byles on Bills of Exchange and Cheques”. 
Therefore, it is unclear whether “Byle’s (German Bills)” refers to a German or an 
English source. It has been found that the 17th edition of Byles on Bills of Exchange 
and Cheques65, published in 1911, contains the English translation of the German 
Bills of Exchange Act 1849.66 Therefore, it can be inferred that the phrase “Byle’s 
(German Bills)”, given by the Thai drafters, may have been intended as a reference 
to the English translation of the German Bills of Exchange Act 1849 which appeared 
in the 17th edition of Byles on Bills of Exchange and Cheques. In short, the phrase 
“Byle’s (German Bills)” is a shorthand reference to the drafters having used that 
English translation of the German Act. 
 
                                                 
64 Index of Civil Code 203. The List of Abbreviations of this source does not specify the full name of 
“Byle’s (German Bills)”. 
65 W J B Byles & E R Watson, A Treatise on the Law of Bills of Exchange, Promissory Notes, Bank-
Notes and Cheques, 17th edn (1911). 





(iii) Analysis of promissory notes  
 
Like the case of promise to pay a penalty for not performing an obligation, the 
drafters translate the term “promissory note” as “ตัว๋สญัญาใชเ้งิน” (which literally means 
“a contractual note to pay a sum”). This suggests that the drafters may have used the 
term “promissory” in a “contractual” sense. At first glance, it appears to be 
reasonable to refer to a promissory note as a contractual obligation, given that the 
concept was derived in part from English law, where the term “promise” is generally 
used in the sense of a contractual promise. However, if one thoroughly considers the 
text of §982, it would be found that a promissory note is promissory (and not 
contractual) in nature. The phrase “a written instrument by which a person… 
promises to pay a sum of money to… another person…” suggests that the maker of a 
promissory note unilaterally binds him/herself to pay a stated sum to the payee. The 
payee does not generally need to agree with the conditions of the note, but rather 
he/she can enforce the payment once he/she receives the promissory note. This 
suggests that a promissory note is binding without acceptance. 
 
(c) Promise to pay remuneration 
 
In employment contracts, 67  §576 states: “The promise to pay remuneration is 
implied, if, under the circumstances, it cannot be expected that the services are to be 
rendered gratuitously.”68 
 
(i) Sources of promise to pay remuneration 
 
Section 576 was inspired by two German provisions, namely §612 of the BGB and 
§59 of the German Commercial Code, and one Swiss provision, namely Art 338 of 
the Swiss Code of Obligations. 69 
 
                                                 
67 The Thai Code uses the term “hire of service”. 
68 Thai Code, §576. The texts are from D Bunnag, ค าอธิบายประมวลกฎหมายแพ่งและพาณิชย์ บรรพ 3 (Commentary 
on the Civil and Commercial Code, Book 3) (1981), 211. 





Firstly, §612 of the BGB, in the textual forms of this provision in force at the time of 
drafting of the Thai Code, states: 
“Remuneration is deemed to have been tacitly agreed upon if, under 
the circumstances the performance of the service is to be expected only for 
remuneration. 
If the amount of remuneration is not specified, and if there is a tariff, 
the tariff rate of remuneration, or, if there is no tariff, the usual remuneration 
is deemed to have been agreed upon.”70 
 
Secondly, §59 of the German Commercial Code, in the textual forms of this 
provision in force at the time of drafting of the Thai Code, states: 
“Any person employed in a mercantile business to perform mercantile 
services for a remuneration (hereinafter called a mercantile employee) must, 
in the absence of any special agreements as to the nature and extent of his 
services or as to his remuneration, perform the services and receive the 
remuneration usual according to local custom. In default of any local custom 
the services to be performed must be held to be such as appear reasonable 
under the circumstances of the case.”71 
 
Thirdly, §576 was borrowed from Art 338 of the Swiss Code of Obligations. 72  
However, there appears to be a mistake here. According to the Code des obligations 
(published in 1911)73, Art 338 is concerned with an employer’s duties in providing 
tools and materials.74 The provisions of employment contract under the 1911 edition 
of the Swiss Code of Obligations that the present writer consults should be similar to 
those of the Swiss Code of Obligations that the Thai drafters consulted.75 Under the 
1911 edition of the Swiss Code of Obligations, the provision which is the most 
similar to that on promise to pay remuneration appears to be Art 320 para 2, which 
states: 
                                                 
70 The texts are from Translation of German Civil Code (1907) 133. 
71  The texts are from The German Commercial Code (translated and briefly annotated by A F 
Schuster) (1911). Therefore, it is believed to be the genuine original provision which was used as the 
model for §576 of the Thai Code. 
72 Index of Civil Code 173. 
73 Recueil Des Lois Fédérales No 18 (19 juillet 1911), Loi fédérale complétant le Code civil suisse. 
(Livre cinquième: Droit des obligations (du 30 mars 1911). 
74 Ibid.  
75 The text of Art 338 of the 1967 edition of the Swiss Code of Obligations is exactly the same as that 





“It is in particular deemed to have been concluded as soon as the performance 
of work has been accepted for a certain period of time and which in the 
circumstances could be expected only in exchange for a salary.”76 
 
Consequently, there might have been a mistake about the reference of the Swiss 
source. The correct reference should be Art 320, rather than Art 338. Therefore, the 
following analysis will be based on Art 320 of the Swiss Code of Obligations. 
 
(ii) Ambiguities and analysis of promise to pay remuneration  
Although §576 is concerned with “promise to pay a remuneration”, the texts of §576 
suggest that the employer does not intend to make a promise in the sense of a 
unilateral obligation. Rather, according to the circumstances of the case, one would 
not expect the employee to do unpaid work. Accordingly, the law regards that there 
is an implied contract between the parties, and that the employer has made a promise 
to pay the remuneration. Therefore, the binding characteristic of promise to pay 
remuneration contrasts with other promises under the Thai Code. For example, as 
previously discussed, promise of reward is a genuine unilateral obligation. Also, in 
the cases of promise to pay a penalty for not performing an obligation and 
promissory notes, the promisee can choose whether he/she will accept or enforce the 
promise or not. However, the promisee in the case of promise to pay remuneration is 
not really in the situation where he/she can choose to enforce or refuse the promise. 
The employees in this instance would always naturally want to receive remuneration. 
This can be usefully compared with the foreign sources where §576 was derived 
from. The German and the Swiss provisions are contractual principles, rather than 
promissory ones. In fact, all the sources of §576 do not use promissory language. 
This suggests that the nature of a promise to pay remuneration under the Thai Code 
is not actually a unilateral binding obligation, but rather a contractual one. 
 
                                                 
76 Author’s translation. The French texts appear as: “Il est notamment présumé conclu dés que du 
travail a été accepté pour un temps donné et que, d’aprés les circonstances, ce travail ne devait étre 





It is unclear why the Thai drafters used the term “promise to pay remuneration”, 
despite the fact that §576 is not a unilateral obligation. One possible answer is that 
they used the word “promise” in the sense of a contractual “promise”, i.e. promissory 
language was used here to describe a contractual situation. The fact that the Thai 
drafters used the term “promise” in the provision of promise to pay remuneration in a 
contractual sense reinforces the argument that they did not acknowledge the 
difference between bilateral and unilateral obligation.  
. 
(d) Promise to enter into a contract  
 
The final type of promises specifying a promisee is “promise to enter into a 
contract”. The origins and analysis of the provisions in relation to promise to enter 
into a contract will be explored specifically in the next section. 
 
C. PROMISE TO ENTER INTO A CONTRACT 
 
There are two main types of promises to enter into a contract under the Code, namely 
promises of sale (§454, 456 para 2) and promises of a gift (§526). In addition, this 
thesis argues that hire purchase can be characterised as a contract containing a 
promissory undertaking by the hirer. Therefore, this section also discusses the origins 
of hire purchase under the Code. 
 
(1) Promise of sale77 (§454) 
 
Section 454 of the Code states: 
“A previous promise of sale made by one party has the effect of a sale 
only when the other party has given notice of his intention to complete the 
sale and such notice has reached the person who made the promise.  
If no time has been fixed in the promise for such notification, the 
person who made the promise may fix a reasonable time and notify the other 
party to give a definite answer within that time whether he will complete the 
                                                 
77  The idea of promise of sale also appears in §456 para 2. However, it is concerned with the 
conditions under which a promise to sell immoveable property can support a lawsuit action. As §456 
para 2 is not directly concerned with the juristic nature of a promise to make a contract, this chapter 





sale or not. If within that time he does not give a definite answer, the previous 
promise loses its effect.” 
 
(a) Sources of §454 
 
This provision was drafted under the influence of Art 1589 of the Code civil, Art 22 
of the Swiss Code of Obligations and Art 556 of the Japanese Code.78  
 
First, Art 158979 of the Code civil,80 in the textual forms of this provision in force at 
the time of drafting of the Thai Code, states: “Promise of sale is as good as sale, 
where there is the reciprocal consent of parties as to the thing and as to the price.”81 
 
Second, Art 22 of the Swiss Code of Obligations, in the textual forms of this 
provision in force at the time of drafting of the Thai Code, states: 
“A party may by contract bind himself to enter into a future contract. Where 
the law for the protection of the parties prescribes a certain form for the 
validity of the future contract, the preliminary contract must also be made in 
that form.”82 
 
Finally, Art 556 of the Japanese Code, in the textual forms of this provision in force 
at the time of drafting of the Thai Code, states: 
“A promise to buy or sell made by one party has the effect of a sale, 
as soon as the other party expresses his intention to complete the sale. 
If no time is fixed for such expression of intention, the promisor may 
fix a reasonable time and notify the other party to give a definite answer 
within that time whether he will complete the sale or not. If within that time 
he does not give any definite answer, the promise loses its effects.”83 
 
                                                 
78 รายงานการประชุมกรรมการรางกฎหมาย (Memorandum of the Committee of Codification), 21 May 1924 (B.E. 
2467) 1176; Index of Civil Code 165. 
79 The current texts of this provision read: “The promise of sale is equivalent to a sale, where there is a 
mutual agreement of the two parties upon the article and the price.” 
80 All the texts of the Code civil which are mentioned in this chapter are from Translation of Code 
Napoleon (1811). Therefore, these provisions are believed to be the genuine original provisions which 
were used as the model for the Thai provisions. 
81 The texts are from Translation of Code Napoleon (1811) 326. 
82 The texts are from Translation of Swiss Code of Obligations (1984) 245. The French texts of Art 
338 of the 1984 edition are the same as those of Art 338 of the 1911 edition. Therefore, it can be 
inferred that this provision was not amended between 1911 and 1987. This thesis therefore uses the 
English translation from the 1984 edition. It is believed to be the genuine original provision which 
was used as the model for §454 of the Thai Code. 





The texts of the Japanese provision show the greatest similarity to the Thai provision. 
Moreover, like the Thai provision, the Japanese provision contains the rule regarding 
lapse of the promise of sale, whereas the French and Swiss provisions do not.  
 
(b) Promise of sale under the drafts of the Code 
 
During the drafting period, there were three provisions concerning promise of sale, 
namely §§461-463. The drafters, however, did not use the term “promise” in those 
provisions. 84 This was different from the Japanese, French and Swiss Codes, the 
original sources of promise of sale, in which the term “promise” was used. 
Nonetheless, in the understanding of the drafters those provisions concerned the 
concept of promise of sale.85 
 
There were several terms which the drafters used in those provisions. The most 
obvious evidence shows that the draftsmen had used the term “contract” and then 
changed to the term “offer”, without giving any reasons for the amendment.86 In 
considering these provisions, the drafters occasionally used the term “an agreement 
to buy or sell” although the provisions were about a promise of sale (according to 
current law).87 This could suggest that perhaps the draftsmen understood this concept 
as an agreement to buy or sell, which binds only one party (either the seller or 
buyer), rather than a promise of sale. Eventually, the term “offer” was changed to 
“promise”. It was not appropriate to use the term “offer” in the provision of promise 
of sale because the concept of promise of sale would appear in Book III (Specific 
Contracts) and the term “offer” had already been used in the Book of Obligations, 
                                                 
84 รายงานการประชุมกรรมการรางกฎหมาย (Memorandum of the Committee of Codification), 21 May 1924 (B.E. 
2467) 1179; รายงานการประชุมกรรมการรางกฎหมาย (Memorandum of the Committee of Codification), 22 May 
1924 (B.E. 2467) 1190. 
85 รายงานการประชุมกรรมการรางกฎหมาย (Memorandum of the Committee of Codification), 21 May 1924 (B.E. 
2467) 1176. 
86 รายงานการประชุมกรรมการรางกฎหมาย (Memorandum of the Committee of Codification), 29 May 1924 (B.E. 
2467) 1207.  






which had been promulgated.88 If the term “offer” was used again in Book III, this 
could cause confusion and overlap between the term “offer” in the provisions 
regarding the formation of a contract in Book II and the term “offer” in “promise of 
sale” (Book III).89 It appears that most of the draftsmen considered a promise of sale 
as a kind of contract which unilaterally binds either the buyer or the seller.90  
 
(c) Problems with, and analysis of, promise of sale 
 
The concept of promise of sale is a mixture of several foreign laws. This concept was 
drafted with an unclear understanding of the underlying basis of the concept. As 
noted, when the draftsmen was drafting the provision concerning promise of sale, the 
terms “contract”, “offer”, and “an agreement to buy or sell” had been used. The 
drafters followed the Japanese provision heavily. However, most of the drafters were 
of the view that a promise of sale was a unilateral contract binding only one party, 
despite the fact that the legal characteristics of the Japanese concept are those of a 
unilateral obligation.  This suggests that perhaps the drafters did not clearly 
understand the actual legal nature of promise of sale.  
 
Moreover, the provision of promise of sale originated in three sources, namely 
French, Swiss and Japanese law. The texts of the Japanese provision suggest that a 
promise of sale under Japanese law is a genuine unilateral obligation because it can 
be unilaterally created. In contrast, a promise of sale under French law is not a 
unilateral obligation on the basis that it cannot be created by one party. The Swiss 
provision deals with a future contract. This reflects the fact that there is no 
consistency amongst these foreign sources in terms of the legal characteristics of 
promises. The difference between the Japanese, Swiss and French sources in relation 
to the juristic nature of promises helps to explain why the Thai drafters were facing 
such difficulties when drafting this provision.  
                                                 
88 รายงานการประชุมกรรมการรางกฎหมาย (Memorandum of the Committee of Codification),  29 May 1924 (B.E. 
2467)1185. 
89 Ibid. 






(2) Promise of a gift (§526) 
 
(a) General concept of promise of a gift 
 
The notion of promise of a gift appears in §526 of the Code, which states: 
“If a gift or a promise for a gift91 has been made in writing and registered by 
the competent official and the donor does not deliver to the donee the 
property given, the donee is entitled to claim the delivery of it or its value, but 
he is not entitled to any additional compensation.”92 
 
This provision does not govern the juristic nature of a promise of a gift. Rather, it is 
concerned with the formalities of promises of a gift in order for them to be 
enforceable.  
 
(b) Sources of §526 
 
There are four foreign sources for the concept of promise of a gift, namely French, 
German, Swiss and Japanese law.93 
 
(i) French law 
 
The concept of promise of a gift is influenced by Art 931 of the Code civil. Art 931, 
in the textual forms of this provision in force at the time of drafting of the Thai Code, 
states “All acts of gift shall be passed before notaries, in the ordinary form of 
contracts; and a minute thereof shall be left, under pain of nullity”.94 It can be seen 
that the French provision does not actually deal with a promise of a gift, but rather a 
contract of gift. It appears that there is no notion of promise to make a gift under the 
Code civil.95 This is compatible with the position of promises under the Code civil 
that, as has been argued in this thesis, a unilateral promise made by one party is not 
                                                 
91 According to the translation of the Thai Code that the author of this thesis consults, the term 
“promise for a gift” is used. However, the author suggests that a more proper term would be “promise 
of a gift”. 
92 Thai Code, §526. 
93 Index of Civil Code 170. 
94 The texts are from Translation of Code Napoleon (1811) 190. 





binding. Recall that under French law an enforceable promise of sale has to be made 
by two parties, i.e. it requires an agreement between the seller and the buyer.96 
 
(ii) German law 
 
Section 526 also finds its origin in §522 of the BGB.97 However, according to the 
edition of the BGB that the present writer consulted (published in 1907)98, §522 
concerns “interest of default in a gift”.99 Instead, the BGB provision which deals with 
the concept of “form of a gift” is §518. According to the 1975 edition of the BGB, 
there was no change to §522 between 1900 and 1975.100 Therefore, there was likely 
to be an error in the evidence regarding the origin of §526 under the Thai Code. The 
actual origin of §526 should be §518 of the BGB, rather than §522. 
 
Section 518, concerning “form of promise of gift”, in the textual forms of this 
provision in force at the time of drafting of the Thai Code, states: 
“For the validity of a contract whereby an act of performance is 
promised gratuitously, judicial or notarial authentication of the promise is 
necessary. If a promise of debt or an acknowledgement of debt of the kind 
specified in 780, 781, be made gratuitously, the same rule applies to the 
promise or the declaration of acknowledgement. 
Any defect of form is cured by the performance of the promise.”101 
 
The German provision is similar to the Thai provision in that it is directly concerned 






                                                 
96 See Chapter I, A. THE LEGAL OBLIGATION OF PROMISE, (4) Northern Natural Law jurists, 
(b) Grotius’ influence on French law. 
97 Index of Civil Code 170. 
98 Translation of German Civil Code (1907). 
99 “A donor is not bound to pay interest for default.” BGB, §522. The texts are from Ibid at 113. 
100 The German Civil Code as amended to January 1975 (translated by I S Forrester et al) xxvi. 





(iii) Swiss law 
 
Another source of the provision of promise of a gift is Art 59 of the Swiss Code of 
Obligations. The Swiss provision, in the textual forms of this provision in force at the 
time of drafting of the Thai Code, reads: 
“The promise of a gift to be valid requires a written form. If pieces of land or 
real rights in such are the subject of the gift, the public authentication thereof 
is requisite for their validity. If a promise of gift is fulfilled, the situation will 
be considered as a gift from hand to hand.”102 
 
Like the German provision, the Swiss provision deals with the formal requirements 
of promise to make a gift. However, the Swiss approach is more flexible than the 
German approach towards making a promise. Parties who want to make a promise of 
a gift in Swiss law generally can make the promise by themselves, unless such 
promises are related to real property. In contrast, in German law, promises of a gift 
for all types of properties must be authenticated by a notary. 
 
(iv) Japanese law 
 
The final source of §526 is Art 550 of the Japanese Code, which, in the textual forms 
of this provision in force at the time of drafting of the Thai Code, states: “A gift not 
expressed in writing can be rescinded by either party, except so far as performance 
has already been made.”103 
 
Unlike the German and Swiss provisions, the Japanese provision deals with form of a 
gift contract. Under the Japanese Code, a gift is defined, in the textual forms of this 
provision in force at the time of drafting of the Thai Code, as “where one party 
expresses his intention to give property of his own to the other party without 
consideration, and the other party expresses his acceptance.”104 This shows that gift 
in Japanese law is different from that of Thai law.  Under Thai law, “A gift is valid 
                                                 
102 The texts are from The Swiss Civil Code of December 10, 1907 (Effective January 1, 1912). 
Translated by R P Shick (1915) 245. 






only on delivery of the property given.”105 Thus, under Thai law a mere agreement 
between the donor and the donee cannot constitute a complete contract of gift. In 
contrast, in Japanese law the parties can agree to make a valid contract of gift 
without delivery the property given. However, if the contract is not made in writing, 
each party can terminate the contract freely. 
 
(c) Problems with, and analysis of, promise of a gift 
 
Section 526 is a mixture of foreign sources, namely French, German, Swiss and 
Japanese laws. However, the French and Japanese sources are not directly concerned 
with the form of promise of a gift, but rather about the form of a contract of gift. In 
contrast, the German and Swiss provisions are directly concerned with the form of 
promise of a gift, which is similar to §526. 
 
Nonetheless, all the foreign sources of §526 are about necessary formalities. Such 
formalities in these four sources can be grouped into two types. First, French and 
German law require the transaction to make a gift to be verified by a notary. Second, 
Swiss and Japanese law require the transaction to be made in writing. This shows 
that the Swiss/Japanese approach is more flexible than the French/German one. 
 
Thai law adopted both these two approaches into §526: it requires a promise of a gift 
both to be made in writing and to be registered by a competent official. This 
approach, however, causes a problem about the application of §526. The formal 
requirement of a promise of a gift under Thai law is impractical. It may be 
reasonable for a promise of a gift of an immoveable property to be made in writing 
and registered, given that immoveable properties are governed by a system of  
registration. However, this is not the case with moveable properties, which are not 
governed by a registration system, i.e. they are not stored in the records of any 
government offices. Therefore, it is unclear which official or government agency 
would have the authority to register a promise of a gift of moveable property.106   
                                                 
105 Thai Code, §523. 






The impracticality of §526 probably results from the fact that Thai law adopted this 
provision from foreign approaches without taking into consideration whether such 
approaches are compatible with the situation in Thailand or not. Since there is no 
notarial profession within the Thai legal system, the idea of a competent official was 
thus chosen to be the authority for the purpose of validating a promise of a gift. 
Nonetheless, notaries in the Civil Law systems are not equivalent to competent 
officials. While a competent official in Thailand is a government agency, a notary in 
the Civil Law systems is a private lawyer who is given the power to authenticate 
certain kinds of transactions. For example, in France, notaries are trained legal 
professionals whose important role is the drawing up of legal instruments in certain 
areas of the law such as the law of property, family law, and corporate law.107 Some 
transactions such as conveyancing, matrimonial contracts and wills, need to be 
authenticated by a notary to be valid.108 In Germany, a notary is a specialist legal 
professional, who is appointed by the Land Justice Department to exercise his/her 
profession in a particular area. Like French law, in many cases, transactions are 
required to be authenticated by a notary in order to be valid. 109 In short, notaries in 
France and Germany have the power to authenticate certain kinds of transactions, 
including the promise of a gift. In France and Germany, it is more convenient for 
individuals to have the transaction of a promise of a gift verified by a notary, unlike 
Thailand, where the same transaction needs to be authenticated by a competent 
official. This explains why this provision concerning the form of promise of a gift 
under the Code has seldom been applied in practice. 
 
In fact, if Thai law had adopted the Swiss approach, then this provision may have 
been more often applied in practice. The Swiss approach provides a flexibility which 
enables the parties to make their promises of a gift of moveable property in writing 
by themselves. However, such promises which are related to real property have to be 
                                                 
107 G A Bermann & P Kirch, French Business Law in Translation, 2nd edn (2008) preface at vi; P E 
Herzog & M Weser, Civil Procedure in France (1967) 102. 
108 Ibid. 





authenticated by an authority. This appears to be a more practical approach than the 
current one for Thailand. 
 
(3) Promise of sale in hire purchase (§§572-574) 
 
Most of the Thai commentators do not consider hire purchase to be a type of promise 
to make a contract. Rather, they generally consider hire purchase to be a type of 
specific contract without making reference to promise. Nonetheless, some writers110 
consider hire purchase as a type of promise to make a contract. For example, 
Sethabutr explains that there are three types of promise to make a contract under the 
Code, namely promise of sale, promise of a gift, and promise of sale in a contract of 
hire purchase.111 In addition, promissory language is used in §572. It is therefore 
worth considering the origins of this provision.  
 
(a) Sources of §572 and analysis 
 
Section 572 states: “A hire-purchase is a contract whereby an owner of a property 
lets it out on hire and promises to sell it to, or that it shall become the property of, the 
hirer, conditionally on his making a certain number of payments.”112 
 
This provision was inspired by Halsbury’s Commentary on The Law of England.113  
Under this English law commentary114, hire purchase was explained as: 
“The contract of hire-purchase, or, more accurately, the contract of hire with 
an option to purchase, is one under which an owner of a chattel lets it out on 
hire and undertakes to sell it to, or that it shall become the property of, the 
                                                 
110 E.g. Sethabutr, Juristic Acts and Contracts 224; K Chutiwong, ค าอธิบายประมวลกฎหมายแพ่งและพาณิชย์ว่าด้วยนิติ
กรรมและสัญญา (Commentary on the Civil and Commercial Code: Juristic Acts and Contracts)  (n.d., 
Faculty of Law, Chulalongkorn University) 304; S Mekkriangkrai and N Thongdee, ค าอธิบายประมวลกฎหมาย
นิติกรรมและสัญญา (Commentary on the Code: Juristic Acts and Contracts), (n.d., Faculty of Law, 
Chulalongkorn University) 145. 
111 Sethabutr, Juristic Acts and Contracts 224. 
112  Thai Code, §572. The texts are from Translation of Thai Code 124. 
113  The Council of State, อุทาหรณ์ประมวลกฎหมายแพ่งและพาณิชย์ (Drafting’s Instances of the Civil and 
Commercial Code) n.d, n. pag. 





hirer, conditionally on his making a certain number of payments. Until the 
making, however, of the last payment, no property in the chattel passes.”115 
 
The above definition shows great similarities to that of the Thai Code. It appears that 
the Thai drafters mainly followed the definition given by Halsbury. The draftsmen, 
nevertheless, omitted some phrases which may appear (to them) to be unnecessary 
such as “...contract of hire with an option to purchase” and “However, no property in 
the goods passes until the making of the last payment”. Omitting these phrases, 
however, does not change the basis of this definition. 
 
Nonetheless, there is one difference between the English and Thai definitions. While 
the definition given by Halsbury uses the words “undertakes to sell”, the Thai 
definition uses the words “promise to sell”. The use of promissory language of the 
Thai definition may support the argument that hire purchase can be characterised as a 
type of promise. Moreover, the definition under English law enhances the 
understanding of hire purchase under Thai law. Based on the origin of §572, hire 
purchase can be analysed using the idea of an “option”, i.e. a hirer is given an option 
but not an obligation to purchase the property hired.  This is compatible with the 
nature of unilateral obligation. 116  Accordingly, it is appropriate to regard hire 
purchase as a contract containing a promissory undertaking by the hirer under Thai 
law. 
 
(b) Sources of §§573 and 574 and analysis 
 
Section 573 states: “The hirer may at any time terminate the contract by redelivering 
the property at his own expense to the owner.” In drafting this provision, the drafters 
benefited from consulting foreign sources.117 First, it was inspired by §§542 and 649 
of the BGB.118 The drafters also consulted “The Principles of German Civil Law”, 
                                                 
115 Ibid at 554 (para 1124). Three English cases are cited, namely Helby v Matthews [1895] AC 471; 
Re Davis & Co, Ex parte Rawlings (1888), 22 QBD 193; and Cramer v Giles (1883), 1 Cab & El 151. 
116 This is later discussed in Chapter VII, B. USING PROMISE TO CREATE OBLIGATIONS, (1) 
Options, (b) Thai law, (i) Hire purchase. 
117  The Council of State, อุทาหรณ์ประมวลกฎหมายแพ่งและพาณิชย์ (Drafting’s Instances of the Civil and 






which is a commentary on German Law written by Earnest J Schuster.119  Second, it 
was inspired by Art 620 of the Japanese Code.120 Third, the drafters benefited from 
Halsbury’s Commentary on The Law of England.121 Finally, §561 of the Thai Code 
itself was also used as a source.122 
 
The sources of §574, concerning the right of the owner of the property hired to 
terminate the contract, are similar to those of §573, except that the drafters did not 
consult English law.123  
 
Unlike §572, the drafters used a number of foreign sources in drafting §§573 and 
574. Nevertheless, most of the sources of §§573 and 574 are not directly concerned 
with the subject of hire purchase. For example, §§542 and 649 of the BGB are 
provisions of hire and contracts of work, respectively.124 Art 620 of the Japanese 
Code deals with lease. Section 561 of the Thai Code is a provision of hire of 
property. 
 
The reason why the Thai drafters consulted foreign legal principles which do not 
directly deal with hire purchase can be explained by considering the status of the law 
of hire purchase during the period of the drafting of the Thai Code. In the 1920s, it 
appears that the notion of hire purchase was not fully developed in most 
jurisdictions. In Japan, for example, the notion of hire purchase began after the 
Second World War.125 The Japanese Hire Purchase Act was later enacted in 1961.126 
In England, the Hire Purchase Act 1938 was the first legislation dealing with hire 
purchase that came into force. It was then followed by the 1954, 1964 and 1965 Acts, 
respectively.127 However, these Acts only applied to hire purchase contracts in which 
                                                 
119 The reference pages of this commentary are pages 249-250. Ibid. 




124 Translation of German Civil Code (1907) 117 and 142. 
125 M Takizawa, “Consumer Protection in Japanese Contract Law” (2009) 37 Hitotsubashi Journal of 
Law and Politics 31 at 31. 
126 Ibid. 





“the hire-purchase price was below a certain figure”. 128  Hire purchase contracts 
which fell outside the scope of these Acts were governed by the common law.129 
Therefore, at the time of the drafting of the Thai Code, there was no legislation 
dealing with hire purchase in England.130 That explains why the Thai drafters had to 
consult a commentary on English law, rather than English legislation, when drafting 
the definition of hire purchase. Also, when consulting German and Japanese law, the 
draftsmen used their provisions of hire of property (lease) and hire of work instead.  
 
D. CASE LAW 
 
The Thai courts were asked to decide if there was a promise of sale between the 
parties as early as 1929, only one year after the promulgation of Book III of the Thai 
Code. In the Supreme Court Decision 121/1929 (B.E. 2472)131, a sale of land was 
concluded. The seller transferred the ownership to the buyer. The buyer drew up a 
document which was given to the seller stating that the seller could redeem the 
property. It was held that the document giving the seller a right to redeem the 
property was a promise to sell. After the foregoing 1929 case, there have been 
number of cases in which the Thai Court dealt with promissory grounds as 
summarised below. 
 
(1) Case law concerning a promise of reward 
 
The Supreme Court Decision 1265/1953 (B.E. 2496) appeared to be the first case in 
which the Thai courts dealt with a promise of reward. The Police Department had 
announced that it would give a reward for information leading to the arrest of anyone 
who was found illegally exporting rice from the country. In this case, the rice had 




131 The names of the pursuer and the defender do not appear as titles of case law in the Thai legal 
culture. In fact, case law that is publicly reported does not contain the full names of the parties to the 
dispute. The terms “โจทก์” (equivalent to plaintiff/pursuer) and “จ าเลย” (equivalent to 
defendant/defender) is used, or sometimes the initials of the names of the pursuer and defender. The 
title of the case law appears (in sequence) as the name of the court (e.g. Court of First Instance, Court 
of Appeal or Supreme Court), the number of the case, and the year in which the case was decided in 





been exported from Indochina and was destined for importation into Singapore. 
However, a serious storm had caused the shipper to bring it to Thailand. Therefore, 
this could not be regarded as rice that had been illegally exported from Thailand.  
Thus, the person who gave the information leading to the arrest was not entitled to 
the reward. In 1965, it was held that an internal regulation of a government 
department which was announced to the public amounted to a promise of reward.132 
In 1979, by using a promissory analysis, the court enforced a promise of reward 
made by a company to pay a bonus to its employees.133 In this case, the defender (the 
company) had issued a directive about paying its employees a pension when they 
retired or the employment contract ended. When the pursuer (the defender’s 
employee) fulfilled the conditions stated in the directive, the defender was bound to 
pay the pursuer the bonus. Although the defender reserved the right to alter the 
conditions of the directive, it had not done so before the pursuer fulfilled them. As a 
result, the pursuer was entitled to the bonus. Later in 1995 and 2003, the courts, 
again, enforced the effects of a promise of reward using a promissory analysis, which 
can be found in the Supreme Court Decisions 5933/1995 (B.E. 2538) and 5149/2000 
(B.E. 2543), respectively. These two cases were analysed using a promissory 
approach. More recently, in the Supreme Court Decision 810/2011 (B.E. 2554), the 
court was asked to determine if a promise made by clients to give a reward 
equivalent to five percent of the value of the asset to their lawyer was a promise of a 
reward in the sense of advertisement of reward under the Thai Code. The factual 
circumstances of this case and the reasoning in the case will be revisited in Chapter 







                                                 
132 Supreme Court Decision 1153/1965 (B.E. 2508). 
133 Supreme Court Decision 2302/1979 (B.E. 2522). 
134 See Chapter VI, A. THE NATURE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF PROMISE, (2) Thai law, (b) 





(2) Case law concerning a promise to enter into a contract 
 
(a) Promise of sale 
 
There are a number of cases in which the Thai courts have dealt with issues relating 
to a promise of sale, particularly in terms of whether there was a promise of sale 
between the parties. 135  The factual background and decisions of some cases 
regarding a promise of sale can be found in Chapter VI, which contains a comparison 
of the features of a promise in Thai law and Scots law. 
 
(b) Promise of a gift 
 
In 1947136 and 1965137, it was held that a promise of a gift of immoveable property 
was unenforceable because the parties did not register the transaction. In 1980, the 
court considered whether the pursuer’s undertaking to give part of the disputed land 
to the defender was a promise of a gift or a compromise agreement.138 In 1994, it was 
held that a promise of a gift of immoveable property needed to be in writing and 
registered with the competent official.139 There were two cases in 1995140 in which 
the court, again, held that a promise of a gift was invalid unless it complied with the 
formality requirements. In 1998, there was a case in which a father acknowledged in 
the divorce agreement that he would give land to his children. The court was asked to 
consider whether the case involved a promise to make a gift of immoveable property 
or a third party right (the latter is not subject to the formality requirement).141 In 
2000, the court considered if there was a promise to make a gift.142 In 2004, it was 
                                                 
135 E.g. Supreme Court Decisions 121/1929 (B.E. 2472), 965/1935 (B.E. 2478), 1004/1942 (B.E. 
2485), 347/1945 (B.E. 2488), 411/1947 (B.E. 2490),  853/1947 (B.E. 2490), 100/1954 (B.E. 2497), 
1240/1962 (B.E. 2505), 489/1966 (B.E. 2509), 764/1964 (B.E. 2509), 2214/1976 (B.E. 2519), 
2597/1987 (B.E. 2530), 1032/1993 (B.E. 2536), 4145/1996 (B.E. 2539), 5758/2539, 25787/1996 (B.E. 
2539), 2192/1998 (B.E. 2541), 2838/1998 (B.E. 2541), 2551/2006 (B.E. 2549) and 2493/2010 (2553) 
136 Supreme Court Decision 1374/1947 (B.E. 2493). 
137 Supreme Court Decision 999/1965 (B.E. 2508). 
138 Supreme Court Decision 2537/1980 (B.E. 2523). 
139 Supreme Court Decision 1931/1994 (B.E. 2537). 
140 Supreme Court Decisions 586/1995 (B.E. 2538) and 8504/1995 (B.E.2538). 
141 Supreme Court Decision 6478/1998 (B.E. 2541) 





held that a promise to redeem a mortgage is required to be made in writing and 
registered.143  
 
(c) Promise to lease 
 
As can be seen from earlier sections, foreign legal sources from which the provision 
of promise to lease was derived from are not discussed. This is because the concept 
of promise to lease is not recognised under the Code. However, the court has held 
that a promise to lease is enforceable as a result of the doctrine of autonomy of will, 
which plays an important role in Thai private law.144 
 
There have been cases since at least 1942 in which the court enforced a promise to 
lease.145 The notion of a promise to lease in Thai law is revisited in Chapter VII, 
where it is argued that the concept can be analysed using the idea of an option. 
 
(3) Case law concerning hire purchase 
 
There have been several cases in which the Thai courts have considered, inter alia, 
the legal status and legal effect of hire purchase. The Thai courts, of course, have 
referred to hire purchase as a contract without making reference to a promise. 
Nonetheless, in the Supreme Court Decision 6967/2002 (B.E. 2545), the court 
adopted a slightly different approach by referring to the idea of a promise in hire 
purchase. The court explained that, according to §572, the law categorises hire 
purchase into two conditions, namely (i) where an owner rents a property out on hire 
and promises to sell it, and (ii) where an owner rents a property out on hire and 
agrees that it shall become the property of the hirer on condition that the latter makes 
                                                 
143 Supreme Court Decision 4729/2004 (B.E. 2547). 
144 See Chapter V, B. THEORIES AND DOCTRINES RELATING TO PROMISE  IN THAI LAW, 
(4) Will theory in Thai law. 
145 E.g. Supreme Court Decisions 1004/1942 (B.E. 2485), 368/1945 (B.E. 2488),  411/1946 (B.E. 
2490), 626/1946 (B.E.2490), 146/1951 (B.E. 2495), 1324/1952 (B.E. 2496), 170/ (B.E. 2497), 
1170/1962 (B.E. 2506), 661-662/1968 (B.E. 2511), 1051/1971 (B.E. 2514), 294/1972 (B.E. 2515), 
1213/1974 (B.E. 2517), 1925/1974 (B.E. 2517), 3670/1985 (B.E. 2528), 316/1987 (B.E. 2530), 
450/1988 (B.E. 2531), 748/1990 (B.E. 2533), 3761-3765/1990 (B.E. 2533), 3263/1992 (B.E. 2535), 
876/1994 (B.E. 2537), 6515/1995 (B.E. 2538), 5995-5996/1995 (B.E. 2538), 563/1997 (B.E. 2540), 





a certain number of payments.  It can be inferred from the court’s decision that hire 
purchase can be characterised in two different ways. It can either be a contract of hire 
containing a promise to sell made by the hirer, or a contract of hire containing an 
agreement of sale between the parties (i.e. the former is a unilateral obligation and 
the latter is a bilateral one). Therefore, it is possible to regard hire purchase as a 
contract that contains a promissory undertaking by the hirer. 
 
(4) Case law concerning other types of promise 
 
There is case law concerning other types of promise, namely a promise to pay a 
penalty for not performing obligation, a promise to pay remuneration, and 
promissory notes. However, since the Thai courts generally did not provide a 
promissory analysis when dealing with these kinds of promises, the case law 
concerning them is not included in this chapter due to space constraints. 
 
(5) Concluding remarks 
 
Although promise is not a main source of voluntary obligations in Thai law, the 
concept of promise has been used by Thai people in various forms in practice. This is 
particular in the case of a promise to enter into a contract, as can be seen from 
several cases relating to promise of sale and promise of a gift. Additionally, 
individuals have begun to include some practical usage that does not exist in the 
Code, such as a promise to lease. The fact that the court enforced this usage 
reinforces the importance of a promise in practical terms. Also, the Court Decision 
6967/2002 (B.E. 2545) suggests that analysing hire purchase as a contract that 
contains a promissory obligation is a possible approach. These examples suggest that 
the application of a promissory obligation could be expanded if the concept was 
developed to clarify its legal status in the obligational framework. As in the case of 
Scots law, the increase in promissory case law reflects the importance of the 
promissory doctrine. In addition, it indicates that there is a need to reform the law of 
promise in Thai law. As argued in this thesis, Thai law lacks a clear the underlying 





not recognised under the Code suggests that there is a practical demand for the 
enforcement of promissory undertakings which is not being adequately reflected in 
legal recognition. Thus, the proposed approach of this thesis to clarify the underlying 
basis of Thai promissory law can help to deal with the uncertainty in this area of Thai 
law. 
 
E. CONSTITUTION AND PROOF OF PROMISE 
 
There is no unified rule regarding constitution and proof of a promise in Thai law. 
Rather, the constitution and proof of both promise and contract, as well as other 
juristic acts, are discussed in the wider scope of the constitution and proof of juristic 
acts. Therefore, it is helpful to provide the general background of the formality 
requirement (governing the constitution of juristic acts) and written evidence 
(governing proof of juristic acts) in Thai law. 
 
(1) Constitution of juristic acts 
 
There are three formality requirements under Thai law, the first of which is the 
requirement of writing, or the written form. Certain kinds of juristic acts are required 
to be in a written form. Examples include the declaration to make a will146, the 
transfer of an obligation performable to a specific creditor147, and the transfer of 
shares.148 A transaction relating to promise that the law requires to be in writing is 
hire purchase. 149  Second, some juristic acts are required to be in writing and 
registered with the competent official. Examples are sale of immoveable property,150 
donation/gift of immoveable property,151 and mortgaging of immoveable property.152 
The final kind of formality required by the law is registration, whereby the law 
requires some juristic acts to be registered with the competent official. Examples 
                                                 
146 Thai Code, §§1646, 1657, 1658, 1660 and 1705. 
147 Thai Code, §306. 
148 Thai Code, §1135. 
149 Thai Code, §572 para 2. 
150 Thai Code, §456. 
151 Thai Code, §525. 





include marriage153  and divorce.154 These formality requirements govern the validity 
of the constitution of an obligation or a juristic act. Juristic acts which do not comply 
with formality requirements will be void or invalid. 155  In short, these formality 
requirements mean that, as a general rule, there is no requirement for the constitution 
of a promise. Only certain kinds of contracts, especially those that relates to 
immoveable property, and some important juristic acts are subject to formality 
requirements. 
 
(2) Proof of juristic acts 
 
The law requires some juristic acts to have “written evidence” or they will not be 
enforceable by action. Examples include a loan of money for a sum exceeding two 
thousand baht156, a hire of immoveable property157, an agreement to buy or to sell 
immoveable property158, a contract of sale of moveable property where the agreed 
price is 20,000 baht or more159, and surety.160 In the case of promise, a promise of 
sale of immoveable property “is unenforceable by action unless there is some written 
evidence signed by the party liable or unless earnest is given161, or there is part 
performance.” 162  Since written evidence does not govern the validity of an 
obligation, it does not need to exist at the time the obligation is created. The most 
important point is that it must be signed by the person who is liable, for example, the 





                                                 
153 Thai Code, §1457-1458. 
154 Thai Code, §§1514-1515. 
155 Thai Code, §§152. 
156 Thai Code, §653. 
157 Thai Code, §538 para 2. 
158 Thai Code, §456 para 2. 
159 Thai Code, §456 para 3. 
160 Thai Code, §680 para 2. 
161 This is the exact official translation of the Thai Code. The term used by the Code is earnest, which 
means “deposit”. 





(3) Concluding remarks 
 
In general, the constitution of obligations and juristic acts do not require formality. 
Thus, the requirement of formality under Thai law is an exceptional rule. There are 
only some kinds of transactions that Thai law requires to be made in writing or in 
writing and registered. These are transactions that are considered by law to be 
important transactions because, for example, they relate to immoveable property. In 
the case of written evidence, it appears that the law intends the parties to have clear 
evidence of entering into the agreement for particular transactions. Hence, 
transactions of which the law requires written evidence are unenforceable if the 




(1) The mixture of the Civilian and Common Law traditions 
 
The law of promise under the Thai Code is derived from several sources. The main 
influence is from the Civil Law systems, such as French, German, Swiss and 
Japanese law. Nonetheless, English law was also used as a point of reference e.g. the 
concepts of promissory notes and hire purchase. Moreover, some of the usages of the 
term “promise” under the Thai Code might be referring merely to contractual 
promises, i.e. contractual obligations. This is seen from the example of promises to 
pay remuneration. This usage shows similarities to the usage of the word “promise” 
in English contract law. This suggests that English law also has had an effect upon 
the usage of the word “promise” in a more generalised sense in Thai law. 
 
(2) Flaws in promissory provisions 
 
One may assume that the concept of promise under Thai law could be productive 
because it was influenced by the promissory principles of leading European 
jurisdictions. The drafters could therefore choose the “best” rules of promise for the 





this case was rather unsuccessful. In fact, the Thai promissory doctrine is confused 
because it was derived from too many sources. The end result is the existence of 
ambiguities in the doctrine which cause difficulties in terms of its application by Thai 
lawyers. These ambiguities would not have occurred if the promissory principles had 
been successfully received into Thai law. 
 
Furthermore, there appear to be flaws in most of the provisions in respect of promise. 
Firstly, there is a contradiction between the actual characteristics of promises of 
reward and the section under the Code to which this concept belongs. Its juristic 
nature, like that of German law, is regarded as genuine unilateral obligations.  
However, the provisions of promises of reward are placed in the part on the 
formation of contract. 
 
Secondly, there is an inconsistency in the usage of promissory language. In the 
provisions of advertisements of reward, prize competitions, promises of sale and 
promises of a gift, the term “promise” is used in the sense of a unilateral obligation. 
However, in the provision of a promise to pay remuneration, the term “promise” is 
used in the sense of a contractual promise. Moreover, there is an inconsistency in the 
translations between the terms “contract” and “promise” under the Code. In the case 
of a promise to pay a penalty for not performing an obligation, the term “promise” 
was translated as “สญัญา”, which literally means contract. Also, a promissory note is 
translated as “ตัว๋สญัญาใชเ้งิน”, which literally means “a contractual note to pay a sum”. 
However, the juristic nature of a promise to pay a penalty and a promissory note is 
promissory in nature. These inconsistencies reflect the fact that the draftsmen of the 
Code misunderstood the difference in nature between unilateral obligations 
(promises) and bilateral obligations (contracts). They used the terms “contract” and 
“promise” as if they were interchangeable. 
 
Thirdly, it appears that the draftsmen of the Code did not clearly understand the 
concept of a promise of sale. They used the term “offer” and “agreement to buy or 





argument that the drafters did not realise the distinction between unilateral and 
bilateral obligations.  
 
Finally, the drafters adopted the formalities of a promise of a gift from several 
foreign sources without having thoroughly considered whether such foreign methods 
were suitable for the situation in Thailand or not. The result is that the approach 
regarding the formalities of a promise of a gift that the Code adopted is an 
impractical one. 
 
(3) Different attitudes on unilateral promises between French and German law 
and their effects on the Thai Code 
 
The shift of the Thai Code from the French to the German model is an important 
factor which affects the quality of the drafting of the Code. It will be recalled, the 
1923 Code (based on the French model) was replaced by the 1925 Code (modelled 
on the BGB). With this in mind, the draftsmen of the Code had very limited time to 
make this sudden change. Therefore, defects in the drafting of the Code might have 
occurred as a result of the limited amount of time. 
 
Moreover, the switch from French to German law is a substantial change from one 
legal model to another. The attitudes to unilateral obligations between French and 
German law differ significantly. The scope of unilateral obligation in German law is 
broader than it is in French law. The Thai drafters cannot have realised this 
difference. They consulted both French and German law when drafting promissory 
provisions. While the provisions of promise of reward were derived from German 
law, the provision of promise of sale was inspired, among other sources, by French 
law. Therefore, the provenances of the idea of promise under the Thai Code are from 
both the German and the French legal traditions, which have different attitudes 
towards unilateral promises. Consequently, there are defects in most of the kinds of 







(4) Concluding remarks 
 
The ambiguities regarding the application of promise under Thai law occur, inter 
alia, because of the defects in drafting the promissory provisions. It is important to 
learn from these flaws. As one aim of this thesis is to offer satisfactory solutions for 
the problems related to promises, understanding the actual nature of contract and 






Theoretical Framework of Promise in Scots Law and Thai Law 
 
This chapter considers theories and doctrines relating to promises in both jurisdictions in 
order to understand those theories themselves, and the role of promise in the overall 
obligational framework of each system.  
 
A. THEORIES AND DOCTRINES RELATING TO PROMISE IN SCOTS LAW 
 
(1) The notion of a juristic act 
 
As the later discussion will show, in order to understand the ideas of both contract and 
promise under Thai law, it is necessary to understand the concept of juristic acts. This is 
because all acts which have legal effects are deemed to be juristic acts. Therefore, an 
examination of Scots law is considered to be beneficial for a comparative study. 
 
A useful explanation of the unified idea and general nature of a juristic act can be 
obtained from the chapter entitled Objects of Law in TB Smith’s Short Commentary. The 
doctrine of juristic act governs “a declaration or manifestation of the will [which] creates, 
modifies, transfers or extinguishes a right.”1 Juristic acts can be classified by various 
approaches such as between inter vivos and mortis causa juristic acts2  and between 
gratuitous and onerous juristic acts.3  Moreover, the distinction can be made between 
unilateral and bilateral juristic acts. An example of bilateral juristic acts is a contract.4 
Examples of unilateral juristic acts are “renunciation of rights, wills and enforceable 
promises (pollicitations)”.5 TB Smith stated, “[t]he unilateral juristic act inter vivos in the 
form of enforceable promises has special importance in Scots law.”6 
 
                                                 










However, it appears that modern literature tends to ignore the general concept or unified 
idea of a juristic act.7 Nonetheless, there is some private law literature using the term 
“juristic act”. For example, in Contract Law in Scotland, assignation is distinguished 
from JQT because “the latter is a creation of the original contract whereas assignation 
requires a further and independent juristic act by one of the contract parties”.8  In Family 
Law in Scotland, it is stated that “the child [under 16] cannot enter into juristic acts, for 
example make a contract”.9 In Institutions of Law: An Essay in Legal Theory, it is stated 
that “[t]he legal ability to enforce, secure, uphold or vindicate—or waive or abandon—
one’s rights involves a capacity to perform ‘juristic acts’ or ‘acts-in-the-law’, that is, to 
carry out legal transactions.”10 The Scottish Law Commission defines a juristic act as “[a] 
manifestation of will or intention by a person acting in the realm of private law which 
has, or is intended to have, a legal effect as such.”11 Similarly, the term “juristic act” is 
used by the Scottish courts.12 For instance, in Regus (Maxim) Ltd v Bank of Scotland 
Plc13, when dealing with the nature of promissory liability, the court stated: “a promise in 
the law of Scotland is a unilateral juristic act.”14 As can be seen, contemporary writers, 
the Scottish Law Commission and the Scottish courts use the term “juristic acts” in a 









                                                 
7 It has been observed that “the concept is not widely used and a general theory of juridical [juristic] acts is 
missing.” P Hellwege, “Juridical Acts in the Draft Common Frame of Reference - a Model for Scotland?” 
(2014) 18(3) EdinLR 358 at 381. 
8 MacQueen & Thomson, Contract para 2.84. 
9 J Thomson, Family Law in Scotland, 7h edn (2014) para 10.1. 
10 N MacCormick, Institutions of Law: An Essay in Legal Theory (2007) 88. 
11 The term used by the Scottish Law Commission is “juridical act”, rather than “juristic act”. However, 
they refer to the same concept.  The Commission explains that the term “juristic act” may be confused with 
the act of a jurist. Therefore, it is more appropriate to use the term “juridical act”. Discussion Paper, 
Interpretation in Private Law (Scot Law Com No 101, 1996), 3 at note 18. 
12 Examples can be found in Port of Leith Housing Association v Akram [2011] CSOH 176 at para 15; 
Sheltered Housing Management Ltd v Bon Accord Bonding Co Ltd [2010] CSIH 42 at para 23; Halifax Life 
Ltd v DLA Piper Scotland Ltd [2009] CSOH 74 at para 8. 
13 [2013] CSIH 12. 









In Stair’s account, promise is distinguished from contract: the former is unilateral whilst 
the latter is bilateral.15 Stair defined contract as based upon agreement, rather than an 
exchange of promises (as traditionally explained in England). 16  Thus, promises and 
contracts are distinguished from each other within the obligational framework.17 Stair’s 
promissory theory has been accepted and followed by both later Institutional writers18 and 
legal scholars.19 
 
Similarly, the Scottish courts have relied on Stair’s theory when dealing with cases 
concerning promises. For example, in Macfarlane v Johnston and Others20, the court 
referred to Stair’s approach when dealing with the distinction between promise and offer. 
The court stated: “[t]here is a philosophical and practical distinction between a promise 
and an obligation, which is nowhere better stated than by Lord Stair”.21 In Cawdor v 
Cawdor22, the court relied on Stair’s account of three acts of wills, in which he stated that 
only an engagement is obligatory.23 In Regus (Maxim) Ltd v Bank of Scotland Plc24, the 
court stated: “Stair tells us that a promise is obligatory per se”. 25  Most recently, in 
MacDonald v Cowie's Executrix Nominate26 , the court, again, benefited from Stair’s 
approach of three acts of will when considering whether an expression amounted to a 
promissory obligation.27 
 
                                                 
15 Stair, Inst 1.10.3. 
16 Stair, Inst 1.10.6. 
17 It is worth noting that there is a small overlap in Stair’s treatment on promise and contract. He stated that 
an offer is a “promise pendent upon acceptation”, i.e. a promise with the condition attached that it will not 
be binding unless it is accepted by the offeree. Stair, Inst 1.10.6.  
18 MacKenzie, Inst 3, 2; Bankton, Inst 1.11.1; Erskine, Inst 3.2.1; Bell, Prin, §9. 
19 E.g. Smith, Short Commentary 744-746; Gloag, Contract 25; McBryde, Contract para 2-02-2-03. 
20 (1864) 2M 1210. 
21 Ibid at 1213 per Lord Justice-Clerk. 
22 2007 SLT 152. 
23 Ibid at para 15 per Lord President (Hamilton). 
24 [2013] CSIH 12. 
25 Ibid para 33 per Lord President (Gill). 
26 [2015] CSOH 101. 
27 Lord Tyre stated: “[a]dopting Stair’s categorisation, I do not consider that the deceased’s act of will 





Moreover, the courts benefited from Stair’s promissory theory in making a doctrinal 
distinction between promise and offer. For example, in Macfarlane v Johnston mentioned 
earlier, Lord Justice-Clerk Inglis explained that “[a] promise is a pure and simple 
expression of the will of the party undertaking the obligation, requiring no acceptance, 
and still less requiring mutual consent…”28 Therefore, it was held that the term “I agree to 
pay” constituted a promissory obligation.29 As Lord Neaves explained, “…when a party, 
in terms of this letter, agrees to pay £100 … he is making a promise and that by the bare 
act of his will thus expressed he undertakes an obligation to pay…”30 The fact that the 
party agreed to make a payment without requiring the other party to accept it led the 
courts to believe that there was a promise. This can be usefully compared with courts in 
other jurisdictions where there is no sharp distinction between promise and offer. Obvious 
examples are jurisdictions where promissory law is similar to Grotius’ account: promises 
are not entirely distinguished from contracts because they require acceptance. In other 
words, a promise which is legally binding will also be regarded as a contract. 31  
Therefore, courts in jurisdictions which followed Grotius’ approach would not be able to 
make a doctrinal distinction by relying on the same grounds as Scots law. For instance, in 
France, a promise of sale requires an acceptance from the promisee to be binding.32 
Therefore, the French courts cannot make the distinction between promise of sale and a 
sale by relying on the ground that a promise is binding without acceptance.   
 
Furthermore, Stair’s theory of voluntary obligations is influenced by the Natural Law 
tradition.  With particular regard to the law of promise, this can be observed from his 
explanation in 1.10.10. Stair began the paragraph by writing “[b]ut let us inquire whether 
promises, or naked pactions, are morally obligatory by the law of Nature?”33 He gave 
Connanus as an example of the opposite view that promises are not naturally binding. 
Stair stated: 
“if promises were not morally obliging, they could have no effect, but by positive 
law, which is no more itself than a public paction. … and then all pactions and 
                                                 
28 (1864) 2 M 1210 at 1213. 
29 Ibid at 1214. 
30 Ibid at 1214. 
31 As discussed in Chapter I, A. THE LEGAL OBLIGATION OF PROMISE, (4) Northern Natural Law 
jurists (a) Grotius. 
32 Code civil, Art 1589. 





agreements among nations would be ineffectual, and all commerce and society 
among men would be destroyed.”34 
 
It can be seen that in Stair’s account, the idea of promises as voluntary obligations is 
grounded in the doctrine of the Natural Law.35  
 
(b) Later Institutional writers 
 
As pointed out, Institutional writers after Stair did not pay much attention in explaining 
the law of promise.36 Therefore, their passages dealing with promises do not contain any 
promissory theory that we would not find in Stair’s account. Accordingly, modern writers 
tend to criticise the later Institutional writers suggesting that they lacked Stair’s analysis 
of promise. For instance, McBryde seems to suggest that not much theoretical analysis 
can be gained from the later Institutional writers’ works. In Promises in Scots law, 
McBryde made only one brief reference (consisting of a short paragraph) to Erskine and 
Bankton as examples of later Institutional writers.37 A stronger criticism has been made 
by Sellar who writes that later Institutional writers “lacked Stair’s clarity of analysis”38 
and “[n]one was so deeply imbued in the tradition of the jus commune as Stair had 
been”.39  
 
It is possible that later Institutional writers paid little attention to explaining the law of 
promise because of the increased influence of the English law on Scots law at that time. 
Stair published his Institutions before Scotland and England became part of the same 
political union. Other Institutional writers, except Mackenzie, published their works after 
1707. Broadly speaking, English commercial law had a large influence on Scots law after 
the Act of Union of 1707.40 An example may be observed from Bell’s work. Bell brought 
English legal influence into Scots law.41 Bell referred to English case law and this created 
                                                 
34 Ibid. 
35 This is usefully compared with the obligational nature of a promise explained by David Hume. See 
Chapter III, C. SCOTTISH MORAL PHILOSOPHERS, (3) David Hume. 
36 See Chapter III, B. LATER INSTITUTIONAL WRITERS. 
37 McBryde, Promises 56-57. 
38 Sellar, Promise 269. 
39 Ibid. 
40 For a general discussion on this point see TB Smith, “English Influences on the Law of Scotland”. (1954) 
3(4) The American Journal of Comparative Law 522 at 552-542. 
41 It is suggested that Bell’s Principles is “the first attempt to integrate reference to Common Law materials 





English influence.42 The fact that Bell largely focused on commercial law but paid little 
interest to the law of promise suggests that he may have thought promise was not useful, 
given that English law, which was such a successful commercial legal system, does not 
have this doctrine. Furthermore, while doctrinal analysis of promise is mostly absent from 
later Institutional writers’ works, a number of novel contractual analyses have been 
derived from those sources. For example, some later Institutional writers introduced the 
concept of a “valuable consideration” in their definitions of contract.43 This is something 
which, not surprisingly, cannot be found in Stair’s account.44 Consequently, in relation to 
Sellar’s aforementioned argument, this may explain why later Institutional writers 
departed from the tradition of the ius commune. Due to the increasing importance of the 
commerce between Scotland and England and the increasing influence of English law, it 
is perhaps not unexpected that later Institutional writers placed more focus on contractual 
theories, and less on promise. 
 
To conclude, the doctrinal foundation of the law of promise was well established by Stair. 
However, Institutional writers after Stair plainly followed his analysis, whilst only 
making a brief discussion of promise. Hence, there is no really helpful doctrinal analysis 








                                                                                                                                                  
Principles of the Law of Scotland, Fourth Edition, with an introduction by Kenneth G C Reid, (2011) 15 
EdinLR 331 at 331.  
42 It is observed that Bell “does not content himself with simply citation from the great civilians, as the 
Continental jurists do, but he adds the English and, in many cases, the American authorities also.” 
Principles of the Laws of Scotland by George Joseph Bell, The American Law Register (1852-1891) Vol 9 
No 5 (Mar 1861) 315 at 317. 
43 E.g. Bankton, Inst 1.11.6; Bell, Prin §34. 
44 The term “valuable consideration” used by some Institutional writers does not suggest that consideration 
is needed in constituting a contract. This can be observed from Bell’s Principles (1839) when he explained 
gratuitous and onerous obligations. He noted: “[t]he word onerous in contradistinction to gratuitous, is used 
in the law of Scotland, as synonymous with the English phrase “for a valuable consideration”.44 Thus, Bell 






(c) Contemporary writers 
 
During the twentieth century, a number of writers sought to contribute to Scots 
promissory theory. It is therefore interesting to assess whether their contributions to the 




In Gloag’s The Law of Contract, the reference to promissory law is very brief. There is no 
single chapter in the book that belongs to the topic of promise. The section on unilateral 
obligation is part of the chapter on “Requisites of Contract”. 45 The subjects of a promise 
to keep offers open and proof of promises are discussed in the chapter “Formation of 
Contract”46 and the chapter “Onerous and Gratuitous Contracts”,47 respectively. Thus, 
there is not much doctrinal analysis of promissory law that can be drawn from Gloag’s 
account. 
 
However, Gloag has provided a number of new analyses for contractual theories. For 
example, he explained the notion of patrimonial interest as a basis of contract which the 
courts will enforce. 48  Moreover, when discussing the idea of an agreement, two 
definitions of an agreement are provided.49 The first definition is grounded in Pothier’s50, 
Stair’s51, Erskine’s52 and Bell’s53 accounts.54  The second definition is from Pollock55, an 
English writer.56 The idea in the second definition regarding an “act in the law” was also 
adopted in Scots law as a result of case law57 in 1910.58 Gloag’s work reflects a closer 
relationship to English legal tradition than does Stair’s work. In short, like the case of 
Institutional writers after Stair, Gloag placed more focus on contractual theories, but less 
                                                 
45 Gloag, Contract at 1-15. 
46 Ibid at 35-36. 
47 Ibid at 48-65. 
48 Ibid at 9. 
49 Ibid at 6. 
50 Pothier, Obligations §3. 
51 Stair, Inst 1.10.1. 
52 Erskine, Inst 3.2.3. 
53 Bell, Prin §7. 
54 Gloag, Contract 6. 
55 F Pollock, Principles of Contract, 9th edn, 2. 
56 Gloag, Contract 6. 
57 Millen & Somerville, Ltd (Liquidators of) v Millen, 1910, SC 868 (per Lord Kinnear), as cited by Gloag 
in Ibid. 





on promise. He provided a useful analysis for contractual theories, but did not do so for a 
promissory analysis. 
 
(ii) TB Smith 
 
In turn, TB Smith, who published his Short Commentary half a century after Gloag’s, is 
more conservative in relation to the traditional scholarship of the ius commune. He 
devoted a chapter to the account of promissory obligation. The historical development of 
the promissory doctrine and the relevant debates within the ius commune are discussed at 
great length. Although Smith’s theory of the fundamental basis of promissory obligations 
mainly follows that of Stair, the part of his promissory account that cannot be found in 
Stair’s account relates to the view of a promissory obligation within the scope of a juristic 
act. 
 
As noted, Smith classified unilateral juristic acts on the one hand and bilateral juristic acts 
on the other. A promise belongs to the former, “where effect is given to a single will”.59 ”. 
A contract falls within the scope of the latter because it “involve[s] the concurrence of the 
plurality of wills.”60  Although a contract may appear in a unilateral form, a unilateral 
contract is distinctive from a unilateral promise because “no obligation is created in the 
former case [unilateral contract] until offer has been met by acceptance, and performance 
must thereafter be accepted”.61 
 
Moreover, what Smith has achieved is his contribution in emphasising the value of the 
promissory doctrine. He made references to JQT, promises to keep an offer open and 
promises of reward, each of which can be analysed using a unilateral promissory 
approach.62 The discussion of promises of reward is much longer than the others. The 
reason for this is probably because, after the famous English Carlill63 case in 1893, there 
appeared to be a tendency for the Scottish courts to decide reward cases based on a 
                                                 
59 Smith, Short Commentary 284. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid at 746-751. 





contractual analysis. Smith then argued that a promissory analysis can be perfectly 
applied to the reward case which also produces a more satisfactory outcome.64  
 
(iii) Concluding remarks 
 
Smith’s promissory analysis is more valuable than that of any Institutional writers after 
Stair and modern commentators such as Gloag. His evaluation of a unilateral juristic act 
is especially useful for an analysis of the way the term “unilateral” is used in Scots law. 
Within the framework of juristic acts, a promise can be clearly distinguished from a 
contract as different kinds of juristic acts. In addition, Smith’s focus on promise shows 
that there was an attempt to make this doctrine more attractive. The promissory doctrine 
was well set out by Stair, who was inspired by, among other things, the ius commune 
tradition. However, afterwards, the importance of the doctrine began to decline. This 
decline appears to have been caused by, inter alia, the influence of English law. Given 
that TB Smith was, broadly speaking, well-known for being a conservative and nationalist 
Scots lawyer65, it comes as no surprise that he wanted Scots law on the area of promise to 
return to its roots.  
 
(3) Unilaterality of promise 
 
It is worth explaining what “unilaterality”66 means in Scots law. In general, a unilateral 
obligation, as opposed to a bilateral obligation, may have more than one meaning. Firstly, 
it refers to an obligation which is made by merely one party, without the requirement of 
an act performed by the other party.67 Secondly, it can be an obligation in which only one 
party is obliged to perform the obligation.68  
 
In Scots law, each definition of a unilateral obligation is compatible with the nature of a 
promise. As can be seen from Stair’s account, a promissory obligation can be constituted 
                                                 
64 Smith, Short Commentary 747-751. 
65 E.g. Smith expressed his concern that English influence could undermine the doctrine of promise. He 
wrote: “we are in danger of confusing and frustrating one of the most valuable doctrine of our law of 
obligations–the unilateral juristic act by bare promise or pollicitatio (as contrasted with contract or 
agreement)”. TB Smith, “Strange Gods: The Crisis of Scots Law as a Civilian System”, in TB Smith, 
Studies Critical and Comparative (1962) 72 at 86. 
66 In this context, “unilaterality” refers to the quality of being unilateral.  






by the only will of the promisor. Hence, it is compatible with the first definition of 
unilaterality. The second definition is also suitable for the situation in Scots law because a 
promisee is obliged for nothing but to be benefited from the performance of the thing 
promised.  
 
To conclude, the unilateral nature of a promise in Scots law means that the promissory 
obligation can be created by one party and that only the party who creates the obligation 
is bound to perform it. This is also compatible with the fact that a promise is classified 
within the scope of juristic acts as a unilateral juristic act: it can be created by the will of 
one party. 
 
(4) Will theory in Scots law 
 
(a) Will theory from the perspective of an analysis of voluntary obligation 
 
The role of the will theory in Scots law can be clearly found from Stair’s analysis of 
conventional obligations. Stair divided obligations into two categories. First, an 
“obediential obligation” arises from the will of God and the law of nature.69 Second, a 
“conventional obligation”70 arises from the will and consent of individuals.71 Contract and 
promise are regarded as conventional obligations because they are made by the consent of 
human beings. He wrote: 
“Conventional obligations do arise from our will and consent, for, as in the 
beginning hath been shown, the will is the only faculty constituting rights, 
whether from him to the acquirer. so in personal rights, that freedom we have of 
disposal of ourselves, our actions and things, which naturally is in us, is by our 
engagement placed in another, and so engagement is a diminution of freedom, 
constituting that power in another…. ”72 
 
Stair’s account of conventional obligation is deeply rooted in the will theory. In Stair’s 
explanation, one can understand that a promissory obligation has its origin in the will of 
the person who undertook the obligation. 
 
                                                 
69 Stair, Inst 1.10.1. 
70 In modern Scots law the term “voluntary obligation” is widely used instead of the term “conventional 
obligation”. See Smith, Short Commentary 284, McBryde, Promises 1; MacQueen & Thomson, Contract, 
Ch 2; Hogg, Obligations; Sellar, Promise 253, 267; Gordley, Promise 48. 
71 Stair, Inst 1.10.1. 





Similarly, TB Smith explained that a juristic act “depend[s] on the manifestation of 
wills”.73 He wrote: 
“If this is expressed by persons of full capacity in the form required by the law for 
the category of act in question, and contemplates a lawful object, the freedom of 
the declarant to act as he pleases thereafter is restricted to the extent he himself 
has willed in his declaration.”74  
 
Also, in the Regus (Maxim) case earlier discussed, the court stated: “[a promise] acquires 
its binding force by reason of the declarant's expression of his will to be bound.”75 Both 
the explanations of Smith and the court in Regus (Maxim) imply that a promissory 
obligation is based on the will of the person who performs the promissory obligation. 
 
(b) Will theory from the perspective of remedies 
 
The role of will theory in relation to promise may also be observed from the perspective 
of remedies. This perspective, however, requires us to discuss remedies in Scots contract 
law first. As argued by Hogg, “will theory is more easily supported in Scots law because 
of the importance placed upon performance remedies (specific implement is the primary 
remedy in Scots Law, rather than damages)…”76 
 
Before considering Hogg’s argument, it is helpful to explain the general theory regarding 
the role of specific implement in Scots contract law. While specific implement is 
described as the primary remedy as can be seen from Hogg’s statement above, McBryde 
argues that, both in theory and practice, an aggrieved party is “not bound to seek 
implement but may seek damages”.77 Therefore, “neither damages nor implement (nor 
any other remedy) have automatic priority”.78 
 
Initially, it seems that Hogg and McBryde’s views fundamentally contradict each other, 
given that the former considers the role of specific implement as the primary remedy 
whereas the latter suggests the contrary. However, the difference between these two 
views may be more subtle than substantial. It appears that Hogg uses the term “primary 
                                                 
73 Smith, Short Commentary 284. He cited Stair, Inst 1.10.1. 
74 Ibid. 
75 [2013] CSIH 12 at para 33. 
76 M Hogg, “Perspectives on Contract Theory from a Mixed Legal System” (2009) 29(3) OxJLS 643 at 666. 
77 W W McBryde, “Remedies for Breach of Contract” (1996) 1 EdinLR 43 at 49. 





remedy” to mean that it is an entitlement that applies in every case unless there are 
reasons to exclude it. Thus, he perhaps does not suggest that the primary remedy has 
priority over damages. McBryde, however, seems to imply that it means that one remedy 
has “priority” over another. This suggests that these two writers use the term in two 
different senses, thus they can be actually reconciled. Hence, it is perhaps more 
appropriate to refer to specific implement as the “primary right of the creditor”.79 This 
approach is found in the court’s statement in Highland and Universal Properties Ltd v 
Safeway Properties Ltd80. Lord Penrose stated: “[i]n Scotland there is no doubt that—
unlike the position in England—a party to a contractual obligation is, in general, entitled 
to enforce that obligation by decree for specific implement as a matter of right...”81  
 
As argued by Hogg, “Scots contract law can withstand the criticism that contracts are 
really only about making reparation for breach”.82  This same analysis can also apply to 
the case of promissory law. By way of analogy, promissory obligations are not merely 
about compensating the promisee, but rather about enforcing the performance of the 
obligation which has been promised. This key characteristic is compatible with the nature 
of promissory obligation. A promise is a unilateral obligation which a promisee can 
choose either to enforce or to reject. Hence, if a promisee chooses to enforce the promise, 
it means that he/she wishes to demand the performance of what was promised. In fact, 
given that a promisee is not bound to perform any obligation, it is more natural for an 
aggrieved promisee to use specific implement, rather than seeking damages. It would be 
rather strange if the promisee were to seek damages if the performance of what was 






                                                 
79 Smith, Short Commentary 854; See also MacQueen & Thomson, Contract para 6.6 and L Macgregor, 
“Specific Implement in Scots Law”, in J Smits et al (eds), Specific Performance in Contract Law: National 
and Other Perspectives (2008) 67 at 70. 
80 2000 SC 297. 
81 Ibid at 309; Lord Rodger stated: “even where the obligation of the debtor is to do something, the basic 
rule is that the creditor has a choice of remedies: he may either seek specific implement of the obligation or 
damages.” Ibid at 299. 






(c) Concluding remarks 
 
The role of the will theory in Scots promissory law can be viewed from two different 
perspectives, the first of which is Stair’s promissory account, which is rooted in the will 
theory. This can be observed from his explanation that promissory obligations arise from 
the will of the promisor. The second perspective by which the role of will theory can be 
viewed is remedies. In jurisdictions where damages are the primary remedy, it can be 
argued that the law of voluntary obligation is not compatible with the will theory on the 
grounds that it merely refers to compensation, i.e. not enforcing the actual obligation of 
the parties. Scots promissory law can defend itself against the criticism that the law is 
only concerned with compensating the aggrieved party: the fact that the promisee has the 
right to enforce the promised obligation shows that Scots law enforces the actual 
obligation made by the will of the parties, thus demonstrating the compatibility of 
promissory law with the will theory. 
 
(5) The doctrine of third party rights 
 
A jus quaesitum tertio (“JQT”) also shares some similarities with promise. Stair 
explained that promises to create rights in favour of persons who are not yet born or who 
are absent can be enforceable.83  Stair’s approach of characterising JQT as a promise in 
favour of a third beneficiary is supported by contemporary scholars such as TB Smith,84 
MacQueen85 and Hogg.86  The fact that a promise is binding without acceptance helps to 
explain why JQT in Scots law is enforceable regardless of the beneficiary’s acceptance. 
This is different from third party rights in other systems, in which the rights of 
beneficiaries come into existence when they express their intention to take the benefit, i.e. 
to accept the offer of a contract.87 
 
                                                 
83 Stair, Inst 1.10.4 
84 Smith, Short Commentary 746-747 
85 H L MacQueen, “Third Party Rights in Contract: Jus Quaesitum Tertio” in K Reid & R Zimmermann, A 
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86 Hogg, Promises 305-307. 
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Nonetheless, some propose that JQT is not promissory in nature.88 McBryde, for instance, 
suggests that JQT should be regarded as “an independent right, which shares some of the 
characteristics of other contractual rights but also has special features.”89 Moreover, it 
appears that some of the requirements for a JQT that have been developed do not apply to 
an ordinary promise. For instance, as proposed by Gloag, an intention to confer a right for 
a third party beneficiary in JQT may be either express or implied.90 This rule does not 
apply to an ordinary unilateral promise. As the later discussion will show, the constitution 
of a unilateral obligation must be expressed in clear terms.91 
 
To conclude, traditionally a JQT is analysed using a promissory analysis. However, there 
is a modern debate over whether or not a JQT is promissory in nature. Also, some of the 
requirements for a JQT that have developed do not apply to a unilateral promise. 
 
(6) Gratuitousness of promise 
 
Fundamentally, it is suggested that promises are always gratuitous. Whether an obligation 
is gratuitous or onerous is determined when it is first constituted. This approach had been 
suggested by certain of the Institutional writers, e.g. Erskine92 and Bankton.93 This view 
is also supported by the Scottish Law Commission.94 Subsequently, this approach has 
been adopted by a number of contemporary scholars. TB Smith, for instance, explained 
that gratuitous juristic acts include “a donation and promise.”95 MacQueen argues that all 
promises are gratuitous by explaining that a unilateral statement cannot bind anyone else 
to do anything.96 This conviction is also shared by Hogg,97 Black98 and Sellar.99  
 
                                                 
88 For an analysis see H L MacQueen, “Third Party Rights in Contract: Jus Quaesitum Tertio” in K Reid & 
R Zimmermann, A History of Private Law in Scotland: Volume 2: Obligations (2000) esp sections IV-XI. 
89 McBryde, Contract para 10-07. 
90 Gloag, Contract 236. 
91 For further discussion see Chapter VI, A. THE NATURE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF PROMISE, 
(1) Scots law, (b) Words used for promissory liability. 
92  “Where nothing is to be given or performed but upon one part, and which are therefore always 
gratuitous” Erskine, Inst 3.2.1. 
93 Bankton, Insti 1.11.2. 
94  Memorandum, Constitution and Proof of Voluntary Obligations: Formalities of Constitution and 
Restrictions on Proof (Scot Law Com No 39, 1977) 41. 
95 Smith, Short Commentary 284. 
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Conversely, some argue that promises can either be gratuitous or non-gratuitous. For 
instance, Cross proposed that a promise may be onerous.100 A promise is gratuitous where 
only the promisor undertakes an obligation. Gloag suggested that a promise can be non-
gratuitous by giving an example of a promise to keep an offer open for a specified 
period.101 McBryde argues, by using promissory notes and banker’s irrevocable credits as 
examples of non-gratuitous promises, that not all promises are gratuitous. 102  Also, 
Thomson103 explains that a promise is gratuitous only where the promisor receives no 
benefit from the promisee.104  
 
This thesis supports the theory that promises are not always gratuitous. Firstly, the terms 
“gratuitous” and “unilateral” do not necessarily have the same meaning, especially in the 
Scottish legal context. This may be usefully compared with the idea of unilateral contracts 
in relation to gratuitous contracts in the Civilian tradition, which is different from the 
usage in Scots law. In the Civil Law, a unilateral contract will arise from the agreement of 
the contracting parties. However, only one party has a duty to perform an obligation. For 
example, gratuitous loan is deemed to be a unilateral contract.105 In this context, unilateral 
contracts can also be called “gratuitous contracts” because they are always gratuitous.106 
Therefore, in the context of Civilian contract law, “unilateral” and “gratuitous” tend to 
have the same meaning. Scots legal commentators tend to refer to a contract in which 
only one party is required to perform an action (i.e. unilateral contract in the Civilian 
sense) as a “gratuitous” contract. They, however, tend not to refer to this kind of contract 
as a unilateral contract or unilateral obligation. 107  Rather, the term “unilateral 
contract” 108 is normally applied to the English legal concept, which, in many 
circumstances, equates to the notion of promise in Scots law. 109  As for the term 
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101 Gloag, Contract 25. 
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“unilateral obligation”, it is normally applied to a promise.110 Thus, in the Scottish legal 
context, unilateral obligation, namely a promise, does not necessarily mean a gratuitous 
obligation, given that unilateral and gratuitous do not necessarily mean the same thing. 
 
Moreover, as the later discussion will show, a number of commercial transactions can be 
characterised as promises.111 This illustrates that business transactions are often structured 
using a number of connected contracts or obligations. While one obligation initially looks 
gratuitous when it is looked at on its own, when it is placed in its context within the 
transaction as a whole it is not gratuitous. A promise, while in itself unilateral, can be 
used to form part of a wider series of transactions in which the promisor intends to make 
some gain if the promise is accepted. For example, a pre-contractual undertaking (e.g. 
promises attached to invitations to tenders) is a unilateral promise that is intended to 
follow at the contractual stage. A firm offer is a gain which the offeror intends to make if 
the party in receipt of the firm offer accepts it. Also, a landlord who unilaterally grants a 
tenant an option to purchase the property intends to make a gain in a sale if the tenant 
exercises it. In these circumstances the person who unilaterally makes a promise intends 
to make some gain, suggesting that the nature of the obligation itself is not gratuitous.  
 
Furthermore, the approach of regarding a promise as either onerous or gratuitous supports 
the application of the doctrine. According to this theory, not all promises are required to 
be made in a written form. Rather, it depends on whether or not the promisor gains some 
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B. THEORIES AND DOCTRINES RELATING TO PROMISES IN THAI LAW 
  
(1) The notion of a juristic act 
 
Juristic acts are “voluntary lawful acts, the immediate purpose of which is to establish 
between persons relations, to create, modify, transfer, preserve or extinguish rights.”112 
Different juristic acts can be distinguished in a variety of ways. For example, a distinction 
can be made between inter vivos juristic acts (e.g. gifts) and mortis causa juristic acts 
(e.g. wills).113 Also, juristic acts can be distinguished based on the side of the declarant 
who creates the juristic act. There are two main types of juristic acts in this category.114  
 
First, “unilateral juristic acts” are juristic acts in which the person making the act alone 
declares his/her intention and that declaration has a legal effect regardless of any 
acceptance.115 Unilateral juristic acts can be further categorised into two groups, namely, 
unilateral juristic acts that require to be communicated to the recipient and unilateral 
juristic acts that do not require to be communicated. Examples of the former include the 
declaration of termination of contract116 and the declaration to set aside avoidable juristic 
act.117 An example of the latter is the declaration to make a will.118 
 
Second, “bilateral juristic acts” are acts which have legal effects when two persons make 
their declarations of intention.119 Thai commentators are of the view that a contract is a 
bilateral juristic act. They explain contract as based upon an agreement. 120  As for 
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promise, there is a debate amongst Thai lawyers as to whether a promise is a unilateral or 
a bilateral juristic act, as discussed below. 
 
(2) Promissory theory as explained by Thai writers 
 
(a) Controversies over legal status of promise 
 
The number of scholars who make a contribution to the law of promise is fewer than to 
that of contract law. Some explain the notion of promise briefly.121 Some merely make 
reference to promises to make a contract.122  This is likely to be because this type of 
promise is linked to contract. A unified concept of promise was therefore seldom 
discussed in literature. Amongst scholars who make a contribution to scholarship on 
promises, there has been much controversy over the juristic nature of promise. 
 
Firstly, some suggest that promises are unilateral contracts (or bilateral juristic acts). 
Saenguthai explains that a promise of sale is a contract between two parties, but only one 
party is bound. 123 Prokati124 suggests that a promise is a unilateral contract having a 
condition precedent. When a condition is fulfilled, the contract will take effect and then 
the promisor is bound to do as he/she has promised. 
 
Secondly, it is argued that promises are “unilateral juristic acts”. Tingsabadh explains that 
a promise creates an obligation binding a promisor to perform the obligation before the 
contract is concluded.125 Sotthibandhu explains that in general promises are unilateral 
juristic acts.126 Pramoj127 explicitly disagrees with the view that promises are unilateral 
                                                                                                                                                  
Juristic Acts and Contracts [LA 101]), Faculty of Law, Thammasat University, 6, available at 
http://www.law.tu.ac.th/teacher/kittisak-prokati. 
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contracts. When a promisee acknowledges a promise, it has not been accepted yet. Thus, 
there is no concluded contract. If a promise is regarded as a unilateral contract, this would 
suggest that a contract can be concluded by the consent of one party only, which in fact it 
is not possible128 because “one hand cannot clap loud.”129 Nevertheless, amongst those 
who are of the view that promises are unilateral juristic acts, there is a disagreement 
between them as to whether a promise requires a communication to the promisee or not. 





The issue under discussion concerns the fundamental basis of promise. Each theory 
places promises in different positions in the framework of juristic acts. However, if one 
thoroughly considers the features of promise in Thai law, it would be found that a 
promise produces legal effects regardless of the mutual consent of the parties. First, as 
discussed, a promise of reward is binding once it is made. The knowledge of the promisee 
regarding the existence of the reward is not essential.131 Therefore, a promise of reward is 
not a bilateral juristic act, given that the person who fulfils a specific act can claim the 
reward even if he/she was not aware of its existence. 
 
Second, in the case of promise of sale, the promisee has to accept the promise by giving 
his/her notice to the promisor so that a contract of sale is concluded. However, the 
promise of sale itself does not require mutual consent from both parties.132 Therefore, the 
juristic nature of a promise of sale is clearly not a bilateral juristic act. It binds the party 
who made it without the consent of the other party.  
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The feature of promise of sale under Thai law may be usefully compared with that of 
French law, which is a bilateral juristic act because it requires an agreement from both 
parties.133 Recall that the provision of promise of sale under Thai law was inspired by 
three foreign sources, namely French, Swiss and Japanese law. However, the 
characteristics of promise of sale under the Thai Code are closer to the Japanese concept: 
a binding promise of sale can be made by either the seller or the buyer. The fact that 
French law is a source of the Thai concept may have convinced some scholars that the 
juristic nature of promise of sale under Thai law is similar to that of French law. 
However, in fact they have different characteristics. 
 
To conclude, a promise is a unilateral juristic act on the basis that it arises from the 
intention of one party only. This is different from a unilateral contract which must be 
made by two persons. Additionally, the notion of juristic acts enhances the understanding 
of this feature of promises and contracts under Thai law. Although promises are not a 
free-standing legal obligation and exist alongside contracts, they are distinguished from 
contracts within the framework of juristic acts. 
 
(3) Unilaterality of promise 
 
As noted, the unilaterality of an obligation can be viewed in two different senses. In Thai 
law, a promise is also a unilateral obligation in the first sense. Both a promise of reward 
and a promise of sale can be unilaterally created by the promisor’s will. Also, a promise 
in Thai law is compatible with the second sense of unilaterality that only the promisor is 
bound. Like the case of Scots law, both definitions of unilaterality are compatible with the 
unilateral obligation of promise under Thai law. Hence, although promises are not 
regarded as a freestanding ground of liability, Thai law is not unfamiliar with the idea of 






                                                 





(4) Will theory in Thai law 
 
(a) Will theory from the perspective of an analysis of voluntary obligation 
 
The notion of freedom of contract is an important basis of Thai contract law.134 Freedom 
of contract is related to will theory, which was dominant in the nineteenth century and 
still has a strong influence.135 In Thailand will theory is generally perceived as a doctrine 
which permits individuals to make a contract freely.  Moreover, it is generally explained 
by Thai lawyers that a contract generally arises when the wills of two or more parties 
coincide.136  
 
Legal commentators do not explicitly discuss the role of will theory in the law of promise 
because, as one might expect, promises are not a main source of voluntary obligations. 
Nonetheless, the connection between will theory and the law of promise may be observed 
from the perspective of some controversies about the law of promise. 
 
As noted in Chapter IV, the Thai Code contains provisions regarding promise of sale and 
promise of a gift. This causes ambiguities whether or not an individual can make 
promises to enter into other types of contract than sale and gift. One might argue that, for 
example, if the Code is intended to permit individuals to make promises to enter into 
other types of contracts, then promise of sale and promise of a gift should not be 
specified. There has been no writer who expressly suggests that promises to enter into 
other types of contract than promises of sale and promises of a gift should not be 
enforceable. However, most writers acknowledge this uncertainty in Thai law.137 Most 
commentators, nevertheless, suggest that an individual can make promises to enter into 
any type of contract as a result of the theory of autonomy of individual will.138 Since will 
theory plays an important role in contract law, individuals should have the freedom to 
make a promise to enter into any kind of contracts that they wish to enter into.139 The 
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Thai courts also support this view.  There have been a number of cases in which the court 
decided that a promise of lease, which is not recognised by the Code, was enforceable.140   
 
Sethabutr has a unique approach in explaining the issue under discussion by making 
reference to English and French law. First, he explains that in English law a bare promise 
is unenforceable because consideration is required.141 Second, he explains that in the 
Civilian systems such as France a promise to enter into a contract is a unilateral juristic 
act recognised by law.142 Hence, by analogy, such a promise is enforceable as a result of 
the general theory of juristic acts in Thai law (§149), although those promises are not 
specified under the Code.143 However, he argues that a promise to enter into a contract 
where, (i) the promisor receives no benefits and (ii) the contract in which the promise is 
intended to enter into is a gratuitous contract such as gratuitous loan, should not be 
enforceable. He reasons that there is no justification why this kind of promise should be 
enforceable because it is more like the matter of hospitality or kindness between 
parties.144 However, where a promisor receives benefits or where there is a contract in 
which a promise is made to enter into is a commutative contract e.g. sale, then the 
promise is enforceable.145 It appears that Sethabutr is inspired by both English and French 
law in reaching this conclusion. 
 
Sethabutr’s explanation is not satisfactory. It is clear that, under Thai law, there is no 
requirement of consideration. Also, if a promise to enter into an onerous contract is 
enforceable according to the theory of autonomy of will, there is no theoretical objection 
why a promise to enter into a gratuitous one should not be enforceable. In fact, the 
reference that Sethabutr made to French law is not entirely correct. Recall that a promise 
to enter into a contract under French law requires mutual agreement between two 
parties.146 Therefore, if a promise is classified as a kind of juristic acts147 under French 
law, it cannot be a unilateral juristic act.  
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(b) Will theory from the perspective of remedies 
 
In Thai law, there are two main types of remedies, namely specific performances and 
damages. The Thai Code states: “If a debtor fails to perform his obligation, the creditor 
may make a demand to the Court for compulsory performance, except where the nature of 
the obligation does not permit it.”148 As for damages, the Code states: “When the debtor 
does not perform the obligation in accordance with the true intent and purpose of the 
same, the creditor may claim compensation for any damages caused thereby.” 149  Thai 
scholars therefore explain that specific performance is the right of the pursuer.150 Thus, 
like the analysis of Scots law, one can argue that promissory obligations in Thai law are 
not merely about compensating an aggrieved promisee, but rather about enforcing the 
performance of the obligation that has been promised. 
 
(c) Concluding remarks 
 
Will theory plays an important role in the law of promise. This can be observed from two 
perspectives. First, it permits individuals to make a promise to enter into other kinds of 
contract than promises of sale and promises of a gift. The second is observable from the 
perspective of the remedy. The law of promise lends itself to criticism for only being 
about compensating the aggrieved promisee. 
 
(5) The doctrine of third party rights 
 
A third party right is viewed as a contract.151 Unlike Scots law, the concept is not linked 
to the notion of unilateral obligations. A beneficiary has to declare his/her intention to 
acquire the right.152 The declaration of the third party is equivalent to a declaration to 
accept an offer in the case of a regular contract. Thus, as long as a beneficiary has not yet 
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come into existence, the contracting parties can always revoke it.153 The Thai approach on 
third party right is similar to that of French law, as previously discussed.154 
 
(6) Gratuitousness of promise 
 
The idea of gratuitousness is discussed in the wider scope of juristic acts. Juristic acts can 
be distinguished by reference to, inter alia, benefits received by parties. 155  First, a 
“commutative juristic act” is where each of the parties gives and receives benefits. 
Benefits may be in the form of payments, properties or other performances such as 
sale.156  Second, a “gratuitous juristic act”157 is where only one of the parties receives 
benefits e.g. gifts, loans for use, and wills.158  It appears that an important factor of being 
a commutative, or non-gratuitous, juridical act is that each of the parties gives and gains 
an equivalent. This suggests that whether a juristic act is gratuitous or non-gratuitous 
depends on whether or not both parties gain or receive benefits. In short, Thai law does 
not consider “gratuitousness” from the moment that a juristic act is constituted, but rather 
from its actual nature. Thus, a promise under Thai law is not always gratuitous. 
 
C. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF PROMISE IN SCOTS LAW AND THAI 
LAW: COMPARISON 
 
(1) The notion of a juristic act 
 
Both systems recognise the notion of a juristic act, but its role in Thai law is clearer than 
in Scots law. The definition of a juristic act appears to be similar in both systems, as 
illustrated by TB Smith and the definition in the Thai Code. Specifically, juristic acts are 
classified as being unilateral and bilateral in both systems. Most importantly, a promise 
belongs to the former, whereas a contract belongs to the latter. 
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(2) Unilateral nature of a promise 
 
Although the roles of promise within the obligational framework in Scots and Thai law 
differ, the idea of unilaterality is compatible with the nature of promises in both systems. 
In Scots law, a promise is made by one party and only that party is obliged to perform the 
obligation. Although in Thai law promise is not regarded as a separate legal institution 
from contract, it is binding without acceptance, which reflects the fact that it can be 
unilaterally created. Also, only the promisor has an obligation to perform what he/she has 
promised. Therefore, Thai law has not been antagonistic to the notion that unilateral 
declarations of will can create obligations. This is something which even some Civilian 
jurisdictions, e.g. France, do not have. French and Scots law may be similar to each other 
in a number of aspects of their doctrine of obligations. However, when it comes to the 
idea of a declaration of will as a source of obligation, the French approach fundamentally 
contradicts the Scots approach. 
 
(3) The role of will theory 
 
Will theory also has a substantive role to play in both jurisdictions. The role of will theory 
in Scots law can be traced from Stair’s idea explaining that a promissory obligation is an 
exercise of the will. As for Thai law, it can be observed from the fact that will theory 
permits individuals to make a promise to enter into any kind of contract, not strictly to 
only promises of sale and promises of a gift (which are specified in the Code).  
 
Moreover, will theory can be observed from the perspective of remedies. Specific 
implement/performance is the primary remedy in both systems in the sense it is the right 
of the pursuer to choose whether to enforce the performance or damages. Therefore, 
promissory obligations in both systems are not merely about compensating the aggrieved 











(4) The doctrine of third party rights 
 
While in Scots law JQT is traditionally analysed using a promissory analysis, under Thai 
law the concept of third party right is seen as contractual in nature. Thai law adopted the 
doctrine from Continental European systems, which had been inspired by Grotius’ 
promissory account. Therefore, this difference stems from different attitudes towards 
promissory obligations between Stair and Grotius.  
 
Moreover, this difference may arise from the fact that in Scots law promise is a free- 
standing legal obligation. Therefore, the scope of promissory obligation in Scots law is 
wide enough to cover some concepts such as third party rights. However, under Thai law, 
unilateral promise is only recognised in certain limited circumstances. Thus, if the law 
does not clearly state that an obligation is a promise, Thai lawyers would not analyse it by 
using a unilateral approach. 
 
(5) Gratuitousness of promise 
 
In Scots law, there is a debate over whether promises are always gratuitous. There is no 
consensus amongst Scots lawyers because they view the issue from different angles. 
While the first theory considers gratuitousness from the moment that the promissory 
obligation comes into existence, the second theory looks at whether the promisor has 
gained anything or not. The second theory is preferred in this thesis, based on the 
argument that unilateral nature and gratuitousness are not necessarily similar. In addition, 
a promise is often used to form part of a wider series of transactions in which the 
promisor intends to make some gain if the promise is accepted. 
 
In Thailand, the idea of gratuitousness is discussed in the wider scope of juristic acts 
which can also apply to promises. The main condition of being a non-gratuitous juristic 
acts under Thai law is that both parties receive benefits. This suggests that Thai law does 
not consider the gratuitousness of a juristic act from the moment when it comes into 
existence, but rather from the actual nature of the obligation. Therefore, this thesis 









There are certain resemblances between Scots and Thai law in promissory theories and 
the obligational nature of a promise, which suggest that the underlying basis of the 
promissory obligation between the two systems is similar. 
 
Firstly, both systems recognise the concept of a juristic act, which can be classified into a 
unilateral juristic act (which involves promise) and a bilateral juristic act (which involves 
contract). Secondly, the studied systems both accept the notion that an obligation can be 
created by a unilateral act of will and that only one party is obliged to fulfil an obligation. 
Thirdly, will theory plays an important role in promissory law of both systems. Fourthly, 
according to the preferred approach of this thesis, promises in both systems can be either 
gratuitous or non-gratuitous. The only difference in the theories that relate to promise 
between these two systems is the relationship between promises and third party rights. 
However, this difference is perhaps fairly insignificant, given that Scots law does not 
entirely accept that the third party right is promissory in nature. All of these 
commonalities illustrate that the underlying basis of promissory law in both of the studied 
systems is fundamentally similar. 
 
Moreover, the discovery in this chapter confirms what has been argued in Chapter II: not 
only are Scots and Thai law a mixture of the Civil and Common Law traditions, but there 
are also certain similarities in promissory theories between them. This is likely to benefit 
a comparative analysis of these two jurisdictions, given that they already share important 
commonalities in their fundamental basis of promissory obligations. 
 
Nonetheless, there are certain issues in which Thai law appears to have a more precise 
approach than Scots law. For example, Thai law has a clearer general theory of juristic 
acts. The discussion in this chapter shows that this general theory enhances the 
understanding of the actual legal nature of a promise in Thai law. In addition, although 
the discussion regarding gratuitousness of promise does not exist, this can be achieved by 
an analogy of the idea of the gratuitousness of a juristic act. Thus, that there may be some 






A comparative treatment of the relations between Scots law and Thai law on some other 
important aspects of promise will be particularly provided in the next chapter. This 
requires us to investigate deeply whether or not the attitude of Scots law towards 
unilateral obligations as a main source of obligations can improve the theoretical structure 







Promise in Scots Law and Thai Law: Comparative Perspectives 
 
This chapter compares the concept of promise between the studied systems. There 
are five aspects which are focused on, namely (i) its nature and characteristics, (ii) 
communication, (iii) acceptance and rejection (iv) legal effects and (v) promises to 
keep offers open. The chapter also refers to the role of unilateral promise under the 
DCFR. 
 
A. THE NATURE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF PROMISE 
 
(1) Scots law 
 
(a) Promise as distinguished from other types of expressions 
 
(i) Expressions which have no legal effects 
 
There are some types of expressions which may be somewhat similar to promises in 
the sense that they express a person’s intention to undertake to do something. 
However, a person who uses these expressions has no intention to be legally bound 
by these expressions. Therefore, these expressions have no legal effect. 
 
Firstly, an expression of a “resolution’” does not confer an obligation. In Kincaid v 
Dickson,1 the court held that an oath of a person was merely an expression of a 
resolution, not a promise to pay a sum of money.2 In Ilona (Countess of Cawdor) v 
Vaughan (Earl of Cawdor),3 (henceforth: Cawdor v Cawdor) a husband and a wife 
(the Countess) were members of a pension scheme (the No 1 Scheme). At a formal 
meeting they instructed the trustees of the No 1 Scheme to transfer “an equitable 
share of the scheme’s assets” to the No 2 Scheme. The Countess claimed that a 
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promise had been made by the trustees of the No 1 Scheme in favour of the trustees 
of the No 2 Scheme. However, it was held that the statement made at the meeting 
was merely an indication of a future intention. As noted in Chapter V, the court in 
this case relied on Stair’s account of three acts of will: only the third act, namely 
engagement, leads to a binding obligation. Although the meeting between the parties 
was formal, the court was of the view that the professional advice given by the 
defenders did not go any further than the stage of resolution. The court was 
influenced by the fact found from the case that the defenders “decided that they 
would comply”4 with the pursuer’s request. This fact suggests that the defenders’ 
expression had not reached the stage of engagement, given that it was still in their 
power to choose to do or not to do as the pursuers requested. 
 
More recently, in MacDonald v Cowie's Executrix Nominate,5 the pursuer averred 
that the letter given by Mrs Hazel Moir, his grandmother who had died, created a 
binding promise to make an inter vivos gift of the deceased’s house in his favour. 
The contents of the letter appeared as “I have promised to give him this house for 
many years because of the work he has done in looking after the property and the 
kindness he has always shown to me…” By referring to Stair’s account regarding 
three acts of will, the court concluded that the deceased’s intention did not pass from 
the stage of resolution to the stage of engagement. In reaching this conclusion, the 
court construed from the words of the letter. As Lord Tyre explained: 
“"I …wish to give" is the language of resolution, ie expression of intention, 
and not of disposal or immediate commitment to disposal.  "I have promised 
to give him this house for many years…" is no more than a description of 
something that may or may not have occurred in the past, and not an 
expression of a current promise or commitment.  Taken on its own, the 
Writing says no more than "It is my present intention to make a gift of the 
house to [the pursuer]"”.6   
 
In short, the tone of the language suggests that the deceased did not seriously intend 
to undertake an obligation. 
 
                                                 
4 2007 SC 285 at 290. 
5 [2015] CSOH 101. 





Secondly, a mere expression of future intention or a statement of intention is not 
obligatory.7 In Scott v Dawson,8 the defender wrote a letter to the pursuer that “[i]t is 
absolutely out of my power to pay off any of my debt to you until my return, when, if 
I find I can draw anything from the firm, I will certainly do so.” It was held that a 
general statement of intention is not sufficient to constitute a promissory obligation. 9 
In Ritchie v Cowan & Kinghorn10, C and K granted R a receipt for the payment 
“being 10s. per £1, in full [settlement] of our claim against the said Ritchie, ... it 
being, however, understood that the said Ritchie will pay the balance of 10s. per £1 
whenever he is able to do so”. It was held that the document did not impose legal 
liability. It only expressed an honourable understanding or an honourable intention 
that the debtor would pay the debt when he could.11 The circumstances of these two 
cases are similar in that they are concerned with acknowledgement of the debts. In 
both cases, the tone of the language used by the defenders was an important factor 
which convinced the court that the defenders did not intend to make a binding 
promise. In the first case, the defender wrote “if I find I can…, I will certainly do 
so”. In the second case, the receipt stated that the defender would pay the debt 
“whenever he is able to do so”. The tone of the language was not strong enough to 
suggest that they were absolute undertakings on the part of the debtors, given that the 
debtors would only pay the debt in full when they were able to do so.  
 
In Aitken v Standard Life Assurance Ltd12, the pursuer took out a pension policy with 
the defender. The defender had sent out the “Annual Statements” to the pursuer at 
least from 1998. The “Annual Statements” sent out in 2000 contained a statement 
that “You’ll get an update every year to help you review your pension needs.” 
Afterwards, the defender had failed to send out an updated policy to the pursuer 
before the pursuer made a decision to reduce the final bonus. The pursuer averred 
that the above mentioned statement made by the defender contained an implied 
contract and/or an implied promise. However, it was held that neither a contractual 
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nor promissory obligation could be inferred from the statement of the defender. Lord 
Glennie stated that the “Annual Statements” were “designed to keep the policyholder 
updated on an annual basis of the value of his policy…”13 The “Annual Statements” 
themselves, however, did not suggest that other types of document would be sent out 
every year. This suggests that people are bound to perform an obligation as a result 
of making a statement, rather than what they intended to do, i.e. evidence of an 
intention to be bound, disclosed in the language used. 
 
More recently, in Regus (Maxim) Ltd v Bank of Scotland Plc14, the pursuer expressed 
an interest that it wanted to take a sub-lease of a building at a development. The 
Bank of Scotland issued a letter to the pursuer confirming that the bank held a 
deposit on behalf of the owner of the development relating to the fit-out costs 
incurred by the pursuer when it carried out fit-out works. It was stated in the letter 
that: 
“It may assist the proposed tenant to have confirmation from us that … we 
hold the sum of £913,172 to meet the landlord's commitment to fit-out costs. 
These funds will be released in accordance with the drawdown procedure 
agreed between the parties…” 
 
The pursuer carried out the works and issued invoices but the Bank of Scotland 
refused to pay the cost. The pursuer averred, inter alia, that the letter was an 
undertaking in terms of which the bank were obliged to make payment. The court, 
however, held that the letter did not constitute a legally enforceable obligation. It was 
merely a letter of comfort which can carry a moral, but not a legal obligation. As in 
the Scott v Dawson15 and Ritchie v Cowan & Kinghorn16 cases, it appears that the 
tone of the language used by the bank was not strong enough to suggest that the bank 
absolutely undertook to make payment to the addressee of the letter.  
 
Moreover, a declaration of intention expressed by one person may lead another 
person to believe that the former has promised to undertake or perform an obligation, 
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i.e.it creates a hope or an expectation on the part of the recipient. However, such 
expressions do not amount to any binding obligation. For example, in Gray v 
Johnston,17 the pursuer claimed that he had received a proposal from the defender 
that if he lived with and looked after the defender, he would become the defender’s 
heir. The pursuer did as the defender proposed but he was not made the defender’s 
heir. It was held that there was no promise made by the defender on the grounds that 
the defender did not make anything other than an expression of intention.  The 
pursuer “acted on a spes or expectation (be it more or less justified) which was 
disappointed.”18 
 
Analysis of expressions which have no legal effect 
 
There are several kinds of expressions which can be distinguished from promises. 
They can be made either in the form of conduct, words or documents. These 
expressions are referred to by several names e.g. an expression of resolution, an 
expression of future intention, an indication of a future intention, an honourable 
understanding and a letter of comfort. Despite their different names, their 
commonality is that they reflect a person’s future intention to undertake or do 
something unilaterally. Additionally, expectations/hopes are usually created on the 
part of the recipients of these expressions. These two characteristics make the nature 
of these expressions similar to promises. As discussed, a promise is an undertaking to 
perform something in favour of another party.19  Nevertheless, what makes them 
distinct from promises is that the persons making these expressions do not intend 
themselves to be legally bound. For instance, in the Regus (Maxim)20 case discussed 
above, the letter from the bank carried a moral obligation, i.e. the bank did not intend 
to be legally bound by issuing the letter. Consequently, in reaching the conclusion 
that a person’s undertaking is a promise, the courts have to assess whether or not that 
person intended to be legally bound. 
                                                 
17 1928 SC 659. 
18 Ibid at 663 per Lord Murray’s; See also Mackersy v Davis & Sons Ltd (1895) 22 R 368. 
19  See Chapter I, C. NATURE AND REQUIREMENTS OF PROMISE (4), A promise is an 
undertaking to perform something in favour of another party. 





An objective assessment is applied by the courts when determining whether or not a 
person’s intention is sufficiently binding to be regarded as a promise.21 For instance, 
in the Regus (Maxim)22 case, under reference to Ballast plc v Laurieston Properties 
Ltd 23 , the court stated that a promissory obligation “should be approached 
objectively on the basis of what a reasonable recipient with knowledge of the 
background would have understood by the documents in question”.24 
Moreover, in determining whether a person’s declaration of intention is to make a 
promise or not, regard cannot be had merely to the nature or types of circumstances 
in which the declaration was made. For instance, in the Gray v Johnston25  case 
discussed earlier, the claim arose from the circumstance where the defender indicated 
that he would make the pursuer his heir if the pursuer looked after him. The 
pursuer’s proposal did not give rise to a promise. Nevertheless, this does not 
necessarily mean that where a person proposes to another person that the former 
would benefit the latter in some ways if the latter does him a favour then that cannot 
constitute a promissory obligation. This may be usefully compared with English 
cases which have a similar circumstances to the Gray v Johnston case, namely 
Wayling v Jones26 and Gillett v Holt.27 As will be fully discussed later, the English 
courts enforced the promise based on promissory estoppel.28 This suggests that if 
both cases arose in Scotland, the Scottish courts could simply enforce the promises, 
given that, objectively assessed, the promisors in both cases seriously intended their 
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22 [2013] CSIH 12. 
23 [2005] CSOH 16 at para 143, (as cited in Ibid at para 38). 
24 [2013] CSIH 12 at para 38 per Lord President; See also Royal Bank of Scotland Plc v William 
Derek Carlyle [2013] CSIH 75 2013 at para 54. 
25 1928 SC 659. 
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As a promise does not require an act of acceptance29, it is distinguished from an 
offer. Thus, when analysing a promise, it is then not necessary to question whether 
the promisee is a party to the obligation or not.30 However, if the expression is 
deemed an offer, it must be followed by an acceptance in order to constitute a 
complete contractual obligation. In Wylie v Grosset31, the pursuer, who participated 
in a clinical drugs trial, raised an action for compensation against the doctor, who 
was the principal investigator of the trial, and the health board. The pursuer argued 
that the defender had undertaken a unilateral obligation regarding payment of 
compensation, as provided in the patient information sheet. The significant words 
that required the court’s interpretation were as follows: 
“Compensation for any injury caused by taking part in this study will be in 
accordance with the guidelines of the Association of the British 
Pharmaceutical Industry (ABPI). Broadly speaking the ABPI guidelines 
recommend that the sponsor without legal commitment, should compensate 
you without you having to prove that it is at fault.” 
 
The court held that those words did not “amount to any sort of guarantee that 
compensation will actually be paid.”32 Consequently, the patient information sheet 
constituted merely an offer made by the defenders, and the consent form signed by 
the pursuer was the acceptance. 
 
Furthermore, the gratuitous nature of an undertaking is not the main factor in 
ascertaining whether such an undertaking is a promise or an offer. For example, in 
Smith v Oliver,33 the church’s trustees claimed that Mrs Oliver had promised to give 
£7,000 in her will for the church’s construction. The church had been given money 
from time to time by Mrs Oliver during her lifetime for alterations of church 
building, but there was no provision of promise appearing in her will. The courts had 
to decide whether Ms Oliver’s statement was an offer or a promise. The approach 
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that the courts used for the justification of this decision was that Ms Oliver did not 
receive or gain any benefit in return for the payment. Consequently, her statement 
was regarded as a promise.34 However, in Morton’s Trs v The Aged Christian Friend 
Society of Scotland35, Morton wrote to the Society, offering to pay £1,000 (by 10 
annual instalments of £100) if certain conditions about its constitution were 
observed. The Society accepted Morton’s offer. Morton paid the instalments every 
year during his life time. He, however, died at a point when there were two unpaid 
instalments left. The court held that there was a contract between Morton and the 
Society. Unlike the Smith case, although the undertaking made by Morton’s was 
gratuitous, it was nonetheless deemed to be an offer. These two examples suggest 
that the fact that an undertaking is gratuitous does not necessarily mean that it 
naturally constitutes a unilateral obligation. It depends on the factual circumstance of 
each case whether a person intended to be bound immediately.   
 
(b) Words used for promissory liability 
 
The words used are not the only relevant factor in determining whether an act is a 
promise.  The most natural form of making a promise is “I promise.”36 Yet, the form 
of expression “I promise” does not always constitute a promissory liability.37 The 
statement in the form “I promise” may be used without the intention to be bound at 
law or in a non-beneficial sense such as the phrase “I promise that I will sue you.”38 
Also, an expression in the form “I promise” may constitute a contractual obligation if 
the parties intend to enter into an agreement. 39  In contrast, there are some 
circumstances in which other similar forms of expression are used instead of “I 
promise” such as the words “I engage” or “I will do it”40 which are promises and are 
legally enforceable as promises too. In Macfarlane v Johnston and Others41, it was 
held that the statement in the form, “we agree to pay you” could be regarded as a 
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promissory note.42 As Lord Neaves explained, he saw “no difference between the 
expressions "I agree to pay," and "I promise to pay." … therefore, … the words "I 
agree to pay" are expressive of a promise.”43  
 
More recently, in Carlyle v Royal Bank of Scotland PLC44, the appellant (Carlyle) 
appealed against the decision of the Second Division,45  which had overturned a 
decision of the Lord Ordinary. The background of the case was that Carlyle had 
sought funding from the respondent (RBS) for the purchase and development of a 
property. RBS had then raised an action against Carlyle for the repayment of the 
loan. Carlyle defended the action and counterclaimed for damages. The counterclaim 
was that he had entered into the loan with RBS subject to the condition that RBS 
would provide him with a collateral warranty.  It is important to note that a collateral 
warranty in this case is different from a collateral warranty used in construction law, 
which will be discussed in Chapter VII as an example of a promise used in practice. 
In this case, the statement on the phone was argued to be a collateral warranty to 
provide funds for both the purchase and the development when Carlyle had applied 
for the funds. In other words, a collateral warranty in this context refers to an 
undertaking made as collateral to a principal contract (namely a contract of loan), 
and the borrower was led to enter into the principal contract as a result of this 
collateral. The Lord Ordinary had held that the telephone conversation in which RBS 
told Carlyle that his proposal was approved (“You’ll be pleased to know it’s all 
approved”) amounted to a binding agreement. RBS was therefore in breach of a 
collateral warranty. On appeal, the Second Division of the Inner House decided in 
favour of RBS by holding that there had been no agreement between the parties. 
Carlyle appealed to the Supreme Court, which reversed the decision of the Inner 
House decision and held that a statement concerning additional future funding of 
Carlyle prior to the loan agreement did not constitute a collateral warranty. However, 
the statement was binding as an independent obligation of promise. It can be inferred 
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that where a party assures another party that a certain act would occur, such 
assurance can be binding as a promise, even if the word “promise” is not used. 
 
However, although promissory language is not required, a person’s undertaking to be 
legally bound as a promise must be expressed in clear words for the constitution of a 
promissory obligation. In the Morton’s Trustees case earlier mentioned, the court 
observed that “[w]hat is necessary is that the promissor should intend to bind himself 
by an enforceable obligation, and should express that intention in clear 
words.” 46  Also, in Dow v Tayside University Hospitals NHS Trust, 47   a patient 
undergoing treatment by the NHS made a claim against an NHS trust on the basis of 
breach of contract. Nevertheless, the court also made reference to the formation of a 
promissory obligation in this case. The pursuer’s claim arose from the circumstances 
where the doctor had guaranteed a successful outcome of the pursuer’s treatment, 
namely the termination of the pursuer’s pregnancy. The treatment, however, did not 
succeed. The pursuer then sought damages for breach of contract. The case was 
dismissed on the grounds that there was no contractual relationship between the 
parties. The court ruled that any further obligations which are imposed on doctors 
other than those set out by statutory requirements have to appear in clear terms. In 
reference to the constitution of a promissory obligation, the court stated: 
“There would need to be demonstrated an intention to add an additional 
liability on the part of the doctor. That would correspond with the 
requirements for a unilateral promise in any circumstances which would not 
be implied but would require expression in clear terms.”48 
 
The approach that holds that clear words are required for the constitution of promise 
was applied again in 2009. In Jeroen Van Klaveren v Servisair UK Limited,49 the 
court was influenced by the idea that a promise is a unilateral obligation which is 
generally gratuitous. Hence, “clear intention must be shown”.50  
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Similarly, in Regus (Maxim) 51   discussed earlier, the court explained that a 
promissory obligation has to be made by clear words only because the obligation is 
based on intention. Hence, it has to be considered whether “the evidence, objectively 
assessed, discloses an intention on the part of the alleged promisor to incur a legally 
binding engagement”52 Here, the court made a strong conclusion that “[c]lear words 
are required to constitute a promissory obligation in every case”.53 More recently, in 
the Carlyle54 case discussed before, although the Supreme Court held that the bank’s 
assurance amounted to a promise, the court observed that had the Supreme Court 
been deciding the case, it would perhaps have held that there was no promise 
between the parties during the telephone conversation. As stated by Lord Hodge,  
“Were I deciding the matter at first instance …, I might have shared the view 
of the Second Division (a) that the statement by Ms Hutchison on 14 June 
2007 did no more than communicate to Mr Carlyle that the bank had reached 
a decision in principle to provide funding for the development of the two 
plots and (b) that the parties were required to take further steps to create a 
legally binding obligation....”55 
 
Lord Hodge’s statement shows that this kind of statement by the bank employee 
(“it’s all approved”) may be thought to be promissory in nature by some judges, but 
others may disagree. This implies that some judges would only decide that a 
promissory obligation has been created if the factual circumstances of the case show 
that the promisor clearly intends his/her undertaking to be legally binding. 
 
The approach under discussion appears to be different from the approach that was 
applied in Smith v Oliver56 in 1911.  Here, the court took other circumstances into 
account to determine whether a person wishes to make or not to make a promise. Ms 
Oliver initially expressed her concern to those who had responsibility for the 
church’s construction. She then indicated that she would cover the various costs of 
the construction. This was followed by her donations towards the cost of construction 
from time to time. Ms Oliver could not give a large sum of money during her lifetime 
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because the money was kept in the form of trust funds held by trustees in England. 
She therefore proposed that she would do this by the way of a testamentary will. As 
can be seen, although Ms Oliver did not made a clear statement that she promised to 
leave money by means of her will, her statement could nonetheless give rise to a 
unilateral obligation. The court took other circumstances of the case and the fact that 
Ms Oliver received nothing in return into consideration to support that she intended 
to make a binding promise. However, in this case a promise could not be enforced 
because the obligation had not been formally constituted.57  At first glance, this 
suggests that, if the approach that clear terms are required had been applied to the 
Smith case, Ms Oliver’s statement might not have been deemed to be a promise. On 
closer inspection, however, the court in the Smith case may have been less worried 
about the lack of precise words. This is because the promise made by Ms Oliver 
would not be enforceable in any case, given that it could not be proved by her oath 
and there was no writ to support the obligation.58  
 
To conclude, the court’s approach regarding the requirement of precise words for the 
constitution of the unilateral obligation has not changed. This approach was 
established in at least 1899 and has been followed by a number of cases. Modern 
case law from 2006 has particularly emphasised that a promissory obligation must be 
expressed in clear terms.  
 
(c) Binding characteristics of a promise 
 
(i) A promise is binding without acceptance 
 
A promise is “simple and pure, and hath not implied in it as a condition of its being, 
the acceptance of another”.59 It is a “unilateral juristic act”60 arising from the will of 
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a party.61  It does not need acceptance.62A promise therefore can be enforceable 
regardless of whether anything has followed on from it or not. 63  In Bathgate v 
Rosie64, a mother promised the shopkeeper’s wife that she would pay for the damage 
which had arisen because her son broke a shop window. The court held that the 
mother was bound to pay damages.65 This, in principle, fundamentally contrasts with 
English law. In English law, a bare promise, without consideration and acceptance, is 
generally unenforceable.66 For instance, in Combe v Combe67, a husband promised 
his ex-wife that he would pay her an annual maintenance. The English court did not 
enforce the obligation on the grounds that “there was no consideration for the 
husband’s promise.”68 
 
The doctrine of estoppels under English law 
 
There is an exception to this English general rule that a bare promise is not legally 
binding. Where the doctrine of estoppel applies, a bare promise, without 
consideration and acceptance, is obligatory. Estoppel is described as “an impediment 
or bar to a right of action arising from a man’s own act as, for example, where a man 
is forbidden by law to speak against his own deed”.69 There are various kinds of 
estoppels under English law and these are linked “by the broadest of general 
principles: that a person’s taking of inconsistent positions is in some situations to be 
discouraged by law.”70 However, there is no common set of rules to govern them.71  
Due to the limited space, this thesis only discusses the doctrines of promissory and 
proprietary estoppels for the purpose of a comparative study. 
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Firstly, promissory estoppel is “[a] representation of intention or a promise suffices 
for the purpose of the equitable doctrine”. 72  A promissory estoppel arises, for 
example, “when one party to a contract in the absence of fresh consideration agrees 
not to enforce his rights an equity will be raised in favour of the other party.”73 The 
important requirements of a promissory estoppel are (i) a clear or unequivocal 
promise or representation, (ii) reliance, (iii) detriment and (iv) inequity.74  
 
Secondly, proprietary estoppel arises “in certain situations in which a person has 
done acts in reliance on the belief that he has, or that he will acquire, rights in or over 
another’s land.”75 A clear or unequivocal promise or representation is not required.76 
In proprietary estoppel, the claimant is required “to prove a promise or assurance that 
he will acquire a proprietary interest in specified property.”77 
 
Traditionally, estoppels can only be used as a defence in action, and not to make a 
claim.78 In Combe v Combe79 mentioned above, the court stated that the doctrine of 
estoppel “cannot of itself give a cause of action.”80 There have been a number of 
cases in which the English courts enforced a bare promise based on promissory and 
proprietary estoppels. For instance, in Central London Property Trust Ltd v High 
Trees House Ltd,81 the court held that, despite the lack of consideration, where “a 
promise intended to be binding, intended to be acted on and in fact acted on”82, such 
a promise is legally binding. Similarly, in Wayling v Jones83, the claimant and the 
defendant lived together as partners. The claimant helped the defendant run his 
business. The defendant made a number of promises that the claimant would inherit 
his business. However, the defendant did not do as he had promised and then he 
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passed away. It was found as a matter of fact in the case that the claimant would have 
left the defendant if he had known that the defendant would not honour his promise. 
The court held that the promise made by the defendant gave rise to a proprietary 
estoppel.84 More recently, in Gillett v Holt85, the English court adopted a very broad 
approach in applying the doctrine of proprietary estoppel. The case had a somewhat 
similar character to the Wayling case but the relationship between the parties in this 
case was a relationship of employment and friendship, rather than a relationship 
between partners. Nevertheless, the similarity to the Wayling case was that the 
claimant had helped the defendant in the running of his business and was promised 
that he would inherit it. As in the Wayling case, the claimant had relied on the 
defendant’s promise. The Court of Appeal enforced the promise based on proprietary 
estoppel.  As the court explained, where the assurances given “were intended to be 
relied on, and were in fact relied on” 86 , there is no necessity to search for an 
irrevocable promise. It is the promisee’s “detrimental reliance on the promise which 
makes it irrevocable”.87 
 
To conclude, at first glance, the theoretical status of promise in Scots law and 
English law appears to be completely different. As a general rule, in Scots law 
unilateral promises are binding without consideration and without acceptance, 
whereas in English law both consideration and acceptance are required. 
Nevertheless, the example of the cases discussed above shows that the Scottish and 
English approaches in relation to unilateral promises are not as different as they 
initially appear. Under the doctrines of promissory and proprietary estoppels, the 
English courts can enforce a bare promise, making its approach towards unilateral 
promise closer to the Scottish approach than might at first glance be thought to be the 
case. This reflects the importance of unilateral obligations in practice. Traditionally, 
English law is renowned for not enforcing unilateral promises as a general rule. 
However, the fact that the English courts in modern case law adopt a holistic 
approach when dealing with promissory and proprietary estoppels suggests that a 
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contractual analysis cannot appropriately deal with all the issues in the law of 
voluntary obligation. This is why the English courts adopt the doctrine of promissory 
and proprietary estoppels, which shows similarities to the doctrine of promise in 
Scots law, as an alternative approach. 
 
(ii) An accepted promise does not convert into a contract 
 
A promise is binding without an acceptance. Thus, even if there is an action 
following on it, a promise is not converted into a contract. In the Smith v Oliver88 
case discussed earlier, a promise made by Mrs Oliver to give money for the church’s 
construction followed by the construction performed by the church did not result in a 
contractual obligation. As the court explained, “a party cannot turn what is, in its 
nature, a mere promise into a contract”.89 Accordingly, in this case a promise could 
not be enforced because the obligation was not formally constituted. Nevertheless, if 
the circumstance resembling the Smith case were to occur today, the outcome might 
have been different. In 1991, proof of promise could be carried out only by oath or 
by writ. 90   However, these methods of proof were abolished in 1995 when the 
Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995 was introduced. Currently, a gratuitous 
unilateral obligation requires a written document for the constitution of the 
obligation, except for those undertaken in the course of business.91 However, where 
“…a creditor in the obligation…has acted or refrained from acting in reliance on the 
… obligation…with the knowledge and acquiescence of …the debtor in the 
obligation…”92, the Act provides that the debtor “shall not be entitled to withdraw 
from the…obligation” 93, and “the obligation…shall not be regarded as invalid, on 
the ground that it is not so constituted, if the condition set out in subsection (4) … is 
satisfied.”94  The condition is that “the position of the first person— (a) as a result of 
acting or refraining from acting as mentioned in that subsection has been affected to 
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a material extent; and (b)as a result of such a withdrawal as is mentioned in that 
subsection would be adversely affected to a material extent.”95 Had the Smith case 
arisen after 1995, Mrs Oliver’s promises could have been enforced because the 
church had relied on Mrs Oliver’s promise, and with the knowledge of Mrs Oliver.  
 
However, there is an opposite view to the theory that an accepted promise cannot be 
converted into a contract. This will be later discussed in the section on acceptance 
and rejection of a promise.96 
 
(2) Thai law 
 
(a) Promise as distinguished from other types of expressions 
 
Thai law distinguishes promises from other types of expressions. Conceptually, a 
promisor has a stronger intention to bind himself/herself in comparison with a person 
who makes other types of expressions, which are an overture, an invitation to treat or 
an offer. Consider the following situations: 
 
(i) A is leaving the country so he has to rehome his pet rabbit. He prefers to sell it so 
that he can ensure that the rabbit will go to a good home. He knows that B his friend 
loves animals, so he asks B when he has a chance whether B is thinking about 
adopting a pet or not. A’s expression is deemed to be an “overture” because he 
merely makes preliminary enquiries as to B’s interest in order to know the possibility 
of having a contract with B. 
 
(ii) B responds that he has not thought about adopting any pet. A then states that he 
has to find someone to look after his pet rabbit and he prefers to sell it to someone 
that he knows personally. Therefore, if B is interested, he can let A know a price that 
he can afford. A’s expression of willingness is still not regarded as an offer because 
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it does not contain certain terms which shall become binding (as a contract) if B 
accepts. It is only an invitation to treat made by A to invite B to make an offer. 
 
(iii) B still does not make an offer to A. Then A proposes that he wishes to sell his 
pet rabbit and its cage to B for the price of 5,000 Thai baht. A’s declaration of 
intention is regarded as an offer on the basis that a sale can be concluded if B accepts 
A’s proposal. 
 
(iv) B does not accept A’s offer. A then makes a new proposal by stating that he 
wishes to sell his rabbit and its cage to B for the price of 5,000 Thai baht, and during 
the period of one month, A will not sell the rabbit to any other person. If B wishes to 
buy the rabbit and its cage, B can inform him, and he will sell them for the stated 
price. A’s proposal is regarded as a promise to sell so that a sale is concluded if and 
when B accepts the promise. 
 
From the above examples, these types of expression are categorised into four levels, 
according to the degree to which a person who makes the expression intends to be 
bound. The extent to which a promisor wishes to bind himself/herself is the greatest. 
An offeror intends to be legally bound to a certain degree, which is less than that of 
the promisor. A person who makes an overture and an invitation to treat does not 
wish to be legally bound by his/her action at all.97  
 
It is unclear why Thai lawyers introduce the concept of overture when making a 
distinction between promises and other expressions.  In fact, an overture and an 
invitation to treat can be simply classed as the same kind of expression, given that 
neither of them amount to an offer and neither can be accepted. A possible reason is 
that they want to emphasise the fact that these expressions can be distinguished from 
each other by the extent to which the person making the expression desires to be 
bound.  
 
                                                 





The foregoing theory is supported by both academics98 and courts.99 For example, in 
the Supreme Court Decision 411/1947 (B.E. 2490), the defender wrote a letter to the 
pursuer stating that he wished to buy 60 tons of a mineral, 10 tons to be purchased 
immediately. It was held that the letter was an offer to buy 10 tons, whilst the 
statement concerning the remaining 50 tons was neither an offer nor a promise to 
buy, but only an overture.100 In another case101, the parties made a contract of loan 
and the debtor gave his title deeds as the warranty. It was stated in the contract that 
the land would be sold to the creditor, not anyone else, within 3 years for the price of 
20,000 baht. The court decided that the agreement between the parties was merely a 
contract of loan. There was no promise of sale made by the debtor. It was only a 
proposal without an intention to create legal relations. In the Supreme Court Decision 
100/1954 (B.E. 2497), the landlord promised the tenant that if he were to sell the 
rented land, he would let the tenant buy it first, but an agreed price was not 
mentioned. It was held that there was no promise of sale between the two parties. 
The court explained that, in general, an agreed price is, inter alia, an essential 
condition of an offer for sale. As the parties did not agree on the price, the landlord’s 
proposal was not an offer, and could not be a promise either.102   
 
Moreover, these decisions show that the Thai courts are required to undertake two 
stages of analysis in order to determine whether a person’s expression is a promise or 
other expressions. First, the courts objectively103 assess whether that expression is an 
offer or whether it is another expression which is not legally binding. Therefore, 
although the person who expresses an intention does not intend to create a legal 
relation, his/her expression could still give rise to a binding obligation. Second, the 
determination of the difference between an offer and a promise will be made. As will 
be discussed below, other forms of statement than the form beginning “I promise” 
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are deemed by the courts to be promises. This suggests that the objective approach is 
used for distinguishing between a promise and an offer, given that the courts do not 
merely consider the words used, but rather the circumstances of the case. 
 
(b) Words used for promissory liability 
  
The words used are not the main factor in deciding whether an expression is a 
promise under Thai law. There are a number of cases in which the courts have 
enforced statements taking the form “you may redeem”104, “I will return”105 , “I 
consent to buy”106 or “I certify that I will buy”107 which are deemed to be promises. 
For example, in the Court Decision 121/1929 (B.E. 2472) discussed earlier in 
Chapter IV, it was held that the document stating that the seller could redeem the 
property was a promise to sell.108 Similarly, in the Court Decision 1004/1942 (B.E. 
2485), a sale of farmland was agreed by the parties. Then the buyer drew up a 
document stating that if the seller had the money to redeem the farmland, the buyer 
would return it at any time. The court held that this statement was a promise. As can 
be seen, although the word “redeem” was used by the buyers, the courts regarded it 
as a promise to sell and not as a sale with a right of redemption. 
 
There are a number of cases in which the parties used the word “promise” but the 
courts did not decide it was a promise. For instance, in the Court Decision 1398/1952 
(B.E. 2495), an employer terminated the employment contract of one of his 
employees by stating that he promised that he would pay a pension to the employee. 
This was agreed by the employee. However, the employer refused to pay the 
pension, claiming that he later knew that the employee had not performed his duty 
properly. It was held that the act of the employee in agreeing with the employer’s 
proposal was regarded as an acceptance. Thus, there was a concluded contract.109 
More recently, in the Supreme Court Decision 810/2011 (B.E. 2554), the defenders 
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had appointed the pursuer as their lawyer in a case concerning the right of 
inheritance. They had later promised to give him a reward equivalent to five per cent 
of the value of the asset they would receive from the inheritance. Although the 
parties used the term “promise to give a reward”, the court held that this was not an 
advertisement of reward as appeared in §362 of the Code. Rather, it was an 
agreement between the parties to pay the lawyer’s fee. It can be seen from these 
cases that, although the parties used the word “promise”, their statements were 
deemed to be an offer. 
 
(c) Binding characteristics of a promise 
 
The binding characteristics of a promise of reward and a promise to enter into a 
contract under Thai law are not exactly the same. Therefore, this section discusses 
their binding characteristics in different sub-headings. 
  
(i) A promise of reward is binding without acceptance 
 
As discussed in Chapter V, a promise of reward under Thai law can be perfectly 
analysed using a promissory analysis. However, the provisions of promise of reward 
belong to the section of “formation of contract” under the Code. This leads to a 
debate amongst Thai lawyers whether a promise of reward requires acceptance or 
not. 
 
Firstly, a number of writers, e.g. Pramoj 110 , Tingsabadh, 111  Sethabutr 112 , and 
Sujiva113, consider a promise of reward to be equivalent to an offer. It is an offer to 
make a contract, like a normal offer but made to the public.114 Therefore, acceptance 
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is required. Secondly, some commentators, such as Sotthibandhu,115  argue that a 
promise of reward is not an offer made to the public, but rather a unilateral juristic 
act. Hence, it is binding without acceptance.  
 
In order to decide whether a promise of reward is distinct from an offer or not, it is 
helpful to consider the types of persons to whom a promise/an offer is made. 
Practically, a promise of reward is usually made to the public, whereas an offer is 
normally made either to the public or to an individual. Thus, there are differences 
between a promise of reward and an offer as a matter of practice. However, there is 
no theoretical objection to anyone who wishes to make a promise of a reward to a 
specific individual. Thus, one may argue that this distinction between promise of 
reward and offer is not significant in terms of legal theory, given that in principle 
they can be made to either the public or an individual. 
 
Nonetheless, Thai law lends itself to the defence of the claim under discussion. The 
Thai Code states: “A person who by advertisement promises that he will give a 
reward to whoever shall do a certain act is bound...”116 The Code uses the term 
“advertisement”. An advertisement is by nature something shared publicly. It can be 
inferred that a promise of reward under Thai law is intended to be made to the public 
only, given that the term “advertisement” is used. If Thai law had intended a promise 
of reward to be made either publicly or privately, the provision should have used 
other proper terms such as “notice”, rather than “advertisement”. Also, in the 
Supreme Court Decision 810/2011 (B.E. 2554) earlier discussed, although the 
defenders promised to give a reward equivalent to five per cent of the value of the 
asset to their lawyer, it was held that this was not an advertisement of reward. Rather, 
it was an agreement between the parties. The court’s decision reinforces that a 
promise of reward under Thai law intended to be made to the public only. Thus, 
under Thai law, there are not only practical reasons but also doctrinal reasons for the 
distinction between promise of reward and offer in terms of their recipients. 
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Consequently, the theory that a promise of reward is distinct from an offer, thus 
binding without acceptance, provides a more satisfactory explanation.  
 
(ii) A promise to enter into a contract can be converted into a contract 
  
While the debate whether or not a promise of reward is distinct from an offer remains 
unsettled, legal writers agree that a promise to enter into a contract can be converted 
into a contract. There is a theory, which is commonly understood amongst Thai 
commentators, explaining promise to enter into a contract as  per se an offer on the 
grounds that a promisor also makes an offer to a promisee to enter into a contract. 
The Code does not give a definition of an offer. Nonetheless, generally an offer is 
defined by Thai writers as a “request for a contract”.117 Most Thai academics explain 
that a promise to make a contract can always be regarded as an offer because a 
promisor also invites a promisee to enter into a contract. 118  Eventually there will be 
a concluded contract if the promisee accepts the promise. 119  Thai commentators 
further explain that the rules regarding offer can be applied to this kind of promise 
too. The Thai courts120 also applied the principles of offer to promise as the provision 
most nearly applicable.121  
 
However, the foregoing theory fails to explain some theoretical questions about the 
difference between a promise and an offer. For instance, if a promise to make a 
contract is per se an offer, why does Thai law need to have a specific provision on 
promises of sale and promises of a gift? In addition, it is questionable whether the 
rules of offer can appropriately apply to promise. Clearly, some rules regarding offer 
cannot be applied to promise. There are certain circumstances where the intention of 
the promisor is intrinsically different from that of the offeror. For example, an offer 
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made to a present person without specifying a period for acceptance can be accepted 
only there and then.122 Apparently, this rule cannot apply to a promise in which the 
promisor does not specify a period of acceptance, made to a present person. It would 
be strange if a promise made to a present person lapsed immediately if it was not 
accepted at the time at which it was made. The promisor normally has an intention to 
bind himself/herself for a period of time and the promisee should be able to accept 
the promise after that, not only there and then.  
 
More importantly, the theory under discussion causes difficulties in distinguishing a 
promise to make a contract from an offer. Some academics argue that it is impossible 
to distinguish a promise to make a contract and an offer because they are both in fact 
offers.123 All these examples show that there are theoretical problems arising from 




(a) Words used for promissory liability and an objective test of promise  
 
The Scottish courts use an objective approach in determining whether an act is a 
promise or an offer, or something which merely expresses a statement of future 
intention.  Similarly, an objective assessment is applied both (i) when the Thai courts 
distinguish an expression which has legal consequences from one which does not and 
(ii) when dealing with the distinction between promise and offer. 
 
In both systems, the language used is not the only tool used to differentiate between a 
promise and other expressions. Statements in the form of “I engage”, “I will do it”, 
“you may redeem” or “I will return” may be deemed to be promises, whereas the 
phrase “I promise” does not necessarily infer promissory liability. This is similar to 
the approach under the DCFR where statements in the form such as “"I undertake 
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to", or "I bind myself to" or "I promise to"…”124 may be sufficient for it to be 
regarded as a unilateral undertaking, if a person wishes to be legally bound by his/her 
intention without acceptance. 125  Also, under the DCFR, the perspective used to 
determine whether someone wishes to make an offer or a promise is an objective 
one.126 If a promisor were permitted to use his/her subjective intention, then that 
would be unfair to the promisee, as that might contradict the promisee’s reasonable 
understanding of the promisor’s expression.127  
 
(b) Promise as distinguished from other types of expression 
 
Promise in both systems is distinguished from other types of expressions which do 
not infer a legal obligation, e.g. expression of future intention, invitation to treat and 
overture. It is also distinguished from an offer (but in Thai law this distinction is not 
as clear as in Scots law). Similarly, the DCFR distinguishes between an offer128 and a 
promise (known as a unilateral undertaking). 129  Under the DCFR, a unilateral 
promise can be legally binding without any acceptance if this is the intention of the 
promisor.130 
 
(i) The extent to which a person who makes an expression intends to be bound 
 
The way in which Thai commentators classify promises, offers and other expressions 
which are not legally binding is different from that of Scots lawyers. In Thai law, 
each type of expression is categorised into levels according to the degree to which a 
person who makes the expression wishes to bind him/herself. These expressions of 
willingness may be viewed along a spectrum. A promise is placed in the top layer 
since the degree to which a promisor wishes to be bound is the greatest amongst 
others. An offer is placed one layer below on the grounds that an offeror also wishes 
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to be bound by his/her offer, but the extent to which a person making an offer intends 
to be bound is less than that of a person making a promise.131  The third level is an 
invitation to treat. The main feature of an invitation to treat is that the person making 
it has no intention to be legally bound. Moreover, it does not contain sufficient detail, 
and so cannot result in a contract when it is accepted by the other party.  Finally, the 
expression in the lowest level is the so-called “overture”. A person’s statement is 
regarded as an overture if he/she only intends to know about the other person’s 
interest so that he/she can know the possibility of having a contract with that person. 
 
The explanation of an overture is different from that of Scots law, which only 
recognises the terms “invitation to treat”, “offer” and “acceptance”. Hence, the Thai 
analysis regarding the pre-contractual stage is more extended than the Scots one. 
Nevertheless, the explanation regarding an overture may be not helpful in terms of 
legal analysis. Like an invitation to treat, an overture has no legal consequences. 
Thus, distinguishing them from each other does not help to differentiate an act which 
has a legal effect from another one which does not. This is different from the case of 
distinguishing an invitation to treat from an offer, in which the latter is binding and 
can constitute a contractual obligation when it is accepted. 
 
Scottish writers do not explain the difference between a promise and other types of 
expressions by reference to the extent to which a person who makes the expression 
wishes to be bound. However, the approach of characterising these expressions 
proposed by Thai lawyers can also apply to Scots law, albeit that Scots law does not 
recognise an overture as a separate class. In Scots law, a promise is binding once it is 
made and a promisor cannot revoke it thereafter. In contrast, an offeror can withdraw 
his/her offer as long as it has not been accepted. This difference reflects the level to 
which a person commits him/herself to perform an obligation.  
 
However, one might argue that the distinction between promise and offer by 
reference to the extent to which a person who makes them intends to be bound 
distinguishes their effects after the event, rather than the nature of the juristic acts 
                                                 





themselves. In other words, it can be argued that a promisor is bound, whereas an 
offeror is not, because of the structure of the law of obligation that enforces a 
promise once it is made, but does not enforce an offer until it has been accepted. In 
short, opponents of the notion of hierarchy of intention to be bound argue that this 
theory does not reflect a higher intention to be bound between the promisor and the 
offeror. Rather, it depends on whether or not the law will enforce the promise or the 
offer. 
 
In response to this, the fact that a promise is generally irrevocable suggests that a 
promisor intends his/her expression to be binding immediately. The fact that an offer 
can be generally withdrawn suggests that the offeror does not have an intention to be 
bound immediately, given that he/she can still withdraw the offer as long as it has not 
been accepted. Consider the following example. Both A and B desire to buy C’s pet 
rabbit. A makes a promise to buy that rabbit to C, whereas B makes an offer to buy 
that rabbit to C. As a general rule, A’s promise is irrevocable, whereas B’s offer can 
be withdrawn before it has been accepted. Certainly, the intention to be bound is not 
equal in both cases. The degree to which B (offeror) desires to bind himself is less 
strong than that of A (promisor) on the basis that B still has an opportunity to change 
his mind, whereas A does not.  
 
Moreover, the notion of hierarchy of intention to be bound can be supported by 
referring to the notion of a juristic act. As noted in Chapter V, under Thai law a 
juristic act is defined as an act that is voluntarily created by a person, with “the 
immediate purpose … to create, modify, transfer, preserve or extinguish rights.”132 
Thus, a promise is regarded as a juristic act because a promisor immediately binds 
him or herself to confer rights to the promisee. In contrast, an offer is not regarded as 
a juristic act because an offeror does not have an immediate purpose to confer any 
rights on the offeree. This certainly reflects a hierarchy of the intention to be bound 
between the promisor and the offeror. It would be strange if the extent to which a 
promisor and an offeror intend to be bound was equal, but only the intention of the 
promisor was regarded as being a juristic act. 
                                                 






Furthermore, it is helpful to revert to the late scholastics’ promissory account and 
recall their explanation that the binding force of a promise lies in the intention of the 
promisor and that a promise creates an obligation per se.133 This suggests that a 
person who makes a promise must have a stronger intention to bind him or herself 
than a person who makes other expressions that are not legally binding, given that 
the intention of the promisor creates an obligation without any further requirement. 
This suggests that the counterargument of the notion of hierarchy of intention to be 
bound can only apply in jurisdictions in which a promise does not create an 
obligation per se, but further conditions, such as acceptance, are required. An 
example of this is French law, in which, as already noted, a promise of sale is only 
binding if it is accepted. Therefore, under French law there is no real difference 
between a promise of sale and an offer of sale, because they both must be accepted in 
order to be binding. Thus, this suggests that the theory that a promisor has a stronger 
intention to bind him/herself than an offeror is particularly true in jurisdictions in 
which a promise is regarded as a unilateral obligation, i.e. it is binding without 
having to be accepted. 
 
To conclude, not only the difference in terms of their effects after the event, but an 
offer and a promise are also different in nature.  This difference can be justified by 
reference to the extent to which offerors and promisors intend their expressions to be 
binding.   
 
(ii) Problems of the Thai approach 
 
Initially, the Thai approach seems to be workable because it distinguishes a promise 
from other expressions which do not infer legal obligation. Yet, a difficulty arises at 
the stage of distinguishing an offer from a promise.  Although there is an attempt to 
distinguish them by reference to the degree to which a promisor/offeror intends to be 
bound, the distinction is unclear. This is because in Thai law a promise to make a 
                                                 






contract is regarded as per se an offer. Therefore, there is an overlap between these 
two types of expressions. 
 
In Scots law promise stands as a promissory obligation whilst offer, requiring an 
acceptance, is considered to be a contractual obligation. Scots law therefore makes a 
clearer distinction between promise and offer than Thai law. The Scots approach can 
be helpful for Thai law. Given that the Thai theory that a promise and an offer are 
distinguishable is based on the degrees to which a person who makes them wishes to 
be bound is compatible with the situation in Scots law, it would be possible for Thai 
law to distinguish a promise from an offer if they are regarded as different types of 
obligations. 
 
B. COMMUNICATION OF A PROMISE 
 
(1) Scots law 
 
There are two competing theories in relation to communication of a promise in Scots 
law. 
 
(a) Theory that communication of a promise is required 
 
The first theory suggests that the law requires the promisor to communicate his/her 
intention to the benefited party. For example, in Beatrix Tunno and Brotherstons v 
Andrew Tunno, 134 a brother expressed his intention in giving a sum of money, as a 
dowry, to his sister. The brother’s expression was known to the sister’s husband. It 
was held that the brother was obliged to pay that sum of money. However, if the 
promise is not communicated but the benefited person accidentally or through an 
unauthorised person becomes aware of it, he/she cannot claim the reward or benefit. 
For instance, in Burr v Bo'ness Police Commissioners135, the defenders had decided 
to increase the pursuer’s salary but then it was cancelled. The pursuer heard of the 
                                                 
134 (1681) Mor 9438; See also Margaret Ker v Ker of Keith (1751) Mor 9442. 





increase from conversation but did not receive any official notice about this increase. 
It was held that there was “no jus quœsitum under the resolution, as it had not been 
intimated to”136 the pursuer. 
 
Moreover, literature and case law suggest that a written promise must be delivered. 
This is based on the general rule that writing must be delivered in order to be 
effective,137 which also applies to promise. Thus, a written promise takes effect when 
it is delivered to the promisee138, or to someone empowered to receive delivery of the 
promise on behalf of the promisee.139  
 
(b) Theory that communication of a promise is not required 
 
The other theory suggests that the communication of a promise is not an essential 
requirement for the constitution of a promissory obligation.140 This theory cited Stair 
as an authority to support this proposition. 141  In Cawdor v Cawdor earlier 
discussed142, the court explained that “[d]elivery to or acceptance by the promisee is 
not necessary to the constitution of a promise.”143 In the Regus (Maxim) 144 case 
earlier discussed, the court also observed that a promise “is binding even though it is 
not known to the promisee.”145 More recently, in MacDonald v Cowie's Executrix 
Nominate,146  Lord Tyre, by citing the Lord President Hamilton’s opinion in the 
Cawdor v Cawdor case, supported the theory that communication of a promise is not 
required.147  
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Similarly, some writers suggest that an oral promise becomes effective when a 
promisor utters the promissory words.148 Thus, the promisee does not need to be 
present when the words of promise are uttered or at the time the promise is made149  
although in practical terms he/she has to be aware of the existence of the promise.150  
 
(c) The preferred approach and analysis 
 
The theory that a promise needs to be communicated to the promisee is supported. 
The justification goes back to Stair’s explanation. Although the main authority for 
the theory that a promise can be legally binding without any delivery to the promisee 
is Stair (1.10.4), it is arguable whether Stair in fact suggested that there is no 
requirement of communication for the constitution of promise in every case. 
 
It appears that in 1.10.4 Stair mainly dealt with the subject of an acceptance of a 
promise (that it is not required), rather than the subject of a communication/delivery 
of a promise. It is true that Stair explained that a promise gives rise to a binding 
obligation for third party “absents, infants, idiots, or persons not yet born, who 
cannot accept…”151 However, this explanation is concerned with the case of JQT, 
which shares similarities to promise in that they do not require an acceptance on the 
part of the promisee/beneficiary. The crucial factor in deciding if something is a 
simple promise or a JQT is whether the debtor intends to make a free-standing 
promise in favour of someone or whether he is entering into a contract with the 
stipulator from which a third party will benefit. Therefore, in the case of JQT, there 
is always a stipulator who is the recipient of the expression of the promisor. This is in 
contrast with a unilateral promise in which the promisor creates an obligation 
him/herself, i.e. does not agree with the stipulator. This further suggests that it is 
reasonable to treat the obligation of JQT as coming into existence when it is made, 
i.e. when the debtor utters the promissory words to the stipulator (in the case of oral 
                                                 
148 However, a promise for the creation, transfer, variation or extinction of an interest in land needs to 
be in writing, according to the Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995, s 1 (2) (a) (i). 
149 M Hogg, Obligations 55. 
150 Ibid. 





promises) or when the promise is delivered to the stipulator (in the case of written 
promise). There is no necessity to deliver such a promise to a third party, given that it 
has been communicated to the stipulator already. In some circumstances, it is not 
possible to deliver such a promise to the beneficiary at all, e.g. if a promise is made 
in favour of a foetus or an infant who cannot be aware of its existence. Thus, Stair 
might have intended the rule that a communication of a promise is not required to 
apply to the case of JQT only. This does not necessarily mean that in the case of an 
ordinary unilateral promise, a communication to the promisee will not be required at 
all. In the case of unilateral promise, it is possible that in reality there is no one to 
witness the promisor’s expression because the promissory obligation is unilaterally 
created. Hence, a promise should be required to be delivered to the promisee.  
 
Moreover, as discussed in chapter I, merely an internal thought of a person who 
wishes to make a promise is generally inadequate to constitute a legal obligation. The 
intention must be expressed in some way which can be objectively observed.152 
There must be a person present so that the promisor’s expression can be sufficiently 
regarded as communicating a serious intention.153  
 
Furthermore, the rules regarding the effectiveness of written and oral promises 
reflect an inconsistency in relation to the requirement of the communication of a 
promise. As noted, the rule that a written promise takes effect when it is delivered to 
the promisee suggests that a promise requires an act of communication. The rule that 
the promisee does not need to be present at the time when promissory words are 
uttered suggests the contrary. Thus, adopting the theory that a promise requires 
communication would make the rules regarding the effectiveness of written and oral 
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(2) Thai law 
 
It is questionable whether or not a promise needs to be communicated in order to 
have legal effect.  
 
(a) Theory that communication of a promise is required 
 
A number of academics suggest that the communication of promise is required in 
order to be effective. Sotthibandhu154 explains that a promise is a declaration of 
intention in which the extent to which it is binding is stronger than that of an offer.155 
Thus, it should be communicated to the relevant party so that he/she can be made 
aware of the promise.156 Krea-ngam particularly explains a promise of sale that the 
promise of sale must be communicated, but the acceptance of promise is not 
required.157 
 
(b) Theory that communication of a promise is not required 
 
Certain commentators suggest that that promises do not need to be communicated. 
Therefore, it becomes effective once a promise is made. Tingsabadh explains that a 
promise (to enter into a contract) creates an obligation binding a promisor to perform 
the obligation before the contract is concluded.158 Neither the communication of the 
promise nor the acknowledgement of the promisee (regarding the existence of 
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(c) The preferred approach and analysis 
 
The theory that a promise requires a communication is preferred. According to the 
nature of public promises, a promisor has to make his/her promise available to 
others, generally by way of an advertisement. This suggests that a public promise 
requires a communication. As for a promise made to a specific person, it is naturally 
concerned with two parties because it confers rights/benefits on the other party. 
Accordingly, it is more appropriate to assume that a promise needs to be 
communicated to the benefited person.  Otherwise, the benefited person would not 
know of its existence and would not be able to enforce the promise. Moreover, the 
approach holding that a promise is binding without any communication causes 
uncertainties regarding the moment when the promise first comes into existence. 
Such a moment is important in circumstances where one has to determine whether a 
promise is still enforceable or not (e.g. if a promisor specifies a period during which 
a promise is binding). Consequently, the more satisfactory approach is to consider a 




Neither Scots nor Thai law has a clear approach dealing with the communication of a 
promise. This thesis supports the theory that a communication of a promise is 
required for both the cases of Scots and Thai law. Thus, according to the preferred 
approach, the communication of promise should be the same between the two 
jurisdictions. 
 
Under the DCFR,160 a unilateral juristic act161 must be communicated to the person to 
whom it is addressed.162 The rule applies to a unilateral promise too on the basis that 
                                                 
160 The DCFR regulates three requirements for constituting a unilateral juristic act. See DCFR, Art II.–
4:301. 
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comparison between the concept of juristic acts in Scots and the DCFR see P Hellwege, “Juridical 





it is a type of unilateral juristic act. This rule reflects the fact that giving notice of a 
juristic act is mandatory. The Commentary states: “[a] secret intention which is not 
communicated to anyone is not binding”.163 Therefore, the DCFR approach supports 
what is argued here in relation to both Scots law and Thai law, i.e. that a promise 
should take effect when it is communicated to the recipient.  
 
C. ACCEPTANCE AND REJECTION OF A PROMISE 
 
(1) Scots law 
 
(a) Acceptance of a promise 
 
Unilateral promise is enforceable without the requirement of acceptance. 164 
Moreover, an action following on a promise does not convert it into a contract.165 
Yet, there is a view suggesting that the promisee’s acceptance can result in a 
concluded contract. As explained by McBryde, the law permits the future effect of 
juristic acts to alter according to the reaction of another.166 Thus, a contract may be 
created if a promise is accepted. McBryde’s argument was made with reference to 
Chapman v Aberdeen Construction Group Plc 167 , where the court made an 
observation regarding the effect of an option when it is accepted. An option can be 
seen either as a firm offer or as a unilateral promise, the latter being the more 
common.168 The issue under discussion here is concerned with the latter point. If an 
option is a unilateral obligation, what is the legal effect of an option when it has been 
accepted?  By citing Gloag,169 the court explained that “…if the option fell to be 
regarded as a promise or unilateral obligation on the part of the defenders, that 
                                                                                                                                          
162 DCFR, Art II.–4:301. 
163 Commentary on the Draft Common Frame of Reference 340. 
164 Stair, Inst 1.10.4; Smith, Short Commentary 745-746; Gloag, Contract 4; McBryde, Contract para 
2-03; Smith v Oliver 1911 SC 103 at 111, per Lord President Dunedin; Cawdor v Cawdor  2007 SLT 
152 at para 15, per Lord President (Hamilton); Regus (Maxim) Limited v Bank of Scotland plc [2013] 
CSIH 12 2013 at para 34 per Lord President. 
165 Smith v Oliver 1911 SC 103; See also Miller v Tremamondo (1771) Mor 12395. 
166 McBryde, Contract paras 2-28-2-34. 
167 1993 SLT 1205. 
168 This is discussed again in Chapter VII. 





promise was accepted by the payment of £1 by the pursuer and accordingly a 
contract was thereby constituted.”170 The court’s explanation suggests that there is a 
possibility that an accepted promise can be converted into a contract in certain 
circumstances such as the case of an option. 
 
Nevertheless, in the recent 2013 case of Regus (Maxim) earlier mentioned,171 the 
court explicitly disagreed with the view that a promise can be converted into a 
contract. The court stated: “where the promise is made subject to a condition 
requiring action by the promisee, the fulfilment of the condition does not convert the 
promise into a contract ex post facto.” 172  The distinction between a conditional 
promise and a conditional offer “is a material and significant distinction…” 173 
Although this explanation is directly concerned with the case of a conditional 
promise, it may be inferred that the court suggested that a promise cannot be 
converted into a contract in every case. 
 
This thesis supports the approach that a promise cannot be converted into a contract 
even if it is accepted. The theory that an accepted promise can give rise to a contract 
creates an inconsistency in the concept of a voluntary obligation in Scots law. In 
Scots law promise and contract are different obligations within the obligational 
framework, and their juristic nature is determined from the moment that the 
obligation comes into existence. Thus, if an accepted promise can be converted into a 
contract, this would cause the distinction between unilateral and bilateral obligations 
to become less precise since both of them can constitute a bilateral obligation. There 
would be no certainty whether an undertaking is a promissory or a contractual 
obligation. Consequently, the approach that a promise cannot be converted into a 
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(b) Rejection of a promise 
 
The Institutional writers stated that under Scots law a promisee may reject a promise, 
resulting in lapse of the obligation.174 Therefore, if a promisee rejects the promise, he 
or she is no longer entitled to enforce it.175 .  
 
(2) Thai law 
 
(a) Acceptance of a promise 
 
(i) Acceptance of promise of reward 
 
Thai commentators have different views regarding acceptance of promise of reward. 
First, some explain that the “completed act” as specified in the advertisement of 
reward is regarded as an acceptance.176 The acceptance arises when the person who 
completes the act asks for the reward, rather than at the time when the act is 
completed.177 Hence, notification to the promisor that the performing person wishes 
to get the reward is regarded as an acceptance, and it creates a contract between the 
parties.178  
 
Secondly, opponents of the aforesaid theory argue that the completed act stated in the 
advertisement of reward should not be regarded as the “acceptance” on the grounds 
that the intention of the offeree who accepts the offer is different from the intention 
of the person who completes the act in the case of reward.179  
 
This thesis supports the view that a promise of reward does not require an 
acceptance. When an offeree accepts an offer, he/she must always have the intention 
                                                 
174 Stair, Inst 1.10.4; Bell, Prin §8 (He cited Allan v Colzier (1664) Mor 9428). 
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to accept the offer. This differs from the completed act in the case of a promise of 
reward. A promisor of an advertisement promise is bound to give the reward to 
whoever performs the act, even if that person does not have an intention to obtain the 
reward.180 It is therefore possible that a person who completes the act may not know 
that by doing that action he/she can get the reward, and even then there is no contract 
between the parties.   
 
(ii) Acceptance of promise to enter into a contract 
 
It is agreed amongst Thai scholars that a promise to make a contract requires an 
acceptance. This stems from the fact that, as already noted, under Thai law this type 
of promise is regarded as per se an offer. Hence, it is necessary for the promisee to 
accept the promise in order to complete the contractual obligation. For example, the 
court held that if the tenant did not accept the promise of lease before the lease 
ended, the promise of lease lapsed and the expression of intention to accept the 
promise of lease after that had no legal effect.181  
 
(b) Rejection of a promise  
 
Thai law does not regulate the rejection of a promise. However, according to the 
theory of autonomy of will182 and the fact that a promise is a unilateral obligation 
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(a) Acceptance of a promise 
 
(i) Similarities and differences between the studied systems 
 
The position regarding acceptance of a promise in the two systems shows some 
similarities but is not exactly the same. In Scots law, a promise, in any case, does not 
require an acceptance. Although there is a theory suggesting that an accepted 
promise can be converted into a contract, this explanation nevertheless seems to 
contradict the position of a promise as a separate class of obligation. Hence, the view 
that the promisee’s acceptance creates an agreement between the promisee and the 
promisor is not satisfactory. 
 
Under Thai law, one has to distinguish between promise of reward and promise to 
make a contract. According to the preferred approach of this thesis, the former is 
similar to the approach under Scots law in that a promise of reward is binding 
without acceptance. The Thai and Scottish approaches, however, differ when it 
concerns promise to make a contract. Thai law requires an acceptance for such a 
promise.  
 
(ii) The more effective approach 
 
The Scottish promissory approach, without the requirement of acceptance, presents a 
more effective structure of the law of obligations than the Thai approach. This is seen 
from a number of doctrinal applications. Firstly, in Scots law it is easier to 
distinguish the obligation of contract and the obligation of promise. The promisee 
can enforce the promise regardless of acceptance. 183  Consequently, there is no 
necessity to consider the method or time of acceptance.184  
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In Thai law it is much more difficult to distinguish between an offer and a promise to 
make a contract.  Both can constitute a contract and they each require an acceptance 
from the offeree/promisee. Moreover, there is an inconsistency between promise to 
make a contract and promise of reward.  The former requires an acceptance whereas 
the latter does not. Therefore, the approach of Scots law may be useful for Thai law. 
A sharp distinction between promise and offer results from the approach of Scots law 
in seeing them as separate obligations.  
 
Under the DCFR, a unilateral promise can be merged into a contract if it is accepted 
by the promisee.185 Nevertheless, this suggests that there is no consistency on the 
legal character of unilateral promise under the DCFR. It is doubtful why a unilateral 
obligation can be merged into a bilateral one. This approach may cause 
complications. Thai law has experienced this complexity. As noted, Thai lawyers 
have struggled to distinguish a promise to make a contract from an offer.  
 
The discussions under the DCFR and Thai law can be helpful for resolving the 
controversy regarding an accepted promise under Scots law. They reflect the fact that 
the approach which holds that a unilateral undertaking can be merged into a contract 
if it is accepted makes it difficult to distinguish between a unilateral undertaking and 
an offer. Scots law therefore should retain its approach that a promise cannot be 
converted into a contract, given that this is the approach which provides a 
satisfactory outcome already.  
 
(b) Rejection of a promise 
 
In Scots law, it is clear that a promise may be rejected by the promisee, and if so, it 
lapses once it is rejected. The Thai Code, by contrast, does not regulate this matter. 
The DCFR provides a similar rule to Scots law. The general rule is that if a unilateral 
juristic act, including a promise, confers a right or benefit on the person to whom it is 
addressed, it can be rejected by that person.186 The reason behind this rule is that an 
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individual should have the freedom not to accept a right or benefit which he/she does 
not want.187 The result in the case where a promise is rejected is that any right or 
benefit conferred by a promise is treated as never having arisen.188 
 
Thai law could benefit from these examples in order to develop a clearer rule on the 
promisee’s ability to reject the promise. This would prevent theoretical problems 
arising e.g. whether a promisee has a right to reject a promise, and whether he/she 
still retains the right to enforce the promise if he/she had rejected it. 
 
D. LEGAL EFFECTS OF A PROMISE 
 
There are two important issues regarding the legal consequences of promises which 
will be discussed in this section, namely the revocation/withdrawal of a promise and 
lapse of a promise. 
 
(1) Scots law  
 
(a) Revocation of a promise 
 
Once a promise is validly made, the promisor is legally bound by his/her promise and 
cannot revoke it thereafter,189 unless he/she has reserved the right to revoke.190  This 
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(b) Lapse of a promise 
 
(i) A reasonable period of time 
 
The general rule is that if the offer fixes no time for acceptance, it must be accepted 
within a reasonable time.192 Conversely, a promise does not lapse after a passage of a 
reasonable period of time.193 If a promise lapses after a period of time, this would 
suggest that “reasonable time” is treated as a period of prescription or limitation of 
obligation.194 
 
However, it may be possible for a promise to lapse after a period of time. In Sichi v 
Biagi195, the defender granted an option to purchase a shop to the pursuer who was 
the tenant. It was held that the option granted could be exercised without any time 
limit. The decision is in accordance with the rule that a promise does not lapse after a 
reasonable time. Lord Keith, nevertheless, further observed that: 
“Gloag suggests that an option might have to be exercised within a 
reasonable time. I doubt whether mere delay would be enough without some 
circumstances from which abandonment or personal bar might be 
inferred…”196 
 
There are two points which can be inferred from this observation of Lord Keith. 
Firstly, according to the court, Gloag suggested that there might be time-limit on the 
exercise of the option. Nevertheless, in Gloag’s The Law of Contract, he explained 
the issue regarding the lapse of a promise as being part of the general explanation of 
unilateral obligation, i.e. not being restricted only to the case of an option. He wrote 
“a promise is irrevocable, unless refused, subject probably to the condition that 
fulfilment is demanded within a reasonable time.”197 It appears that Gloag in fact 
suggested that a time-limit on the exercise of a unilateral obligation applies to a case 
where a promise is made with a condition, and such a condition requires it to be 
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fulfilled within a reasonable length of time. This is normally the case where the 
promisor has clearly stated such a condition when he/she made the promise. It does 
not apply to the case of simple, unconditional, promise. Secondly, it seems that Lord 
Keith himself suggested that there might be some circumstances where a delay in the 
exercise of an option may amount to abandonment or personal bar. These doctrines 
then prevent the promisee from exercising the option. In short, there may be an 
exception in that a promise may lapse after a reasonable length of time if the courts 
are satisfied that the doctrines of abandonment or personal bar, which arise from a 
delay in exercising the option, apply in this case. 
 
The general period of prescription for obligations is five years, from the date when 
the obligation first became enforceable.198 However, prescriptive periods of twenty 
years apply if it is a bank note199 or any obligation relating to land.200 In Smith v 
Stuart201, the defender had undertaken to enter into an agreement with the pursuer, 
his sister, to give her half of the proceeds of the sale of a land. It was accepted by 
both parties that the pursuer had made a unilateral binding obligation. The main 
dispute was whether the defender had undertaken an obligation relating to land to 
which the twenty-year prescription applied. The court explained that “the obligation 
contained in the Undertaking is not an obligation relating to land and so prescribes in 
5 years.”202 It is further observed that “the obligation does not come into force until 
the Defender sells his land, which may never take place.”203 
 
(ii) Death of the promisor 
 
An offer lapses because of the death of the offeror. The offeror’s heir is therefore not 
bound by the offer.204 Conversely, a promise does not cease to be effective when the 
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promisor dies and the promisor’s heir will be bound by the promise.205 In the Sichi v 
Biagi206 case discussed earlier, the court ruled that “[a]s an obligation [unilateral 
promise] conferring an option on the pursuer, the agreement is clearly binding on the 
deceased’s representative in the property in question, who in this case is his 
heir…”207 
 
(2) Thai law 
 
(a) Withdrawal of a promise 
 
A promise of reward can be withdrawn even after it becomes effective. Unless stated 
otherwise by the promisor, he/she is entitled to withdraw his/her promise by the same 
means used for advertising.208 If a promise cannot be withdrawn by the same means 
used for advertising, withdrawal may be made by other means. However, such 
withdrawal is valid only against those persons who know of it.209  In contrast, a 
promise made to a specific promisee, e.g. a promise to make a contract, cannot be 
withdrawn. If the promisor withdraws it, the withdrawal has no legal effect and 
he/she is still bound by the promise.210 
 
(b) Lapse of a promise 
 
(i) A reasonable period of time 
 
Unlike an offer, a promise does not lapse after a reasonable period of time. This rule 
applies to both a promise made to the public and to a specific individual. However, 
as discussed, a promise of reward can be withdrawn before a specified act has been 
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fulfilled. This means that a promise of reward lapses if it is withdrawn by the 
promisor. 
 
As noted, the law does not permit a promisor to withdraw a promise to make a 
contract once becoming effective. Nonetheless, a promise of sale may lapse if the 
promisor complies with the means stated in §454 para 2. A promisor can cause a 
promise of sale to lapse by fixing a reasonable time and notifying the promisee that 
he/she must give a definite answer within that time. If the promisee does not provide 
an answer within the specified time, the promise will lapse. As can be seen, the 
promisor is not entitled to withdraw the promise freely.211 Thus, if the promisor tries 
to withdraw the promise of sale, for example, the withdrawal has no legal effect and 
the contract of sale will still be concluded if the promisee accepts the promise.212 
 
According to the court’s decision, a promise of sale without specifying a period for 
acceptance binds the promisor although it was made over ten years ago.213 The court 
held that if the promisor did not comply with the means stated in §454 para 2, he/she 
would still be bound by his/her promise.214 The court’s decision suggests that there is 
no circumstance where a promise to make a contract lapses automatically or after a 
reasonable period.  
 
Nevertheless, the criticism has been made that this decision is unfair to the promisor 
on the grounds that he/she is bound by his/her promise for too long a period.215 
Some216 therefore suggest that a promise to make a contract which does not specify a 
period of acceptance should not bind the promisor forever, even if he/she does not 
comply with the means stated in §454 para 2. However, there is no consensus 
amongst legal scholars as to the period during which a promise should be binding. 
Consequently, clarity is required in Thai law.  
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(ii) Death of the promisor 
 
In Thai law, an offer does not automatically lapse because of the death of the offeror. 
It depends on whether the offeree had notice of the fact of the offeror’s death before 
accepting the offer or not. If yes, the offer lapses and does not bind the offeror’s 
heir.217  
 
The Code does not contain a provision dealing with the legal effect of a promise if 
the promisor dies. The Thai courts, nonetheless, have applied the rule that an offer 
lapses on the offeror’s death (if the offeree was aware of the death of the offeror) to 




(a) Revocation/Withdrawal of a promise 
 
There are both similarities and differences regarding revocation/withdrawal of 
promise between the studied systems. In Scots law a promise, unless the right to 
revoke has been reserved, is irrevocable once the obligation comes into existence. In 
Thai law, the rule regarding a promise made to a specific promise such as promise to 
make a contract is similar to that of Scots law. However, a promise made to the 
public can still be withdrawn after it is made.  
 
There is a contradiction between the withdrawal of a promise made to the public and 
a promise made to a specific person in Thai law. Initially, it seems that there is a 
theoretical incoherence between these two types of promises. However, there is a 
reason why the law permits promisors of a public promise to withdraw their 
promises. When a promise made to the public becomes effective, no one individual 
has the right enforce it yet. This is difference from a promise made to a specific 
person where the promisee has the right to enforce it. Therefore, it is reasonable for 
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the law to permit the promisor of a public promise to withdraw it. Although a 
promisor is permitted to withdraw his/her promise, the recipients of the promise are 
also protected by the provision that the withdrawal must be made by the same means 
used for advertising the promise, and it is only valid against those who know of the 
withdrawal. 
 
(b) Lapse of a promise 
 
A promise in both Scots law and Thai law does not lapse after a reasonable period of 
time. However, the position of Scots law is more precise than in Thai law. There is a 
clear principle that, in normal cases, a promise will prescribe in five or twenty years. 
Moreover, the death of the promisor does not terminate the promise. 
 
The Thai courts held that a promise of sale does not lapse as long as the promisor 
does not comply with the means stated in §454 para 2. 219  Initially, the court’s 
decision appears to be satisfactory because the decision is based on the existing law. 
There is no provision under the Code providing that a promise will lapse after a 
reasonable period of time. However, the court’s decision reflects an unfairness to the 
promisor. In comparison with other juristic acts such as contract, the debtor of a 
contractual obligation is bound for only ten years, according to the general provisions 
regarding prescription.220 It therefore seems anomalous for the promisor to be bound 
forever. In addition, in the case of a promise to make a contract, there is no certainty 
whether the contract will be concluded or not.  This may have economically adverse 
effects on commercial transactions.  Also, it could be difficult to find evidence to 
prove the existence of the promise if too much time has passed. This problem reflects 
a defect in this area of Thai law. 
 
Moreover, the Thai courts apply to the case of a promise the rule that an offer ceases 
to be effective because of the death of the offeror. Nevertheless, the court’s decision 
is rather unsatisfactory on the basis that it is not compatible with the actual nature of 
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a promise.  If a promisor has a stronger desire to bind him/herself than that of an 
offeror, a promise should still be binding even if the promisor dies. Thus, the rule 
that an offer lapses because of the death of the offeror should not apply to the case of 
promise. 
 
The DCFR specifies a rule governing the time limit for enforcing an obligation. The 
period of prescription for an obligation is generally three years.221 A person should 
not be bound by his/her obligation for too long a period.  It causes an uncertainty 
whether the obligation will be enforced or not. 222  This policy derives from the 
Civilian idea of extinctive prescription, namely the loss of a right due to the lapse of 
time.223 This instrument permits the debtor to refuse performance because of the 
lapse of time.  
 
In fact, Thai law has a general rule regarding prescription: a claim is barred by 
prescription if it has not been enforced within ten years, 224  unless the law is 
otherwise stipulated.225 This rule, however, is not applied to promise because it is not 
a standalone obligation. The act of accepting a promise by a promisee is not regarded 
as a claim, but as a completion of an obligation of contract. Therefore, the period of 
prescription starts from the time by which the contract is concluded, and not the time 
at which the promise is made. This enhances the idea that if Thai law regards a 
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E. PROMISES TO KEEP AN OFFER OPEN 
 
(1) Scots law 
 
Although promise is obviously distinguished from offer in the obligational 
framework, it is possible to make a promise in an offer.  This could take the form of 
a promise to keep an offer open for a certain specific period of time. A number of 
commentators suggest that in these circumstances an offeror should be obliged to 
keep his/her offer open for the specified period.227 There have been a number of 
cases in which the courts held that a statement to keep an offer open is an 
enforceable promise. 228  In Marshall & M’Kell v Blackwood of Pitreavie 229 , the 
defender offered a sale of victuals to the pursuers by giving “a fortnight to return an 
answer.” The acceptance reached the defender within the specified time. However, 
the defender had sold the victuals to another person before he received the 
acceptance. It was held that the defender was liable in the pursuers’ damages for the 
higher price of the victuals. Also, in Littlejohn v Hadwen230, although the offer made 
by the defender did not give rise to a binding contract, the court made an observation 
that a statement to keep an offer open is an enforceable promise. One of the 
defender’s claims was that he was entitled to withdraw the offer although his offer 
had specified a period of ten days for acceptance. The court, however, explained that 
the defender was not free to withdraw his offer within the specified period. As Lord 
Ordinary Fraser stated, “it was an obligation, no doubt unilateral, but still binding 
upon the offeror during the appointed period”. 231  The court explained that the 
English legal doctrine that an offer can be withdrawn at any time before it is accepted 
is not in accordance with the rule under Scots law.232 The court also referred to the 
decision in the Marshall case to support the irrevocability of this kind of offer in 
Scots law. 233 
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The rule that an offeror who undertakes to keep his/her offer open for a certain time 
cannot withdraw his/her offer in that period was observed by the House of Lords in 
Paterson v Highland Railway Co.234 Here, Viscount Dunedin stated: 
“[T]he opinion of Lord Ordinary Fraser, expressed in the now old case of 
Littlejohn v. Hadwen  … is right, i.e. , if I offer my property to a certain 
person at a certain price, and go on to say: "This offer is to be open up to a 
certain date, " I cannot withdraw that offer before that date, if the person to 
whom I made the offer chooses to accept it.”235 
 
He further explained that “the offer as made contained two distinct promises: (1) to 
sell at a certain price, and (2) to keep the offer open.  It seems to me that (2) is 
completely wanting in the present case.”236 Although Viscount Dunedin disagreed 
with the respondent who argued that there was a promise to keep an offer open, it can 
be inferred from his explanation mentioned above that he supported the proposition 
that in Scots law a promise to keep an offer open is binding within the stated time. 
 
In short, literature and case law suggest that in Scots law an offeror can make a 
unilateral promise to keep his/her offer open until a particular time. By doing so, the 
offeror is not entitled to withdraw the offer before the expiry of the specified period.  
 
(2) Thai law 
 
(a) Irrevocable offers under Thai law 
 
An offeror who specifies a fixed time for acceptance cannot withdraw his/her offer 
within that period. The law states: “An offer to make a contract in which a period for 
acceptance is specified cannot be withdrawn within such period.”237 This is similar to 
the effect of a promise to keep an offer open in Scots law. However, Thai academics 
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do not explain this obligation on the basis of promise. Indeed, it appears that there is 
no discussion amongst Thai academics on this point.238 
 
There is one writer who superficially explains the issue under discussion. Pramoj 
states that irrevocable offers are prohibitions against destroying a declaration of 
intention which has been made (by the offeror).239 This explanation, however, does 
not directly explain the actual idea behind the rule. It seems that the writer tries to 
explain that an offeror is obliged to keep his/her offer open because he/she has 
already expressed his/her intention and should respect it. However, this explanation 
does not clarify the theory regarding the binding nature of the obligation. It does not 
explain why an offer can bind an offeror even if there is no contractual obligation 
existing.  
 
(b) Origins of the Thai principle 
 
The idea that an offer specifying a period for acceptance cannot be withdrawn in 
Thai law is influenced by §145 of the BGB.240 It is therefore worth analysing the 
actual idea behind this principle by considering the German principle. 
 
Section 145 of the BGB241, in the textual forms of this provision in force at the time 
of drafting of the Thai Code, states: “If a person offers to another the making of a 
contract he is bound by the offer, unless he has excluded this obligation”242 Unlike 
the Thai Code, §145 of the BGB does not clearly state that an offer in which a period 
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for acceptance is specified cannot be withdrawn within such period. Nevertheless, 
§148 of the BGB243, in the textual forms of this provision in force at the time of 
drafting of the Thai Code, states:  “If the offerer244 has fixed a period of time for 
acceptance of the offer, the acceptance may take place only within that period.”245 It 
can be seen that under German law an offeror is bound to keep his/her offer open by 
the effect of §145. However, §145 does not specify the period during which the offer 
binds the offeror, but this is governed by §148. Therefore, these two provisions of the 
BGB make the effect of irrevocable offers under German law similar to that under 
Thai law. 
 
The texts of the German provisions do not express the reasons compelling an offeror 
to keep his/her offer open. However, the theory behind this idea can be traced 
through the history of the drafting of the BGB. The evidence shows that the 
provisions regarding withdrawal of offer under the BGB were suggested by Franz 
von Kübel.246 He wrote in his submission to the first drafting Commission of the 
BGB on the topic of contractual offers of “[t]he unilateral promise as grounding the 
obligation to keep one’s word (contractual offer)”. 247  This explains why under 
German law an offeror is bound to keep his/her offer open for a specified period. 
Without a promissory analysis it would be highly difficult to understand why an offer 
binds the offeror.248 This is because within a contractual analysis, there is no contract 
as long as the offer has not been accepted. A promissory analysis therefore gives us 
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the reason why the offeror should be bound to keep his/her offer open even if there is 




In German law the binding characteristics of an offer containing a time limit for 
acceptance are not contractual, but rather promissory. This analysis can apply to an 
offer specifying the period for acceptance in Thai law too. The Thai principle has its 




Irrevocable offers in the two systems are, in essence, similar: the offeror who has 
bound himself/herself to keep his/her offer open for a certain specified period of time 
cannot withdraw his/her offer. The difference, however, is that in Scots law this idea 
is precisely explained through promissory language. In Thai law there is no reference 
to promissory liability. In fact, Thai scholars do not explain the theory behind the 
rule. Nonetheless, by tracing the origins of the model of the Thai provision, it is 
found that the obligation binding the offeror in this case has a promissory nature. 
Therefore, the binding nature of an irrevocable offer in both Scots and Thai law is 
promissory. 
 
The DCFR also covers an offer containing a time limit for its acceptance. The rule is 
that the revocation of such an offer is ineffective.250 It is justified to assume that, if 
the offeror states a period for the acceptance for his/her offer, the offeree will 
reasonably believe that there will be a concluded contract if he/she accepts the offer 
within the specified time.251  
 
The effect of an offer stating a period for acceptance under the DCFR is similar to it 
is under Scots law and Thai law. However, like Thai law, the DCFR does not 
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regulate the rule through promissory language. Nonetheless, there is a link to the idea 
of unilateral promise. The Commentary explains that in circumstances where an offer 
is specified with a fixed time for acceptance, “the offer itself amounts to a unilateral 
juristic act which is binding without acceptance, since it carries with it an express or 
implied unilateral undertaking not to revoke it.”252  Therefore, the actual binding 
characteristic of an offer specified within a time limit for acceptance is a promissory 
obligation. This is similar to the position explored within this thesis in Thai law, i.e. 
that the real binding characteristic of this obligation is promissory, albeit promissory 




(1) What conclusions can be reached on the Scots/Thai comparative analysis? 
 
(a) A clear Scottish and an unclear Thai concept 
 
The law of promise is well worked out in Scots law on a conceptual level. Generally 
Scots law appears to have clear rules dealing with promise in most of the studied 
aspects, whereas Thai law has ambiguous concepts on the law of promise. 
 
Firstly, as Scots law makes clear that a promise does not require an acceptance, a 
promissory and a contractual obligation are clearly distinguished from each other. In 
Thai law, a promise to make a contract requires an acceptance whereas a promise of 
reward does not. Thus, there is no consistency amongst types of promise. In addition, 
as both an offer and a promise to make a contract require the acceptance of the other 
party, there is no theory which could offer a satisfactory approach in distinguishing 
them either at a conceptual or at a practical level.  
 
Secondly, Scots law has satisfactory rules in relation to the legal consequences of 
promissory obligation, namely (i) a promise does not lapse after a certain period of 
time and (ii) a promise does not lapse as a result of the promisor’s death. These rules 
                                                 





are compatible with the juristic nature of a promise that it is a freestanding ground of 
liability. Thai law, conversely, has unsatisfactory rules about the legal effect of 
promise. The Thai court’s approach in applying the rule that the offeror’s death 
terminates the offer to promise is unsatisfactory. This is because it is not compatible 
with the theory that the extent to which the promisor wishes to be bound is stronger 
than that of an offeror. Also, the court’s approach to the effect that a promise of sale 
binds the promisor forever appears to be unfair to the promisor on the grounds that 
there should be a prescriptive period in enforcing an obligation. 
 
Thirdly, Scots law offers a clear justification regarding the irrevocability of offers 
specifying a period of acceptance. Although there is no contractual obligation 
between the parties as yet, the offeror is obliged to keep his/her offer open for the 
specified period due to the binding force of a promissory obligation. In Thai law, the 
legal effects of an offer specifying a period of acceptance are similar to those of 
Scots law. However, Thai lawyers cannot provide any satisfactory legal reasoning to 
establish the principles behind this rule.  
 
Nevertheless, there is an uncertainty in relation to the communication of a promise in 
both systems. Neither Scots nor Thai law has a clear approach to the question 
whether a promise requires a communication to the promisee. Consequently, clarity 
is required in both systems. 
 
(b) Factors causing differences between Scots and Thai law 
 
(i) Institutional writers/ Drafters of the Thai Code 
 
The difference between the two systems in relation to a clear and coherent concept of 
promise may arise from the fact that, inter alia, in Scotland the law of promise has 
been well set out since the period of the Institutional writers, notably Stair. A number 
of clear promissory rules which have been discussed in this chapter have benefited 
from Stair’s approach. An obvious example is the sharp distinction between promise 





Scottish legal scholars 253   and the Scottish courts 254  have generally relied upon 
Stair’s promissory approach when explaining promissory obligations.  
 
In contrast, the law of promise has not been well organised and clarified under the 
Thai Code.  Neither the general provision nor definition of a promise is given by the 
Code. As such, Thai law lacks conceptual clarity on what defines a promise as a 
promise. In addition, the drafters of the Code suffered from a misunderstanding 
about the actual nature of unilateral binding obligations. Recall that the drafters used 
the term “promise” both in the sense of a contractual promise and in the sense of a 
unilateral obligation. Also, the provisions of promise of reward (which is a genuine 
unilateral obligation) belong to the part related to the formation of a contract under 
the Code.255 Therefore, the fact that the Code was not well drafted, inter alia, results 




The Scottish courts also have an important role in establishing and clarifying the 
promissory rules. For instance, the Institutional writers did not clearly provide the 
objective test as a means of ascertaining the intention to undertake a binding 
promise. Instead, this approach was established by the Scottish courts. Also, the 
approach that a promissory obligation can only be created by clear and unambiguous 
words was not found from the Institutional writers’ works. The courts had developed 
this specific rule based on the idea that, inter alia, promise is a unilateral obligation 
which is usually, although not exclusively, gratuitous (subject to the debate). It is an 
obligation that can only be undertaken by the promisor and brings no reciprocal 
benefit to the promisor in many cases. Hence, it must be clearly expressed in order to 
protect the promisor who is being enforced to perform the obligation. 
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The role of the Thai courts in establishing promissory rules is not as obvious as that 
of the Scottish courts. This stems from the fact that Thailand is a codified system. 
Thus, it is not common for the courts to establish new legal principles. However, the 
fact that there are several uncertainties in the law of promise gave the Thai courts the 
opportunity to clarify a number of ambiguous promissory rules. Nevertheless, the 
promissory rules established by the Thai courts offer a rather unsatisfactory outcome.  
The rule that a promise of lease (which is not specified in the Code) is enforceable is 
sound because it is compatible with the will theory which plays a significant role in 
Thai private law. Nevertheless, both the rules that a promise is at an end if a 
promisor dies and that a promise binds the promisor even after ten years result in 
unfair outcomes. 
 
(iii) Legal scholars 
 
Part of the development of promissory doctrine must be attributed to Scottish legal 
scholars, who have helped to clarify promissory legal principles. For instance, the 
Institutional writers did not explain that rewards and options256 can be viewed as 
promissory in nature. These analyses were proposed by later legal scholars. 257 
Moreover, they have emphasised the value of the doctrine, especially its application 
in a commercial context. This is particularly the case of TB Smith, as noted in 
Chapter V.258 
 
Thai commentators have also had a role in developing promissory doctrine, 
especially by pointing out the uncertainties and ambiguities of promissory principles. 
All of the issues which have been discussed in this chapter (except for the issue of 
the irrevocability of an offer) have already been pointed out by Thai scholars. 
However, their suggestions generally cannot satisfactorily resolve these problems. 
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For instance, Thai academics argue that the courts’ decision that a promise binds the 
promisor forever is not fair to the promisor. However, there has been no satisfactory 
approach offered by Thai scholars regarding the period during which a promise 
should be binding, and on what grounds. Moreover, thus far there has been no 
justification for the reason why an offeror who specifies a period for acceptance has 
to keep his/her offer open. In fact, this issue is completely omitted from the 
discussions amongst Thai lawyers. 
 
(iv) Canon Law and the ius commune 
 
The difference between the two systems may stem in part from the fact that Scots 
law was influenced by the Canon Law and was part of the ius commune tradition. 
Firstly, recall that the legal enforceability of a promise originated in the Canon Law, 
where both unilateral and bilateral promises were recognised. Secondly, the ius 
commune was the tradition where promise played a central role in analysing 
voluntary obligations. Although most of the ius commune systems did not develop a 
general enforcement of a unilateral promise, there was an ongoing debate within the 
ius commune regarding the acceptance of a promise during Stair’s time. Stair, under 
the influence of Molina, supported the view that a promise is binding without 
acceptance. Thus, it is not surprising that Stair, who was inspired by, inter alia, the 
Canon Law and the ius commune, was able to propose the idea of a standalone 
promise.  
 
Thai law was, of course, never directly influenced by the Canon Law. Thus, the 
canonists’ treatment of promise was never directly received into Thai law. In 
addition, although Thai law was influenced by a number of Civilian jurisdictions, it 
is not a part of the European ius commune as such. Thai law borrowed some 
promissory principles from the Civilian tradition. However, the idea of a promise as 
a free-standing legal entity outwith contract was never introduced to Thai law.  This 
stems from the fact that there is no Continental European system regards promise as 
an independent obligation. As discussed, the Code civil adopted a similar approach to 





promisee. Although there was a later attempt to regard a promise as a source of 
obligation in the BGB, it did not succeed.259 This helps to explain why the notion of 
a standalone promise was never introduced to Thai law. Furthermore, English law 
was the first legal system which was received into Thailand. Recall that, before the 
promulgation of the Thai Code, the Thai courts applied English legal principles when 
traditional Thai law was not available. Also, Thai jurists, including those who were 
later appointed as the drafting committees of the Code, went to study in England.260 
Presumably, those jurists were not familiar with the idea that a declaration of will can 
unilaterally create an obligation, given that this idea did not exist under English law. 
In addition, the drafting committee of the Thai Code comprised four drafters, of 
which three were Thai and one was French. Presumably, the French drafter was not 
familiar with the idea that a unilateral declaration of will can create an obligation 
either, given that under the Code civil a promise is not a genuine unilateral 
obligation. With this in mind, it comes as no surprise to find that the drafters of the 
Thai Code did not clearly understand the difference between unilateral and bilateral 
obligations.  
 
The lack of understanding of unilateral and bilateral obligations has continually 
affected modern Thai scholars when dealing with the law of promise. As has been 
discussed, a number of Thai lawyers have explained that the complete act in the case 
of a promise of reward is deemed to be an acceptance, resulting in a contract between 
the parties.261 This, however, contrasts with the fact that a person who completes the 
specified act can claim the reward even if he/she is not aware of its existence. Also, 
as noted in Chapter V, some suggest that promises under Thai law are unilateral 
contracts between two parties, but only one party is bound.262 However, this theory 
fundamentally contradicts the nature of a promise in Thai law, in which a promise 
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can be created by a single party. Neither is it compatible with the characteristics of 
contract as an agreement between two parties. Also, some, under the influence of 
English law, propose that a promise to make a gratuitous contract or where a 
promisor receives nothing in return should not be enforceable. 263  However, this 
proposition is not satisfactory because there is no requirement of consideration under 
Thai law. 
 
(v) Concluding remarks 
 
The fact that Thai academics have not yet acknowledged the distinction between 
unilateral and bilateral obligations, as different sources of obligation, may be an 
important factor in explaining why there has been no satisfactory approach dealing 
with the problems in this area of law. This therefore provides this thesis with an 
opportunity to offer a satisfactory approach in order to improve the theoretical 
structure of the Thai law of promise, given that, inter alia, the distinction between 
unilateral and bilateral obligations has been acknowledged in this thesis. There will 
be no defects, in relation to the confusion between unilateral and bilateral 
obligations, in the approach that this thesis will offer. 
 
(c) Substantive roles of promise in the obligational framework 
 
Promise has a substantive role in the obligation framework in Scots law. Scots law 
offers a clear doctrinal analysis regarding promissory legal issues, which stems from 
the fact that, inter alia, a promise is deemed to be an independent obligation. 
Moreover, as promise is binding without acceptance, it can be applied in any 
circumstance where a person unilaterally binds himself/herself for his/her expression.  
 
As for Thai law, despite problems regarding its application, the functions that the law 
of promise performs in Thai law are useful. Promise has been used to oil the wheels 
of the law of obligations. It governs certain types of obligations which are both 
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unilateral and binding.  Obvious examples are promises of reward, which are legally 
enforceable regardless of the acceptance or even the acknowledgement of the 
promisee. Another example is the role that unilateral promise plays in an offer 
containing a time limit for acceptance. This type of offer binds the offeror because of 
the binding nature of promise. In addition, promise to make a contract can also be 
analysed as a unilateral binding obligation. Therefore, promise is a useful legal tool 
within the Thai legal system. There are also other practical circumstances under both 
Scots and Thai law which can be explained using a promissory analysis, to be 
discussed later in the next chapter.  
 
Furthermore, the example of the DCFR in recognising unilateral undertaking as a 
source of obligation reflects the importance of unilateral obligation. The fact that 
there are similarities between the most recent model rule of European private law and 
the Scottish approach in enforcing unilateral promises shows that the idea that a 
declaration of will can unilaterally create an obligation is important in the theoretical 
framework of the law of obligations. This reflects the fact that the idea of bilateral 
obligation cannot deal with every issue in the area of voluntary obligations. There are 
circumstances where a person wishes his/her intention to be legally binding without 
any acceptance of the other party. Additionally, it is interesting to see that promise 
now has an important role to play in the most recent model of European private law.. 
It was once the case that a promise played a leading role in voluntary obligations 
within the ius commune. Its status was then no longer dominant in the European 
private law, and Scotland is the only jurisdiction which has continued to regard 
promise as a source of obligation. Although the DCFR is not regarded as the 
common law of Europe, at least the recognition of unilateral undertakings under the 
DCFR shows that the idea of unilateral obligation  is important, and this is why it is 
included in the most recent model of European private law. 
 
Finally, the reference to the doctrine of promissory estoppel under English law also 
reflects the importance of unilateral promise. Traditionally, English law has adopted 
a very restricted approach in enforcing a bare promise due to, inter alia, the doctrine 





approach that promissory estoppel could only be used as a “shield”, rather than a 
“sword”, appears to have been changed. Recent case law suggests that the English 
courts are prepared to recognise an estoppel if the courts are satisfied with the 
requirements of the doctrine. 264  The English courts also appear to have used a 
holistic approach when dealing with estoppel in recent cases.265 The change in the 
English courts’ attitude towards bare promise therefore reflects the importance of 
unilateral obligations, given that the courts in jurisdictions where it is most difficult 
to enforce unilateral promises have made it more flexible for a unilateral promise to 
be enforceable than it used to be. 
 
(2) Advantages of regarding promise as a standalone obligation 
 
From the comparative treatment, the approach of considering promise as a source of 
obligations, as existed in Scots law and the DCFR, is very attractive to Thai law. It 
sharply divides the obligations of promise and contract, which will help to solve 
problems under Thai law. This section will describe benefits which Thai law could 
gain if it were to recognise promise as a separate class of obligation which is 
independent from contract. This will be done by making reference to the ambiguities 
regarding promissory principles which have been discussed in this chapter (and 
previous chapters). 
 
Firstly, recall that it has been generally explained in Thai law that a promisor has a 
stronger intention to bind him/herself than that of an offeror, a person making an 
invitation to treat, and a person making an overture, respectively. However, the fact 
that Thai lawyers regard a promise to make a contract as per se an offer causes 
difficulties in distinguishing them.266 The Thai courts are required to engage in two 
stages of analysis in determining whether a person’s expression is a promise or not. 
The approach of regarding promise as an independent obligation can help to 
eradicate an overlap between promise to make a contract and an offer. Distinguishing 
                                                 
264 This is discussed in section A. THE NATURE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF PROMISE, (1) 
Scots law, (c) Binding characteristics of a promise, (i) A promise is binding without acceptance. 
265 See Ibid. 
266 This is discussed in section A. THE NATURE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF PROMISE, (2) 





them will be easier as they will be regarded as different juristic acts. If the courts find 
that a person intends his/her expression to be binding without the acceptance of the 
other party, it can be simply regarded as a binding unilateral obligation.  Thus, the 
current approach of considering promises to enter into a contract as per se offers has 
to be changed. In the new approach, a promise to make a contract is entirely 
distinguished from an offer. 
 
Secondly, the proposed approach helps to clarify the legal status of promise to make 
a contract under Thai law. If a promise is per se obligation, its legal nature would be 
clearly regarded as a unilateral juristic act, and not a unilateral contract. This suits its 
actual characteristics on the grounds that a promise under Thai law can be 
unilaterally made. Additionally, this makes the position of a promise to make a 
contract compatible with that of a promise of reward since the latter is seen as a 
“genuine unilateral promise” already.267 Consequently, there would be no confusion 
regarding the legal status of a promise to make a contract and promise of reward 
under Thai law.  
 
Thirdly, the new approach helps to solve the problem regarding the period during 
which a promise is binding. A promise to make a contract is binding as long as the 
promisor does not comply with the means stated in §454 para 2. However, it is unfair 
for the promisor because he/she is bound for too long a period.268 The general rule 
regarding prescription suggests that there are limited periods of time in enforcing 
obligations. Hence, it is not justifiable that a creditor of a promissory liability can 
still enforce the obligation even if the time limit of the obligation has already passed. 
If promise is regarded as an independent obligation, the general rule of a prescriptive 
period of ten years can then undoubtedly apply to a promise. There is no need to 
provide a new provision regarding the period after which a promise lapses.  
 
                                                 
267 This is discussed in section A. THE NATURE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF PROMISE, (2) 
Thai law Binding characteristics of a promise. 
268 This is discussed in section D. LEGAL EFFECTS OF A PROMISE, (2) Thai law, (b) Lapse of a 





Fourthly, the proposed approach provides a more satisfactory outcome to the case of 
the death of the promisor.269 If a promise is an independent obligation, it does not 
lapse when the promisor dies. The promisor’s successor is still bound to perform the 
obligation. This is also compatible with the theory that the degree to which a 
promisor wishes to be bound is greater than that of an offeror. Finally, the new 
approach enhances the reason behind the rule concerning the irrevocability of offers 
specifying a period for acceptance. 270  Although there is not yet contractual 
obligation, an offeror is bound to keep the offer open for the specified period as a 
result of a unilateral obligation. 
 
However, considering promise as a separate class of voluntary obligations cannot 
automatically resolve the issue regarding its communication.  This can be observed 
from the example of Scots law, where it has remained unsettled whether or not a 
promise requires communication to the promisee to becoming binding.271 According 
to the preferred approach of this thesis, the theory which holds that a promise 
requires a communication to the promisee provides a more satisfactory outcome.  
                                                 
269 As discussed in section D. LEGAL EFFECTS OF A PROMISE, (2) Thai law, (b) Lapse of a 
promise, (ii) Death of the promisor. 
270 This is discussed in section E. PROMISES TO KEEP AN OFFER OPEN, (2) Thai law. 






The Practical Application of Unilateral Promise 
 
 A promise is a unilateral obligation binding without acceptance. It is within this 
framework that a promissory analysis of obligations can play an important role in 
explaining aspects of transactions. It can help us understand and explain the 
obligations parties owe to each other.  
 
This chapter discusses the practical applications of promise. This will help emphasise 
the practical value of a promissory analysis. Similar practical usages of promise are 
grouped together under the same headings, namely (i) pre-contractual promises, (ii) 
using promises to create obligations, (iii) using promises as enticements, (iv) using 
promises to guarantee existing obligations, and (v) promises to waive contractual 
right. This chapter is divided into two parts due to its substantial length. As a 
consequence, there is no conclusion at the end of Part I. The final conclusion is 





















Chapter VII Part I 
 
A. PRE-CONTRACTUAL PROMISES 
 
(1) Promises to keep offers open 
 
(a) Scots law 
 
The unilateral binding effect of promise benefits Scots law in dealing with the 
situation in which an offeror states that he/she will keep his/her offer open for a 
certain period.  Such offeror is bound to keep his/her offer open until the stated 
period of time has elapsed because of the binding nature of promises.1 This is useful 
in practice since it excludes the general rule in which an offeror can withdraw his/her 
offer any time before it is accepted.2 A firm offer is practically useful for forward 
planning, since it enables a company to rely on the prices quoted by potential sub-
contractors when tendering for a major contract.3 
 
Moreover, it is more flexible in comparison with English law where a unilateral 
promise is generally not legally binding.4 Under English law, an offeror is generally 
not bound to keep his/her offer open even if he/she specifies the period of time for 
acceptance.5 This rule was established in Routledge v Grant,6 and has been followed 
                                                 
1 E.g. Marshall & M’Kell v Blackwood of Pitreavie, 12th Nov 1747 (Elch Sale); Littlejohn v Hadwen 
(1882) 20 SLR 5; Paterson v Highland Railway Co 1927 SC (HL) 32. However, where it was stated 
that “[i]t is a condition of this acceptance that missives must be concluded by...”, the court held that it 
was not a promise to keep an offer open, but rather “a condition of acceptance.” Effold Properties Ltd 
v Sprot 1979 SLT (Notes) 84 at 85. See also Henry Heys v Kimball & Morton, Limited. Here, the 
court observed that an offer that was “made on condition of immediate entry being given, and of 
acceptance within three days … does not mean that the offerer might not withdraw his offer within 
these three days”. ([1890] 17 R 381 at 384 per Lord President). 
2 E.g. Countess of Dunmore v Alexander (1830) 9 S 190; Thomson v James (1855) 18 D 1; Campbell v 
Glasgow Police Comrs (1895) 22 R 621; J M Smith Ltd v Colquhoun’s Tr (1901) 3 F 981; Effold 
Properties Ltd v Sprot 1979 SLT (Notes) 84; Smith v Aberdeen City Council 2001 Hous LR 93 at para 
10-28. 
3 This example is particularly suggested by Poole. J Poole Textbook on Contract, 12th edn (2014) 72; 
See also R Stone, The Modern Law of Contract, 10th edn (2013) para 2.13.3. 
4 Misa v Currie (1876) 1 App Cas 554; Combe v Combe [1951] 2 KB 215. 
5 Routledge v Grant 130 ER 920, (1828) 4 Bing 653; Offord v Davies 142 ER 1336, (1862) 12 CB NS 





by a number of cases.7 For instance, in Bristol, Cardiff, and Swansea Aerated Bread 
Company v Maggs8 , it was held that an offer was not a contractual obligation. 
Therefore, although it was stated that the offer would be held open for ten days, it 
was not binding. 9   Nevertheless, there is an exception in English law whereby 
separate consideration is given so that a firm offer is irrevocable. 10  In Holwell 
Securities Ltd v Hughes11, the defendant granted the plaintiff an option to purchase a 
property within a period of six months for a consideration of £100. However, since 
the notice of the exercise of the option had not reached the defendant, it was held that 
the option was invalid and no contract had been concluded. It can be inferred from 
the decision that the firm offer was binding because separate valuable consideration 
was given.12 Another exception is when a promise to keep an offer open is made in a 
deed13  so that the firm offer is irrevocable. However, in this case, a promise made in 
a deed under seal would be considered to be per se a complete contract. 
 
Furthermore, the practical value of promises to keep an offer open for a definite 
period can be reinforced by the fact that most model rules dealing with sales adopt a 
similar approach to the Scottish approach. These include the CISG14, the PECL15 and 
the DCFR.16 Additionally, rather than following the English approach, some Anglo-
American systems have taken a different attitude towards the irrevocability of a firm 
offer. For instance, the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) provides that “an offer by 
                                                                                                                                          
Worrell Holdings (2001) 82 P & CR 34, (2001) 82 P & CR DG18; Dickinson v Dodds (1876) 2 Ch D 
463. 
6 130 ER 920, (1828) 4 Bing 653. 
7 E.g. Dickinson v Dodds (1876) 2 Ch D 463. 
8 [1889 B 535], (1890) 44 Ch D 616. 
9 See also Cooke v Oxley (1790) 3 Term Reports 653 100 ER 785. Although this case was not directly 
related to the validity of a firm offer but rather about the validity of a contract, it could be inferred 
from the court’s decision that a promise to keep an offer open for a specified period is not binding. 
This is based on the fact that the contract itself (an offer that has been accepted) is unenforceable, thus 
an offer containing a promise to keep it open would not be binding either. 
10 Chitty on Contracts para 3-191; W R Anson, Anson's Law of Contract, 29th edn by J Beatson, A 
Burrows and J Cartwright (2010) 56. 
11 [1974] 1 WLR 155. 
12 See also Daulia Ltd v Four Millbank Nominees Ltd [1978] Ch 231; Pitt v PHH Asset Management 
Ltd [1994] 1 WLR 327; Tye v House (1998) 76 P & CR 188 
13 Treitel The Law of Contract para 3-170; For case law see Hall v Palmer (1844) 3 Hare 532; Macedo 
v Stroud [1922] 2 AC 330; Glessing v Green [1975] 1 WLR 863; Pennington v Waine (No 1) [2002] 
EWCA Civ 227 
14 CISG, Art 16. 
15 PECL, Art 2:202 (3)(b). 





a merchant to buy or sell goods in a signed record that by its terms gives assurance 
that it will be held open is not revocable, for lack of consideration, during the time 
stated or if no time is stated for a reasonable time...” 17  In fact, in England the 
criticism has been made by legal scholars 18  (both native and external) that the 
English rule that an offer specifying a period for acceptance is freely revocable is not 
satisfactory. Also, it was proposed by the Law Commission19 that there should be 
changes in relation to this rule but the suggestion was not implemented. 
 
(b) Thai law 
 
An offeror who states in his/her offer the period within which it must be accepted is 
obliged to keep his/her offer open for the specified period. This type of offer is 
commonly used in practice.20 Although promissory language is not used in the Thai 
provision, the binding nature of an irrevocable offer is promissory, rather than 




The example of promises to keep offers open is referred to again in this chapter in 
order to emphasise the value of the binding force of promises.  It has a useful 
function to play in practice. In comparison with English law, in Scots law, it is less 
difficult to deal with the situation of a promise to keep offers open. Also, the Scottish 
approach is compatible with the approach adopted by most legal model rules, 
suggesting that it is an appropriate approach in dealing with commercial practice. 
Additionally, the Scottish approach helps to explain the irrevocability of offers 
specifying a period for acceptance under Thai law.   
 
                                                 
17 UCC, §2-205. 
18 J Poole, Textbook on Contract Law, 12th edn (2014) 72; M Spence, Protecting Reliance: The 
Emergent Doctrine of Equitable Estoppel (1999) 116; J Gordley, The Enforceability of Promises in 
European Law (2001) 279. 
19 Law Commission Working Paper No 60, “Firm Offers”. 
20 E.g. Supreme Court Decisions 927/1955 (B.E. 2498); 73/1966 (B.E. 2509); 1809/1968 (B.E. 2511); 
2170/1986 (B.E. 2529); 19-21/1994 (B.E. 2537); 1943/1999 (B.E. 2542); 6729/2001 (B.E. 2544). 





(2) Promises about the tendering process 
 
(a) Scots law 
 
In the pre-contractual phase promises are useful where they concern tendering, and 
promises attached to an invitation to treat. In English law, tenders that contain certain 
conditions such as to accept the highest bid are viewed as unilateral contracts. The 
concept of the English unilateral contract can be compared with the Scottish 
unilateral promissory approach. The essential question is which approach would 
make better sense doctrinally and provide a fairer result. These two criteria are 
important. The law should be clear and comprehensible and should provide a 
satisfactory outcome to all relevant parties. 
 
(i) The English unilateral contract approach 
There are two leading cases concerning the concept of the unilateral contract under 
English law as follows: 
(1) Harvela Investments Ltd v Royal Trust Co of Canada (CI) Ltd22 (henceforth: 
Harvela)  
Factual circumstances and judicial reasoning 
 
The Royal Trust invited bids for a company in which it owned shares. Sir Leonard 
Outerbridge (Sir Leonard) bid “C$2,100,000, or C$101,000 in excess of any other 
offer... expressed as a fixed monetary amount, whichever is the higher.” Sir 
Leonard’s bid was accepted as being $2,276,000. Harvela, who bid $2,175,000, sued 
for breach of contract on the grounds that the referential bid was invalid. The House 
of Lords held that only fixed price bids were entitled to be considered. Therefore, Sir 
Leonard’s referential bid was invalid. Royal Trust’s expression (to invite bids) was 
regarded as a “unilateral contract” on the grounds that only Royal Trust was bound to 
accept the highest bid once its expression was issued. As stated by Lord Diplock: 
                                                 





“[i]ts legal nature was that of a unilateral or "if" contract, or rather of two 
unilateral contracts in identical terms to one of which the vendors and 
Harvela were the parties as promisor and promisee respectively, while to the 




In the Common Law jurisdictions, the term “unilateral contract” has a different 
meaning from the one used in the Civil Law. As discussed in Chapter V, in the 
Civilian tradition a unilateral contract is a contract arising from the mutual agreement 
of the offeror and the offeree, but one party is obliged to perform an obligation.24  
However, in the Anglo-American systems, a contract has traditionally been defined 
as a promise or set of promises which the law will enforce, rather than an 
agreement.25 Unilateral contract under English law is then a contract in which only 
one party to the contract promises to undertake an obligation.26 For example, in the 
case of rewards only the person offering the reward is obliged, whereas the 
offeree/promisee is not. 27  Nonetheless, the situation in the Harvela case is not 
exactly the same as the case of unilateral contracts of rewards. Royal Trust’s 
invitation constituted an obligation to accept the highest bid made by either Harvela 
or Sir Leonard. In this sense, it is similar to the case of reward: only the promisor is 
bound to perform the obligation. However, the court’s decision seems to suggest that 
Royal Trust made an offer to sell shares to the highest bidder, and the offer itself was 
also a unilateral contract. The offer was concluded with Harvela, the highest bidder. 
It was then transformed into a binding bilateral contract between Royal Trust and 
Harvela. As Lord Diplock explained, “the obligation [of Royal Trust] was to enter 
into a synallagmatic contract to sell the shares to the promise, the terms of such 
synallagmatic contract being also set out in the invitation.” 28  Conversely, Royal 
Trust’s offer with Sir Leonard, which was not the highest bidder, was not concluded 
                                                 
23 Ibid at 224 per Lord Diplock. 
24 See Chapter V, A. THEORIES AND DOCTRINES RELATING TO PROMISE IN SCOTS LAW, 
(6) Gratuitousness of promise. 
25 See Chapter I, B. IS PROMISE DISTINCT FROM CONTRACT?, (2) Contemporary debates, (a) 
Promise is contract. 
26 Chitty on Contracts para 1-099. 
27  See Chapter VII Part II, C. USING PROMISES AS ENTICEMENTS, (1) Advertisements of 
reward. 





and lapsed. Royal Trust’s expression was thus regarded as both an offer and also as 
imposing a binding obligation on the offeror (to accept the highest bidder). It had at 
one and the same time two different characteristics. In this sense, it is different from 
the unilateral contract of reward because in the reward case there is only one 




Although the question of validity of referential bids is not directly relevant to the 
issue under discussion here, namely the characteristics of unilateral contract, it is 
nonetheless helpful to consider this point. This is to see the reasons behind the 
judgement as to why the court treated referential bids as being invalid. The court 
made a distinction between an auction sale and a fixed bidding sale. In the former 
“each bidder may adjust his bid by reference to rival bids”,29 whereas in the latter “a 
bidder may not adjust his bid. Each bidder specifies a fixed amount which he hopes 
will be sufficient, but not more than sufficient, to exceed any other bid.”30 The court 
further explained that there would be a number of flaws as a result of referential bids. 
One of these flaws is that if referential bids were allowed, then such bids could have 
been submitted by both tenderers. If so, “there was a danger, far from negligible, that 
the sale might be abortive and the shares remain unsold.”31  
Criticism by commentators 
The decision of the House of Lords in the Harvela case has important practical 
implications in relation to the tendering process.32 Previously, there had been no 
legal obligation dealing with the liability of the party issuing an invitation to tender 
because the English courts had established that an invitation to tender did not amount 
to an offer.33 However, the Harvela decision established the new rule that a vendor 
                                                 
29 [1986] AC 207 at 230 per Lord Templeman. 
30 Ibid. 
31  Ibid at 231 per Lord Templeman. 
32  R Stone, The Modern Law of Contract, 10th edn (2013) 49; A Haidar, Global Claims in 
Construction (2011) 31. 





making an invitation to tender may have a liability prior to the concluded contract.34 
Consequently, the Harvela decision has attracted a great deal of comment from both 
legal and non-legal commentators. Leaving aside the criticisms from non-legal 
perspectives35, the criticism can be made from a legal perspective that it is not 
entirely clear what the consideration of the unilateral contract in the Harvela case 
was. This is because in the tendering process, “there is no element of bargain--an 
exchange based on consideration from both sides--which is normally required for a 
binding contract”. 36  Moreover, it is questionable whether the term “unilateral 
contract” was used in the correct sense. In the Harvela case, the court suggested that 
there were two unilateral contracts: one was transformed into a bilateral contract and 
the other lapsed. It is not clear how a unilateral contract can be transformed into a 
bilateral one. Additionally, it is doubtful whether “one” undertaking could constitute 
“two” binding (unilateral) contracts. Accordingly, it has been suggested that it would 
be more appropriate to characterise Royal Trust’s undertaking as, for instance, a 
“unilateral offer”37, or “an offer … of a unilateral contract” 38 to accept the highest 
bid.39 These suggestions appear to be sound. If Royal Trust’s invitation was regarded 
as an offer, there would be no theoretical problem as to how a unilateral offer (to 
accept the highest bid) could be transferred into a bilateral contract.  
 
 
                                                 
34 Haidar (n 32) 31.  
35 For the criticism from an economic point of view regarding referential bids see T Blyth & S Garrett, 
“The Rule against Referential Bids: Harvela Revisited and the Prisoners’ Dilemma” (2002) 4(3) 
Journal of International Financial Markets 103. 
36 S Arrowsmith, “The "Blackpool" Implied Contract Governing Public Sector Tenders: A Review in 
the Light of Pratt and Other Recent Case Law” (2004) 5 Public Procurement Law Review NA125 at 
NA131; See also Hogg, Obligations 58; Chitty on Contracts para 3-90. 
37 This example is particularly suggested by Halson in R Halson, Contract Law, 2nd edn (2013) 131. 
38 This example is particularly suggested by Burrows in A Burrows, A Casebook on Contract, 4th edn 
(2013) 22. 
39 These points are not raised in high authorities on English contract law such as Chitty on Contract 





(2) Blackpool and Fylde Aero Club v Blackpool Borough Council 40 (henceforth: 
Blackpool). 
Factual circumstances and judicial reasoning 
Blackpool Borough Council (the Council) had invited Blackpool & Fylde Aero Club 
(the Aero Club) and others to submit tenders for a pleasure flight concession from 
Blackpool airport. The deadline was 12 noon. The Aero Club posted their tender at 
11am on that day in the Town Hall post box. Normally the contents of the post box 
were collected at noon every day, but not on that day, so the Aero Club’s tender was 
considered to be late. The Aero Club brought an action against the Council claiming 
that the Council had promised to consider all tenders submitted by the deadline.  The 
Court of Appeal decided in favour of the Aero Club. It was held that tenderers who 
submitted their tenders before the due date were entitled to have their tenders 
considered. 
Unilateral contracts 
Although the court did not use the term “unilateral contract” in the Blackpool case, 
the nature of the undertaking is quite similar to that which took place in the Harvela 
one.  In both cases only one party is bound under the obligation to perform: in the 
Harvela case, Royal Trust, and in the Blackpool case, the Council. The difference is 
that in the former, only the party who submits the highest bid could fulfil the 
requirement of the obligation of unilateral contract. In the latter the benefit results 
from the submission of the tender on time. 
Criticism by commentators 
Like the Harvela decision, the Blackpool decision has attracted a vast amount of 
comments from legal scholars.41 In fact, the degree to which the Blackpool decision 
                                                 
40 [1990] 1 WLR 1195. 
41 E.g. I Brown & A Chander, “Intent and Contract Formation” (Case Comment) (1991) Conveyancer 
and Property Lawyer 149; J N Adam & R Brownsword, “More in Expectation Than Hope: the 
Blackpool Airport Case” (1991) Modern Law Review 54(2), 28; S Arrowsmith, “The "Blackpool" 
Implied Contract Governing Public Sector Tenders: A Review in the Light of Pratt and Other Recent 





reversed the traditional approach of the formation of contract in tendering situations 
is stronger than that of the Harvela one. While the Harvela decision established the 
rule that an invitor is bound to accept the highest bid if this is “expressly” stated, the 
Blackpool decision went further by suggesting that a vendor inviting tenders could be 
bound to consider simultaneously submitted tenders if it may be “implied” from the 
intentions of the parties that the invitor would do so. Traditionally, the offer and 
acceptance approach is used to determine whether a contract has been concluded 
between the parties.42 It has also been used to refute the idea that every declaration of 
an intention amounts to a contractual obligation.43 Critics claim that it is not clear 
that this approach was properly examined by the court in the Blackpool case. Rather, 
there appears to be only…  
“the hint of a self-fulfilling prophesy in the logic adopted by the court: the 
implied intention of both parties was that properly submitted tenders would 
be considered, therefore, such intent could be conveniently translated into an 
offer which was accepted by each tenderer.”44 . 
This thesis does not entirely agree with this criticism. The offer and acceptance 
analysis is not the only approach that can be used to determine whether an expression 
can create a contractual relationship between parties. For example, a unilateral 
contract is an alternative approach in English law that can be used to determine 
whether a contractual obligation exists. Nonetheless, the fact that the court in the 
Blackpool case failed to clarify its adoption of a unilateral contract approach or offer 
and acceptance approach caused the judicial reasoning of the decision to be 
ambiguous. 
Moreover, unlike the Harvela case, there is no clear explanation from the court in the 
Blackpool case as to why the Council’s expression (that it would not consider late 
tenders) contained a unilateral binding obligation. Therefore, it is argued that there is 
a danger in enforcing a contractual obligation on the basis of unclear terms.45  
                                                 








Furthermore, critics claim that the court’s decision gave rise to a legal obligation in 
response to an expectation. The Blackpool decision reflects the fact that an 
expectation may amount to a binding contract even if there is no reliance on the part 
of the promisee.46 By analogy, this is similar to circumstances where a person makes 
a promise to give another person a sum of money and such a promise is binding 
because the promisee reasonably expects the promisor to keep his/her promise.47 
More importantly, the Blackpool decision shows that the court did not merely limit 
the scope of expectations to express promises, but also extended it to include implied 
ones.48 Although the court accepted that “contracts are not to be lightly implied”49, 
the court “proceeded to establish the requisite intention without any appreciable 
difficulty.” 50  Similarly, it is argued that “the court appears to be manipulating 
contractual principles simply to provide a remedy where it felt one ought to be given 
by some means.”51 In fact, in this case there was also a claim based on tort liability.  
The claim was brought before Judge Jolly, who decided in favour of the Club that the 
Council owed it a duty of care in tort. This suggests that the court could have only 
awarded damages based on tort liability if it had found no contractual relationship 
between the parties. All the negative comments show that there were doubts and 
concerns expressed by legal scholars about the practical implication of the Blackpool 
decision. 
Concluding remarks 
The English courts applied the notion of a unilateral contract to both the Harvela and 
the Blackpool cases (albeit the term “unilateral contract” was not used in the latter). 
The characteristics of the unilateral contract in the Harvela case, however, differ 
from the traditional definition of a unilateral contract. The court suggested that there 
                                                 
46 J N Adam & R Brownsword, “More in Expectation Than Hope: the Blackpool Airport Case” (1991) 
Modern Law Review 54(2), 281 at 283-285. 
47 This view makes a comparison between the reliance principles and the expectation principles that 
they are not the same thing. For further discussion see Ibid at 283-285. 
48 Haidar (n 32) 31. 
49  [1990] 1 WLR 1195 at 1202 per Bingham LJ. 
50 I Brown & A Chander (n 41) at 150. 
51 S Arrowsmith, “The "Blackpool" Implied Contract Governing Public Sector Tenders: A Review in 






were two unilateral contracts: only one of which was transformed into a bilateral one. 
The features of the unilateral contract in the Blackpool case were not so very 
different from the traditional meaning: only a promisor is bound to perform an 
obligation whereas a promisee is not. The difference, however, is that in the 
Blackpool case the court found that a unilateral contract was created by an implied 
term. Both the Harvela and the Blackpool cases can be usefully compared with the 
doctrine of promise in Scots law. 
(ii) The Scottish unilateral promise approach 
 
In Scotland, tenders are treated as offers. However, certain conditions in invitations 
to tender may be treated as “unilateral promises”. The circumstances where the 
English courts applied the concept of unilateral contract can be resolved using a 
promissory analysis under Scots law.52 Firstly, in the Harvela case, Royal Trust is 
legally bound by its promise to make a contract with the highest bidder. The highest 
bidder can directly enforce Royal Trust’s obligation because of the binding effect of 
a promise. Secondly, in the Blackpool case, the Council is legally bound by a 
unilateral obligation to give proper consideration to all timely submitted bids. 
 
It is worth making a reference to a recent Scottish case in which the petitioners relied 
on the rule regarding an obligation to consider tenders in the Blackpool case. This 
Scottish case is related to both private law and public law matters. However, this 
thesis is only concerned with private law matters. In Sidey Ltd v Clackmannanshire 
Council,53 Clackmannanshire Council (the Council) invited four tenderers to submit 
bids for the contract to provide replacements of kitchens and bathrooms in council 
houses. Sidey, whose bid was not successful, sought a judicial review of the 
Council’s decision on the basis of an error of valuation. It was averred, inter alia, that 
there was a binding contract on the part of the invitor of tenders to consider all the 
submitted tenders. By citing Blackpool, it was argued that the tender documentation 
constituted an implied contractual obligation to give proper consideration to all the 
summited tenders as a result of the principles of fairness and equality. Additionally, 
                                                 
52 MacQueen, Options 190; Hogg, Obligation 60. 





it was further argued that if the invitor chose to award the contract to any bidder, it 
was legally bound to award the contract to “the most economically advantageous 
tender.” 54  The court, however, held that the circumstances of the present case 
differed from the Blackpool one. This is based on the fact that, inter alia, the 
Council’s statement did not contain terms which would suggest that it was intended 
by the parties to create a binding contract. As the court explained, “there was no 
evidence available to the court to say that the parties had intended to create a 
contractual relationship.”55 Moreover, in the Blackpool case, the pursuer’s tender was 
not considered fairly and honestly because the plaintiff’s bid was not considered at 
all. However, in the present case Sidey’s tender was considered.56 The way in which 
the court interpreted the obligation in the tendering process was quite strict. This may 
stem from the fact that the rule applied in the Blackpool case fundamentally contrasts 
with the traditional rule of the formation of contracts. In short, the approach applied 
in the Blackpool case is an exception to the general rule of the formation of contracts. 
Therefore, the application of this rule only applies in exceptional circumstances. 
 
What would be the outcome of the case if promise was argued by the petitioners? As 
noted, recent case law suggests that a unilateral obligation in Scots law must be 
expressed in clear terms.57 Therefore, it would be highly unlikely that the Scottish 
courts would regard the Council’s statement as a unilateral obligation to consider all 
submitted tenders and to award the contract to the most economically advantageous 
tender, given that the Council did not expressly state in the tender documentation that 
it would award the contract to any specific bidder.58 
 
 
                                                 
54 Ibid at para 11. 
55 Ibid at para 16 per Lord Brailsford. 
56 Ibid. 
57 E.g. Dow v Tayside University Hospitals NHS Trust [2006] SLT (Sh Ct) 141; Jeroen Van Klaveren 
v Servisair UK Limited [2009] CSIH 37 2009; Regus (Maxim) Limited v Bank of Scotland Plc [2013] 
CSIH 12. 
58 Alternatively, it has been suggested that the petitioners could have “argued that the respondents had 
impliedly held out that they would, as a bare minimum, evaluate each tender in accordance with the 
scoring criteria and procedures which they had settled upon.” For full discussion see M Hogg, 
“Liability for Improperly Rejected Contract Tenders: Legitimate Expectations, Contract, Promise and 






The English unilateral contract and the Scottish promissory approaches provide the 
same outcome for the issue under discussion. Had the Harvela and Blackpool cases 
arisen in Scotland and the doctrine of promise been applied, the results would have 
been similar to the decisions of the English courts. Also, if the petitioners had argued 
in favour of promissory liability in the Sidey case, the claim would have been 
unlikely to be successful. Therefore, in relation to the question as to whether the 
English or the Scottish approach would provide a more satisfactory outcome to 
relevant parties, the answer would be that they are equal.  
However, the Scottish approach provides a more understandable legal analysis in 
comparison with the English approach. It clearly explains why a party calling for 
tenders is bound to accept the highest bid (in Harvela) or to consider timely 
submitted tenders (in Blackpool). This is because the invitors’ undertakings are 
regarded as unilateral obligations. Under the English approach it is questionable how 
a unilateral contract can be transformed into a bilateral one. Also, it is unclear what 
the consideration is since there is no obvious value given by the bidders. It appears 
that the English courts tried to provide a just result to the parties, but the legal 
analysis of the English courts is not in accordance with the English doctrine of 
unilateral contract. This reflects the fact that English law has faced theoretical 
difficulties when the English courts wished to enforce an obligation in circumstances 
where only one party unilaterally binds himself/herself to perform an obligation. 
Conversely, the concept of unilateral promise provides the Scottish courts with 
greater flexibility in dealing with such circumstances, hence such conceptual 












(b) Thai law 
 
(i) General concept of tenders in Thailand 
 
A tender is regarded as an invitation to treat59 while a bidder’s submission is deemed 
an offer.60 Hence, a person calling for bids is entitled to cancel the tendering process 
at any time without any liability.61 The act of an invitor of tenders in selecting the 
bidder and informing him/her is regarded as an acceptance. When the notification 
reaches the chosen bidder, a contract is concluded. This concluded contract is called 
a “tender contract”62 or an “agreement of tender”.63 It is not deemed a main contract: 
a final actual contract under circumstances in which there are two stages or phases of 
the contract. In tenders, the first stage involves the tendering process. At this stage, 
there is an agreement between the party inviting the tender and the chosen bidder. 
The second stage involves an actual contract, i.e. a contract in which a tendering 
process is being called for. 
 
The parties still have to make a further contract, which is a main one, in writing.  
This rule also applies even where the tender is already in writing, i.e. they still need 
another contract, because in the court’s view tenders are not main contracts.64 Thus, 
as long as the parties have not signed a contract, there is no main contract concluded 
which could be enforced by the parties.65   
 
(ii) Problems with, and analysis of tenders in Thai law 
 
If circumstances like the Harvela case arose in Thailand, the result would have been 
different. In that case, such call for bids could be regarded as an offer because it is 
                                                 
59 Supreme Court Decision 3550/1983 (B.E. 2526) at 2730. 
60 Supreme Court Decisions 931/1937 (B.E.2480); 1825/1979 (B.E. 2522); 2811/1986 (B.E. 2529). 
61 Supreme Court Decision 3550/1983 (B.E. 2526) at 2730. 
62 Supreme Court Decision 931/1937 (B.E. 2480). 
63 Supreme Court Decisions 1131/1977 (B.E. 2520) at 703; 1418/1986 (B.E. 2529) at 687; 1825/1979 
(B.E. 2522) at 1512. 
64 Thai Code, §366 para 2. 
65 Supreme Court Decisions 3550/1983 (B.E. 2526) at 2730; 1418/1986 (B.E. 2529) at 687; 931/1937 





certain that the highest bidder will be accepted.66 Therefore, a submission of the 
highest bid would be considered as an acceptance, upon which a tender contract 
would be concluded once the highest bid reaches the offeror. 
 
There appear to be no Thai authorities on the issue regarding referential bids. 
Nonetheless, it is more likely that the Thai courts would adopt a similar approach as 
the English courts when dealing with referential bids. This assumption is based on 
the principles of good faith. Good faith is a broad general concept which governs the 
whole of Thai private law.67 The fact that a tenderer who submitted non-referential 
bids has no chance to win the tender at all would make referential bids not in 
accordance with the doctrine of good faith.  
 
Yet, there is still an issue in relation to the main contract. As discussed, the 
concluded contract is considered to be merely a tender contract or an agreement of 
tender, and the main contract is required to be in writing. Therefore, if a party refuses 
to sign a contract, the other party cannot force him/her to do so even if the tender 
contract has been concluded. In this scenario, the result is unfair to the aggrieved 
party (which would usually be the highest bidder) since he/she cannot force the other 
party (which would usually be an invitor of tenders) to perform his/her obligation (in 
the main contract), although the tender contract has been concluded. Also, this allows 
collusive tendering to occur easily since an invitor of tenders can generally deny 
his/her liability. 
 
In Thai law the final outcome of the Harvela case would have been different from 
both English and Scots law. Royal Trust would have been bound to accept the 
highest bid because its offer contained that term. Unlike the English courts, there is 
no need for the Thai courts to characterise Royal Trust’s proposal as a binding 
unilateral contract. Royal Trust’s invitation would amount to an offer to accept the 
highest bid under Thai law. Moreover, in Thai law an offer which does not specify a 
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period of acceptance is irrevocable within a reasonable period of time.68 Assuming 
that the Thai courts applied the same approach regarding referential bids, Harvela’s 
bid would be deemed to be an acceptance and would constitute a contract with Royal 
Trust’s offer. Nevertheless, the fact that Thai law requires the parties to make a final 
contract in writing prevents the court from forcing the parties to enter into the final 
contract. 
 
The final outcome of Thai law constitutes a disappointment, especially when 
compared with English law. Whilst the English courts faced theoretical difficulty in 
treating Royal Trust’s statement as a binding obligation, the Thai courts have no such 
difficulty. The English courts had to find a way to characterise the invitor’s statement 
to make it binding as a unilateral contract, whereas the Thai courts can simply regard 
it as an irrevocable offer to accept the highest bid. Notwithstanding their clear 
explanation when dealing with the features of unilateral contracts, the English courts 
could reach a satisfactory result to the effect that the invitor of tenders is liable if 
decides not to enter into the final contract. It is a fair result which one can reasonably 
expect. In this sense, the Scottish approach provides a satisfactory outcome too, 
because the result of a promissory analysis is similar to that of an English unilateral 
contract one. Conversely, the Thai courts cannot force the other party to perform the 
obligation on its part. This is rather a strange, and indeed disappointing, outcome, 
given that there is a tender contract between the parties already, and the court cannot 
award contractual damages to an aggrieved party. 
 
Given that both the English and Scottish approaches provide a fair result to the 
parties in this situation, they could be used as a model for Thai law. However, in 
comparison, the Scottish approach would be more suitable for Thai law. Firstly, the 
fundamental basis of Thai contract and promissory law is closer to the Civilian 
tradition than to the Common Law.69 The definition of unilateral contract under Thai 
law is similar to that of the Civil Law in that it arises from an agreement between two 
                                                 
68 Thai Code, §355. 
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parties but only one party is bound to perform an obligation.70 Thus, Royal Trust’s 
statement cannot be regarded as a unilateral contract under Thai law because it does 
not arise from mutual agreement between two parties. The Scottish approach would 
be in accordance with the fundamental basis of Thai law because it would not change 
the understanding of unilateral and bilateral contracts. More importantly, Thai law is 
familiar, to a certain degree, with the notion that a unilateral declaration of will can 
create an obligation. Hence, if Thai law recognised unilateral promises as a free-
standing ground of liability, there would no difficulty in applying a promissory 
analysis to Thai law. The concept of unilateral promise would help to explain why a 
party calling for bids is bound to enter into the main contract, which is required to be 
in writing, with the highest bidder. This is a unilateral binding declaration made by 




The application of Scottish promissory reasoning to the tendering process provides a 
more understandable legal analysis in comparison with the English unilateral 
contract approach. It clearly explains why an invitor of tenders is bound to accept the 
highest bid. The Scottish approach could be used as a model for the reform of Thai 
law.  Under a promissory analysis, a party calling for tenders is bound by his/her 
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(a) Scots law 
 
An option is the term frequently used to describe a “right given to a party which may 
be exercised to secure some benefit for that party.”71 This type of option could be 
contained in a lease, allowing the tenant to purchase the property, at some future 
date.72 A prime illustration of such an option is a clause contained in a lease of 
commercial property. Examples 73  can be found in Davidson v Zani 74 , Bisset v 
Aberdeen Magistrates75 and Advice Centre for Mortgages v McNicoll76. 
 
There are three main approaches to analysing them: (i) unilateral contract; (ii) offer 
as part of a contract; and (iii) unilateral promise. With any approach, the person who 
is granted the option has to exercise the option for it to be enforceable. 
 
(i) Options as a unilateral contract 
 
Three years before the Harvela case, Lord Diplock gave a speech regarding an 
option as a unilateral contract. In Sudbrook Trading Estate Ltd v Eggleton77, a tenant 
of a lease was given an option to purchase the freehold of the property at an agreed 
price. The tenant sought to exercise the option, but the landlord refused. The landlord 
claimed that the option could not be enforced, because it did not contain a specific 
price. It was held that the option was enforceable as a unilateral contract, conferring 
a right to buy upon the lessee. Lord Diplock stated, “[t]he option clause cannot be 
                                                 
71 Hogg, Obligations 63. 
72 MacQueen, Options 189. 
73 See also McDougall v Heritage Hotels Ltd (2008 SLT 494) for a comparison. In this case, the 
pursuer cited the Davidson v Zani and the Advice Centre for Mortgages v McNicoll cases, but the 
factual circumstance of the case differed from those of Davidson v Zani and the Advice Centre for 
Mortgages v McNicoll. 
74 1992 SCLR 1001. 
75 (1898) 1 F 87. 
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classified as a mere "agreement to make an agreement." There are not any terms left 
to be agreed between the parties. In modern terminology, it is to be classified as a 
unilateral or "if" contract.”78 He further stated that the unilateral contract “does not 
give rise to any legal obligations on the part of either party unless and until the 
lessees give notice in writing to the lessors...”79  However, critics claim that this 
explanation is not clear and this is what Lord Diplock meant when he referred to 
“options as unilateral contracts”.80 Instead, he seems to suggest that the option was, 
in itself, the contract (which was unilateral). Therefore, when the option is exercised, 
it transforms the unilateral contract into a bilateral contract. 81  This is an overly 
complicated analysis. 
 
(ii) Options as a firm offer 
  
In Scots law, an option may be considered as a firm offer.82 A conventional use of an 
option is for the purchase of heritable property. 83  For instance, it was held in 
Hamilton v Lochrane84  that the nature of an option is that of a firm offer.85  
 
In this situation, an option is treated as an offer guaranteed to remain open for a 
specific period, i.e. the binding nature of the option is of the same species as a 
promise to keep an offer open for a specific time frame.86 As observed by Lord 
Hodge in Carmarthen Developments Ltd v Pennington87, “…an option contract is 
very similar in effect to a unilateral promise to keep an offer open for acceptance for 
a specified period”.88 
 
                                                 
78 Ibid at 476-477 per Lord Diplock. 
79 Ibid at 477 per Lord Diplock. 
80 MacQueen, Options 189-190. 
81 [1983] 1 AC 444 at 477 per Lord Diplock. 
82 Hogg, Obligations 63. 
83 Ibid at 66. 
84 (1899) 1 F 478. 
85 Ibid  at 482 per Lord Trayner. 
86 Littlejohn v Hadwen (1882) 20 SLR 5 at 7. 
87 [2008] CSOH 139. 





The exercise of an option is required. Otherwise, there will not be a concluded 
contract.89 However, it is unclear whether the exercise of an option is regarded as an 
acceptance or not. In the Hamilton case earlier discussed, the court stated that “…the 
exercise of the option, which was just the acceptance of the offer, to be effectual and 
binding on either party, required to be in writing…”90 However, in the Carmarthen 
case, the court explained that “the exercise of an option is not the acceptance of an 
offer but the exercise of a contractual right conferred by the option agreement.”91 
 
Moreover, if the option is for the purchase of heritable property, the notice of 
intention to exercise the option cannot be regarded as an acceptance. This is evident, 
as some of the requisite formalities are still required (unless the offer and acceptance 
are in writing). 92  This advances the idea that the parties have to conclude the 
agreement again. It would be better to analyse an option as a unilateral obligation, 
thus avoiding this complication.  
 
(iii) Options as a unilateral promise 
 
Most of the Scottish authorities regard an option as a unilateral promise.93 Subject to 
the payment of the purchase price, an option for the purchase of heritable property is 
treated as a unilateral promise to sell.94 There are a number of cases that support this 
view. For example, in both Stone v MacDonald95 and Scott v Morrison,96 the Outer 
House of the Court of Session decided that options are obligatory in their own 
right.97 More recently, in Simmers v Innes,98 the House of Lords held that an option 
                                                 
89 Walker, Contracts para 18.3. 
90 (1899) 1 F 478 at 482 per Lord Trayner. 
91 [2008] CSOH 139 at para 14. It was held that “the postal acceptance rule has no application in the 
circumstances of this case.” (at para 19). 
92 Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995, s 1(2)(a)(i). 
93 Gloag, Contract 166; Walker, Contracts para 18.3; MacQueen, Options 189. 
94 MacQueen, Ibid. 
95 1979 SC 363 at 368. 
96 1979 SLT (Notes) 65; cf Trade Development Bank v David W Haig (Bellshill) Ltd 1983 SLT 107. 
97 1979 SC 363 at 368 per Lord Ross; 1979 SLT (Notes) 65 at 66 per Lord Stott. 





amounted to a unilateral obligation.99 Also, feu dispositions100 and leases101 are types 
of instrument which can contain promissory options.102  
 
The unilateral promise approach makes case analysis more precise in comparison 
with the English unilateral contract approach. There are two stages and two 
obligations when constituting a final contract. At the promissory stage, it is only the 
promisor who gives the option who is bound to the terms and conditions stated in the 
option. The next stage concerns the actual contract of sale, with respect to an option 
to purchase property. It takes effect when the promisee declares his/her intention to 
exercise the option.103  MacQueen opines that the notice of the promisee can be 
regarded as an offer to enter into a contract. The promisor is bound to accept.104 
Although the English unilateral contract analysis also has two stages, the Scottish 
approach is more convincing. The English approach is less clear in that it suggests 
that a unilateral contract can be transformed into a bilateral contract. If the Scottish 
approach were applied to the facts in Sudbrook Trading Estate v Eggleton105, the 
landlord could be treated as granting the tenant an option to purchase the property, 
and the option is enforceable based on the obligatory nature of a promissory analysis.  
 
Furthermore, if an option is regarded as a unilateral obligation, the promisee does not 
need to accept the option. Instead, he/she is merely the recipient of a unilateral 
binding declaration. The promisor is the only party bound by the option. Therefore, 
unlike the firm offer approach, the promissory approach avoids problems arising 
from the exercise of the option. 
 
                                                 
99 Ibid at 141 per Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury. 
100 Banff and Buchan District Council v Earl of Seafield’s Estate [1988] SLT (Lands Tr) 21 at 23. 
101 Davidson v Zani 1992 SCLR 1001. 
102 In some cases, the Scottish courts did not clearly clarify the legal characteristics of an option 
whether it is a unilateral promise or a contract. For example, in Miller Homes Ltd v Frame (2001 SLT 
459), it was stated that “under Scots law a valid option to purchase, whether constituted as a promise 
or bilateral contract, might be created without any consideration.” (at para 14 per Lord Hamilton); In 
Carmarthen Developments Ltd v Pennington ([2008] CSOH 139), Lord Hodge explained that “[t]here 
may be disagreement as to the correct legal characterisation of an option in Scots law, namely whether 
it is a unilateral promise by the grantor, a conditional contract of sale or sui generis” (at para 15). 
103 MacQueen, Options 190. 
104 Ibid. 





Moreover, where the option concerns the purchase of heritable property, the exercise 
of the option is not required to be in writing.106 For instance, in Simmers v Innes107, 
the appellant appealed against a decision of an Extra Division of the Inner House of 
the Court of Session.108 The pursuer entered into a shareholder’s agreement with the 
defender. The agreement stated that: 
“The terms of this Agreement shall remain in full force and effect for a period 
of five years expiring on 31 March 2004. If [the pursuer] has not served on 
[the defender] a notice intimating his intention to effect the Buy-Out prior to 
[31 March 2004], then this Agreement shall terminate automatically without 
the requirement of any party to serve notice.”109 
 
The notice of intention to effect the buy-out of the shares and the property was given 
to the defender prior to the deadline. It had been held by the Extra Division that the 
exercise of an option was validly made and that the option could be enforced. 110  The 
appellant argued that “the agreement did not envisage the option being exercised by 
service of the notice”.111  However, the House of Lords upheld the decision and 
dismissed the appeal. Although it was not expressly stated by the court, it can be 
inferred that the option to purchase certain property in this case amounted to a 
unilateral obligation. This is because there was no issue regarding the acceptance of 
the option which would suggest that the option was an offer. Additionally, the court 
explained that the exercise of an option is “a unilateral right”.112  Furthermore, the 
House of Lords stated, by referring to the judgment of the Extra Division, that “time 
was not of the essence for completion of the purchase of the land.”113 The fact that 
the agreement had not been completed by the 31st March 2004 did not prevent the 
respondent from enforcing the contract of sale, given that he had validly exercised 
the option before the mentioned date.  The decision in the Simmers v Innes case 
reinforces the fact that the granter and the grantee of the option to purchase heritable 
property are not required to conclude another agreement of sale if the option is 
viewed as promissory obligation. The notice of the exercise of the option is sufficient 
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for the grantor of the option to be bound to the contract of sale. As noted, the person 
that is granted the option under a firm offer approach lacks the right to exercise the 
option, since the parties have to conclude a further agreement. Therefore, a 
promissory analysis of an option is more desirable than a firm offer approach.  
 
However, there are limitations when considering an option as a unilateral promise. 
For instance, if the option is for the purchase of heritable property, formal writing 
may be necessary to fulfil the option requirements.114 It then becomes questionable 
as to whether or not the option requires the negotiation of a further contract. 
Additionally, as the promisee is not obliged to perform any duties, a question arises 
where the option is accepted but the promisee subsequently revokes the 
acceptance.115 In response to this, a promisee who has exercised the option is still 
bound to the negotiation as a result of the statutory personal bar.116  This provides a 
satisfactory outcome to both parties. Both the grantor and the grantee of such options 
have reasonable expectations, and these should not be frustrated because of legal 
requirements in relation to the formation of a contract.117  A promissory analysis 
provides a more satisfactory and a fairer approach in dealing with options contained 
in a lease.  
 
Nevertheless, in a case in 2013, the Court of Session treated an option as differing 
from a unilateral obligation. In Playfair Investments Ltd v McElvogue118, the Outer 
House dealt with the issue of whether s 160 of the Bankruptcy and Diligence 
(Scotland) Act 2007 changed the law regarding the effect of an inhibition on the 
existence of a prior obligation to sell.119 It was held that “an inhibition does not strike 
at a transaction which the inhibited person is bound to carry out as a result of a pre-
inhibition obligation.” 120  In analysing an option, the court described it using a 
                                                 
114 Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995, s 1(2)(a)(i). 
115 Hogg, Obligations 65. 
116 Sections 1(3) and (4) of the Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995. 
117 This approach had been proposed by MacQueen before the promulgation of the Requirements of 
Writing (Scotland) Act 1995 under the application of the doctrines of rei interventus or homologation. 
See MacQueen, Options 189. 
118 2013 SLT 225. 
119 Ibid. 





contractual analysis: an option took “the form of an offer and acceptance.”121 It is 
interesting to assess whether or not a promissory analysis would have changed the 
court’s decision in this case. Because an option is treated as a unilateral obligation, it 
would also be considered a pre-inhibition obligation. Yet, as acceptance of the option 
is not required under a promissory analysis, this approach would make case analysis 
more straightforward in comparison with the offer and acceptance approach. 
 
(b) Thai law 
 
It is not common to find a lease with an option that allows the tenant to purchase the 
property at some future date in Thailand.122  Nonetheless, there are a number of 
situations within Thai contract law that may be described by using the idea of option, 
namely hire purchase and promise to lease. 
 
(i) Hire purchase 
 
In hire purchase, a hirer is required to pay the security deposit and then pay a certain 
number of payments, as agreed by the parties. Once the hirer completes all the 
payments, ownership of the property hired will be automatically transferred to 
him/her. Hire purchase123 is an important part of Scots law too. It has been explained 
as “a device for financing what in the end will amount to sale”. 124  Most hire 
purchases fall within the scope of the Consumer Credit Act 1974.125  
 
It may be questionable whether hire purchase is an option or not. One might argue 
that the hirer does not really have an option to buy the property at some time in the 
future, but rather ownership will certainly be transferred to him/her if he/she makes 
all the payments. Nevertheless, this thesis argues that the hirer still has the option not 
                                                 
121 Ibid at para 6 per Lord Hodge. 
122 This can be observed from the fact that leading textbooks on the hire of property (lease) do not 
mention this option. E.g. Sotthibandhu, Lease and Hire Purchase. 
123 For the definition of hire purchase see the Consumer Credit Act 1974, s 189 (1); For a definition of 
hire purchase at common law see A G Guest, The Law of Hire Purchase (1966) 9. 
124 Report on Sale and Supply of Goods (Law Com No 160; Scots Law Com No 104) (1987) para 
5.46. 





to make the last payment, in which event ownership would not be transferred. As 
discussed in Chapter IV, the definition of hire purchase under the Thai Code was 
inspired by Halsbury’s Laws of England,126  which defines hire purchase as “the 
contract of hire with an option to purchase, is one under which an owner of a chattel 
lets it out on hire and undertakes to sell it…”127 However, the Thai draftsmen omitted 
the phrase “...contract of hire with an option to purchase”. The origin of the Thai 
provision suggests that the nature of hire purchase under Thai law is compatible with 
the idea of an option.  
 
A promissory analysis of hire purchase is useful for Thai law. An owner of the 
property is bound to sell the property to the lessee because he/she has promised to do 
so. In fact, promissory language is used to explain the relationship between the 
owner of the property and the hirer: “contract whereby an owner of a property lets it 
out on hire and promises to sell it to…”128  As mentioned in Chapter IV, some 
scholars129 have suggested that hire purchase is a lease which contains a promise to 
sell property, which is a type of promise to make a contract. It is therefore not 
difficult to apply a promissory analysis to hire purchase, especially if Thai law 
recognised the promise as a free standing legal institution. Also, the argument that 
hire purchase can be viewed as an option is consistent with the description of hire 
purchase in Scots law. For example, in Scots Commercial Law130, it is stated that hire 
purchase involves “the hire of goods with the option of buying if certain conditions 
are met.”131 In Commercial Law in Scotland132, it is described that in hire purchase 
agreements, the debtor makes “payments for the ‘hire’ of the goods, with an option 
but not an obligation to purchase the goods either on paying the final instalment, or 
on paying a further sum”.133 According to these two explanations, the hirer has an 
                                                 
126 The Earl of Halsbury, The Laws of England, 1st edn, Vol 1 (1907). 
127 Ibid at 554 (para 1124). 
128 Thai Code, §572. 
129 See notes 110, 111 in Chapter IV. 
130 A D M Forte (ed), Scots Commercial Law (1997). Hire purchase is not mentioned in the 2014 
edition of Scots Commercial Law. Therefore, the 1997 edition is used as a reference in this thesis 
131 Ibid at 72. 
132 Davidson & Macgregor, Commercial Law in Scotland. 
133 Ibid at para 3.1.2.1; For case law concerning hire purchase see Forthright Finance Ltd v Carlyle 






option to purchase the property hired. Hence, it is appropriate to consider hire 
purchase using the option analysis. The characteristics of hire purchase that the hirer 
has the option but not the obligation to purchase the property hired are compatible 
with the idea of unilateral obligations. Thus, hire purchase in Scots law can also be 
viewed as promissory in nature. Under a promissory analysis, the parties enter into 
an agreement of hire. The owner of the goods also makes a promise to the hirer that 
the latter can buy the property hired according to the conditions stated in the hire 
agreement. 
 
(ii) Promise to lease  
 
As noted in Chapter IV, although the Thai Code does not recognise the concept of 
promise to lease, there has been usage of this concept. Since the doctrines of 
autonomy of will and freedom of contract play an essential role in Thai law, 
individuals are permitted to make a promise to enter into a lease.134 
 
A lease of immoveable property, where the period of the lease is longer than three 
years or for the life of either the lessee or the lessor, must be made in writing and 
registered by a competent official. Otherwise, it is enforceable only for three years.135 
However, in practice the parties may sometimes be uncertain whether they wish to 
make a long-term lease or not, or they may not want to register with a competent 
official as it is time-consuming and expensive. Thus, the parties may choose to sign a 
lease for only three years, but also agree that when the lease ends, the lessee is 
entitled to renew the lease. According to the Thai courts, in this situation the parties 
do not have an intention to avoid the requirements of the law because a promise to 
lease is a unilateral juristic act made by the lessor, and the lessee can choose either to 
accept or decline it. In the Court Decision 626/1946 (B.E.2490), a two year lease 
contained a term that after two years the tenant could renew the lease for another two 
years by giving a notice to the landlord. It was held that the period of the lease was 
not longer than three years because it was initially enforceable for two years. Instead, 
                                                 
134 Sotthibandhu, Lease and Hire Purchase 42; Supreme Court Decisions 626/1946 (B.E.2490); 5995-
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it contained a promise to lease, in which only the landlord was bound. Thus, when 
the tenant informed the landlord that he wanted to renew the lease, the landlord could 
not refuse. 
 
Furthermore, a promise to lease also appears in instances where the lease is longer 
than three years. For example136, in the Court Decision 5995-5996/1995 (B.E. 2538), 
a lease contained the details that “the lease is for ten years, and the lessor allows the 
lessee to renew the lease two times, for the period of ten years each.”137 The court 
held that it was merely a promise by the lessor, not a contract. However, in the 
instances in which the lessor can choose to renew the lease, it is not a promise to 
lease.138 
 
Promises to lease can be considered as options. The lessee has an option but not an 
obligation to renew the lease when the lease ends. The Scottish unilateral promise 
approach benefits the analysis of the juristic binding nature of promise to lease. In 
this approach, a promise to lease can be regarded as a unilateral binding declaration 
on the part of the lessor. He/she is bound to accept if the lessee wishes to renew the 
lease.  In fact, the Thai courts have already considered a promise to lease as a 
unilateral binding obligation, as discussed above. Like a promise of sale, a promise 
to lease can be unilaterally made by the lessor. In addition, only the lessor is bound 
to accept the promise to lease. The Thai courts do not, however, explain it as a 
promissory obligation. This is, of course, because unilateral promise is not an 
independent obligation under Thai law. 
 
As discussed, the Thai courts have applied the rule that an offer lapses on the 
offeror’s death to promises to lease.139 The courts held that a promise to lease lapses 
                                                 
136 There are also other cases where leases which are longer than three years contain a promise to lease 
e.g. Supreme Court Decisions 876/1994 (B.E. 2537); 748/1990 (B.E. 2533); 3761-3765/1990 (B.E. 
2533). 
137 Supreme Court Decision 5995-5996/1995 (B.E. 2538). 
138 Also Supreme Court Decisions 661-662/1968 (B.E. 2511); 294/1972 (B.E. 2515). 
139 See Chapter VI, D. LEGAL EFFECTS OF A PROMISE, (2) Thai law (b) Lapse of a promise, (ii) 





on the promisor’s death. 140  However, critics claim that the court’s decision is 
unsatisfactory.141 It will be recalled, under Thai law the degree to which a promisor 
wishes to bind him/herself is greater than that of an offeror. Thus, a promise to lease 
should not lapse because of the death of the promisor. A promissory analysis is also 
useful for analysing this situation. Under the promissory rule, if the lessor who made 




The analysis of an option as a unilateral binding promise is useful for both systems. 
In Scots law, the promissory approach provides a more comprehensible analysis in 
comparison to the English unilateral contract approach. As an option is regarded as a 
unilateral obligation, the promisee does not need to accept the option. The promisor 
is the only party who is bound by the option. This approach also makes case analysis 
more straightforward than the firm offer approach because it avoids problems arising 
from the exercise of the option.  
Moreover, the approach of considering an option as a unilateral undertaking is 
helpful for the analysis of Thai law. Firstly, hire purchase can be explained as a 
situation where an owner lets his/her property and also makes a promise that he/she 
will sell it to the hirer on condition that the latter makes a certain number of 
payments. Secondly, promise to lease can be regarded as a unilateral undertaking 
made by the lessor. While the lessor is bound to accept the lessee’s acceptance if the 
lessee wishes to renew the lease, the lessee is not bound to accept the lessor’s 
proposal. This approach also deals more effectively with the situation where a 
promisor dies because not only a promisor, but also his/her successor is bound by a 
promise to lease. 
 
 
                                                 
140 E.g. Supreme Court Decisions 1212/1974 (B.E. 2517); 4392/2004 (B.E. 2547); 5995-5996/1995 
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(3) Letters of credit 
 
Letters of credit are used in international trade and finance.142 They are used when 
the parties in a contract of sale reside in different countries so that the goods 
purchased have to be transported by a third party.143 Since the seller and buyer have 
usually had no prior contract,144  the seller may be reluctant to ship the goods without 
a guarantee of payment 145 and the buyer needs to be sure that the goods will be 
delivered after the payment has been made.146 A letter of credit provides both parties 
with the necessary assurance.147 The seller is assured of payment by a bank and the 
buyer is protected because the bank will refuse to pay if the seller fails to comply 
with the terms in the letter of credit.148  Examples of the commercial context in 
which letters of credit are used are the international sale and purchase of oil149, iron 
ore150, cotton,151 and rice.152 
 
A letter of credit can be defined as: 
“[A]n open letter of request, whereby one person (usually a merchant or 
banker) requests some other person or persons to advance moneys, or give 
                                                 
142 McKendrick, Contract Law 249. 
143 Goode on Commercial Law 1055; Jack: Documentary Credits para 1.2. 
144 Goode, Ibid. 
145 Goode, Ibid; Jack: Documentary Credits para 1.2; McKendrick, Contract Law 249. 
146 A Malek & D Quest, Ibid; McKendrick, Ibid. 
147 In United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada (The American Accord) 
([1983] 1 AC 168 at 183), Lord Diplock stated that “[t]he whole commercial purpose for which the 
system of confirmed irrevocable documentary credits has been developed in international trade is to 
give to the seller an assured right to be paid before he parts with control of the goods that does not 
permit of any dispute with the buyer as to the performance of the contract of sale being used as a 
ground for non-payment or reduction or deferment of payment.” 
148 McKendrick, Contract Law 249. 
149 E.g. Trafigura Beheer BV v BCL Trading GMBH 2001; United Petroleum Trading (UK) LLP v 
Varteg Energy SA [2014] EWHC 4652 (Comm); Standard Chartered Bank v Dorchester LNG (2) Ltd 
[2014] EWCA Civ 1382(Rev 1); Euro-Asian Oil SA v Abilo (UK) Ltd [2015] EWHC 1741 (Comm); 
OMV Petrom SA v Glencore International AG [2015] EWHC 666 (Comm). 
150 Valency International Trading Pte Ltd v Alton International Resources Pte Ltd Unreported March  
3, 2011 (HC [Sing]); Swiss Singapore Overseas Enterprises Pte Ltd v China CITIC Bank Corp Ltd 
[2013] HKCFI 1291 (CFI [HK]); Emirates Trading Agency LLC v Sociedade de Fomento Industrial 
Private Ltd [2015] EWHC 1452 (Comm). 
151 Bayerische Vereinsbank AG v National Bank of Pakistan [1996] CLC 1443; Dunavant Enterprises 
Inc v Olympia Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd [2011] EWHC 2028 (Comm); A Ltd v B Ltd  [2015] 
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152 Kinane v Mackie-Conteh 2005 WL 62273; DCD Factors Limited v Habib Bank AG [2007] EWHC 
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credit, to a third person, named therein, for a certain amount, and promises, 
that he will repay the same to the person advancing the same, or accept Bills, 
drawn upon himself, for the like amount.”153  
 
In short, a letter of credit is “a banker’s assurance of payment against presentation of 
specified document.”154 
 
(a) Scots law 
 
(i) Letters of credit in the Common Law 
 
Most jurisdictions have faced difficulty in analysing the juristic nature of a letter of 
credits, despite the fact that it is enforceable in those jurisdictions. This is particularly 
the case of the Common Law as a result of, inter alia, the doctrine of consideration. 
In the Common Law, letters of credit have been enforceable at least since 1871.155 
However, while the early English courts held that a letter of credit took effect when 
an offer was accepted, the American courts took a different approach. In Elder 
Dempster Lines v Ionic Shipping Agency,156 the court explained that “the legal 
phenomenon constituted by a banker’s letter of credit is that it is an offer which is 
accepted by being drawn upon”157  However, the American courts held that a letter of 
credit took effect as soon as it was delivered to the beneficiary. In Pan-American 
Bank & Trust Co v National City Bank of New York158, the court reasoned that: 
“[a]n irrevocable commercial import letter is designed to do more than give 
the seller a chance to cash his drafts when the time arrives. Granting that the 
law is not as yet clearly worked out, it is certain, at least in this circuit, that, 
                                                 
153 J Story, Commentaries on the Law of Bills of Exchange, 2nd edn (1847) 590-593. This definition 
has been adopted by some English writers e.g. Davis, Letters of Credit 1; S Chalmers, Chalmers' on 
Bills of Exchange: A Digest of the Law of Bills of Exchange, Promissory Notes, Cheques and 
Negotiable Securities, 12th edn (1952) 168; J W Smith, A Compendium of Mercantile Law, 13th edn 
(1931) 300.  
154 Goode on Commercial Law 1059; See also Jack: Documentary Credits at 2; Enonchong, Letters of 
Credit para 2.01. 
155 In Banner v Johnston (1871-72) LR 5 HL 157, the House of Lords stated that “[t]he transactions 
out of which this letter of credit arose are of a very ordinary character, as we have been able to learn 
from numerous cases brought before the Courts with reference to mercantile engagements in the 
purchase of cotton abroad.” (at 166 per the Lord Chancellor [Lord Hatherly]). 
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157 Ibid at 535 per Donaldson J. 





when once communicated to the seller, the letter creates a contract which is in 
fact irrevocable.”159  
 
The American approach is supported by contemporary writers.160 It is suggested that 
early English case law that held that a letter of credit only becomes binding when it 
is received by the beneficiary should not be followed because it no longer reflects the 
current banking practice.161 Therefore, the preferred approach today is that a letter of 
credit becomes effective when it is communicated to the beneficiary.162  
 
However, it is doubtful whether consideration163 is given by the beneficiary to the 
bank.164 This is because the bank is given consideration by the applicant, not the 
beneficiary.165 Therefore, some suggest that a letter of credit, “for reasons of 
commercial convenience, …[should be] treated as binding despite there being no 
consideration”.166 In addition, there is no mutual understanding between the bank and 
the beneficiary regarding the formation of the contract since the bank is committed to 
the credit immediately once it is communicated to the beneficiary.167 The analysis of 
the bank’s undertaking through a contractual perspective is not satisfactory. Posited 
theories include unilateral contract168, implied promise169, assignment theory170, 
                                                 
159 Ibid at 770; cf Westpac Banking Corp v Commonwealth Steel Co Ltd [1983] 1 NSWLR 735 at 740. 
160  E.g. B Kozolchyk, “Letters of Credits” in J S Ziegel (ed), International Encyclopedia of 
Comparative Law, vol ix, Ch 5, at 105-106; P Ellinger & D Neo, The Law and Practice of 
Documentary Letters of Credit (2010) 109-110; R King, Gutteridge and Megrah’s Law of Bankers' 
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Guarantee (2003) 30; I Carr & P Stone, International Trade Law (2014) 453. 
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162 I Carr & P Stone, International Trade Law (2014) 453. 
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See also Davis, Letters of credit 73-77 for a detailed account about this theory. (in Davis, Letters of 
credit, this theory is discussed under the wider scope of the Offer and Acceptance Theory). 
169 This theory is supported by Story (J Story, Commentaries on the Law of Bills and Exchange, 
Foreign and Inland (2005) 548); See also Michie on Banks and Banking (1996) 381. 
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novation theory171, agency theories172, estoppel or trustee theory173, and the guarantee 
theory.174 Accordingly, some Anglo-American contract theorists, such as Davis175, 
Goode176, Ellinger177, and Dolan,178 have accepted the view that letters of credit 
should be analysed outside the legal framework of contractual obligations.179  
 
Consequently, there has been a theory suggesting that a letter of credit is an 
independent transaction which is separate from the underlying contract (usually a 
sale) between the importer and the exporter.180 This theory is adopted by both 
national courts and model rules. For example, the English courts hold that a letter of 
credit is independent from an underlying contract of sale between the seller and the 
purchaser.181 In W J Alan & Co Ltd v El Nasr Export and Import Co182, the court 
explained that “a confirmed letter of credit is an independent obligation in the form 
of an assurance of payment coming from the banker and not the buyer.”183  More 
recently, in Ibrahim v Barclays Bank Plc184, the court stated that a Singapore bank 
“was a party to an autonomous instrument, namely the Letter of Credit.”185 Similarly, 
the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits (UCP) regards a letter of 
                                                                                                                                          
[1867] LR 2 CH App 391 (Court of Appeal in Chancery); See W E McCurdy, “Commercial Letters of 
Credit” (1922) 35(6) HarvLRev 715 at 738-741; Davis, Letters of Credit 70. 
171 This approach is proposed by McCurdy. See W E McCurdy, “Commercial Letters of Credit” 
(1922) 5 HarvLRev 539 at 582-584. See also Davis, Letters of Credit 71-72 for a discussion. 
172 For a discussion about this theory see H C Gutteridge and Maurice Megrah, The Law of Bankers’ 
Commercial Credits (1984) 33-34; See also Davis, Letters of Credit 71-72. 
173 This theory is supported by Hershey (O F Hershey, “Letters of Credit” (1918-19) 32 HarvLRev 1 
at 10); For case law see Morgan v Lariviere (1875) LR 7 HL Cas 423. 
174 This theory originated in the United States. However, there has been no particular support for it. 
For a discussion about this theory see H C Gutteridge and Maurice Megrah, The Law of Bankers’ 
Commercial Credits (1984) at 31; See also Davis, Letters of Credit 67-68. For case law see Boyd v 
Snyder, 49 Md. 342 (i878). 
175 Davis, Letters of Credit 65-67. 
176 R Goode, “Abstract Payment Undertakings” in P Cane & J Stapleton (eds), Essays for Patrick 
Atiyah (1991) 209; Goode on Commercial Law 1078-1079. 
177 P Ellinger and D Neo, The Law and Practice of Documentary Letters of Credit (2010) 109-113. 
178 J F Dolan, The Law of Letters of Credit: Commercial and Standby Credits (2007) 205. 
179 Some treat letters of credit as contractual in nature. This is, however, despite the fact that it has 
distinctive features, i.e. being sui generis, as far as consideration is concerned. This approach is 
suggested in the 29th edition of Chitty on Contracts. J Chitty, Chitty on Contracts, 29th edn, by H G 
Beale, (2004) para 2-075. 
180 Enonchong, Letters of Credit para 2.02. 
181 Themehelp Ltd v West 1996 QB 84 at 89 per Evans LJ. 
182 [1972] 2 QB 189. 
183 Ibid at 195 per Lord Denning MR. 
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credit as a distinct transaction from the contract of sale between the buyer and the 
seller.186 The fact that an obligation of a letter of credit is independent from the 
contract of sale means that the bank deals with documents, rather than the goods that 
are referred to in the documents.187 
 
According to the theory of independence of letters of credit, the bank is obliged to 
pay the beneficiary if the latter complies with the document required regardless of 
any dispute that has arisen from the underlying contract.188 As the court explained in 
Stein v Hambro's Bank of Northern Commerce,189 “[t]he obligation of the bank is 
absolute, … when the documents are presented they have to accept the bill. That is 
the commercial meaning of it.”190 Also, in Hamzeh Malas & Sons v British Imex 
Industries Ltd191, the Court of Appeal stated: 
“the opening of a confirmed letter of credit constitutes a bargain between the 
banker and the vendor of the goods, which imposes upon the banker an 
absolute obligation to pay, irrespective of any dispute there may be between 
the parties as to whether the goods are up to contract or not.”192 
 
More recently, in Simon Carves Ltd v Ensus UK Ltd193, the court stated: 
“Nor, again absent fraud, will the court restrain a beneficiary from drawing 
on a letter of credit which is payable in accordance with its terms on the 
application of a buyer who is in dispute with the seller as to whether the 
underlying sale contract has been broken … This is the autonomous nature of 
letters of credit.”194 
 
However, if the document presented by the beneficiary contains different terms from 
those in the letter of credit, i.e. the beneficiary is considered to have presented a non-
conforming document, the bank is entitled to withhold payment regardless of 
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whether the discrepancy is material or immaterial.195 In short, a letter of credit is 
viewed by the English courts and the UCP as independent from the underlying 
contract between the importer and the exporter. It is binding irrespective of 
consideration. 
 
(ii) Letters of credit in Scots law 
 
Scots lawyers, with no requirement of consideration, have no difficulty in 
characterising letters of credit. Like the approach adopted by the English courts and 
the UCP, the obligation under a letter of credit in Scots law is “distinct from the 
contract on which the letter of credit might be based.”196 However, it is debatable 
whether a letter of credit is a contract or a promise.  The first theory suggests that a 
letter of credit constitutes a contractual obligation between the bank and the 
beneficiary. It is not only a contract between the bank and the buyer, but the bank 
also makes an offer to “anyone who may take the cheque or bill under it”.197 The 
Scottish courts also characterise a letter of credit using a contractual analysis. In 
Centri-Force Engineering Ltd v Bank of Scotland198, Lord Abernethy stated that 
“[t]here are therefore contractual relationships between that bank and Software [the 
beneficiary]”.199 The second theory suggests that a letter of credit is a unilateral 
binding undertaking.200 Under a promissory analysis, the bank makes a promise to 
the beneficiary, i.e. the seller who delivers goods or services, that he/she will be paid 
if delivery of goods or services has occurred.  
 
Initially, it appears that the approach of characterising a letter of credit as a contract 
under Scots law is possible, given that there is no requirement of consideration under 
Scots law. However, a promissory analysis is a more appropriate characterisation of 
a letter of credit. As noted, the modern view amongst commentators suggests that a 
                                                 
195 JH Rayner & Co Ltd v Hambros Bank Ltd [1943] KB 37; cf Glencore International AG v Bank of 
China [1996] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 135. 
196 Centri-Force Engineering Ltd v Bank of Scotland 1993 SLT 190 at 191. 
197 Gloag, Contract 23. 
198 1993 SLT 190. 
199 Ibid at 192. 
200 E.g. J J Gow, The Mercantile and Industrial Law of Scotland (1964) 471; MacQueen, Options 188; 





letter of credit generally becomes effective as soon as it is communicated to the 
beneficiary. This means that letters of credit do not really require mutual agreement 
between the bank and the beneficiary. Some Anglo-American academics explain that 
a letter of credit is binding irrespective of acceptance. As stated by Goode, a letter of 
credit is “a money promise which is independent of the transaction that gives it birth 
and which is considered binding … without acceptance…”201 Therefore, it is 
unnecessary to regard a letter of credit as an offer that requires acceptance, given that 
it is binding without acceptance. Moreover, a letter of credit becomes effective at the 
same moment as a promissory obligation comes into existence, i.e. when it is 
communicated to the promisee. Hence, the nature of letters of credit is more 
compatible with unilateral obligations. 
 
(iii) Benefits of regarding letters of credit as unilateral obligations 
 
The approach of viewing letters of credit as unilateral obligations can help to 
eradicate some of the practical problems associated with them. It has been argued 
that the courts have lost sight of the purpose of a letter of credit by viewing it as a 
contract.202 The case of documentary compliance is an obvious example of this. 
Traditionally, the Anglo-American courts applied the rule of strict compliance to 
letters of credits, according to which the beneficiary was required to present 
documents that strictly complied with the terms of the letter.203 In Equitable Trust Co 
of New York v Dawson Partners Ltd204, the Court of Appeal stated: 
“…the accepting bank can only claim indemnity if the conditions on which it 
is authorised to accept are in the matter of the accompanying documents 
strictly observed. There is no room for documents which are almost the same, 
or which will do just as well. Business could not proceed securely on any 
other lines.”205 
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However, the Anglo-American courts subsequently applied contractual principles 
when dealing with letters of credit. One of these principles is substantial 
performance. 206  In Anglo-American law, the doctrine of substantial performance 
allows a court to treat a substantial, or partial, performance a substitute for the actual 
performance of a contract.207 The application of substantial performance in letters of 
credit means that it is no longer necessary for the documents presented by the 
beneficiary to strictly comply with the terms of the letter of credit. This rule is called 
substantial compliance and it is the strongest opponent of the strict compliance 
rule.208   
 
The Anglo-American courts have employed substantial compliance to letters of 
credit in a number of cases. 209  However, they have been criticised for wrongly 
equating “substantial performance of a contract with substantial compliance under a 
letter of credit.”210 The courts “fail to recognize the distinction between a letter of 
credit and a contract.211 Critics claim that “once courts begin inquiring into the state 
of mind of the issuing bank, the doctrine of strict compliance has lost its starch.”212 
The application of substantial performance to letters of credit is flawed because 
“substantial performance is designed to prevent unjust enrichment by one party when 
the other party has fulfilled substantially all of the duties under the contract.”213 This 
is different from the obligation of the bank under a letter of credit transaction in 
which the bank is “merely a payment intermediary and has little to gain by either 
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honor or dishonor.”214 In addition, the notion of substantial compliance contradicts 
the standard practice of letters of credit.215The fact that the courts require the issuing 
bank to make a discretionary determination of the beneficiary’s documentary 
compliance means that the bank needs to examine the underlying contract between 
the beneficiary and the applicant. The fact that the issuing bank is responsible for 
examining the underlying contract “vitiates the intent of the parties entering into the 
letter of credit by not enforcing the conditions the applicant believes to be necessary 
to ensure proper tender on delivery.”216 It is therefore difficult for the banks to adopt 
the application of substantial compliance because they need to possess efficient skill 
and a comprehensive understanding to justify whether or not they should accept the 
documents presented.217 Furthermore, the application of substantial compliance in 
letters of credit increases time and costs.218 
 
The application of substantial performance to letters of credit may perhaps stem from 
the fact that a letter of credit is viewed as a contract. Although a letter of credit is a 
separate transaction from the underlying contract of sale, the contractual rule of 
substantial compliance can still be applied because the relationship between the 
issuing bank and the beneficiary is viewed as a contractual relationship. 219 
Accordingly, the approach of considering a letter of credit as a unilateral obligation 
can avoid the problem that arises from the application of substantial performance to 
letters of credit. Under a promissory analysis, the relationship between the issuing 
bank and the beneficiary would be viewed as a promissory relationship. Hence, the 
contractual doctrine of substantial performance could not be applied. The bank will 
merely be required to examine the presented document to determine if it complies 
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with the terms of the letter of credit. However, it will not need to scrutinise the 
underlying contract on which the letter of credit is based. 
 
(b) Thai law 
 
(i) General concept and legal characteristics of letters of credit 
 
Although letters of credit have been used in Thailand, there is no specific legislation 
dealing with them. This stems from the fact that the usage of letters of credit came 
into Thailand after the promulgation of the Thai Code in 1920s. Thus, the legal 
principles used to govern the legal status and legal effects of letters of credit are both 
contractual principles and general principles of obligations. 
 
The Thai courts consider letters of credit as a contract. For example, in the Supreme 
Court Decision 4579/2009 (B.E. 2552), the defender opened three letters of credit 
with the pursuer in order to make payments for an international seller. The pursuer 
then paid the money to the seller. The defender, however, refused to pay the money 
back to the purser. The court held in favour of the pursuer. The court referred to the 
obligation between the parties as “the obligation arising from the contract to open a 
letter of credit”220 Moreover, the Thai courts adopt the notion that a letter of credit is 
a separate and independent transaction from the underlying contract between the 
seller and the buyer.221 
 
It is not surprising why the Thai courts confine their analysis of letters of credit to the 
contractual approach, given that this is the only standalone voluntary obligation. 
Nevertheless, the juristic nature of commercial letters of credit is not actually 
compatible with the characteristics of contract under Thai law. As discussed in 
Chapter V, under Thai law contract is a mutual agreement, typically arising from an 
offer and an acceptance, between two or more parties. In letters of credit, however, 
there is no mutual agreement between the issuer and the beneficiary. 
                                                 
220 There are also other cases in which the Thai courts have analysed letters of credit as contracts e.g. 
Supreme Court Decisions 2983/2006 (B.E. 2549); 2647/2005 (B.E. 2548); 5985/2005 (B.E. 2548). 






However, Thai commentators tend not to refer to a letter of credit as a contract, 
despite the fact that they do not clarify the actual legal characteristics of a letter of 
credit. For instance, Chantikul explains that a letter of credit is a document issued by 
a bank or a similar party, requesting another bank or another party to pay a sum of 
money to the person stated in the document. The party who has paid the money can 
get the money back from the person who opened a letter of credit.222 Jongjakapun 
states that a letter of credit is a method of payment by which a commercial bank 
binds itself to pay the beneficiary on the condition that the beneficiary complies with 
the terms stated in the letter of credit.223 Tantikulanan explains that a letter of credit 
is an assurance of payment of the price the buyer has to pay to a seller who resides 
overseas, when the bank is the intermediary of the payment.224 The fact that Thai 
commentators do not refer to letters of credit as contracts suggests that they may 
consider a letter of credit to be distinctive from a contractual obligation. However, 
given that a contract is the only kind of voluntary obligation under Thai law, it would 
be difficult for Thai scholars to classify letters of credit as a different kind of 
obligation. It is noteworthy that the definition of letters of credit given by Thai 
scholars is compatible with the idea of a letter of credit as a unilateral obligation 
which has been discussed under Scots law. 
 
(ii) Letters of credit and third party rights 
 
Some Anglo-American scholars have suggested that the best approach to characterise 
a letter of credit within a contractual framework is to regard it as a third party 
right.225 Nevertheless, although it initially appears that third party right should be a 
possible approach to conceptualise letters of credit under Thai law, it is difficult to 
apply this concept due to the legal nature of letters of credit. 
                                                 
222  K Chantikul, “ความรู้ทัว่ไปเก่ียวกบัธุรกิจระหวา่งประเทศและกฎหมายการคา้ระหวา่งประเทศ” (General Knowledge of 
International Business and International Trade Law), in คู่ มือการศึกษาวิชากฎหมายการค้าระหว่างประเทศ (Studying 
International Trade Law) (1999) 14-15. 
223 K Jongjakapun, กฎหมายการค้าระหว่างประเทศ (International Trade Law), 4th edn (2010) at 411. 
224 W Tantikulānan, Commentary on Letters of Credit (L/C) and Trust Receipt (T/R) (2001) 1-2. 
225 A Menendez, Letter of Credit, its Relation with Stipulation Pour Autrui, July 30, 2010, at 25, 






Firstly, under Thai law the right of the third party beneficiary “comes into existence 
at the time when he declares to the debtor his intention to take the benefit of the 
contract.”226 This means that when the parties make an agreement that benefits a 
third party, this right does not exist until the beneficiary notifies the debtor that 
he/she wishes to take the benefit. This fundamentally contrasts with the time when 
the right of the beneficiary of a letter of credit comes into existence and is 
enforceable, which is when the letter of credit is communicated to him/her.227 
 
Secondly, in third party rights, the debtor can assert any defence against the third 
party beneficiary based on the same claim that he/she could use against the creditor. 
The Thai Code states that “Defences arising from the contract mentioned in Section 
374 [third party rights] can be set up by the debtor against the third person who 
receive the benefit of the contract.”228 This would mean that, if a letter of credit was 
viewed as a third party right, the bank could use any claim arising from the 
applicant’s relationship with it to refuse to pay the beneficiary, which would clearly 
contradict the rule of letters of credit.  As noted, the relationship between the bank 
and the beneficiary is totally independent. Since the right of the beneficiary does not 
depend on the relationship between the bank and the applicant of the letter of credit, 
the bank cannot use any defence or claim that it has against the applicant to refuse 
the payment.229 
 
The aforementioned problems show that the nature of letters of credit is incompatible 
with third party rights. However, these problems do not arise if a letter of credit is 
viewed as a unilateral obligation.  Firstly, the right of the promisee of a promissory 
obligation exists as soon as the promise is delivered to the promisee.230 This is 
compatible with the right of the beneficiary of a letter of credit that comes into 
existence when it has been communicated to him/her. Secondly, if a letter of credit is 
                                                 
226 Thai Code, §374 para 2. 
227 As earlier discussed in sub-heading (i) Letters of credit in the Common Law. 
228 Thai Code, §376. 
229 UCP 600, Art 4(a). 
230 According to the theory that communication of a promise is required, as discussed in Chapter VI, 





viewed as a unilateral promise, the bank will not be able to assert any defence against 
the beneficiary based on the same defence it has against the buyer. This is also in 
accordance with the rule which states that the bank must honour the beneficiary of a 
letter of credit if the latter complies with the terms in it.  
 
To conclude, under a promissory analysis, there would be no difficulty in explaining 
the relationship between the issuer and the beneficiary. It is a unilateral obligation 
binding without the acceptance of the beneficiary. Thus, the idea of promise would 




Promise plays an important role in the legal analysis of letters of credit under Scots 
law. This type of commercial transaction can easily be analysed using this doctrine. 
Moreover, a promissory analysis helps to avoid some of the practical problems of 
letters of credit, such as documentary compliance. The contractual principle of 
substantial performance will not apply if a letter of credit is viewed as a promise. 
 
The Thai courts analyse letters of credit within a contractual framework. However, 
the real nature of letters of credit is neither a contract nor a third party-right. 
Therefore, if Thai law recognised promise as a free-standing legal institution, letters 

















(a) Scots law 
 
(i) General concept and legal characteristics of IOUs 
 
An IOU is “an acknowledgement of debt”.231  It is a record that “a debt has been 
incurred for a stated amount, with an undertaking in law, which is implied and not 
express, that repayment will be made on demand.”232 The Scottish courts held that an 
IOU imports an obligation to pay back the money. 233  It is per se sufficient to 
“instruct the constitution and resting owing of the debt”.234 Therefore, a genuine IOU 
“requires no evidence to support or explain it.”235 Moreover, an IOU is not merely 
“an adminicle of evidence”, but rather “a substantive ground of action”.236 In short, a 




The Scottish courts held that an IOU constituted a unilateral obligation. In 
McTaggart v MacEachern's Judicial Factor 237 , the debtor wrote an 
acknowledgement of the debt in the form: “I the undersigned herewith agree to repay 
the sum of Two hundred pounds £200 borrowed to-day 10th August 1944”. The 
document was held to be a promissory note.238 However, when the Scottish courts 
held that IOUs implied an obligation to pay back the debt in other cases239, they did 
                                                 
231 M'Kenzie's Executrix v Morrison's Trustees 1930 SC 830 at 836 Per Lord Hunter. 
232 Black v Gibb 1939 SLT 571 at 873 per Lord Moncrieff. 
233 Thiem's Trustees v Collie (1899) 1 F 764 at 767 per Lord Justice-Clerk Macdonald; also at 774 per 
Lord Trayner; Bishop v Bryce 1910 SC 426; M'Creadie's Trustees v M'Creadie, (1897) 5 SLT 153. 
234 Thiem’s Trustees v Collie (1899) 1 F at 779 per Lord Moncrieff. 
235 Haldane v Speirs (1872) 10 M 537 at 541 per Lord President. 
236 Thiem’s Trustees v Collie (1899) 1 F 764 at 778 per Lord Moncrieff. 
237 1949 SLT 363. 
238  It is worth noting in this case Lord MacKintosh stated that, although the pursuer’s counsel 
originally contended that the notes in question were IOUs, counsel subsequently “had come to the 
conclusion that he could not maintain his previous day’s contention that these documents were 
I.O.U.'s…”. (Ibid at 364) Therefore, this does not seem to be a case in which the parties or the court 
were arguing for an IOU analysis of the document. It was simply a promissory note. 
239 E.g. M'Kenzie's Executrix v Morrison's Trustees 1930 SC 830; Black v Gibb 1939 SLT 571; 





not clearly explain whether IOUs constituted a contractual or a promissory 
obligation. The fact that an IOU creates an obligation to pay back the money means 
that it is not merely evidence to support a claim, but per se an obligation. Moreover, 
the scope of IOUs is wider than an acknowledgement of a debt due to a contract of 
loan. In Black v Gibb240, the court ruled that a person may grant an IOU for any 
reasons other than a loan. By citing the opinion of Lord Justice-Clerk in Thiem's Trs 
v Collie241, the court stated that an IOU may be given for 
“a cause not implying a loan; … to close an accounting between parties in a 
matter not involving loan; …to settle a claim of damages, or to provide a fund 
of credit, or to induce another to delay or waive exacting some right in which 
no question of money was involved.”242 
 
The courts’ decisions show that an IOU can be an undertaking to pay money arising 
from a number of different reasons other than a loan. This suggests that it is perhaps 
unnecessary for an IOU to be characterised as being contractual in nature. Therefore, 
it is worth analysing the actual juristic nature of IOUs to determine whether they are 
contracts or promises. 
 




An important issue that needs to be considered is whether the nature of IOUs is 
compatible with the nature of promises. As discussed in Chapter I, an important 
requirement for a promise is that it must relate to an event in the future.243 If that 
were true then, according to the theory adopted in this thesis that a promise must 
relate to future affairs, an IOU could not be regarded as a promise. In other words, 
although an acknowledgement of a debt creates obligation per se, such obligations 
are not considered as promissory in nature on the basis that it does not relate to future 
affairs.   
                                                 
240 1939 SLT 571. 
241 (1899) 1 F 764. 
242 Ibid at 767 per Lord Justice-Clerk (cited in Black v Gibb 1939 SLT 571 at 572). 
243 See Chapter I, C. NATURE AND REQUIREMENTS OF PROMISE, (5) A promise must relate to 






Also, the features of IOUs and promissory notes are, in essence, different. In Muir v 
Muir244, the court was asked to determine if a document containing the following 
term, “Glenlee, Kilcregan. November 10th 1892. I. O. U. one hundred pounds which 
I promise to pay on demand”, amounted to a promissory note or an IOU. Lord 
Skerrington read the document as meaning “I promise on demand to pay One 
hundred pounds for value received.” 245  Therefore, “[t]his is a common form of 
promissory note. It acknowledges that value has been received, but it does not state 
of what that value consisted”246 The court further observed: 
“Where a writing takes the shape of an “I. O. U.” pure and simple, recent 
decisions, and in particular Thiem's Tr. v. Collie, go a long way towards 
assimilating it to a bond, but, these decisions cannot be extended to a writing 
which is essentially different from an ordinary I.O.U.”247 
 
The court’s decision suggests that an IOU is generally made in the simple form of an 
acknowledgment of a debt. In contrast, a promissory note must contain certain details 
to be valid as a promissory note.248  
 
It is further worth analysing whether there is a situation in which a person who gives 
an IOU not only acknowledges an existing debt, but also makes a promise to pay the 
money to the other party, i.e. an IOU can be regarded as a promise because it relates 
to a future event. As noted, it was stated by the court in Thiem's Trs v Collie that an 
IOU may be given for other reasons than a loan; for example, settling a claim for 
damages. However, in this case a right to damages arises as soon as the harm been 
inflicted, which means that it relates to a past event, rather than a future one. In 
another example, an IOU may be given “for a cause not implying a loan; it might be 
granted to close an accounting between parties…”249 As in the case of settling a 
claim for damages, this IOU relates to a relationship between the parties that 
involves closing an account that occurred in the past.  
                                                 
244 Muir v Muir 1912 1 SLT 304. 
245 Ibid at 305. 
246 Ibid. 
247 Ibid. 
248 Bills of Exchange Act 1882, s 83. 







Even though an IOU cannot be regarded as a promise based on the preferred 
approach of this thesis because it does not relate to a future event, their nature is not 
compatible with bilateral obligations either. The fact that an IOU is an 
acknowledgement of a debt suggests that individuals who issue IOUs acknowledge 
that they owe money and are willing to pay it back, whereas the grantees of an IOU 
do not need to make any undertaking. It is not necessary for the grantee, i.e. the 
creditor, to accept an IOU, because naturally, creditors will always want their money 
back. This suggests that the characteristics of an IOU are not really compatible with 
the legal nature of a bilateral obligation. As a result, it is perhaps more appropriate to 
regard IOUs as an independent right, as discussed below. 
 
IOUs as an independent right 
 
It is proposed in this thesis that IOUs, when they create an obligation per se, should 
be regarded as an independent right which has special features, but also shares some 
similarities to promises.250 An important feature of promise which should apply to 
IOUs is the rule that the obligation comes into existence when it is communicated to 
the recipient. If an IOU was viewed as an independent right which shares this feature 
to promises, the creditor would generally be in a better position than a creditor in the 
case of a bilateral analysis. Consider the following example. A, a debtor, writes a 
letter to acknowledge his debt and sends it to B, his creditor. By treating an IOU as 
an independent right which shares some of the characteristics of promises, the IOU 
takes effect once the letter reaches B and it is irrevocable thereafter. In contrast, 
under a contractual analysis, it may be possible for A to withdraw the IOU, even if it 
has already reached B, as long as B has not yet agreed or accepted the IOU.  
 
It is worth considering whether there is any drawback to the approach treating IOUs 
as an independent right caused by the requirements of writing under Scots law. 
                                                 
250 This approach is similar to McBryde’s proposition that JQT should be regarded as an independent 





According to this approach, IOU may be viewed as a unilateral obligation under the 
Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995 on the grounds that it is binding 
without acceptance. Nevertheless, in the case of an IOU given in the course of 
business, the proposed approach is useful because it does not require to be in 
writing.251 As for an IOU not given in the course of business, it is still useful. In a 
general sense, an IOU is defined as “[a] document bearing these three letters 
followed by a specified sum, and signed, constituting a formal acknowledgement of a 
debt.”252 Therefore, one would expect that usually an IOU to be in signed writing. 
 
To conclude, an IOU cannot be regarded as a promise based on the preferred 
approach of this thesis because it does not relate to a future event. Neither is it 
compatible with the characteristics of contract because it is natural for creditors to 
want their money back (so that an acceptance by the creditor would be a superfluous 
requirement). Therefore, it is more appropriate to regard IOUs as an independent 
















                                                 
251 Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995, ss 1(2)(a)(ii). 






(b) Thai law 
 
(i) General concept and legal characteristics of IOUs 
 
There is no requirement of formality in constituting a contract of loan of money. 
However, if the amount of the debt exceeds 2,000 baht, the law requires written 
evidence signed by the borrower, otherwise it was unenforceable by action. 253 
Written evidence can exist in the form of letters, memos, or any other types of 
document. It must be signed by the person who is liable, which in the case of loan of 
money is the borrower.254 Written evidence can be given to the creditor either at the 
time the contract of loan is made or at any time later.255 
 
The scope of application of an IOU in Thai law is narrower it is in Scots law. Whilst 
in Scots law an IOU itself constitutes an obligation to pay back the money, in Thai 
law it can only be used as evidence to support a lawsuit. IOUs would generally be 
viewed as evidence of a contractual relationship between the parties. They would not 




If an IOU does not contain the borrower’s signature, which is an important piece of 
written evidence, it would not be sufficient to constitute written evidence of loan 
under Thai law. This reflects a gap within Thai law. Initially, this suggests that, if 
Thai law recognised a promissory obligation as a standalone obligation, an IOU 
which does not contain debtor’s signature could be useful to the creditor if it was 
viewed as a written promise to repay the debt. However, as in the case of the analysis 
of IOUs under Scots law, according to the theory adopted in this thesis that a promise 
must relate to a future event, an IOU should not be regarded as a promissory 
obligation because it relates to a past event rather than a future one. 
 
                                                 
253 Thai Code, §653. 







Moreover, as will be fully discussed, according to the proposed promissory provision 
of this thesis for Thai law, a promissory obligation which is undertaken gratuitously 
will be required to be made in a written form signed by a person who is liable.256 
Thus, even if an IOU was regarded as promissory obligation, where a debtor makes a 
written promise (IOU) to pay back a debt without a signature and the creditor 
receives nothing in return, such an IOU would not be enforceable. In this sense, there 
is no difference between a promissory analysis of IOUs and IOUs as written 
evidence to support a lawsuit action in a contract of loan, given that neither approach 
helps a creditor to force the debtor to pay the money back.   
 
One might argue that the analysis of a unilateral promise in the case of IOUs is 
useful for Thai law in relation to the prescription of obligation. For example, if an 
IOU can create an obligation to pay back the money, the period of prescription will 
start when it is given rather than from the date when the contract of loan was 
concluded. Nevertheless, the Thai Code states “prescription is interrupted if…[t]he 
debtor has acknowledged the claim towards the creditor by written 
acknowledgement…”257 Thus, there is no difference between treating an IOU as a 
separate promise or as evidence of a subsisting obligation because both approaches 




In Scots law, the fact that an IOU can be used as a ground for action means that it is 
an obligation per se.  It is argued in this thesis that an IOU cannot be regarded as a 
promissory obligation because it is contrary to the theory, which is widely accepted 
by legal commentators, namely, that a promise must relate to future affairs. The 
nature of IOUs is not compatible with a bilateral analysis on the basis that creditors 
would naturally want their money back. Therefore, an IOU should be binding once it 
has been delivered to the creditor. As a result, it is proposed in this thesis that an IOU 
                                                 
256 See Chapter VIII, C. WHAT CAN BE LEARNED FROM THAI LAW?, (4) Suggestions for Thai 
law, (a) §354 (General provisions). 





should be regarded as an independent right, which shares some of the characteristics 
of promise. Moreover, the approach of not regarding an IOU as a promissory 
obligation helps to distinguish an IOU from a promissory note. Apart from the fact 
that a promissory note must contain certain details whereas an IOU can appear in a 
simple form, they can be distinguished by considering whether they relate to future 
affairs or not.  
 
As for Thai law, it is not proposed to regard IOUs as promissory obligation because 
this would be contrary to the theory adopted in this thesis that a promise must relate 
to a future commitment. Moreover, even if Thai law recognised promises as an 
independent obligation, there is no difference between treating an IOU as a separate 
promise or as evidence of a subsisting obligation. For example, acknowledgement of 









Chapter VII Part II 
 
C. USING PROMISES AS ENTICEMENTS 
 
(1) Advertisements of reward 
 
Advertisements of reward are commonly discussed in both English 1  and Scots2 
contract law textbooks. Although rewards are less common today, people will 
occasionally offer rewards for certain purposes such as for the return of lost pets and 
possessions. There have been a number of advertisements in which rewards were 
offered for a safe return of lost dogs,3 cats4  and rabbits.5  Moreover, police have 
offered rewards for information. For instance, in 2012 a £5,000 reward was offered 
for information about the murder of a 67 year old man in West Lothian.6 More 
recently, in 2015 the US government offered a $5million reward for information 
leading to the recapture of a drug dealer.7 Therefore, it is appropriate to include the 
discussion of rewards in this chapter. 
 
                                                 
1 E.g.  Treitel The Law of Contract para 2-010; Chitty on Contract para 2-019; W R Anson, Anson's 
Law of Contract, 29th edn by J Beatson, A Burrows and J Cartwright (2010) 37-38.. 
2 Gloag, Contract 24; MacQueen & Thomson, Contract para 2.19; Hogg, Obligations 73-76. 
3 E.g. in 2005, a couple offered a £40,000 reward for the safe return of their dog. Couple Put Up 
£40,000 Reward - For a Dog, available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-360475/Couple-
40-000-reward--dog.html; In 2011, a couple from Cornwall offered a reward for their lost dog. 
Olympian Ed Offers Reward to Find Lost Dog, available at 
http://www.thisiscornwall.co.uk/Olympian-Ed-offers-reward-lost-dog/story-14278755-
detail/story.html; In 2012, a £10,000 reward was offered for a safe return of a lost dog, available at 
http://www.missingangel.co.uk/ 
4 E.g. Student Offers Extraordinary £10k Reward for Safe Return of Her Beloved Cat, available at 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1325587/Heartbroken-cat-owner-puts-extraordinary-10k-
reward-pet-vanishes-trace.html. 
5 E.g. In 2010, a reward of £50 was offered for a return of a lost rabbit. Missing Rabbit Greater 
Manchester M30, available at http://www.nationalpetregister.org/mp/22709.htm; In 2012, a reward of 
£200 was offered for a safe return of a lost rabbit. Lost Rabbit Crosby Road Southport ‘£2000 reward 
on offer’, available at http://www.otsnews.co.uk/lost-rabbit-crosby-road-southport-200-reward-on-
offer/. 
6  Ronnie Simpson Murder: £5,000 Reward Offered For Information, available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-edinburgh-east-fife-19936238; see also Damien Nettles: 
Police Offer £20,000 Reward, available at http://onthewight.com/2012/10/04/damien-nettles-police-
offer-20000-reward/. 
7 US offers $5M reward for information on El Chapo as head of DEA suggests escaped drug kingpin 






(a) Scots law 
 
There is controversy regarding the juristic nature of rewards under Scots law. Again, 
there are two schools of thought on categorising the legal nature of rewards, namely 
contractual and promissory. 
 
(i) Offer of reward 
 
As the later discussion will indicate, as a result of English influence, the Scottish 
courts tend to consider rewards as contractual in nature. 8  Therefore, it is worth 
considering the analysis of reward under English law. In English law, advertisements 
of reward are usually analysed using a contractual approach. A person making an 
advertisement is deemed to make an offer made to the public.9 Thus, the person who 
completes the specific act stated in the advertisement would be regarded as accepting 
the offer. A contract of reward is concluded when the beneficiary claims the 
reward.10  
 
English courts and scholars, when dealing with the concept of offer of reward, 
frequently use terminology associated with unilateral contracts. For example, in 
Treitel The Law of Contract, it is stated that “[a]n offer of a unilateral contract is 
made when one party promises to pay the other a sum of money if the other will do 
(or forbear from doing) something without making any promise to that effect.”11 In 
Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co12, the Court of Appeal regarded the case as a 
unilateral contract.13 The court ruled that the advertisement “was an offer intended to 
                                                 
8 See the last paragraph of this section. 
9 Fallick v Barber 105 ER 41. See also note below.  
10 E.g. Williams v Carwardine (1833) 5 Carrington and Payne 566, 172 ER 1101; Lancaster v Walsh 
(1838) 4 Meeson and Welsby 16, 150 ER 1324; Gibbons v Proctor (1891) 64 LT 594; Carlill v 
Carbolic Smoke Ball Co [1893] 1 QB 256; Bowerman v Association of British Travel Agent Ltd 
[1996] CLC 451; Azevedo v IMCOPA - Importacao, Exportaacao e Industria de Oleos Ltda [2013] 
EWCA Civ 364, [2015] QB 1. 
11 Treitel The Law of Contract para 2-051; See also Chitty on Contracts para 3-008. 
12 [1893] 1 QB 256. 
13 The term “unilateral contract” was not used by the court in this case. However, it could be inferred 
from its decision that the advertisement of reward was regarded as a unilateral contract. The Carlill 
case was referred to in Bowerman v Association of British Travel Agent Ltd ([1996] CLC 451) in 





be acted upon, and, when acted upon and the conditions performed, constituted a 
promise to pay.”14 The kind of contract which arises in advertisements of reward is 
unilateral because “it arises without the offeree’s having made any counter-promise 
to perform the required act or forbearance”.15  
 
After the Carlill case, the Scottish courts tend to apply the offer of reward doctrine. 
For instance, in Law v Newnes Ltd16 and Hunter v Hunter17, a newspaper included an 
advertisement that it would pay money to the next of kin of anyone killed in a 
railway accident where the deceased possessed a copy of the current issue or where 
he/she was a regular subscriber. In the first case, the court decided in favour of the 
defender18, since Lord Young was uncertain whether “any valid contract had been 
constituted”.19  In the second case, Lord Trayner was prepared to assume that there 
was a contract (this was obiter).20 Also, in General Accident Fire & Life Assurance 
Corp v Hunter21, the appellant, an insurance company, agreed to pay a thousand 
pounds to any owner of a diary who was killed in a railway accident on condition 
that he/she had registered with the appellant company and the claim was made within 
twelve months.  The executor of Mr Hunter, who had been killed in a train accident, 
claimed the money. The House of Lords analysed the claim of reward using a 
contractual analysis. The court regarded the advertisement “as an offer by the 
defenders which can be accepted, and a contract so made, by any person who 






                                                 
14 [1893] 1 QB 256 at 274 per A L Smith, LJ. 
15 Treitel The Law of Contract para 2-051. 
16 Henry Law and Others v George Newnes, Limited (1894) 21 R 1027. 
17 (1904) 7 F 136.  
18 (1894) 21 R 1027 at 1033 per Lord Rutherfurd Clark. 
19 (1894) 21 R 1027 at 1027 and 1028-1030 per Lord Young. 
20 (1904) 7 F 136. Here, Lord Trayner stated that “[i]t was not argued to us, but I assume for the 
moment that there was such a contract. But if so what was the contract…” (at 140-141). 
21 [1909] AC 404. 





(ii) Promise of reward 
 
Under a promissory analysis, an advertisement of reward takes effect once the 
advertisement is made. While the Scottish courts have been reluctant to apply a 
promissory approach, this approach has been well supported theoretically by legal 
scholars e.g. TB Smith23, McBryde24, MacQueen25, Hogg26, Sellar27 as well as the 
Scottish Law Commission.28 
 
This thesis argues that the features of rewards are more compatible with unilateral 
obligations. Rewards are usually created for the purpose of obtaining some 
information or for the recovery of property regardless of whether the person who 
brings the information or brings back the lost property has any knowledge of the 
advertisement of reward. The main purpose of the party issuing an advertisement of 
reward is to encourage performance of the act specified in the notice of reward, 
rather than to reach a mutual agreement between the parties. In Scots law a contract 
is regarded as a mutual agreement between two parties, whereas a promise is a 
unilateral undertaking which is binding without acceptance. It is therefore more 
appropriate to treat a reward as a unilateral obligation. Moreover, the adoption of a 
promissory approach enhances case analysis. Since an acceptance is not required, the 
person who completes the act can earn the reward even if he/she does not act with 
intent to get the reward. This makes the situation different from the offer of reward 
approach where the beneficiary needs to be aware of the reward.29  
 
Moreover, the promisee under a promissory analysis is in a better position than the 
offeree under a contractual one. This is because an offer can generally be revoked 
                                                 
23 Smith, Short Commentary 747-751; TB Smith, “Pollicitatio - Promise and Offer” (1958) Acta 
Juridica 141-152. 
24 McBryde, Promises 50; McBryde, Contract paras 2-05 and 2-27 
25 MacQueen, Options 187. 
26 Hogg, Promise 229-230; Hogg, Obligations para 2.77-2.83. 
27 Sellar, Promise 277. 
28 Memorandum, Constitution and Proof of Voluntary Obligations: Unilateral Promises (Scot Law 
Com No 35, 1977) 10-11. 





any time before it is accepted.30 Thus, there could be a problem for the person who 
completes the act, particularly if the offeror can withdraw his/her proposal before the 
act has been done. This can be usefully compared with an American case in which 
the offeror of a reward was freely entitled to revoke the reward. In Shuey v United 
States31, a reward for information leading to the apprehension of a criminal was 
offered on 20 April 1865. The reward was then withdrawn on 24 November of the 
same year. The plaintiff who was unaware of the withdrawal subsequently obtained 
some information which could lead to an arrest a year later. It was held that the 
plaintiff was not entitled to the reward. This problem would not arise in the Scottish 
promissory approach since the promise takes effect once it is made. The promisor 
has no right to withdraw it, unless that right has been reserved. 
 
Nevertheless, the disadvantage of using a promissory analysis of reward is the 
required form. Promises not undertaken in the course of business need to be made in 
writing 32 , whereas contracts not undertaken in the course of business do not. 
Therefore, when a reward is made by a non-business entity, the constitutive 
requirement of form by viewing a reward as a contract will be more flexible than it 
being regarded as a promise. Nonetheless, a promissory analysis would be more 
attractive than a contractual one in the case of rewards made in the course of business 
in which the obligation is not required to be in writing. 
 
(b) Thai law 
 
In Thailand people also occasionally offers rewards for certain purposes such as for 
the return of lost pets. For example, in February 2015, a lady offered a 10,000 baht 
reward for the safe return of her lost dog.33 In May 2015, a 50,000 baht reward for 
                                                 
30 E.g. Countess of Dunmore v Alexander (1830) 9 S 190; Thomson v James (1855) 18 D 1; Campbell 
v Glasgow Police Comrs (1895) 22 R 621; J M Smith Ltd v Colquhoun’s Tr (1901) 3 F 981; Effold 
Properties Ltd v Sprot 1979 SLT (Notes) 84. Smith v Aberdeen City Council 2001 Hous LR 93 at para 
10-28. 
31 (1875) 92 US 73. 
32 Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995, ss 1(2)(a)(ii), 2(1). 





the return of a missing cat was offered.34  Also, Thai police have offered rewards for 
information. For instance, in 2014, a 500 baht reward was offered to anybody who 
provided information about people who planned to protest against the National 
Council for Peace and Order (NCPO). 35  More recently, Thai police offered a 
1,000,000 baht reward for information leading to the arrest of the main suspect in the 
bomb attack in central Bangkok.36 These examples show that rewards have been used 
in practice in Thailand. 
 
As discussed in Chapter VI, Thai law considers an advertisement of reward as a 
genuine unilateral promise rather than a contract.37 The person who completes the act 
can claim the reward even if he/she is not aware of the existence of the 





In Scots law, a promissory analysis lends itself to case analysis of advertisements of 
reward. A beneficiary in the unilateral approach is better protected because he/she 
can enforce the promise without being required to accept it. In Thai law, it is clear 
that a promise of reward is considered as a genuine unilateral promise, rather than a 






                                                 
34  Mthai, 50,000 Bath Reward for Lost Cat, available at http://news.mthai.com/hot-news/social-
news/450868.html. 
35  The Nation, Bt500 for Tip-offs on Planned Protests, available at 
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/homeBt500-for-tip-offs-on-planned-protests-30236954.html. 
36  BBC, Bangkok Bomb: Thailand Trebles Award to Find Main Suspect, available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-34021729. 
37  See Chapter VI, C. ACCEPTANCE AND REJECTION OF A PROMISE, (2) Thai law, (a) 
Acceptance of a promise. 





(2) Prize competitions 
 
Organisations often use prize competitions to promote their businesses. For instance, 
the Law Society of Scotland ran an Annual New Lawyers Essay Competition.39Also, 
the Department of English Literature of the University of Edinburgh held a prize 
competition for prose and verse compositions. 40  The Rabbit Awareness Week 
website ran a competition as a part of an annual event which raises awareness of 
rabbit welfare. 41  Similarly, firms or companies use prize competitions to attract 
customers. For instance, the BBC offered a competition for secondary school 
students to create a soundtrack for one of its series.42 It is therefore appropriate to 
include the discussion of this transaction in this chapter. 
 
(a) Scots law 
 
The writer, despite extensive searches, has not been able to find any Scottish case 
dealing with the legal nature of prize competitions. There are a few articles in 
contract law literature discussing the legal characteristics of this transaction.43 Prize 
competitions are likely to be analysed in Scots law as gratuitous contracts,44 although 
they can be alternatively regarded as unilateral promises.45 Nonetheless, there was a 
case in 1848 in which the Scottish courts dealt with prize competitions. In Graham v 
Pollok46, a dog won a prize in a dog race. The main dispute between the parties was 
who was entitled to receive the prize- the owner of the dog or the person whom 
                                                 
39  The Law Society of Scotland, Essay Competition, available at 
https://www.lawscot.org.uk/education-and-careers/studying-law/currently-studying-the-llb/essay-
competition/. 
40  English Literature, The University of Edinburgh, Writing Prizes, available at 
http://www.ed.ac.uk/literatures-languages-cultures/english-literature/undergraduate/current/beyond-
curriculum/prizes-scholarships/writing-prizes.  
41  Rabbit Awareness Week, Competition, available at 
http://www.rabbitawarenessweek.co.uk/competition/. 
42  BBC, Doctor Who 'Create a Soundtrack' Competition, available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/articles/Kxwskzz7R0YqwLjknWbtWT/doctor-who-create-a-
soundtrack-competition. 
43 Leading literature on Scots contract law, such as Gloag on Contract, The Law of Contract in 
Scotland, and Contract Law in Scotland, do not discuss the nature of prize competitions. 
44 Hogg, Obligations 76-77. 
45 Ibid. 





nominated it. Although the court did not characterise the nature of the prize 
competition, in can be inferred from its decision that prize competitions create an 
obligation. Therefore, it is necessary to characterise the juristic nature of prize 
competitions as either a contract or a promise, both of which are voluntary 
obligations in Scots law. 
 
While it can be argued that rewards are unilateral in nature on the grounds that a 
promisee is not required to have the knowledge of the existence of reward, the same 
argument cannot be made in the case of prize competitions. Since a person who 
enters into a prize competition intends to enter the competition, one might argue that 
prize competitions should be regarded as bilateral agreements on this basis. 
Nonetheless, the fact that the entrants are always aware of the existence of the 
competition does not necessarily mean that prize competitions are not unilateral in 
nature. There are a number of transactions where the recipients always have 
knowledge of the transaction, but their natures are still compatible with unilateral 
obligations. Examples include firm offers, options and letters of credits, as have been 
discussed.  In fact, the features of prize competitions are quite similar to those of 
promises of reward. A person who offers a prize competition also makes a promise to 
give the remuneration to another person. Moreover, prize competitions are generally 
made to the public, rather than to an individual person. The difference is that in prize 
competitions such a prize would be given to the person who wins the competition. 
However, in promises of reward, the reward is given to a person who completes the 
specific act as stated in the promise. The nature of the obligation itself is, 
nevertheless, similar. 
 
It has already been noted that there appear to be no authorities regarding the legal 
nature of prize competitions in Scots law. It is therefore worth making reference to 
the Anglo-American approach dealing with prize competitions because there are a 
number of articles in the Common Law discussing prize competitions.47 Also, there 
                                                 
47 E.g. Chitty on Contracts para 2-111; F Cross, R Miller, The Legal Environment of Business: Text 
and Cases: Ethical, Regulatory, Global and Corporate Issues 8th edn, (2011) 187; R Miller and G 
Jentz, Business Law Today: Text & Summarized Cases: Diverse, Ethical, Online and Global 





have been a number of cases in which the Anglo-American courts have analysed the 
juristic nature of prize competitions.48  
 
In England, critics claim that prize competitions cause theoretical difficulties in 
relation to their legal analysis. The traditional offer and acceptance approach cannot 
appropriately deal with prize competitions. It is doubtful whether the act of an 
entrant in entering into a contest amounts to an offer or an acceptance, or both of 
them.49 This advances the idea that the traditional rule of offer and acceptance is “out 
of date”50 since it cannot deal with the formation of a contract in some complex 
circumstances.51 However, these difficulties do not arise in Scots law. Within the 
framework of a promissory analysis, there is no question as to whether an entry 
constitutes an offer or acceptance since the competition itself will be regarded as a 
unilateral promise to award the prize to the winner. If an entrant wins the 
competition, he/she can simply enforce the promise. 
 
In the United States, prize competitions are regarded as unilateral contracts.52 They 
are contracts which can be accepted only by completing the anticipated act of 
performance.53 This is because “the only acceptance of the offer that is necessary is 
the performance of the act.”54 A unilateral contract of prize competition is formed 
when an entrant complies with the rules of the contest, for example, by submitting an 
                                                 
48 E.g. Englert v Nutritional Sciences LLC, 2008-Ohio-5062; Brackenbury v Hodgkin, 116 Me 399, 
102 A 106 (Me. 1917); Harwood v Avaya Corp (SD Ohio 2007), No C2-05-828. 
49 Chitty on Contracts para 2-111. 
50  Ibid at para 2-112; For instance, in Butler Machine Tool Co. Ltd. v Ex-Cell-O Corporation 
(England) Ltd, Lord Denning MR stated that “I have much sympathy with the judge’s approach to this 
case. In many of these cases our traditional analysis of offer, counter-offer, rejection, acceptance and 
so forth is out of date.” [1979] 1 WLR 401 at 404. 
51  In New Zealand Shipping Co Ltd Appellant v A M Satterthwaite & Co Ltd Respondent, Lord 
Wilberforce observed that “[i]t is only the precise analysis of this complex of relations into the 
classical offer and acceptance, with identifiable consideration, that seems to present difficulty, but this 
same difficulty exists in many situations of daily life... These are all examples which show that 
English law, having committed itself to a rather technical and schematic doctrine of contract, in 
application takes a practical approach, often at the cost of forcing the facts to fit uneasily into the 
marked slots of offer, acceptance and consideration.” [1975] AC 154 at 167; See also Chitty on 
Contracts 112. 
52 In Englert v Nutritional Sciences, the Ohio Courts of Appeals stated: “[a]s the majority points out, 
courts have historically treated contests as unilateral contracts.” LLC, 2008-Ohio-5062 at para 41. 
53 R Miller and G Jentz, Business Law Today: Text & Summarized Cases: Diverse, Ethical, Online 
and Global Environment 10th edn, 2012, 197. 
54 Cohn v Levine 6 RCL 607. This was cited in Brackenbury v Hodgkin (116 Me 399, 102 A 106 (Me 





entry in the competition.55 In this sense, it is different from a bilateral contract in 
which the contract is formed when promises are exchanged.56 In a unilateral contract, 
“the promise becomes binding when the act is performed.” 57  For instance, in 
Brackenbury v Hodgkin,58 the defendant was a widow, who lived alone in Lewiston, 
Maine. She had asked the plaintiffs, her daughter and son-in-law, to move to 
Lewiston and look after her in exchange for a farm. The plaintiffs moved to 
Lewiston, but the defendant subsequently revoked her offer before they arrived.  It 
was held that the contract had been formed when the offeree first initiated the 
request. The court ruled that “[t]he offer was the basis, not of a bilateral contract, 
requiring a reciprocal promise, a promise for a promise, but of a unilateral contract 
requiring an act for a promise.”59 
 
As discussed, the promisee is normally better protected than the offeree on the 
grounds that the offeror has the right to withdraw the offer whereas the promisor 
cannot. Yet, the Anglo-American courts have developed the rule that the offeror of a 
unilateral contract cannot revoke his/her unilateral contract once the promisee has 
begun the performance.60 In the case of prize competitions, it would mean that after 
emailing or posting an entry into the competition, the competition holder cannot 
cancel the competition. Thus, the Anglo-American unilateral contract approach lends 
itself to the defence of the claim that the promisee under a promissory analysis is in a 
better position. This is because under a unilateral contract approach, the offeror 
cannot withdraw his/her offer either. The offerees under the unilateral contractual 
approach are therefore protected equally in comparison to the promisees under the 
unilateral promissory one. 
 
                                                 
55 R Miller and G Jentz, Business Law Today: Text & Summarized Cases: Diverse, Ethical, Online 
and Global Environment 10th edn, 2012, 197. 
56 J E Murray Jr, Murray on Contracts, 5th edn (2011) §18; R Miller and G Jentz, Business Law 
Today: Text & Summarized Cases: Diverse, Ethical, Online and Global Environment 10th edn, 2012, 
197; F Cross, R Miller, The Legal Environment of Business: Text and Cases : Ethical, Regulatory, 
Global and Corporate Issues 8th edn, (2011) 186. 
57 Cohn v Levine 6 RCL 607. This was cited in Brackenbury v Hodgkin (116 Me 399, 102 A 106 (Me 
1917) at 107. 
58 116 Me 399, 102 A 106 (Me 1917). 
59 Ibid at 107 per Cornish, CJ. 





Nonetheless, in some complex circumstance, the offeror of a unilateral contract may 
still be able to revoke his/her offer although the offeree/promisee has already begun 
the performance. It was held in Englert v Nutritional Sciences61 that an offeror of a 
unilateral contract, who reserved the right to cancel or alter the terms of the contract, 
is entitled to change the value of the prize after an offeree has already entered the 
contest. In this case, the respondent sponsored a contest. The appellant, who was 
chosen as the runner up in her age group, received a “challenge winner agreement” 
offering the sum of $250 and another $250 worth of the product. The appellant 
averred that she was entitled to the prize worth $1500 on the grounds that this was 
the value that appeared in the contest advertisement. It was found as a fact in the case 
that the contest advertisement stated that “[a]ll winners must agree to the regulations 
outlined specifically for winners before claiming championship or money.” 62  In 
addition, there was an asterisk that appeared next to the said statement that the 
respondent reserved “the right to cancel the [contest] at anytime, or to make changes 
as we see fit”.63 Based on these pieces of information, the court held that there was 
no breach of contract by the respondent. 64 It can be seen that in these circumstances, 
the offeree is placed in a very disadvantageous position, given that the offeror can 
alter the value of the prize freely at any time, even after the contestant has already 
entered the contest. Clearly, the fact that the value of the prize could be altered from 
$1500 to $250 is an unfair outcome to the aggrieved party.  
 
As there is no authority in Scots law on this point, it is interesting to assess how the 
Scottish courts, by applying a promissory analysis, would deal with this situation. 
Although in Scots law a promise takes effect once it is made and cannot be revoked 
thereafter, the promisor may reserve the right to revoke the promise.65 Nonetheless, 
the ability to revoke the promise should also depend on when the right of the 
promisee comes into existence. A person who presents a prize competition to the 
                                                 
61 LLC, 2008-Ohio-5062. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid. 
64 The result would have been different if the asterisked term reserving the right to withdraw the offer 
had not been included in the advertisement, in which case, the rule that an offeror is not entitled to 
withdraw his/her offer after the offeree has begun the performance would have applied. 





public should be able to withdraw from the competition (if he reserves that right) as 
long as the competition has not started. Moreover, when the winner has been chosen, 
the right to claim the prize would exist and the promisor should not be able to cancel 
the competition. Therefore, in this case, under a promissory analysis, Englert’s right 
to claim $1500 existed once she was chosen as the runner up. Accordingly, 
Nutritional Sciences would not be able to alter the value of the prize. 
 
To conclude, the unilateral theory of prize competitions avoids complexity arising 
from the bilateral theory as well as providing better protection to an aggrieved party, 
i.e. a fairer outcome. 
 
(b) Thai law 
 
Prize competitions are regarded as unilateral promises under the Thai Code. A 
greater level of protection is provided to the promisee under a promissory analysis. 
The Code states that “…the promisor may so long as there is no person who has 
completed the specific act, withdraw his promise by the same means which was used 
for advertising, unless he declared in the advertisement that he would not withdraw 
it.” Thai law generally permits the promisor of a prize competition to withdraw 
his/her promise. However, the withdrawal must be made before any promisee has 
completed the specific act, which in the case of a prize competition is when he/she 
has been chosen as the winner. Therefore, had Englert arisen in Thailand, the contest 
sponsor would not be able to revoke the promise even though such a right has been 
reserved. This is because the contestant had been chosen as the winner already. The 
Thai outcome would also be the Scots outcome given that, in Scots law the right of 
the promisee in a prize competition would, as one reasonably be expected, exist 
when he/she is chosen as the winner. 
 
Thai law does not require the value of the prize to appear in the contest 
advertisement. 66  This is different from the rule under the Anglo-American Law, 
where there must be clear details about the value of the prize so that the contest can 
                                                 





be regarded as a unilateral contract. In an unpublished opinion of the Minnesota 
Court of Appeal, the court was asked to determine when a contract of a contestant 
was formed. In Rogalski v Little Poker League67, the appellant had won a tournament 
managed by the respondent. There was a dispute regarding the nature of the prize 
between the parties. While it was argued by the respondent that the prize was a seat 
at an event plus the entry fee of $10,000 and $2,500 of travel expenses, it was argued 
by the appellant that the winner was given an option to choose the prize of $12,500. 
Moreover, it was found that the appellant (as well as other contestants) had signed a 
document called a “WSOP Agreement” with the respondent during the tournament. 
The agreement provided that the “respondent would pay the WSOP entry fee, worth 
$10,000, on the winner’s behalf and pay the winner $2,500 for travel related 
expenses.”68 It also provided that “the winner would relinquish the WSOP seat and 
return the expense money to respondent if the winner did not attend the WSOP.”69 
However, it was averred by the appellant that a unilateral contract was formed when 
he began to participate in the tournament, not when the agreement was signed. The 
court nevertheless held that the respondent’s advertisement was not sufficient to be 
regarded as “an offer for a unilateral contract that may be accepted by 
performance.”70 This is based on the fact which was found from the case that the 
contest adverts made by the respondent were not definite. Some adverts did not 
precisely state the ultimate prize; some mentioned $12,500; and some mentioned 
$12,500 as the value of a trip. Most importantly, the “appellant does not allege that 
respondent offered the winner the option to select either the trip or its cash value.”71 
The court, therefore, held that the contest advert did not amount to a unilateral 
contract.72 Rather, the bilateral contract was formed when the contestant signed an 
agreement with the offer during the tournament, which “is the first and only contract 
formed”.73 Had the Rogalski case arisen in Thailand, the advertisement could be 
regarded as a valid prize competition as a binding obligation, although the details 
                                                 
67 LLC, 2011 WL 589636 [Minn App 2011]. 
68 Ibid at 3. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid at 5. 
71 Ibid at 4. 






regarding the value of the prize were vague. It would be the court’s role to award an 
appropriate prize to the winner. Nevertheless, it is clear that under Thai law the 
contest advertisement would be a promise which is irrevocable once the contestant 




Both the Scottish and Thai jurisdictions show that the approach of recognising a 
prize competition as a promise is possible. The nature of prize competitions is also 
compatible with unilateral obligations. More importantly, the unilateral theory of 
prize competitions provides better protection to the promisee in comparison with the 
bilateral one. Although in the Common Law the offeror of a unilateral contract is not 
entitled to revoke the offer once the offeree has begun the performance, there is an 
exception in circumstances where the offeror has reserved the right to revoke or 
change the conditions of the competition that allows him/her to revoke the offer. In 
contrast, under a promissory analysis, once the right of the promisee comes into 
existence, i.e. when he/she has been chosen as the winner, the promisor is not 
permitted to revoke the promise.  Also, in circumstances where the clear details of 
the prize do not appear, the contest statement cannot be regarded as a unilateral 
contract under the Common Law. Conversely, this kind of statement can still be 
regarded as a unilateral promise in Thai law.  
 
(3) Marketing offers 
 
In daily life, shops or stores make sales promotions in the form of “Buy one, get one 
free”74, or “Buy one, get one half price”75, or “Buy two get third half price”76 and so 
on. Similarly, some service businesses use the marketing technique in a form which 
                                                 
74  E.g. Buy one get one free promotions offered by Tesco, available at 
http://www.tesco.com/groceries/specialoffers/specialofferlist/?promoType=buy1get1free. 










guarantees that it provides the cheapest price, or something equivalent, for that type 
of service. For example, “Flight Centre”, a travel agent, states on its website that 
“[w]ith our Fly For Free Promise, if we can’t find you a cheaper airfare in the same 
cabin you’ll fly for free!”77 Booking.com uses the marketing technique of “best price 
guaranteed” on all hotel bookings. 78  If customers find their reservations with 
Booking.com at a lower price on any other website, it will match the same price for 
the customer’s reservations.79 Virgin Trains East Coast states on its website that “[i]f 
you have booked your ticket for travel … at virgintrainseastcoast.com and found a 
cheaper price online, we’ll match it and refund you the difference.”80 
 
(a) Scots law 
 
There appears to be no authority that deals with the legal nature of marketing offers 
in Scots law.81 Therefore, they may be either offers or unilateral promises. 
 
(i) Best price guarantees 
 
Best price guarantees can be analysed within the framework of contractual 
obligations. The expressions of those businesses are then regarded as public offers. 
In the case of the promise of “best price guaranteed” made by Booking.com, a 
passenger who books a room via Booking.com enters into a contract with 
Booking.com. The price guarantee is a condition of the contract. Booking.com is 
obliged, as a condition of the contract, to match the price if the customer can find a 
cheaper price elsewhere. The same analysis applies to the case of a promise made by 
                                                 
77 Fly For Free, available at http://www.flightcentre.co.uk/first-and-business/policies/fly-for-free. 
78  There are several similar websites to Booking.com which also use the concept of “best price 
guaranteed” or “best price promise” e.g. The LateRooms.com, Price Promise, available at 
http://www.laterooms.com/en/price-promise.mvc; Lastminute.com, Our Price Match Guarantee, 
available at http://www.lastminute.com/site/deals/price_promise/. 
79  Best Price Guaranteed, available at http://www.booking.com/general.en-
gb.html?label=gog235jc;sid=a97a79d669d459bad6a58580d9bb05e0;dcid=1;tmpl=doc/rate_guarant
ee. 
80  Virgin Trains East Coast, Our Price Promise, available at 
https://www.virgintrainseastcoast.com/rail-travel/your-ticket/price-promise/. 
81 The nature of this kind of marketing offer is not discussed in leading literature on Scots contract law 
and the UK contract of sale. Examples include Gloag on Contract, The Law of Contract in Scotland, 






Virgin Trains East Coast. However, it is difficult to explain how the contract is 
concluded in the case of a promise made by the Flight Centre. There will not be a 
concluded contract until a customer accepts, or fulfils the conditions of the offer. In 
order to claim a free flight, a customer must give notice of intention to the travel 
agent that he/she wishes the agent to search for the cheapest flight. It is, however, 
doubtful whether the customer’s notice of intention is to be regarded as an 
acceptance. There will not be a concluded contract if the agent can provide the 
cheapest flight to the customer. The contract (to provide the free flight) only arises 
when the travel agent fails to fulfil the customers’ request.  
 
Alternatively, this marketing offer can be characterised as being promissory in 
nature. While under a contractual analysis it is unclear how a contract is concluded if 
the Flight Centre can provide the cheapest flight to the customer, there is no such 
ambiguity under a promissory analysis. The advertisement of the agent is treated as a 
unilateral obligation. The promisor is bound to provide a free flight to any customer 
who comes to the agent if it cannot find cheaper flights for them. There is no need 
for customers to accept it. It is therefore theoretically clearer. It explains how the 
obligation is binding in comparison to a contractual analysis. There is no need to 
consider the acceptance of the promise and the conclusion of a contract. The 
characteristics of such marketing offers are therefore more compatible with the 
nature of unilateral obligations than that of bilateral ones. The same legal analysis 
applies to circumstances where stores or service businesses use marketing offers in 
the form which guarantees that it provides the cheapest price, or something 
equivalent, for that type of service such as the case of Booking.com and Virgin 
Train. 
 
(ii) Buy one get one free 
 
“Buy one get one free” may be regarded as an offer to sell two items together at half 
price. Unlike in the case of the Flight Centre, there is no difficulty in explaining how 
a contract is concluded because in the “Buy one get one free” case there will always 





Nevertheless, a contractual analysis cannot explain how a contract is concluded in a 
situation where the customers are not aware of the “Buy one get one free” condition, 
which can happen in reality. For example, a supermarket places a sign “Buy one get 
one free” on a pack of free range eggs. The sign accidently falls down from the shelf. 
A customer takes a pack of free range eggs to the counter without knowing that the 
eggs are on promotion. Would the customer be entitled to the other pack of eggs for 
free? Theoretically, if the promotion is viewed as being promissory in nature, the 
customer can always get the other item for free regardless of their awareness of the 
promotion. In contrast, if the “Buy one get one free” example is viewed as an offer to 
sell two items at half price, the customer would not be entitled to another pack of free 
range eggs because the customer wants to enter into a contract of sale for only one 
pack of eggs. It would mean that the customer makes a counter-offer to buy the item 
at the full price and the shop accepts the counter offer, despite the fact that in practice 
most supermarkets would be willing to allow customers to get another pack of eggs 
in order to retain their standards of customer service.  Thus, there may not be any 
practical difference between regarding the “Buy one get one free” example as either 
a promise or an offer. However, the fact that the store, generally speaking, intends to 
give another item for free, even if the customer is not aware of the promotion, means 
that the store unilaterally binds itself to give another item for free. 
 
Moreover, if “Buy one get one free” is regarded as an offer to sell two items together 
at half price, it would mean that “Buy one, get one half price” means an offer to sell 
two items together at a 25 per cent discount for each item. It is then more difficult to 
explain the example of “Buy two get one half price”, in terms of percentage, whether 
it is an offer to sell three items at however many per cent discount. Conversely, if it 
is deemed to be a promise, it can simply be explained that “Buy two get one half 










(b) Thai law 
 
Best price guarantees and “Buy one get one free” offers are also used in Thailand. 
Some Thai businesses, e.g. Tops Supermarket,82 Pizza Hut83 and Samsung84, have 
used these techniques for their marketing. However, there is a lack of discussion of 
these types of marketing offers in legal business or amongst academics. Leading 
legal literatures both on contract and on sale85 do not discuss these marketing offers.  
 
As contract is the main route for the creation of voluntary obligations under Thai 
law, these types of marketing offers would be characterised by Thai lawyers as 
contractual in nature. However, if Thai law recognised the unilateral obligation as an 
independent obligation, they may alternatively be viewed as unilateral obligations. A 
unilateral approach is more advantageous to customers because in the promissory 
approach these advertisements are irrevocable. Customers do not need to accept, but 
they can enforce the promise as long as they fall within the conditions of the 
promise. Like the example of “Buy one get one free” discussed under Scots law, a 
customer who is not aware of the existence of the promotion will be entitled to get 




In Scots law, promissory doctrine is useful for analysing these marketing techniques. 
It offers a clear explanation of the way in which the obligation is binding as well as 
providing better protection for customers. The Flight Centre unilaterally promises 
that customers will get a free flight if it cannot find a cheaper airfare in the same 
cabin for them. Moreover, for simplicity’s sake, it avoids complexity arising from a 
                                                 
82  Tops, Buy 1 Get 1 Free, available at 
http://www.tops.co.th/topsshoponline/Promotion/Promotion.aspx?promotion_id=3. 
83 Pizza Hut, Promotion, available at http://www.pizzahut.co.th/promotion.php?lang=en. 
84 Samsung, Promotion: Buy 1 get 1, available at http://www.samsung.com/th/promotion/buy1get1/. 
85 E.g. Sotthibandhu, Juristic acts and Contracts; Sotthibandhu, Sale; Sanongchart, Juristic acts and 
Contracts; P Sataman and P Punyapan, ค าอธิบายประมวลกฎหมายแพ่งและพาณิชย์ ลกัษณะซ้ือขาย (Commentary on the 
Civil and Commercial Code: Sale), 15th edn (2008); P Eagjariyakorn, ค าอธิบายซ้ือขาย แลกเปลีย่น ให้ 
(Commentary on Sale, Exchange and Gift), 6th edn (2011); W Krea-ngam, ค าอธิบายกฎหมายว่าด้วยซ้ือขาย 





contractual analysis when explaining the characteristics of the “Buy two get one half 
price” offer. Thai law could benefit from using a promissory analysis if unilateral 
promise were recognised as a free standing legal entity. A promissory analysis would 
be more attractive than a contractual one.  
 
D. USING PROMISES TO GUARANTEE EXISTING OBLIGATIONS 
 
(1) Product or service guarantees 
 
(a) Scots law 
 
In sales contexts, a guarantee is commonly offered by manufacturers of products.86 
This is usually provided free of charge. 87  For example, vacuum-cleaner 
manufacturers will usually offer a guarantee with their products that, for a year or 
more, they will carry out free repairs for problems caused by a manufacturing 
defect.88  A product guarantee is described as: 
“[A] voluntary undertaking given by a manufacturer (the guarantor) without 
charge to provide a remedy, should the product covered by the guarantee 
become defective as a result of poor workmanship or the use of faulty 
materials in the manufacturing process during a specified period of time after 
purchase.”89  
 
Moreover, some businesses or service firms provide guarantees in respect of their 
services. For example, Pizza Hut guarantees that “the customer will get his next 
pizza for free if we fail to deliver a hot and on time product.”90 
 
                                                 
86 Twigg-Flesner, Product Guarantees 1. 
87 Ibid. Twigg-Flesner explains that “consumers are not required to pay for such a guarantee in 
addition to the overall purchase price of the product covered by the guarantee, because it is an 
“integral part of the bundle of satisfactions”. He cited J G Udell and E Anderson, “The product 
warranty as an element of competitive strategy” (1968) 32 Journal of Marketing 1 at 1. 
88  E.g. all Miele vacuum cleaner products come with a free two year guarantee, available at 
http://www.miele.co.uk/vacuum-cleaners/guarantees-and-warranties/. 
89 Twigg-Flesner, Product Guarantees 1. This definition is also adopted in Aityah’s Sale of Goods at 
288. 






Although product guarantees are common in practice, there has been a lack of 
discussion about legal issues both in England and Scotland.91 Also, there has been a 
lack of authority on the effect of product guarantees both in English and Scots law.92 
In circumstances other than those governed by the Sale and Supply of Goods to 
Consumers Regulations 2002, the legal characteristics of such a guarantee may not 
necessarily be deemed to be contractual in nature. Examples of such circumstances 
are non-consumer product guarantees. Also, service guarantees93 generally do not fall 
within the scope of the Regulations. However, where guarantees are provided free of 
charge to customers who purchase goods under a sale of goods contract, they are 
regulated by the Sale and Supply of Goods to Consumers Regulations 2002. Under 
the Regulations, the nature of the guarantees is regarded as contractual. The 
Regulations state: 
“Where goods are sold or otherwise supplied to a consumer which are offered 
with a consumer guarantee, the consumer guarantee takes effect at the time 
the goods are delivered as a contractual obligation owed by the guarantor 
under the conditions set out in the guarantee statement and the associated 
advertising.”94 
 
English law has faced difficulties in analysing the legal nature of a product/service 
guarantee. Non-consumer product guarantees may be treated as collateral contracts. 
This approach, however, would be possible only in circumstances where the buyers 
are aware of the guarantee.95 The consideration is the purchase of goods from the 
dealer.96 Nevertheless, normally a buyer is not aware of the guarantee until he/she 
gets home and opens the box, or when he/she receives the product delivered and 
opens the box.97 Alternatively, a unilateral contract analysis may be applied98, as is 
the case in other circumstances e.g. tenders, options and rewards. However, it would 
still not be clear what the consideration is in the case of a guarantee which is free of 
                                                 
91 Twigg-Flesner, Product Guarantees 1. 
92 Atiyah, Sale of Goods 289. 
93 The Regulations do not extend to services in general but only to installation, in certain limited 
circumstances. 
94 Sale and Supply of Goods to Consumer Regulations 2002 (SI 2002/3045), reg 15 (1).  
95 Atiyah, Sale of Goods 289. 
96 Shanklin Pier Ltd v Detel Products Ltd [1951] 2 KB 854. 






charge between the seller and the buyer. The same difficulty also arises with service 
guarantees under English law. 
 
However, such difficulties do not arise in Scots law. Such guarantees can be viewed 
as promissory in nature on the grounds that guarantees are usually provided free of 
charge. 99  The nature of a guarantee is compatible with the characteristics of a 
unilateral promise. As Twigg-Flesner explains, “[e]very guarantee will promise 
something to the customer. In most cases, the promise is that the product is free from 
defects in workmanship and material.”100  Additionally, customers receive greater 
protection if a promissory analysis is attached to product/service guarantees because 
a manufacturer is not permitted to revoke a guarantee that is given to customers.101 
Thus, a promissory analysis is useful as applied to non-consumer product guarantees 
and service guarantees in Scotland. 
 
(b) Thai law 
 
Where product or service guarantees are provided by a business to customers, they 
are regulated by the Consumer Protection Act (No 2) 1998.  The Act states: 
“In the case where a person operating a business in connection with 
the sale of goods or the provision of services makes a promise for a guarantee 
contract to the consumer, such contract shall be made in writing, signed by 
such person or his agent and delivered to the consumer together with the 
goods or services. 
If the contract under paragraph one is made in a foreign language, the 
Thai translation shall be attached thereto.” 102   
 
The law recognises consumer product guarantees as a contract between 
manufacturers and customers. The Thai provision regarding products or service 
guarantees is quite restrictive. According to the provision, a guarantee has to be made 
in writing and signed by the manufacturer. However, in reality, although 
                                                 
99 Hogg, Obligations 77; C Ervine, “The Sale and Supply of Goods to Consumers Regulations 2002” 
(2003) SLT (News) 67 at 70; Atiyah, Sale of Goods 289; A Wiewiórowska-Domagalska, Consumer 
Sales Guarantees in the European Union (2013) 78. 
100 Twigg-Flesner, Product Guarantees 29. 
101 M Ebers, A Janssen and O Meyer, European Perspectives on Producer’s Liability (2009) 508. 





manufacturer guarantees are commonly made in writing, it is unlikely that such 
guarantees will be signed by manufacturers. 
 
In circumstances other than those governed by the Consumer Protection Act, Thai 
law does not have a specific legal principle dealing with product or service 
guarantees. Nonetheless, in these circumstances, such guarantees would be 
characterised by Thai lawyers as contracts too. 
 
A promissory analysis of product/service guarantees could be useful for Thai law. 
Under this analysis, a manufacturer/firm promises the customers that any defects 
occurring in its products/services are covered by its guarantee. Businessmen or 
service providers are bound once the guarantee reaches the customers. This contrasts 
with a contractual analysis in which customers are required to accept the guarantee. 
Consequently, a unilateral approach is more protective to customers.  The adoption 
of a promissory analysis can apply to both (i) product or service guarantees provided 
by a business to customers (which are regulated by the Consumer Protection Act (No 
2) 1998) and (ii) products or service guarantees in circumstances other than those 
governed by the Consumer Protection Act. 
 
One might argue that, in the case of product/service guarantees under the Consumer 
Protection Act, an acceptance may be implied. The texts of the provision under 
discussion seems not to envisage the need for an acceptance. Nevertheless, a 
promissory analysis offers a more flexible approach, making clear that an acceptance 




The idea of unilateral promise provides flexibility in analysing product or service 
guarantees in Scots law. While English law has difficulties because of the 
requirement of consideration, Scots law can simply apply a promissory analysis to 
these instances. The Scottish promissory approach could benefit the analysis of 





guarantee takes effect spontaneously once the customer purchases the goods or 
service, without a requirement to accept the guarantee separately for another 
transaction. In fact, promissory language is used in the provision under the Consumer 
Protection Act (…a person…makes a promise for a guarantee…). It would not be 
difficult to characterise product/service guarantees as promissory in nature if 
unilateral promise were recognised as a standalone obligation under Thai law. The 
same analysis can also apply in non-consumer cases where a party offers a guarantee 
in relation to his/her products or services.   
 
(2) Cautionary obligations/Suretyship 
 
(a) Scots law 
 
(i) General concept of cautionary obligations 
 
Another type of guarantee is the instance in which a person undertakes to the creditor 
that the main debtor will perform his/her obligation under the principal contract.103 
This type of obligation is classified in Scots law as a cautionary obligation. It is “not 
an independent obligation, but is essentially conditional in its nature, being properly 
exigible only on the failure of the principal debtor to pay at the maturity of his 
obligation.”104 
 
It is therefore distinct from other obligations such as independent obligations105, 
delegations106, representations as to credit107, indemnities108 and insurance.109 These 
types of non-independent obligations are commonly recognised under the term 
                                                 
103 Bell, Comm I, 364, Bell, Prin §245; Erskine, Inst 3.3.61; Gloag &Irvine, Law of Rights in Security 
644; W M Gloag, The Law of Scotland, 13th edn (2012) para 16.01. 
104 Gloag & Irvine, Law of Rights in Security 644. This passage was quoted by Lord Justice Clerk 
Ross in City of Glasgow District Council v Excess Insurance 1986 SLT 585 at 588.  
105 Morrison v Harkness (1870) 9 M 35; Stevenson’s Tr v Campbell & Sons (1896) 23 R 711; Aitken 
& Co v Pyper (1900) 8 SLT 258. 
106 Delegation is “the substitution of a new debtor for the old, with consent of the creditor”. Prin §577; 
See also W A Wilson, The Scottish Law of Debt, 2nd edn (1991) para 14.2. 
107 Fortune v Young 1918 SC 1. 
108 Simpson v Jack 1948 SLT (Notes) 45. 





“accessory”.110 In the case of cautionary obligations, the debt (between the creditor 
and the debtor) is regarded as “principal”. The “security” of the debt, i.e. a 
cautionary obligation, is regarded as “accessory”.111  The cautioner is required to 
perform his/her obligation only when the principal debtor fails to pay his/her debt. 
The cautioner’s liability cannot exceed that of the principal debtor.112  
 
There are two forms of caution. First, proper caution refers to a cautionary obligation 
where it is properly understood that the cautioner is bound as a cautioner.113 Second, 
improper cautionary obligations refer to circumstances in which the granter of the 
guarantee is bound, as it appears to the creditor, as a co-debtor. However, the actual 
relationship between the co-debtors themselves is that one is bound as a cautioner 
and the other is bound as the principal debtor.114  Traditionally, the main difference 
between proper and improper caution is that a proper cautioner could request the 
creditor to enforce the debt against the principal debtor prior to enforcing it against 
the cautioner, whereas an improper cautioner could not do so.115 However, this right 
ceased to exist with the introduction of the Mercantile Law Amendment (Scotland) 
Act 1856.116 Accordingly, today “there is very little difference, from the creditor's 
point of view, between an improper cautioner and a co-principal debtor”.117  
 
(ii) Cautionary obligation and guarantee 
 
Cautionary obligations may be similar to guarantees.118 Both the guarantor and the 
cautioner assure the creditor that the principal debtor will perform his/her obligation, 
                                                 
110 For an analysis on the nature of accessory rights see A Steven, “Accessoriness and Security Over 
Land” (2009) 13(3) EdinLR 387 at 387-426. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Jackson v McIver (1875) 2 R 882; For further discussion see H L MacQueen et al (eds), Gloag and 
Henderson: The Law of Scotland, 13th edn (2012),  para 16.03. 
113 Bell, Prin §247; Erskine, Inst 3.3.61 
114 Paterson v Bonar (1844) 6 D 987; Bell, Prin §246; W M Gloag, The Law of Scotland, 13th edn 
(2012), para 16.02. 
115 Davidson & Macgregor, Commercial Law in Scotland para 5.5.4. 
116 Mercantile Law Amendment (Scotland) Act 1856, s 8. 
117 S M Eden & J T Pretorius, “Suretyship and Cautionary Obligations” in R Zimmermann et al (eds), 
Mixed Legal Systems in Comparative Perspective: Property and Obligations in Scotland and South 
Africa (2004) 335 at 343-344. 
118 In Law of Rights in Security, cautionary obligation is treated as similar to guarantee. Gloag & 





otherwise the guarantor/cautioner will take responsibility for non-performance.119 
Like caution, a guarantee always requires another, i.e. principal, obligation of some 
other obligor.120 It is always both ancillary and subsidiary to the other contract or 
liability on which it is founded.121  
 
Traditionally, the difference between a cautionary obligation and a guarantee is that 
the former tended to refer to a personal context whereas the latter tended to refer to a 
commercial context.122 In old case law, the court sometimes distinguished between 
these two obligations.123 Accordingly, the courts attempted to protect a cautioner “by 
placing him in a favoured position in comparison with other obligants by imposing 
higher duties on the creditor”.124 However, Gloag pointed out that such distinctions 
“are of little practical value”.125 The differences between these two obligations are 
rather in terminology than in substance. 126  Furthermore, in modern contexts, it 
appears that cautionary obligations are not merely used in a personal context127, but 
                                                 
119 For the definition of a guarantee under English law see L S Sealy and R J A Hooley, Commercial 
Law: Text, Cases and Materials, 4th edn (2008) 1100; In The Law of Principal and Surety, a surety is 
defined as “one who contracts with an actual or possible creditor of another to be responsible to him 
by way of security, additional to that other, for the whole or part of the debt.” S A T Rowlatt, Rowlatt 
on Principal and Surety, 5th edn, by G Moss and D Marks (1999) para 1-01. 
120 General Surety and Guarantee Co Ltd v Francis Parker Ltd [1977] 6 BLR 16 at 21 per Donaldson 
J. 
121 Mountstephen v Lakeman [1871] LR 7 QB 196 at 202, Ex Ch, per Willes. 
122 Gloag and Irvine, Law of Rights in Security 643; Bell also distinguished between caution and 
guarantee. He explained that a cautionary obligation, or surety, is “an accessory obligation or 
engagement, as surety for another, that the principal obligant shall pay the debt or perform the act for 
which he has engaged, otherwise the cautioner shall pay the debt”. Bell, Prin §§245, 282. 
123 For example, in Wilson v Tait (1840, 1 Rob App 137), the House of Lords held that a cautionary 
obligation was not equivalent to a guarantee. According to the Court, the term “guarantee” did not 
necessarily constitute a cautionary obligation. In a traditional sense, caution was distinct from 
guarantee because generally a cautioner was a person who voluntarily bound himself under an 
obligation “out of motives of friendship with no prospect of reward.”. 
124 S M Eden & A Clark, “Cautionary Obligations and Representations as to Credit”, in The Law of 
Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia vol 3 (1994) para 801. 
125 Gloag and Irvine, Law of Rights in Security 644. 
126 Ibid at 643.  
127 E.g. Smith v Bank of Scotland 1997 SC (HL) 111; Forsyth v The Royal Bank of Scotland Plc 
[2000] SLT 1295; Broadway v Clydesdale Bank Plc 2003 SLT 707; Ahmed v Clydesdale Bank Plc 
2001 SLT 423; Wright v Cotias Investments Inc 2001 SLT 353; Clydesdale Bank Plc v Black 2002 SC 
555; Thomson (Laura) v The Royal Bank of Scotland Plc 2003 SCLR 964; Royal Bank of Scotland Plc 
v Wilson 2004 SC 153; Cooper v Bank of Scotland Plc [2014] CSOH 16 2014; This may be usefully 
compared with English law, where a similar concept applies to all non-commercial case in relation to 
a personal guarantee, including the relationship between employers and employees. For further 





also in a commercial one.128 For example, an insurance company and a contractor 
jointly gave a bond to pay a fixed sum of money on default by a contractor to a 
district council. 129 A partner in a business provided a personal bond as a guarantee in 
favour of the other partner.130 A more recent example of cautionary obligation used 
in a commercial context can be found in South Lanarkshire Council v Coface SA.131 
Here, a French financial institution granted a performance guarantee bond132 to a 
Scottish council to guarantee the performance of a Scottish company’s obligation to 
the council.133 
 
Moreover, there are also a number of cases in which the courts used the terms 
“caution” and “guarantee” interchangeably. For instance, in Wallace and Gibson134, 
the court stated that whether the letters given by the defender “…undertook to give 
him a guaranty to that effect if and when required to do so… [it] is, in the sense of 
Scottish law, a "cautionary obligation"”. 135  In Aitken's Trustees v Bank of 
Scotland136, it was stated that “[a] cautioner entered into a guarantee.”137 Similarly, 
commentators do not differentiate the usages of the terms “guarantee” and 
                                                 
128 See also Royal Bank of Scotland v O'Donnell [2014] CSIH 84. 
129 City of Glasgow District Council v Excess Insurance Co Ltd 1986 SLT 585. 
130 Hewit v Williamson 1999 SLT 313. 
131 [2016] CSIH 15.   
132 A performance bond may be similar or dissimilar from a cautionary obligation, depending on its 
nature. In Glasgow District Council v Excess Insurance (1986 SLT 585), the defender, an insurance 
company, provided the pursuer, a district council, with a performance bond that contained the 
following terms: “We are held and firmly bound for the payment...” The court was asked to determine 
if the bond was insurance or cautionary. The pursuer argued that the bond was an indemnity or 
insurance and a twenty-year prescription applied. However, the defender argued that the obligation 
was cautionary by nature and subject to a five-year prescriptive period. It was held that the bond was a 
cautionary obligation; In contrast, in the English case of Cargill International SA v Bangladesh Sugar 
& Food Industries Corp ([1998] 1 WLR 461), the plaintiffs and the defendant entered into a sale, in 
which the plaintiffs as sellers were required to provide the defendant with a performance bond issued 
on their behalf. It was held that such a bond is not a guarantee in the sense of surety. 
133 The main points disputed by the parties were the proper construction of the bond and the notice of 
the bond’s compliance with its terms. While these are not directly relevant to the discussion here, what 
is relevant is that the nature of the bond is the same as that of a cautionary obligation. 
134 [1895] AC 354. 
135 Ibid at 362 per Lord Herschell LC. 
136 [1944] SC 270. 





“caution”.138  Accordingly, it is suggested that today there is no clear distinction 
between the terms “guarantee” and “caution”.139  
 
To conclude, the distinction between cautionary obligation and guarantee might have 
once existed. However, the distinction was not particularly obvious. Today caution is 
used in both personal and commercial contexts, and the terms “caution” and 
“guarantee” appear to be used, both by courts and academics, correspondingly. This 
illustrates that the practical usage of cautionary obligation is getting broader since it 
applies to both personal and commercial contexts. Consequently, in this thesis the 
concept of a personal guarantee is regarded as being similar to the concept of 
cautionary obligation. Therefore, case law in relation to personal guarantee will be 
deemed to be a cautionary obligation. The fact that a guarantee is used 
interchangeably with a caution also supports the argument presented later in this 
section, namely, that the legal characteristics of a cautionary obligation are unilateral. 
This is based on the notion, in general, that a guarantee is promissory in nature.140 
This is seen from the cases of product or service guarantees (discussed earlier) as 
well as collateral warranties (to be discussed later). 
  
(iii) Legal characteristics 
 
In a modern context in Scots law, a cautionary obligation is often referred to as a 
contract between a creditor and a cautioner.141 In the well-known case of Smith v 
                                                 
138 E.g. McClelland, Cautionary Obligations para 10.03; D M Walker, Principles of Scottish Private 
Law, 4th edn (1988), vol 2 at 417; Gloag and Irvine, Law of Rights in Security 642. 
139 Gloag and Irvine, Law of Rights in Security 643-644. 
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obligation, the seller’s solicitor guarantees that no problem will arise from the transaction during the 
gap period. (G Gretton and K Reid, Conveyancing, 4th edn (2011)173). This therefore supports the 
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Bank of Scotland142, the court referred to a cautionary obligation as a contract: “the 
element of good faith which is required of the creditor on the constitution of a 
contract of cautionary…”143 In Joint Liquidators of Simclar (Ayrshire) Ltd v Simclar 
Group Ltd144, the court explained that the obligation between the parties was not a 
cautionary obligation and there was no contract between the parties “which 
determined that one party’s obligation was primary and the other secondary.”145 
Also, the term “contracts of caution” is used by legal writers.146 
 
Nevertheless, literature and previous case law suggest that a cautionary obligation 
can arise either from an offer or a unilateral undertaking.  First, the obligation of a 
cautionary obligation arises from circumstances where a cautioner made an offer to 
guarantee a debt for a debtor to a specific creditor.147  An express acceptance is 
therefore required.148 Second, the obligation of caution may simply arise from a 
promise “to pay if the debtor fails.”149 For example, it may arise from circumstances 
where a cautioner makes an undertaking to guarantee a debt to a principal debtor 
without specifying whom the caution is provided for.150 In this sense, a cautionary 
obligation is unilateral in nature, given that it does not need mutual agreement 
between the cautioner and the creditor. Also, a cautionary obligation may be a 
unilateral obligation if it is stated by the cautioner that an express acceptance is not 
required.151 The approach that a cautionary obligation can arise from a promise can 
be found in a number of cases. For instance, in Donald Sinclair v Robert Sinclair152, 
the court analysed a cautionary obligation using a promissory analysis.153 Moreover, 
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in Wallace v Gibson154, the court explained that the letter written by the respondent 
offering a guarantee to the appellants amounted to a conditional offer of caution. 
However, the offer became binding as a guarantee prior to the acceptance of the 
creditor.155 
 
Furthermore, legal scholars frequently use terminology associated with promise 
when dealing with cautionary obligations. In Law of Rights in Security,156 it is stated 
that “the person who gives the promise is the cautioner, surety, or guarantor; the 
person to whom the promise is given is the creditor: and the person whose liability is 
the foundation of the contract is the principal debtor.”157 In Commercial Law in 
Scotland158, it is stated that “the cautioner promises the creditor that, if the principal 
debtor fails to pay a certain sum or fulfil a certain obligation (the principal debt), 
then he (the cautioner) will pay or fulfil.”159 Additionally, some scholars propose that 
some of the cautionary obligations can be regarded as gratuitous unilateral 
obligations under the Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995.160 Given that in 
Scots law caution can be viewed as either promissory or contractual in nature, a 
cautionary obligation should therefore not be exclusively defined as a kind of 
specific contract. 
 
The discussion above illustrates that a cautionary obligation can be considered either 
as a unilateral undertaking or an offer. This depends on the factual circumstances of 
each case. It is further helpful to make a reference to personal guarantees under the 
DCFR, where personal guarantees can also arise either by a unilateral undertaking or 
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by a contract.161 Nonetheless, the rule under the DCFR suggests that a guarantee is 
unilateral in nature. This is because, even where a personal guarantee arises through 
an offer, the offer becomes effective once it reaches the creditor, regardless of the 
acceptance (unless it is expressly stated otherwise).162 This suggests that in fact the 
offer of a guarantee can be regarded as unilateral undertaking, given that it is 
generally binding without acceptance. This approach can be applied to personal 
guarantees, in a general sense, in Scots law too.163 In many circumstances caution is 
meant to be binding without any acceptance of the creditor. For instance, where a 
lender requires a borrower to provide a personal guarantee, the lender may advise 
that the guarantor could be the borrower’s spouse/partner. The borrower and his/her 
partner then agree with each other that the partner will become a cautioner. Then the 
partner’s expression is sent to the lender. There would be no need on the part of the 
lender to accept such an offer as naturally the lender must be willing to accept it. 
Promises can also apply to circumstances where a creditor does not know who will 
become a cautioner and will need to approve that first. As a promise is a unilateral 
obligation which only binds the promisor, the creditor is not bound by the promise. If 
he/she does not approve a prospective cautioner, he/she can simply reject or not 
enforce the promise. 
 
In short, the way in which a cautionary obligation is created, both theoretically and 
practically, is unilateral in nature in certain contexts. This is because the parties in 
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(b) Thai law 
 
Suretyship is defined as “a contract whereby a third person, called the surety, binds 
himself to a creditor to satisfy an obligation in the event that the debtor fails to 
perform it”.164 A surety must be a third party.165 
 
Thai courts and Thai commentators further explain the essential characteristics of 
suretyship. Firstly, there must be a valid principal obligation between the parties.166 
Secondly, a surety binds him/herself to perform the obligation in the event that the 
debtor fails to perform it.167 Therefore, if a third person merely assures that a debtor 
has the ability to perform his/her obligation, this is not regarded as a suretyship.168 
Finally, as surety is a contract between the surety and the creditor, the debtor’s 
consent to the suretyship is not required.169 
 
Suretyship in Thai law shows some similarities to cautionary obligations in Scots 
law. A cautioner and a surety assure the creditor of the principal obligation that the 
debtor will perform his/her obligations. If the debtor does not perform his/her 
obligation, such performance will be fulfilled by the cautioner/surety. The difference, 
however, is that under Thai law the equivalent concept of improper caution cannot 
exist. Under Thai law a surety must be neither the creditor nor the debtor. Hence, a 
surety cannot appear as a co-obligant even if one of themselves is bound as a surety 
for the debt of the principal obligant.  
 
Unlike Scots law, an alternative approach of analysing cautionary obligations using 
promissory doctrine does not exist among Thai legal academics. This stems from the 
fact that under Thai law promise is not a free-standing ground of liability. However, 
if Thai law considers unilateral promise as a standalone obligation, the idea of 
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promise may be an alternative analysis of suretyship. A promissory analysis of 
suretyship can be useful for the concept of surety under Thai law. Firstly, in some 
circumstances, an obligation of suretyship arises from an agreement between the 
debtor and the surety. The debtor and the surety agree that the latter will act as surety 
before informing the creditor. Thus, the creditor is merely the recipient of the 
undertaking made by the surety. This is particularly relevant when a surety and a 
debtor are from the same family. In the case of bank loans, it is common for the bank 
to require the personal guarantors to be members of the same family as the debtor. 
For example, the Kasikornbank, a Thai commercial bank, offers a type of loan called 
“K-Klean Credit”. In relation to the requirement of a loan guarantor, who is a natural 
person, the “guarantors must have a direct relationship with the borrower, such as 
parents, spouse or children”.170 This means that, in reality, the debtor and the surety 
must agree with each other before the creditor applies for the loan. In this case, it 
would be more appropriate to treat surety as a unilateral obligation because of its 
unilateral characteristic. 
 
Moreover, the creditor, who is viewed as a promisee, is placed in a better position 
than if he/she is regarded as an offeree. This is because under a promissory analysis 
the obligation of surety is binding upon the communication to the promisee 
irrespective of acceptance. Consider the following example. A asks B to act as his 
surety for the existing debts that he owes to C. B agrees to do so. After sending the 
intention to become a surety to C, B subsequently withdraws his offer. This would 
mean that if a surety is constituted as a contractual obligation, there has been no 
concluded contract between B and C, on the basis that B withdraws it before C has 
accepted. By contrast, under a promissory analysis, B’s proposal would become 
binding once his expression has been communicated to B (according to the theory 




                                                 








In Scots law cautionary obligations can be formed either by way of an offer or a 
promise. It depends on the intentions of the parties whether they wish the obligation 
to be binding without acceptance or not. Consequently, the legal characteristics of 
this kind of obligation should not be restricted to being contractual in nature.  
 
As for Thai law, a promissory analysis is helpful to conceptualise the notion of 
suretyship because a suretyship does not require the acceptance of the creditor in 
some circumstances, for example, where a surety is required by a Thai bank to have a 
direct relationship with the borrower. Hence, it should be regarded as unilateral 
obligation. This helps to explain the actual legal nature of the obligation. Moreover, 
once a suretyship/caution has been created, it cannot generally be revoked thereafter. 
A creditor, who is viewed as a promisee, is therefore placed in a better position than 
if he/she is regarded as an offeree.  
 
(3) Collateral warranties 
 
(a) Scots law 
 
(i) General concept of collateral warranties 
 
Collateral warranties, sometimes known as “a duty of care deed”,171  are documents 
furnished by a contractor, subcontractor, professional consultant or construction team 
as a guarantee of construction work.172 In both English and Scots law of tort/delict, 
there are limitations on the remedies available to a subsequent purchaser of the 
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building for defects arising from the initial construction process.173 This has led to 
the use of collateral warranties. These warranties create a duty of care with respect to 
defects that arise out of negligence, where the construction team or contractor can be 
held liable. 174  As observed by Lord Drummond Young, the use of collateral 
warranties has been more common “following the decision of the House of Lords”175 
in Murphy v Brentwood DC.176 Here, it was held that a contractor had no liability in 
tort for the failure to comply with the building regulations.177 Today in the United 
Kingdom, it is “quite rare to see a construction project which does not require the 
design team to provide them [collateral warranties]”.178  
 
Without collateral warranties, it would be very difficult for a buyer to claim his/her 
loss. From a contractual perspective, an aggrieved party can make a claim through a 
contractual chain of liability if a contractual obligation exists. However, generally a 
contractual obligation does not exist. Hence, normally an aggrieved party would be 
able to claim his/her loss only if he/she has been granted a third party right.179 As for 
a direct claim in tort, such a claim against the architect or the contractor is unlikely to 
succeed.180  
 
(ii) Legal nature and legal effects  
 
Collateral warranties create “a right of action between parties who, under the 
standard legal structures used in construction contracts, would not otherwise be in 
any contractual relationship.” 181  In 2010, the Scottish courts analysed the legal 
effects of collateral warranties. In Scottish Widows Services Ltd v Kershaw 
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Mechanical Services Ltd (henceforth: Scottish Widows),182 the Outer House heard 
legal arguments centred on the effectiveness of collateral warranties assigned to a 
sub-tenant. The court was asked to decide whether or not the collateral warranty 
issued by the granters was legally enforceable. The court decided that the party who 
originally provided the collateral warranty was legally bound to the obligations.  
 
The purpose of a collateral warranty is “to ensure that the party who suffers loss has 
a right of action against any contractor or member of the professional team who has 
provided defective work.”183 Specifically, the fundamental purpose of a collateral 
warranty is to “provide a right of action to a person who is liable to suffer loss as a 
result of defective performance of a building contract or a contract for professional 
services in connection with a building project.”184 Collateral warranties are legally 
binding because 
“there is no reason that any person who becomes liable for the cost of 
repairing a defect in a building should not be entitled to sue for the cost 
provided that he is the beneficiary of a collateral warranty granted by the 
person responsible for the defect.”185 
 
Collateral warranties as a contract 
 
The Scottish courts have analysed collateral warranties using a contractual analysis. 
In the Scottish Widows case, the court explained that a collateral warranty constitutes 
a separate contract between the person who gives the warranty and the beneficiary. 
By providing a collateral warranty, 
“the granter undertakes that it will perform specified works to a standard of 
competent workmanship (in the case of a contractor), or will provide 
specified services and observe proper professional standards of skill and care 
(in the case of an architect or engineer).”186 
 
If the party who provides a collateral warranty fails to perform its duties to the 
required standard, “the grantee can raise an action to compel such performance; that 
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applies in any case where an action of specific implement is competent.” 187 
Alternatively, “if the grantee suffers financial loss as a result of the defective 
performance, it may raise proceedings against the granter in order to recover the 
amount of that loss.”188 In such a case, “the primary loss resulting from defective 
performance is a physical defect in the building.”189 Both in Royal Bank of Scotland 
v Halcrow Waterman Ltd190 and Friends Provident Life Assurance Ltd v Sir Robert 
McAlpine Ltd191, the courts referred to a collateral warranty as a “collateral warranty 
agreement” 192, suggesting that it is contractual in nature. Most recently, in Kier 
Construction Ltd v WM Saunders Partnership LLP193, the court, again, applied a 
contractual analysis to collateral warranty. The fact in this case is that Dumfries & 
Galloway Council appointed the pursuer as the principal contractor for its 
construction project. The pursuer undertook to provide a collateral warranty in 
favour of the Council from all the design consultants and sub-contractors it employed 
for the construction. The pursuer and the defender, who was employed as a 
consultant, signed an appointment contract dated 31 October and 1 November 2006. 
Under the appointment contract, the defender undertook, inter alia, to provide “a 
signed collateral warranty in favour of the Council within 14 days of a formal 
request”194  from the pursuer. However, the pursuer did not make such a formal 
request until early 2015. The court was tasked with assessing whether the pursuer 
and the defender had reached an agreement in March 2015, when there had been a 
series of written exchanges between them related to the defender’s obligation to 
provide the said collateral warranty. 
 
Collateral warranties as a promise 
 
Scottish scholars argue that the term “warranty” is not exclusively used in the context 
of a contractual obligation. For example, Hogg suggests that a warranty, in a broad 
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sense, can be characterised as a unilateral promise.195 He states: “[t]he fact that some 
collateral undertakings have been analysed as contractual in nature … does not entail 
that all collateral undertakings must be contractual in nature.”196  Hogg’s view is 
supported by Christie, who argues that a warranty need not necessarily be a term of 
contract. 197  Although these commentators do not directly argue that a collateral 
warranty in construction is a unilateral obligation, their explanations suggest that a 
warranty in Scots law can be viewed as being either contractual or promissory in 
nature. Therefore, it is possible to treat a collateral warranty in construction as a 
unilateral promise, especially since the nature of a collateral warranty is compatible 
with that of a unilateral promise.  By providing a collateral warranty, the grantor of a 
collateral warranty promises the beneficiary that he/she will provide repairs in the 
case of a defect during construction. A Scottish practitioner explicitly suggests that 
collateral warranties have the same characteristics as unilateral obligations.198  This 
is because “[collateral] warranties need not require the beneficiary to make reciprocal 
obligations to the contractor or consultant.”199 Similarly, in response to the English 
court’s decision that a collateral warranty is a construction contract in its own right, 
as to be fully discussed below, an English practitioner argues that a beneficiary of a 
collateral warranty “is simply the recipient of a unilateral undertaking, collateral (the 
clue’s in the name) to the primary contract…”200 This is compatible with the notion 
of a unilateral obligation in Scots law. 
 
Moreover, by using a promissory analysis, a contractor cannot deny a party the right 
to bring a claim of loss for defects where there is an entitlement under a collateral 
warranty. The obligation of a collateral warranty takes effect once a grantor provides 
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a collateral warranty to the grantee. Acceptance by the other party is not necessary. 
In Kier Construction Ltd v WM Saunders Partnership LLP earlier mentioned, if the 
court had applied a promissory analysis to the case, it would not have been necessary 
for it to consider whether the letters exchanged between the parties in March 2015 
amounted to an offer and an acceptance. The court could have simply regarded the 
defender’s undertaking to produce a signed collateral warranty in favour of the 
Council in the appointment contract in 2006 as a unilateral obligation to provide a 
collateral warranty. 
 
Again, adopting a promissory approach would represent an improved framework for 
case analysis. Additionally, a court will not have any difficulty establishing the 
existence of an obligation because all collateral warranties are made in the course of 
business. Thus, a written document is not required.201 
 
Furthermore, another benefit of considering collateral warranties as unilateral 
obligations may be observed by making reference to an English case where the 
English courts held that a collateral warranty amounted to a construction contract 
under the Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act 1996 (the HGCRA 
Act). In Parkwood Leisure Ltd v Laing O'Rourke Wales and West Ltd202, although 
the court observed that not all collateral warranties would automatically fall within 
the scope of the HGCRA Act, it was held that the collateral warranty in this case was 
a construction contract in its own right. The HGCRA Act defines a construction 
contract as “an agreement with a person for any of the following— (a) the carrying 
out of construction operations…”203 The document of collateral warranty between 
the parties stated that the party giving the warranty “warrants, acknowledges and 
undertakes that… it has carried out and shall carry out and complete the Works in 
accordance with the Contract…”204 The court reasoned that in interpreting whether 
or not a collateral warranty in this case was a contract, “ordinary contractual 
                                                 
201 Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995, ss 1(2)(a)(ii), 2(1). 
202 [2013] EWHC 2665 (TCC). 
203 Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act 1996, s 104. 





interpretation principles”205 must be used for such interpretation. The court explained 
that the terms “warrants, acknowledges and undertakes” were understood by the 
parties in three different ways. The court explained that “[a]n undertaking often 
involves an obligation to do something.”206 Hence, it fell within the scope of the 
definition of a construction contract under the HGCRA Act. 
 
The foregoing decision has attracted a number of critics, especially among those who 
are practitioners. For example, critics claim that, as the court’s decision suggests that 
the beneficiary of a collateral warranty is not excluded from adjudicating disputes 
with the contractor, it would cause an increase in the tendency for the grantee of a 
collateral warranty to seek damages by using this claim.207 This is not the kind of 
approach that the grantor of a collateral warranty would desire.208 In addition, the 
decision gives rise to unwelcome uncertainties.209 It does not provide a settlement for 
construction disputes. Nor does it benefit construction procurement.210 Moreover, it 
has been argued that the court’s decision is not correct because it does not reflect the 
actual purpose of a collateral warranty. It was doubtful, and indeed arguable, why a 
beneficiary of a collateral warranty, who has no control or power over the 
instructions of the construction, could be deemed to be a contracting party of a 
construction contract.211 Moreover, it is argued that the payment provisions of the 
HGCRA Act cannot reasonably apply to collateral warranties.212 This is because a 
beneficiary of a collateral warranty does not have an obligation to make a payment, 
“other than perhaps a nominal consideration (in this case £1)”.213  
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The fact that a collateral warranty is held to be a construction contract has caused 
consternation among English practitioners. A promissory analysis of collateral 
warranties in Scots law can be practically useful. This is because it can help to avoid 
a collateral warranty from falling within the scope of a construction contract under 
the HGCRA Act. Had the Parkwood case arisen in Scotland, the Scottish courts 
could apply the unilateral approach to the collateral warranty. This would exclude a 
warranty from being a construction contract under the HGCRA Act, simply because 
a warranty is not a contract but a promise. The outcome would suit the actual 
purpose of a collateral warranty. 
 
(b) Thai law 
 
There appears to be no evidence of the use of collateral warranties214  in Thailand.215 
Instead, in construction it is more common to have insurance which covers damages 
occurring from the construction. For instance, the Viriya Insurance offers a 
“Contractor’s All-risk Insurance Plan” for contractors or owners of construction 
projects.216 The insurance covers “liabilities of contracted work, such as construction 
work, civil engineering work, and machinery installation work… and legal liabilities 
                                                 
214 It is worth noting that Thailand has now introduced the Business Collateral Act 2015 (B.E. 2558), 
which came into force in November 2015. The Business Collateral Act 2015 contains a new type of 
contract called “a collateral contract”. However, this is different from the collateral warranties used in 
construction projects, which are discussed in this chapter. According to the Business Collateral Act 
2015, a business collateral contract is “a contract whereby one party, “a security provider”, grants a 
security over property to another party, “a security receiver”, in order to guarantee the performance of 
an obligation without the need to deliver the property to the security receiver.” Business Collateral Act 
2015, §5 para 1 (Author’s translation). 
215 In October 2012, Lyne Andrews, Senior Associate at Herbert Smith Freehills (Thailand) Ltd 
observed that “[u]nlike HKG [Hong Kong] and the UK where collateral warranties are popular I have 
yet to come across them in Thailand. This is surprising as I have advised some of the largest, privately 
listed developers, in Thailand.” Personal email from L Andrews (Lyle.Andrews@hsf.com) to author 9 
October 2012; Meanwhile, Ratinan Choochaimangkhala, Associate (Foreign Law), WongPartnership 
(Singapore) and former Junior Associate, Baker & McKenzie Ltd (Thailand) also observed in an 
email dated May 2016 (ratinan.choochaimangkhala@wongpartnership.com) that collateral warranties 
have not been used in Thailand. Personal email from R Choochaimangkhala 
(ratinan.choochaimangkhala@wongpartnership.com) to author 21 May 2016; Neither are collateral 
warranties mentioned in leading textbooks on surety (e.g. S Visruthpich (n 166).  






to a third party as a result of the contracted work.”217 Thai law considers insurance as 
a contract.218  
 
The fact that collateral warranty is not used in Thailand perhaps stems from the fact 
that, under Thai law of delict, an aggrieved party is not prohibited from claiming 
damages for pure economic loss. In other words, the insurer will compensate any 
losses that are caused, including pure economic losses, to the insured construction, as 
long as they fall within the scope of the terms of the construction insurance. This is 
different from the situation in the United Kingdom where it was established that the 
recovery of damages through pure economic loss was not permitted,219 which led to 
the use of collateral warranties, as already noted. 
 
Nonetheless Thai insurers usually exclude their liabilities in certain circumstances. 
For instance, Muang Thai Insurance excludes liabilities on its construction 
insurances in a number of circumstances. Examples of these exclusions include loss 
or damage due to: 
“[f]aulty or defective design materials or workmanship inherent vice latent 
defect gradual deterioration deformation or distortion or wear and tear; 
[i]nterruption of the water supply gas electricity or fuel systems or failure of 
the effluent disposal systems to and from the premises; and [c]ollapse or 
cracking of buildings…”220  
 
This suggests that it is likely to be less difficult to claim remedies from a collateral 
warranty than from construction insurance.221 Therefore, it may be possible that the 
use of collateral warranties will be introduced to construction projects in Thailand, 
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especially those involving international construction teams, contractors, or buyers. 
For instance, Mayer Brown JSM, an international law firm with a branch in 
Bangkok, states on its advertisement regarding “Real Estate and Construction in 
Thailand” that it offers “to advise companies on all construction and pre-construction 
matters … assist in the preparation of ancillary project documentation such as bonds, 
collateral warranties and guarantees…” 222  Therefore, if the concept of collateral 
warranties is adopted in Thailand, a promissory analysis could be helpful in 
conceptualising this transaction. As indicated in the discussion of Scots law, the 
nature of this transaction is more compatible with a unilateral obligation, and the 




Collateral warranties have benefited persons involved with construction projects in 
the United Kingdom. They create legal duties which would not otherwise exist 
between the relevant parties. Although the Scottish courts have characterised their 
legal status as contracts, they can also be viewed as promissory in nature. This thesis 
argues that their characteristics suit unilateral promises. Again, a promissory analysis 
improves the capacity to evaluate cases as well as providing more protection to the 
beneficiaries. 
 
The author has been unable to find evidence of the usage of collateral warranty in 
Thailand.  A constructor/builder/contractor commonly takes out insurance to cover 
damage which would arise from the construction. This is likely to be because Thai 
law does not prohibit an insured from claiming damages for pure economic loss. 
Nonetheless, it is possible that collateral warranties may be used in Thailand as an 
alternative way to claim remedies arising from losses incurred in construction 
projects, apart from insurance. The use of collateral warranties in Scotland provides 
an illustration that unilateral obligations can be useful in a commercial transaction. 
                                                 








Thus, if Thai law were to develop an independent idea of promise, a promissory 
analysis could be applied to similar commercial situations. 
 
E. USING PROMISES TO ALTER/WAIVE OBLIGATIONS 
 
(1) Promises to waive contractual right 
 
(a) Scots law 
 
Hogg suggests that where a creditor undertakes to a debtor that he/she would not 
enforce an obligation, or not do so for a specific time, this undertaking could be 
classified as a unilateral binding declaration.223 According to the binding nature of 
promises, the creditor’s proposal constitutes a unilateral obligation, taking effect 
once it is made, not requiring acceptance by the debtor. 
 
In comparison with the waiver of contract approach, the debtor (in a promissory 
approach) benefits more than the creditor because his/her acceptance is not required. 
Thus, the creditor is not able to change his/her mind once he/she makes a promise. 
By contrast, under a contractual approach, the creditor’s offer can be withdrawn any 
time before the debtor accepts it. 
 
It is worth referring to the doctrine of waiver, which may apply in the case of a 
proposal to waive contractual rights if the requirements of waiver are satisfied. In 
this case, a creditor’s proposal to waive contractual rights would not be regarded as a 
type of voluntary obligation, but rather a unilateral declaratory act.224 In the case of 
express waiver, there is no requirement of reliance by the party benefiting from the 
waiver (namely, the debtor in the issue under discussion).225 Neither is the conduct of 
affairs on the basis of waiver required.226 However, in the case of implied waiver, 
case law suggests that the party benefiting from waiver is required to have conducted 
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affairs on the basis of waiver.227 This leads to the question of why the requirement of 
implied waiver should be different from that of express waiver.228 This then advances 
the idea that promise can be helpful in characterising a creditor’s proposal to waive 
contractual rights because the action of the debtor (the promisee) would not be 
required under a promissory analysis. 
 
(b) Thai law 
 
A promise to waive contractual rights is viewed as a promise to make a gift. Under 
Thai law, a creditor’s undertaking to waive a contractual right is deemed by law as a 
gift.229 The law states, “A gift may be made by granting to the donee the release of an 
obligation or by performing an obligation due from the donee.”230  
 
The law requires promises of a gift to be made in writing and to be registered by the 
competent official, otherwise they are unenforceable. This rule applies to all 
circumstances of promises of a gift, including a promise to waive a contractual 
right.231 However, as discussed, this principle is impractical and inefficient.232  In 
practice it is less likely that the parties who wish to make a promise of a gift would 
make such promises in writing and register it with the relevant official. Amendments 




The approaches that Scots and Thai law take when dealing with a creditor’s proposal 
not to enforce the debtor’s obligation are different. In Scots law, it can be analysed 
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using either a contractual or a unilateral promissory approach. A promissory 
approach enhances case analysis and is more advantageous to the debtor.  
 
Under Thai law this juristic act is deemed to be a promise to make a gift, which 
requires to be made in writing and to be registered. However, this rule has almost 
never been applied in reality. As will be proposed in the Conclusion Chapter, this 
thesis suggests that under Thai law a gratuitous promise of a gift is unenforceable by 
an action unless there is some written evidence signed by the promisor. 233  This 
proposed approach would be more efficient than the current approach because it 
would suit the actual practice of parties. 
 
 G. CONCLUSIONS 
 
(1) Promises in commercial practice 
 
As illustrated in earlier sections, a number of commercial transactions can be 
characterised as promises. This may contrast with what most people think. Non-
lawyers perhaps tend to think that it is not common for business people to promise 
anything gratuitously. This, however, is not necessarily true. Business transactions 
are often structured using a number of connected contracts or obligations. While one 
obligation looks gratuitous when it is considered in isolation, when it is placed in its 
context within the transaction as a whole it is not gratuitous. This suggests that a 
unilateral promise is not always gratuitous, which is compatible with what this thesis 
has argued in Chapter V. 
 
Moreover, it can be observed from the Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995 
that there is no requirement for promises undertaken in the course of business to be 
in writing. 234  This suggests that it is not unusual for business people to make 
promises, and for their promises to have legal consequences. This is why the law 
does not require their promises to be made in writing. Also, the Scottish Law 
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Commission235  and Scots legal scholars 236  suggest that the doctrine of unilateral 
promise should be applied to business transactions. Additionally, promises can be 
seen to be commonly used in commercial practice in a number of cases in which the 
Scottish courts have enforced promises made in the course of business. 237  
 
Furthermore, business people often develop new ways of working for which there 
was no specific legal analysis dealing with them before. The legal analysis has to be 
created afterwards to help explain the practice. For instance, when letters of credit 
were developed by bankers and merchants to use in international trade, the law had 
to develop a new legal theory to deal with them by treating them as an independent 
transactions from the underlying contract. Examples of letters of credit support the 
useful function of the doctrine of promise in Scots law. While other jurisdictions 
have found it difficult to deal with the legal characteristic of letters of credit because 
the law of contract could not properly address the legal relationship between the bank 
and the beneficiary, Scots law could simply characterise this kind of relationship 
using a promissory analysis. The Scots promissory approach of letters of credit is 
also compatible with the approach of the independence of letters of credit adopted by 
other jurisdictions and legal models.  Likewise, collateral warranties were created in 
order to establish legal relationships between parties which would not otherwise 
exist. Then they can be characterised, according to the preferred approach in this 
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(2) Practical advantages of unilateral promise in Scots law 
 
The study in this chapter shows that unilateral promise is a very useful concept, 
playing an essential role in practice. This is particularly the case in legal business, 
notably in Scotland. There are four main kinds of practical situations that can be 
characterised as promissory obligations, as summarised below. 
Firstly, there are certain commercial situations in which the doctrine of promise is 
the most appropriate approach because their characteristics are outside the scope of a 
bilateral analysis.  Obvious examples are offers specifying a period of acceptance 
and invitations to tender containing a condition that the invitor will accept the highest 
bid. They cannot be binding under a contractual analysis because there is no 
contractual obligation yet between the parties. Under a promissory analysis, an 
offeror and an invitor of tenders are bound to keep his/her offer open for a specified 
period and to accept the highest bid, respectively. Also, in the case of letters of 
credit, although it may be possible to regard them as contracts, it has been argued in 
this thesis that they are unilateral in nature. This is on the basis that the bank cannot 
refuse the acceptance of the beneficiary, i.e. a letter of credit is binding prior to 
acceptance. 
Secondly, there are situations in which there appears to be no certain way of 
characterising the obligations. However, most authorities are of the view that they 
are promissory in nature. These transactions are options to purchase property at some 
point in the future, product or service guarantees, and advertisements of rewards. In 
the case of reward Scottish academics suggest that it should be analysed using a 
unilateral approach, whereas the Scottish courts tend to apply a contractual analysis. 
Nevertheless, it has been argued in this thesis that the promissory obligation 
facilitates case analysis to a greater extent. This is essentially because a promise is a 
unilateral obligation which is binding without acceptance. A promissory analysis 
therefore avoids any complexity that may arise from an analysis at the acceptance 
stage. By the same token, a greater level of protection is provided to the grantees of 





guarantee related to a product or service than the acceptance requirement found in a 
contractual analysis. 
 
Thirdly, the legal natures of some transactions are debatable. However, it is more 
common for them to be characterised as contracts. Examples include cautionary 
obligations, collateral warranties, and a creditor’s proposal to alter/waive contractual 
rights. Nevertheless, the study in this thesis shows that these transactions can also be 
created either by an offer or a unilateral undertaking. This makes two important 
points. First, the unilateral approach of promise can be an alternative approach other 
than contract in characterising them. Second, the main advantage of viewing these 
transactions as promises is that it provides better protection to a promisee. Moreover, 
the fact that promise is a unilateral obligation means that the promisee naturally has 
no duty to perform an obligation. Therefore, in the case of cautionary obligations, a 
creditor, who is viewed as the promisee, will not be have a heavy duty to act in good 
faith. In the case of collateral warranties, a promissory analysis would make a 
collateral warranty fall outwith the scope of construction contracts under the 
HGCRA Act. This outcome suits the purpose of the collateral warranty. 
 
Fourthly, there appears to be no clear approach towards characterising some 
transactions. Examples are marketing offers, prize competitions and IOUs. A 
promissory analysis is helpful in the case of marketing offers, such as a promise to 
guarantee the best price. This is because it clearly explains how the obligation is 
binding on the part of the person making the offer. A contractual analysis cannot 
explain how a contract is concluded if an offeror can provide the best price for the 
customer, since there would be no contract in this case. In the case of prize 
competitions, a promissory analysis is helpful because it provides a just result to both 
parties. The promisor in prize competitions will not be able to alter or change the 
condition of a promise once the contestant has entered the contest or has been chosen 
as the winner, whereas an offeror under a contractual analysis can still do so. As for 
IOUs, the Scottish courts hold that they are grounds for an action in their own right, 
but does not explain their juristic nature. The fact that an IOU is an 





the money to the grantee and is willing to repay it. Due to the nature of the 
relationship between the grantor and the grantee of an IOU, the latter will generally 
want his/her money back and therefore the need for an acceptance of the IOU would 
appear superfluous. This shows that IOUs are well suited to being unilateral in 
nature.  Nevertheless, although IOUs can be viewed as unilaterally binding 
undertakings, it is argued in this thesis that they are not unilateral promises on the 
grounds that they do not relate to future affairs. As a result, it is proposed in this 
thesis that IOUs should be regarded as an independent right, which shares some of 
the characteristics of promise but also has special features.  
 
Moreover, the study in this thesis has shown that promise allows unilateral 
undertakings to be legally enforceable without going through the artificial process of 
establishing a contract. An obvious example is the case of a tendering process which 
can be simply analysed as a binding promise in Scots law. This is particularly 
obvious when compared with the equivalent English concept. Although the English 
unilateral contractual analysis provides the same result, the English analysis is overly 
complex. In fact, there are flaws in analysing the tendering process as a unilateral 
contract because the nature of the transaction is not contractual. Also, the unilateral 
analysis helps to clarify the actual nature of letters of credit which are controversial 
in the Common Law jurisdictions. These examples reflect the fact that the concept of 
promise is a useful legal tool. It enables the courts to be flexible when dealing with 
an undertaking which a contractual analysis cannot appropriately deal with. 
 
Furthermore, the fact that a promise does not require an acceptance means that it 
cannot be revoked once it becomes effective. Thus, where revocation is at issue, a 
promisee in a promissory analysis is generally better protected in comparison with an 
offeree in a contractual one. This is particularly helpful for transactions related to 
consumers, in which the law provides more protection to customers than to 
businesses. Also, the courts can especially benefit from a promissory analysis when 







(3) Practical advantages of unilateral promise in Thai law 
 
Not only in its theoretical analysis could Thai law learn from Scots law, but there are 
also practical applications of promise in Scots law which could benefit practical 
usages and commercial practice in Thailand.  
 
Firstly, although the unilateral obligation is not a free standing legal entity under 
Thai law, the legal characteristics of some transactions are genuine unilateral 
obligations already. They are obligations which are binding without acceptance. An 
example is the advertisement of reward in which a promisee who can claim the 
reward does not need to know about its existence. Also, prize competitions are 
viewed as unilateral obligations similar to rewards. Additionally, a promissory 
analysis helps to resolve the legal issues within the contractual framework. This is 
most obvious when considering an offer specifying a period of acceptance. The 
binding nature of promises helps to explain why an offeror is bound to keep his/her 
offer open for a specified period. Also, a promise to lease is not recognised by the 
Code. The Thai courts nevertheless enforce its legal effects. Furthermore, hire 
purchase can be described using the notion of option, i.e. the hirer has an option but 
not an obligation to purchase the property hired. Both a promise to lease and hire 
purchase are unilateral obligations which are binding on the part of the lessor/owner 
of the property prior to the acceptance of the lessee/hirer. These examples show that 
unilateral promise has a substantive role to play in governing certain transactions in 
Thai law already. 
 
Secondly, a promissory analysis could help to characterise some transactions as 
unilateral undertakings. For example, the promissory idea enhances the analysis of 
tenders. Recall that an agreement between the invitor of tenders and the highest 
bidder is regarded as a tender contract. The final contract must be in writing. This 
reflects a gap in Thai law allowing contracting parties to deny liability although a 
tender contract has been concluded. By applying a promissory analysis, an offeror 
calling for bids is bound both to accept the highest bid and to enter into the final 





as a unilateral promise. This would be more practically useful than the current Thai 
approach, which requires a creditor’s proposal to wave a contractual right to be in 
writing and be registered.  
 
Thirdly, there are circumstances in which Thai law has no specific legal principles to 
apply. Although they can be analysed as contracts, these transactions would be 
treated as unilateral obligations if the idea of a promissory obligation were developed 
as a free-standing legal obligation under Thai law. This would include guarantees of 
product/service to non-consumers, marketing offers and suretyship. Like Scots law, a 
promissory approach represents an improved framework for case analysis and the 
promisee is better protected.  
 
Fourthly, the idea of a promise is more convincing than the contractual approach to 
explain the nature of some transactions. For instance, Thai law has no specific 
provision dealing with letters of credit. Thus, they have to be analysed by the Thai 
courts within the contractual framework. However, the characteristics of letters of 
credit do not fit within the scope of contract under Thai law. Although legal writers 
do not refer to a letter of credit as a contract, they fail to provide a satisfactory 
explanation in terms of its actual legal nature. However, if promise were to be 
developed as a standalone obligation, Thai legal commentators would benefit by 
adopting the concept of a promise when explaining the legal nature of this 
commercial transaction. A promissory analysis would explain the juristic nature of 
letters of credit more convincingly than a contractual approach. 
 
Finally, there are practical measures that have never been used in Thailand, such as a 
collateral warranty. Thailand could benefit from this kind of commercial practice. It 
affords better protection to buyers in construction projects than construction 
insurance, particularly if it is viewed as a unilateral obligation. This is because the 








(4) Concluding remarks 
 
The analysis and discussion in this chapter indicate that the doctrine of unilateral 
promise is a highly useful legal doctrine which can be used to conceptualise practical 
circumstances and commercial transactions. The idea of promise can be applied and 
used in several different ways. It governs the pre-contractual stage of an obligation. 
A promise itself confers a unilateral obligation. It has been used as a means of 
enticement. In other circumstances, it can be used to guarantee an obligation which 
already exists. A creditor’s proposal to alter/waive a contractual obligation can also 
be analysed using the notion of promise. These reflect the fact that the doctrine of 
promise is a valuable doctrine which should be preserved (in Scots law), and indeed 






Chapter VIII Conclusion 
 
A. WHAT HAS THIS THESIS DISCOVERED AND CONTRIBUTED? 
 
This comparative analysis of promise in Scots law and Thai law shows that 
recognising the independence of promise from contract would make an important 
contribution to the theoretical structure of the law of obligations. This thesis argues 
that the Scots promissory approach presents a more efficient structure of the law of 
obligations than the Thai approach. It encounters fewer problems than Thai law 
because a promise is deemed to be a standalone obligation. This thesis further 
analyses the practical applications of promise, arguing that a promissory analysis is 
useful in conceptualising practical circumstances. Adopting a promissory approach is 
beneficial, making doctrinal analysis clearer in comparison with the offer and 
acceptance approach. It is concluded that the Scots approach of regarding a promise 
as an independent obligation separate from contract could be adapted to Thai law. 
There are certain resemblances between Scots and Thai law in promissory theories 
and the obligational nature of a promise. Therefore, Thai law is not unfamiliar with 
the notion that a declaration of wills can unilaterally create an obligation. The 
proposed approach provides a number of advantages e.g. eradicating an overlap 
between a promise and an offer; clarifying the legal status of promise; and making 
the legal status of a promise to make a contract compatible with a promise of reward. 
In particular, this thesis postulates that promise has a substantive role to play in 
governing an offer specifying a period of acceptance. This particular observation has, 
to date, not been made in relation to Thai law. What this thesis has discovered and 
contributed can be summarised as follows; 
 
(1) The historical development of promise and the distinction between promise 
and contract 
 
The general legal enforcement of promissory obligations was first recognised by the 
canonists. They took a different path from Roman jurists by enforcing promises as a 





modern legal systems because their promissory account was followed by both the 
late scholastics and leading Natural Law commentators.  
 
Promises and contracts have a complex relationship because they originate from the 
same root. There is a theory, commonly believed amongst Anglo-American contract 
theorists, that a promise is a contract. Nonetheless, it has been argued in this thesis 
that a promise should be treated as being different from a contract based on the 
grounds that the requirements of a promise are different from those of a contract. 
 
Firstly, a promise is a unilateral obligation because it can be created by the will of 
one party, whereas a contract is a bilateral obligation which must be created by two 
wills. Secondly, a promise must relate to a future commitment, whereas a contract 
can be a statement confirming a present state of affairs. Thirdly,  from an historical 
point of view, the canonists made a distinction between unilateral and bilateral 
promises. Likewise, there was a distinction between contracts and promises in the 
late scholastic tradition (which was subject to debate). Also, although they did not 
generally enforce unilateral promises, Roman jurists saw a pollicitatio as a unilateral 
undertaking distinguished from an agreement which is a contract/covenant. As a 
result, this thesis concludes that promise should be regarded as being distinctive from 
contract, particularly in jurisdictions in which the idea that a unilateral declaration of 
will can create a binding obligation exists. Both Scots and Thai law fall within the 
scope of such jurisdictions.    
 
(2) A comparative analysis between the two mixed jurisdictions 
 
It is widely accepted that Scotland is a mixed jurisdiction because the Scottish legal 
system is influenced by both the Civil Law and the Common Law. This thesis argues 
that the legal system of Thailand is mixed because its modern legal system has been 
influenced by both the Civilian and Common Law traditions and traditional Thai law 






(a) The reception of the Civil Law and the Common Law in Scotland and its 
relevance to the law of promise 
 
The reception of Roman law in Scotland did not have a significant impact on the 
historical development of Scots promissory law because the latter was not derived 
from Roman sources. This thesis therefore assesses the connection between the 
reception of Roman law and the development of promissory law from other 
perspectives. Since there is no consensus amongst legal historians regarding the 
century in which Roman law was first received into Scotland, all proposed centuries 
are considered by assessing whether the reception of Roman law in each of them had 
any impact on the course of development of the law of promise.1  
 
Firstly, this thesis points out that Roman law may have had influence on promise in 
the early period of Scots law, namely between the thirteenth and fifteenth century.  
This is based on the assumption that, at that time, Scots law did not appear to enforce 
promises. Therefore, the position of Scots promissory law in that period is similar to 
that of Roman law, where promises were not regarded as a general principle. 
Secondly, the reception of Roman law in Scotland during the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries is observed from the perspective of an attempt to codify Scots 
private law. This thesis concludes that the failure of codification had no direct impact 
on the historical development of promise based on the assumption that Scots law 
would still have regarded promise as a standalone obligation irrespective of the 
success of codification. The Commission for Revising the Law that was appointed 
for drafting the Code was to revise and consider existing law in Scotland (1649). It is 
clear that promises were being enforced by the Scottish courts during that time. Also, 
given that Stair was a member of this commission, it is likely that promise would 
have been recognised under the completed Code. 
 
Nor did the reception of English law in Scotland have a significant impact on the 
historical development of the law of promise because Scots law did not derive its 
                                                 
1 See Chapter II, B. SCOTS LAW: A CLASSICAL MIXED LEGAL SYSTEM, (1) Reception of the 





promissory law from the English sources. This thesis therefore examines the 
influence of English law on promise through the attempt to unify the law between 
Scotland and England proposed by King James VI and I. The successful unification 
of Scots and English law could have altered the position of promise in Scotland due 
to the powerful role of English law in Great Britain. Given that English law does not 
generally enforce unilateral promise, it is highly unlikely that any unified law would 
have regarded promise as a main source of obligation.2 
 
Nevertheless, the influence of English law on Scots promissory law appears to have 
increased from the eighteenth century. It appears that Institutional writers who came 
after Stair and Scottish commentators did not focus on analysing the law of promise.3 
One possible reason for this is the increase of commerce between Scotland and 
England. Given that English law was such a powerful legal system, especially in 
commercial practice, these writers may have thought that the concept of promise was 
not useful since English law did not recognise this concept. Also, it appears that the 
Scottish courts sometimes are reluctant to enforce promissory obligation, again 
possibly because of the influence of English law. This is observable from a number 
of cases in which the Scottish courts adopted a bilateral approach when 
characterising the juristic nature of legal transactions. For instance, the court appears 
to follow the English approach in analysing reward using a contractual analysis.4 
Also, there are circumstances in which the nature of the instrument is compatible 
with a unilateral obligation, such as collateral warranties5 and letters of credit6, but 
the courts analyse it within contract, often without acknowledging promise as an 
alternative. In addition, it is clear from the literature and the courts in the past 
perceived either an offer or a promise to constitute a cautionary obligations. 
                                                 
2 See Ibid at sub-heading (b) Reception of English Law. 
3 See Chapter III, B. LATER INSTITUTIONAL WRITERS and Chapter V, A. THEORIES AND 
DOCTRINES RELATING TO PROMISE IN SCOTS LAW, (2) Promissory theory as explained by 
Institutional and contemporary writers, Later Institutional writers. 
4 See Chapter VII Part II, C. USING PROMISES AS ENTICEMENTS, (1) Advertisements of reward. 
5 See Chapter VII Part II, D. USING PROMISES TO GUARANTEE EXISTING OBLIGATIONS, 
(3) Collateral warranties. 





However, in contemporary case law, they tend to exclusively refer to this obligation 
as a kind of contract.7 
 
(b) The reception of the Civil Law and the Common Law in Thailand and its 
relevance to the law of promise 
 
There is no controversy regarding the exact period when the Civil Law and English 
law were first implemented in Thailand. It is clear that the reception of English law 
preceded the reception of the Civil Law. English law initially appeared to be the most 
important foreign legal source in the reformation of the Thai legal system.8 Thai 
lawyers were sent to study in England. When they returned to Thailand, they 
established the first Thai law school, where English legal principles were taught. The 
Thai courts also employed English law in cases where there was no applicable Thai 
law. Had Thailand not codified its law, English law would have continued to be the 
main source of legal influence in the Thai legal system. Thailand is likely to have 
borrowed all of its legal rules from England, in which case, the modern position of 
Thai contract law would have been similar to that of English law in that unilateral 
promise would not be legally binding. 
 
Nonetheless, the fact that Thailand adopted a codified system changed the course of 
historical development of the law of promise.  Codification reduced the influence of 
English law in the Thai legal system.9 Moreover, the shift of the Thai Code from the 
French model (the 1923 Code) to the German model (the 1925 Code) is an important 
point of the historical development of the law of promise in the Thai legal system.10 
This is because some fundamental concepts of the French and German law of 
obligations, and especially the law of promise, are different. If the 1923 Code was 
still in force, the notion of a promise in the Thai Code would have been a promise in 
                                                 
7 See Chapter VII Part II, D. USING PROMISES TO GUARANTEE EXISTING OBLIGATIONS, 
(2) Cautionary obligations/Suretyship 
8 See Chapter II, B. SCOTS LAW: A CLASSICAL MIXED LEGAL SYSTEM, (1) Reception of the 
Civil Law and the Common Law in Scotland, (b) Reception of English Law. 
9  See Chapter II, C. THAILAND: A NEWLY DISCOVERED MIXED LEGAL SYSTEM?, (2) 
Reception of foreign laws in Thailand, (d) Effects on the Thai promissory law as a result of the 
codification, (i) Effects of the change from the Common Law to the Civilian tradition. 





a contractual sense, i.e. a promise requiring acceptance. However, according to the 
German concept of juristic act, a promise can be classed as a unilateral juristic act, 
which is distinct from the bilateral juristic act of contract. More importantly, Thai 
law borrowed a number of promissory legal principles from German law, such as 
promise of reward, promise of sale, and promise of a gift, each of which is a genuine 
unilateral obligation. Thai law is therefore familiar with the notion that a unilateral 
declaration of will can, in some cases, create an obligation. 
 
Moreover, two examples of traditional Thai law, namely Utthalum (prohibiting a 
person from taking a case against his/her own ascendants) and duties of children to 
maintain parents, are considered in this thesis to support the claim that Thailand is a 
mixed legal system.11 These two concepts had been influenced by Buddhist belief, 
and became traditional Thai customs. Therefore, the characteristics of Thai law suit 
the requirements of a mixed legal system. Modern Thai law is constituted of three 
legal traditions, namely the Civil Law, the Common Law and traditional Thai law. 
 
(c) Mixed systems but different outcome 
 
Mixed jurisdictions do not necessarily have the same mixture of the Civil and 
Common Law, nor do they have more general substantive laws. Much depends on, 
inter alia, the timing of the mixture and the way in which they were influenced. This 
can be observed from the mixed characteristics of Scots and Thai law and the law of 
promise in each system. Scots law and Thai law are similar in that they have been 
influenced both by the Civilian and English legal traditions. Also, their promissory 
laws originated in part in the Civilian tradition (or, more accurately, the ius commune 
in the case of Scots law). However, Scots law regards a promise as a standalone 
obligation, whereas Thai law does not. This difference stems from the fact that, inter 
alia, when the law of promise was developed in each system, the role of promise 
within the obligational framework in the ius commune (in the case of Scots law)/ 
amongst the Civilian systems (in the case of Thai law) is different. 
                                                 
11 See Chapter II, C. THAILAND: A NEWLY DISCOVERED MIXED LEGAL SYSTEM?, (3) 






When the law of promise was developed in Scotland, the binding force of a promise 
was strongly debated within the ius commune. There were two competing views of 
whether a promise requires the acceptance of the promisee. 12  The view that a 
promise is binding without acceptance was adopted in Scotland.13 By the time that 
promissory law was developed in Thailand, the role of a promise was already well 
established in the Civil Law systems consulted by the Thai drafters (e.g. France, 
Germany and Switzerland). Since no Continental European system adopted the 
approach that a promise is an independent obligation separate from contract, the 
notion of a standalone promise was never introduced into Thailand. 
 
Moreover, when the law of promise was developed in Scotland, there was a strong 
influence from the Canon Law. Stair was heavily influenced by the canonist 
approach that a promise is binding in its own right. 14 Scots law then regards promise 
as a free standing legal institution outwith contract. By contrast, Thai law, either the 
law in general or the law of promise, was never directly influenced by the Canon 
Law. Therefore, Thai lawyers were never inspired by the canonist rule that that a 
promise is binding as a source of obligation. 
 
Furthermore, Scots promissory law was not influenced by English law (as the origin 
of the doctrine). Although English influence increased later, it was after the law of 
promise had been well established. Thus, English influence does not affect the 
understanding that a promise is a unilateral obligation in Scots law. In the case of 
Thai law, there was influence from English law, as the origin of the promissory 
doctrine.15 Although the Thai Code was mainly drafted on the lines of German law, 
the Thai drafters used the term “promise” both in the sense of a unilateral obligation 
(similar to German law) and a contractual promise (similar to English law). This 
                                                 
12 See Chapter I, A. THE LEGAL OBLIGATION OF PROMISE, (3) The late scholastics and (4) 
Northern Natural Law jurists; See also Chapter III, A. STAIR AND THE DOCTRINE OF PROMISE, 
(2) ius commune, (a) Debate on the binding force of promise. 
13 See Ibid. 
14 See Chapter III, A. STAIR AND THE DOCTRINE OF PROMISE, (1) Canon Law. 
15 See Chapter II, C. THAILAND: A NEWLY DISCOVERED MIXED LEGAL SYSTEM?, (2) 





illustrates that the influence of English law on Thai promissory law affected the 
underlying basis of the “unilateral nature” of a promise in Thai law. 
 
In short, although the law of promise in Scots law and Thai law originated in part in 
the Civilian tradition, the role of promise in the obligational framework of each 
system is different due to the timing of the mixture and the way in which they were 
influenced. In addition, Thai promissory law was partly influenced by English law, 
as the origin of the doctrine, whereas Scots promissory law was not. Therefore, it is 
important to take fundamental differences between Scots law and Thai law into 
consideration because their different underlying basis may render the Scots 
promissory model not entirely suitable for Thai law.16 
 
(d) Advantages of regarding Thailand as a mixed legal system 
 
This thesis points out that the concept of a mixed legal system is not widely 
recognised amongst Thai lawyers and that they generally consider Thailand to be a 
Civil Law system.17 Therefore, the demonstration in this thesis that Thailand is a 
mixed jurisdiction could promote the notion of mixed legal systems in Thai legal 
academia. Moreover, it is important for Thai lawyers to understand the actual 
characteristics of their legal system, as well as the fundamental basis of each legal 
concept, so that the application of those legal concepts can be appropriately applied. 
The fact that Thailand is viewed as a Civilian system may cause Thai lawyers to rely 
on a Civilian approach when facing difficulties with the application of legal doctrine. 
However, some legal concepts were borrowed from English law. Some are the 
product of the mixture of the Civilian and the Common Law traditions. Therefore, 
the Civilian model may not be able to resolve the legal problems in Thai law if the 
underlying basis of the law does not have a Civilian root and vice versa.  
 
                                                 
16 This is later discussed in section (4) Promise from a comparative perspective, (b) Different theories 
and doctrines that relate to promissory obligation. 
17 See Chapter II, C. THAILAND: A NEWLY DISCOVERED MIXED LEGAL SYSTEM?, (4) 





It is also advantageous for Thailand to be regarded as a mixed jurisdiction. In this 
way, it could draw on the general body of research on mixed jurisdictions. This could 
benefit Thai law in terms of comparative legal study of other mixed jurisdictions. In 
Thailand, the typical comparative approach is to compare Thai law with the Civil 
Law and/or the Common Law.18 A comparative study of Thai law with other mixed 
legal systems is therefore a novel legal analysis in the Thai context. 
 
Particularly, this discovery may support the comparative study of Thai law and Scots 
law. This thesis introduces the Scottish legal system to Thai legal academics and vice 
versa. More importantly, this thesis has proved that there are many advantages of a 
comparative analysis of promise between Scots law and Thai law. Therefore, a 
comparative analysis of Thai and Scots law could be an interesting option for Thai 
and Scots legal scholars wanting to conduct a comparative study between two mixed 
jurisdictions in other areas of law. 
 
(3) Promise from an historical perspective 
 
(a) Scots law 
 
Stair was inspired by both the Canon Law and the late scholastic tradition in 
claiming that a unilateral promise is enforceable. There was a lively debate within 
the ius commune as to whether a promise requires acceptance in order to be binding 
during his time.19 Stair, under the influence of Molina, supported the view that a 
promise is binding without acceptance. The other school of thought, of which 
Grotius was a member, proposed a counter argument. 20  Grotius’ account was 
followed by Pothier, whose work was used as the main reference when drafting the 
                                                 
18 For example, in Good Faith & Supervening Events, the author of the book compares the doctrine of 
good faith applied in supervening events between German, French, Anglo-American and Thai law. In 
Comparative Thai law with foreign Civil Codes, the author of the book compares the approach of Thai 
law with a number of foreign civil codes, namely Germany, France, Switzerland, Spain, Italy, Russia, 
Japan, China, Canada, Egypt and Mexico. 
19 As discussed in Chapter III, A. STAIR AND THE DOCTRINE OF PROMISE, (2) ius commune, 
(a) Debate on the binding force of promise.  
20 As discussed in Chapter III, A. STAIR AND THE DOCTRINE OF PROMISE, (2) ius commune, 





Code civil.21 Therefore, the influence of Grotius on the Code civil was not direct, but 
through Pothier’s work. This explains why, traditionally, under French law a promise 
(e.g. a promise of sale) is created by the wills of two parties.22 Also, French law does 
not generally recognise the notion that a promise can be unilaterally created (e.g. a 
promise of reward and a promise of a gift are not recognised under the Code civil).23 
Other European systems have followed French law due to the influence of the Code 
Napoleon. There is an exception in German law, and other systems which adopted 
the German approach, whereby the idea of a unilateral binding obligation was later 
developed.24 The recognition of a unilateral obligation under German law, however, 
appears to be an exceptional rule, not a main source of obligation. Scotland was 
never influenced by Grotius in this area of the law, since his promissory account was 
clearly rejected by Stair and was never followed by the Scottish courts and 
contemporary writers. 25  Although David Hume and Adam Smith explained that 
acceptance is required for the constitution of a promise, which is similar to Grotius’ 
claim, their theories regarding the acceptance of a promise never prevailed in 
Scotland.26  Therefore, it is postulated in this thesis that the divergence between 
Scotland and the rest of Europe regarding the position of promise within the 
obligational framework stems from the fact that Stair and Grotius took a different 
view in relation to the acceptance of promise.27 
 
                                                 
21  As discussed in Chapter I, A. THE LEGAL OBLIGATION OF PROMISE, (4) Northern Natural 
Law jurists, (b) Grotius’ influence on French law. 
22 Code civil, Art 1589. 
23 It is worth noting that France reformed its law of contract in February 2016, and this included a 
change to the breach of a unilateral promise. As a result of this reform, the parties cannot revoke a 
unilateral promise to enter into a contract. This means that even if one party revokes it, the other party 
can still enforce the contract in which the unilateral promise was made. Nonetheless, there has been no 
change in the juristic nature of a unilateral promise to enter into a contract. As discussed, under 
French law, unilateral promises to contract are made by the agreement of both parties. Therefore,  a 
unilateral promise to enter into a contract is not a genuine unilateral obligation under French law. 
Official report can be found at Legifrance, Ordonnance n° 2016-131 du 10 février 2016 portant 
réforme du droit des contrats, du régime général et de la preuve des obligations, available at 
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000032004939&categorieLien=i
d. 
24 This is observed in Chapter II, C. THAILAND: A NEWLY DISCOVERED MIXED LEGAL 
SYSTEM?, (2) Reception of foreign laws in Thailand, (d) Effects on the Thai promissory law as a 
result of the codifications, (ii) Effects of the change from French to German models for the Thai Code. 
25 See Chapter III, B. LATER INSTITUTIONAL WRITERS; and D. CASE LAW. 
26 See Chapter III, C. SCOTTISH MORAL PHILOSOPHERS,  (2) Adam Smith and (3) David Hume. 
27 See Chapter III, A. STAIR AND THE DOCTRINE OF PROMISE, (3) The divergence between 





This thesis observes that neither Institutional writers after Stair nor early 
contemporary commentators paid much intention to the law of promise. Hence, no 
promissory theories that are helpful for the application of the law of promise can be 
obtained from their works.28 However, in the twentieth century TB Smith played an 
important role in the development of the law of promise. He emphasised the value of 
this doctrine by suggesting that it could be applied in a number of practical 
circumstances e.g. rewards, offers specifying a period  for acceptance and third party 
rights.29 It appears that Smith influenced a number of modern writers (e.g. McBryde, 
MacQueen and Hogg) who favour the doctrine of promise. Therefore, Smith is the 
writer who reinstated the recognition of a promise in Scots law after it had been well 
established by Stair. The promissory doctrine tended to be ignored by later 
Institutional writers and writers before Smith, but writers after him tend to re-
emphasise the value of the doctrine. 
 
 (b) Thai law 
 
Promissory principles under the Thai Code were derived from both Civilian30 and 
English sources. This makes the usage of promissory language confusing.  The Thai 
drafters used promissory language both in the sense of a unilateral obligation and the 
sense of a contract.31 The former can be found in the case of promise of reward32 and 
promise to make a contract.33 The latter can be found in the case of a promise to pay 
remuneration. This is despite the fact that the provision of promise to pay 
                                                 
28 See Chapter V, (2) Promissory theory as explained by Institutional and contemporary writers, (b) 
Later Institutional writers and (c) Contemporary writers, (i) Gloag. 
29 See Chapter V, (2) Promissory theory as explained by Institutional and contemporary writers, (c) 
Contemporary writers, (ii) TB Smith. 
30  It is later argued in this thesis that, although the promissory principles under Thai law were 
borrowed from Civilian sources rather than the Canon Law, the root of this concept is the canonical 
principle to keep one’s word, which led to the enforcement of unilateral obligations in Europe. This 
makes the mixed nature of Thai promissory law similar to that of Scots law, although Thai law has 
never been directly influenced by the Canon Law. See section C. WHAT CAN BE LEARNED FROM 
THAI LAW?, (3) Could the Scots approach be adapted for Thai law? 
31 See Chapter IV, F. CONCLUSION (1) The mixture of the Civilian and Common Law traditions; 
and (2) Flaws in promissory provisions, 
32  See Chapter IV, B. PROMISE UNDER THE THAI CODE, (1) Promise without a specific 
promisee. 





remuneration was borrowed from German and Swiss law, which do not contain 
promissory language.34  
 
Moreover, this thesis argues that the Thai drafters did not acknowledge the different 
attitude towards a unilateral promise of French and German law.35 Some promissory 
provisions were derived from both sources, and this caused a great deal of confusion. 
This is seen from the example of promise of sale. The concept was derived from the 
provisions of promise of sale of both French and German traditions (the latter is 
through Japanese law). The drafters appeared not to understand the obligational 
status of a promise of sale during the period of the drafting, whether it was a contract 
or a unilateral obligation.36 In another example, they placed the concept of promise 
of reward (which is a unilateral obligation) in the part related to the formation of a 
contract under the Code.37 Moreover, in the case of a promise to pay a penalty for not 
performing an obligation, the drafters translated the term “promise” as “สญัญา” but the 
word literally means contracts.38 Also, a “promissory note” is translated as “ตัว๋สญัญาใช้
เงิน”, which literally means “a contractual note to pay a sum”.39 This thesis therefore 
concludes that the flaws in promissory provisions under the Thai Code stems from 
the fact that, inter alia, the drafters did not understand the difference between 







                                                 
34 See Chapter IV, B. PROMISE UNDER THE THAI CODE, (2) Promise with a specific promisee, 
(c) Promise to pay remuneration. 
35 See Chapter IV, F. CONCLUSION (3) Different attitudes on unilateral promises between French 
and German law and their effects on the Thai Code. 
36 See Chapter IV, C. PROMISE TO ENTER INTO A CONTRACT, (1) Promises of sale (§454). 
37  See Chapter IV, B. PROMISE UNDER THE THAI CODE, (1) Promise without a specific 
promisee,  
38 See Chapter IV, B. PROMISE UNDER THE THAI CODE, (2) Promise with a specific promisee, 
(a) Promise to pay a penalty for not performing an obligation. 
39 See Chapter IV, B. PROMISE UNDER THE THAI CODE, (2) Promise with a specific promisee, 





(4) Promise from a comparative perspective 
 
(a) Similar underlying basis of promissory law 
 
This thesis argues that not only are the Scots and Thai law similar in the mixed 
nature of their legal systems, but also in the similarity of the underlying basis of 
promissory law. 
 
Firstly, the notion of a juristic act is recognised in both systems and the definition of 
a juristic act appears to be similar in both systems (but the general theory of juristic 
acts in Thai law is clearer than it is in Scots law).40 Moreover, in both systems 
juristic acts can be distinguished based on, inter alia, their unilateral and bilateral 
nature. Most importantly, a promise is classified as a unilateral juristic act, whereas a 
contract is a bilateral juristic in both systems.  
 
Secondly, the idea of the unilateral nature of obligations can be seen in two different 
senses, namely (i) the obligation can be created by one party and (ii) only one party 
is obliged to perform it. Both senses are compatible with the nature of a promise in 
both systems. This suggests that the perception of the nature of a promise is similar 
in both systems. 41  This is different from jurisdictions in which the nature of a 
promise is understood in a different sense. Two obvious examples are English and 
French law. In English law, a unilateral promise is generally not binding.42 In French 
law, traditionally a promise cannot be created by one party, but rather requires an 
agreement of two parties.43 Therefore, the nature of a promise in English and French 
law is incompatible with the unilateral nature of an obligation in the first sense. 
 
                                                 
40 See Chapter V, A. THEORIES AND DOCTRINES RELATING TO PROMISE IN SCOTS LAW, 
(1) The notion of a juristic act; and B. THEORIES AND DOCTRINES RELATING TO PROMISE 
IN THAI LAW, (1) The notion of a juristic act. 
41 See Chapter V, C. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF PROMISE IN SCOTS LAW AND THAI 
LAW: COMPARISON,  (2) Unilateral nature of a promise. 
42 This is observed throughout this thesis. See, for example, Chapter VI, A. THE NATURE AND 
CHARACTERISTICS OF PROMISE, (1) Scots law, (c) Binding characteristics of a promise. 
43 See Chapter I, A. THE LEGAL OBLIGATION OF PROMISE, (4) Northern Natural Law jurists, 





Thirdly, will theory plays an important role in the law of promise in the studied 
systems. This stems from the fact that, in Scots law, Stair was influenced by the 
Natural Law tradition. 44  As for Thai law, the idea of voluntary obligation was 
influenced by the Civilian tradition. 45  Additionally, in both systems, specific 
implement/performance is the primary remedy  for breach of obligations in the sense 
that it is the primary right of the creditor. The role of will theory from the perspective 
of remedies in both systems is therefore similar: the law of promise lends itself to 
criticism for only being about compensating the aggrieved promisee.46 
 
Fourthly, the courts in both systems use the objective theory of obligation to 
determine whether a person intends to create a legal obligation of promise.47 This, 
again, is different from jurisdictions such as France, where the subjective theory of 
obligation is generally preferred.48 
 
Finally, a promise can be distinguished from an offer and other expressions which 
are not obligatory by referring to the degree to which the person who makes those 
expressions desires to bind him/herself.49 One might argue that the aforesaid theory 
distinguishes the effects after the event, rather than the nature of the promises/offers 
themselves. Nonetheless, it has been argued in this thesis that the theory under 
discussion is satisfactory based on the fact that a promisor intends his/her 
undertaking to be binding immediately, i.e. a promise is irrevocable having become 
effective and without acceptance. An offeror does not intend to be immediately 
bound since he/she can still withdraw the offer as long as it has not been accepted. 
The difference between Thai and Scots law is that the former recognises the idea of 
                                                 
44 See Chapter V, A. THEORIES AND DOCTRINES RELATING TO PROMISE IN SCOTS LAW, 
(4) Will theory in Scots law. 
45 See Chapter V, B. THEORIES AND DOCTRINES RELATING TO PROMISE IN THAI LAW, (4) 
Will theory in Thai law. 
46 See Chapter V, C. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF PROMISE IN SCOTS LAW AND THAI 
LAW: COMPARISON, (3) The role of will theory. 
47 See Chapter VI, A. THE NATURE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF PROMISE, (3) Comparison, 
(a) Words used for promissory liability and an objective test of promise. 
48 See Chapter I, C. NATURE AND REQUIREMENTS OF PROMISE, (3) The intentions of the 
promisor, (b) How to measure seriousness of intention? 
49 As discussed in Chapter VI, A. THE NATURE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF PROMISE, (3) 





overture.50 However, this difference is insignificant because, like an invitation to 
treat, an overture cannot be accepted and does not confer any legal effect. Thus, the 
attitudes towards the degree to which a promisor, an offeror and a person who makes 
an invitation to treat intend to be bound in Scots and Thai law are similar. 
 
To conclude, there are certain resemblances between Scots and Thai law in relation 
to promissory theories and the obligational nature of a promise, which suggests that 
the underlying basis of the promissory obligation in the two systems is similar. 
 
(b) Different theories and doctrines that relate to promissory obligation 
 
It is important to consider the different theories and doctrines that relate to a 
promissory obligation between the two systems. This is to determine if there are 
some essential differences in each system that may cause their underlying basis to 
differ, making the Scots model inappropriate for Thai law. 
 
The first difference concerns the role of a promise in third party rights. While in 
Scots law, traditionally the constitution of third party rights is analysed using a 
promissory analysis 51 , under Thai law this doctrine has no connection with a 
promissory analysis.52 Therefore, the moment when the right of the beneficiary in 
third party rights exists in each system is different. However, this difference is not 
essential and should not prevent Thai law from borrowing the promissory model 
from Scots law. The approach of regarding promises as standalone obligations would 
not affect the understanding or underlying basis of third party rights under Thai law. 
It is clear that they are viewed as contracts and the rights of the beneficiary come into 
existence when he/she informs the debtor. Hence, the idea that a promise comes into 
existence when it is communicated to the promisee would have no effect on the 
concept of the third party right. In fact, there is a theory in modern Scots law that 
                                                 
50 See Chapter VI, A. THE NATURE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF PROMISE, (2) Thai law, (a) 
Promise as distinguished from other types of expressions. 
51 See Chapter V, A. THEORIES AND DOCTRINES RELATING TO PROMISE IN SCOTS LAW, 
(5) The doctrine of third party rights. 
52 See Chapter V, B. THEORIES AND DOCTRINES RELATING TO PROMISE IN THAI LAW, (5) 





proposes that third party rights should be viewed as an independent obligation. This 
suggests that a promissory analysis may not be entirely appropriate for an analysis of 
third party rights. It is worth noting that the Scottish Law Commission is at the point 
of publishing its proposals for law reform, including a proposed Bill53 to put the law 
of third party rights onto a statutory footing. The current draft of the foregoing Bill 
does not use promissory language for the right of a third party beneficiary. 54 
Therefore, the Scots and Thai approaches to third party rights and the role of a 
promise are not as different as it initially appears. 
 
Secondly, the constitution of a promissory obligation in Scots law is subject to the 
required form.55 However, there is no unified rule regarding constitution or proof of a 
promise in Thai law.56  Thus, it is important for Thai law to consider the issue 
regarding the required form of the constitution of a promise because this rule does 
exist in Scots law. Otherwise, if there is no rule governing the constitution or proof 
of the obligation, the scope of the unilateral obligation under Thai law (if it were 
regarded as a main source of obligation) would be much wider than in Scots law 
(after which it could be modelled). This issue regarding the requirement for 
constitution or proof of a promise will be particularly discussed under the heading of 
“suggestions for Thai law”. It is briefly mentioned here to illustrate that this 
difference between Scots and Thai law is acknowledged in this thesis, and that an 
appropriate solution will be offered for Thai law. 
 
(c) Scots law and a more workable promissory approach 
 
The Scottish promissory approach to the application of this doctrine is more efficient. 
It encounters fewer problems than Thai law because of the fact that, inter alia, in 
Scots law promise is deemed to be a free standing legal institution. It therefore 
avoids the theoretical issue of distinguishing between an offer and a promise. This is 
                                                 
53 Scottish Law Commission, Review of Contract Law, Discussion Paper on Third Party Rights in 
Contract, available at http://www.scotlawcom.gov.uk/files/8013/9592/4224/DP_TSO.pdf. 
54 The draft Bill can be found at 
http://www.scotlawcom.gov.uk/files/6514/5252/9147/A9_provisions_2015-12-29.pdf. 
55 See Chapter III, E. CONSTITUTION AND PROOF OF PROMISE. 





a major issue within Thai contract law. The distinction could be simply made by 
using the theory that a promise is binding without acceptance, whereas an offer 
requires acceptance. In addition, Thai law has a theory that the extent to which a 
promisor desires to bind him/herself is stronger than that of an offeror. 57  This 
concept is useful from a theoretical perspective, since a promise can be distinguished 
from an offer based on the extent to which the promisor and offeror intend to be 
bound. However, the value of the foregoing theory is damaged by another theory, 
which is commonly understood amongst Thai lawyers, that a promise to make a 
contract is per se an offer. It is therefore extremely difficult to make a distinction 
between promise to make a contract and offer, neither at a theoretical nor practical 
level, since they are considered to be the same thing.58 As a matter of principle, in 
Scots law the degree to which a promisor intends his/her intention to be bound is 
stronger than that of an offeror. The difference is that a promise to make a contract is 
deemed to be a distinctive juristic act in Scots law, i.e. not as per se an offer. Thus, a 
distinction can be made between a promise and an offer under Scots law. Therefore, 
if Thai law recognised a promise as a free standing legal entity, it would help to 
differentiate a promise from an offer. Such a distinction could be made by using the 
approach that an offer requires acceptance, whereas a promise does not. Also, the 
distinction could be made by using the theory that the extent to which a promisor 
intends his/her intention to be bound is stronger than an offeror, which already exists 
in Thai law.  
 
Moreover, Scots law has a clear approach to deal with the legal effects of a promise. 
It is clear that a promise does not lapse as a result of the death of the promisor. The 
Thai court applies the rule of offer to the case of a promise, whereby an offer lapses 
as a result of the death of the offeror. 59 However, this rule is incompatible with the 
nature of a promise, given that the extent to which a promisor intends to be bound is 
stronger than that of an offeror. Also, Scots law has a clear rule to deal with the 
                                                 
57 See Chapter VI, A. THE NATURE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF PROMISE, (3) Comparison, 
(b) Promise as distinguished from other types of expression, (i) The extent to which a person who 
makes an expression intends to be bound. 
58 See Chapter VI, A. THE NATURE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF PROMISE, (3) Comparison, 
(b) Promise as distinguished from other types of expression, (ii) Problems of the Thai approach. 





prescription of a promise. In contrast, a promise binds the promisor forever in Thai 
law, even if the general rule of prescriptive period of obligation has passed. In other 
words, under Thai law there is no prescriptive period applicable to promises, which 
is strange, given that a promise is an obligation. 
 
Furthermore, Scots law clearly justifies why an offeror who specifies a period for 
acceptance is bound to keep his/her offer open for that specified period, even if there 
is no contractual relationship between the parties yet. This is because of the binding 
force of promissory obligations.60 In contrast, Thai legal commentators are not able 
to explain why an offer containing a time limit of acceptance binds the offeror. By 
tracing the origins of the relevant provision in German law, the model of the Thai 
provision, it has been found that the obligation in this case is promissory, rather than 
contractual.61 This is an example of how a unilateral declaration of will can create an 
obligation under German law. This discovery that the actual basis of the binding 
characteristic of an irrevocable offer under Thai law is a promissory obligation is a 
new contribution to Thai law. 
 
(d) Some uncertainties of the law of promise 
 
There are some areas of promissory law in both systems that are uncertain, and thus 
need clarification. Firstly, it is unclear whether the communication of a promise to 
the promisee is required. Two rival theories are considered in this thesis in order to 
determine which of them is the most satisfactory.62 Reference is also made to the 
DCFR, which has a clear approach to deal with this point.63 This thesis supports the 
theory that communication of a promise to the promisee is required. One of the 
justifications is that the internal intention of a person has to be express in some way 
which one can objectively observe. 
 
                                                 
60 As discussed in Chapter VI, E. PROMISES TO KEEP AN OFFER OPEN. 
61 As discussed in Chapter VI, E. PROMISES TO KEEP AN OFFER OPEN, (2) Thai law, (b) Origin 
of the Thai principle. 
62 As discussed in Chapter VI, B. COMMUNICATION OF A PROMISE. (1) Scots law and (2) Thai 
law. 





Secondly, in Scots law it is unclear if a promise is always gratuitous or if non-
gratuitous promises exist.64 The latter concept is supported in this thesis. A promise 
is often used to form part of a wider series of transactions in which the promisor 
intends to make some gain if the promise is enforced. 65 Thus, the nature of the 
obligation is not necessarily gratuitous. Additionally, the theory that a promise is not 
always gratuitous provides flexibility for the application of a promise. If a promise is 
not always gratuitous, there is no need to make non-gratuitous promises, which are 
not undertaken in the course of business, in writing.66  In Thai law, the idea of 
gratuitousness is discussed within the framework of juristic acts, which can apply to 
the case of promise. Thai law does not determine the gratuitous nature of the 
obligation at the time it is constituted, but from its actual nature. Under gratuitous 
obligations, only one party gains benefits, whereas non-gratuitous obligations occur 
when both parties gain benefits. Therefore, this thesis suggests that a promise is not 
always gratuitous in Thai law.67 
 
(5) Some practical advantages of promises 
 
In Chapter VII, this thesis analyses the practical applications of promise in order to 
establish whether such a concept is in fact a useful legal tool within a legal system. It 
has been discovered that a promissory analysis is very useful in conceptualising 
practical circumstances and day-to-day legal transactions, notably within the Scottish 
jurisdiction. 
 
This thesis has gathered similar practical usages of promise under the same heading 
so that they can be easily observed. First, promises can create a pre-contractual 
obligation, as can be seen from the examples of promises to keep offers open and 
promises about the tendering process. Second, some promises per se confer unilateral 
obligations, e.g. options to purchase a property, letters of credit and IOUs. Third, 
                                                 
64 As discussed in Chapter VI A. THEORIES AND DOCTRINES RELATING TO PROMISE IN 
SCOTS LAW, (6) Gratuitousness of promise. 
65 Examples of these transactions can be found in Chapter VII. 
66 Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995, ss 1(2)(a)(ii). 
67 As discussed in Chapter V, B. THEORIES AND DOCTRINES RELATING TO PROMISE IN 





they can be used as enticements, of which the common examples are advertisements 
of rewards, prize competitions and marketing offers.  Fourth, a guarantee of existing 
obligations can be alternatively explained through a promissory lens, for example, in 
the case of product or service guarantees, cautionary obligations/surety and collateral 
warranties. Finally, they can be used to alter/waive contractual obligations.  
 
(a) Scots law 
 
A promissory approach represents an improved framework for case analysis of the 
types of transaction studied. Adopting a promissory approach is beneficial, making 
doctrinal analysis clearer in comparison with the offer and acceptance approach 
adopted in a contractual analysis. It avoids problems regarding the acceptance of the 
other party. This suits the nature of several practical transactions in which a person 
intends his/her undertaking to be binding without acceptance. Additionally, generally 
a promisee under a promissory analysis benefits more in comparison with an offeree 
under a contractual analysis. This is because a promise is irrevocable once it has 
become effective but an offer can be revoked at any time as long as a contract has not 
been concluded. This is particularly useful when it concerns transactions related to 
customers where the law wishes to provide more protection to customers or less 
powerful parties.  
 
This thesis has made an original scholarly contribution to Scots private law by 
grouping together similar practical transactions under the promissory umbrella for 
the first time. There are several situations which can be rationalised under a 
promissory analysis. This includes some examples that are commonly discussed in 
literature and some that are not. Firstly, transactions that are commonly discussed in 
Scottish legal literature include promises to keep an offer open68, advertisements of 
reward69, options to purchase property70, cautionary obligations71 and product/service 
                                                 
68 See Chapter VII Part I, B. USING PROMISE TO CREATE OBLIGATIONS, (1) Promises to keep 
offers open. 
69  See Chapter VII Part II, C. USING PROMISES AS ENTICEMENTS, (1) Advertisements of 
reward. 





guarantees. 72  Although these transactions are commonly discussed, an original 
contribution is made by this thesis with the account of a clear doctrinal comparison 
between a promissory and a contractual analysis and an assessment of which 
approach makes better sense doctrinally and produces a fairer result. Specifically, in 
the case of a cautionary obligation, it is pointed out that modern literature and courts 
tend to refer to this undertaking as a contract. However, it is clear from case law that 
a caution can arise either by an offer or a unilateral undertaking.73 In the case of 
options, not only are a promissory and a contractual approach compared in this 
thesis, but reference is also made to the firm offer approach.  It is clearly shown that 
the promissory approach is the most workable, because it avoids problems in the 
exercise of an option. This suits the actual nature of an option, i.e. a person who is 
granted an option has the option to purchase the property without being required to 
renegotiate with the grantor. 74 
 
Secondly, some transactions are not commonly analysed in Scottish legal literature, 
these being letters of credit, collateral warranties, prize competitions, marketing 
offers, and IOUs. Therefore, original contributions are made to Scottish legal thought 
in this thesis by providing a doctrinal analysis of their legal characteristics. Specially, 
in the case of letters of credit, this thesis postulates that a promissory analysis of 
letters of credit is compatible with the theory that regards letters of credit as 
independent transactions from the underlying contract between the importer and 
exporter. The adoption of a promissory approach is particularly useful because it 
resolves some practical problems. This is the case in which the courts applied the 
concept of substantial compliance to letters of credit, making it difficult for the bank 
to examine the underlying transaction between the exporter/importer.75 Also, in the 
case of collateral warranties, this thesis postulates that a promissory analysis would 
                                                                                                                                          
71 See Chapter VII, Part II, D. USING PROMISES TO GUARANTEE EXISTING OBLIGATIONS, 
(2) Cautionary obligations/Suretyship. 
72 See Chapter VII, Part II, D. USING PROMISES TO GUARANTEE EXISTING OBLIGATIONS, 
(1) Product or service guarantees. 
73 See Chapter VII, Part II, D. USING PROMISES TO GUARANTEE EXISTING OBLIGATIONS, 
(2) Cautionary obligations/Suretyship, (a) Scots law. 
74 See Chapter VII Part I, B. USING PROMISE TO CREATE OBLIGATIONS (1) Options. 
75 As discussed in Chapter VII Part I, B. USING PROMISE TO CREATE OBLIGATIONS, (3) 





make a collateral warranty fall outwith the scope of construction contracts under the 
HGCRA Act.76 This outcome suits the actual purpose of the collateral warranty. In 
fact, there appears to be no authority, either in case law or literature, to deal with the 
obligational nature of some transactions at all. This thesis therefore contains an 
original contribution by analysing the legal characterisation for these transactions. 
This is obviously the case with IOUs. The Scottish courts held that they create an 
obligation to pay back the money without classifying which class of voluntary 
obligation they belong to. It is argued in this thesis that, while IOUs bear some 
characteristics of promise, they are not pure promises on the basis that they do not 
relate to a future event. Therefore, they should be regarded as an independent right 
which has special features, but also shares some similarities to promises.77 There is 
also no clear approach to deal with the legal characteristic of prize competitions. The 
Anglo-American approach is analysed in this thesis. It has been found that the 
Scottish promissory approach offers a more satisfactory outcome. In the Anglo-
American approach, a party holding a prize competition who reserves the right to 
withdraw/alter the competition is permitted to withdraw from the contest or alter the 
value of the prize, even if the winner has been chosen. This problem would not arise 
under a promissory analysis.78 As for marketing offers, examples of buy one get one 
free and best price guaranteed are provided in this thesis. Also, this thesis shows that 
a promissory analysis provides a more satisfactory result, both in terms of the legal 
characterisation of the transactions and the protections of customers.79 In short, this 
thesis emphasises how valuable promissory analysis is at a practical level in 
Scotland. It shows that a promissory analysis is alive and well, and is still useful in a 
modern legal system. 
 
(b) Thai law 
 
In Thai law some practical circumstances have already been characterised using a 
promissory analysis. Firstly, under the influence of German law, advertisements of 
                                                 
76  As discussed in Chapter VII Part II, D. USING PROMISES TO GUARANTEE EXISTING 
OBLIGATIONS, (3) Collateral warranties. 
77 As discussed in Chapter VII Part I, B. USING PROMISE TO CREATE OBLIGATIONS, (4) IOUs. 
78 See Chapter VII Part II, C. USING PROMISES AS ENTICEMENTS, (2) Prize competitions. 





reward and prize competitions are regarded as unilateral obligations.80 Secondly, 
there is evidence of the usage of promises to lease in legal practice. This practice is 
useful for present purposes because it is an actual practice of individuals which is not 
recognised under the Code. The juristic nature of a promise to lease is similar to that 
of a promise of sale, namely a unilateral obligation. The court, however, does not 
describe it using a promissory analysis because promise is not the main route for the 
creation of voluntary obligations. Therefore, the approach of regarding a promise as 
a standalone obligation would be helpful because it assists the courts by explaining 
the nature of the transaction using the correct legal analysis.81 Additionally, hire 
purchase can be viewed as an option. This is compatible with its characteristics 
because the hirer has an option, not an obligation, to purchase the property.82  
 
Moreover, there could be more situations which could be analysed using promissory 
reasoning. Firstly, a promissory analysis could resolve some of the issues in Thai 
contract law. This is obviously the case with tendering processes, where the Thai 
courts cannot enforce a final contract, even though there is a tendering contract 
between the parties.83 Also, promises to waive contractual rights can be characterised 
as unilateral obligations, which would not be required to be registered with a 
competent official.84 Secondly, promise provides Thai lawyers with a more 
convincing and appropriate analysis for certain legal problems, as can be seen from 
the example of letters of credit. Their nature is neither compatible with contract nor 
third party rights. A promissory analysis is appropriate for their legal nature, as well 
as being compatible with the explanation of letters of credit given by Thai lawyers.85 
Thirdly, some practical circumstances in which Thai law has no specific legal 
principles could also be characterised as promissory in nature. Examples include 
                                                 
80 As discussed in Ibid at section (1) Advertisements of reward and (2) Prize competitions. 
81 As discussed in Chapter VII Part I, B. USING PROMISE TO CREATE OBLIGATIONS, (1) 
Options, (b) Thai law, (ii) Promise to lease. 
82 As discussed in Ibid at sub-heading (i) Hire purchase. 
83 As discussed in Chapter VII Part I, A. PRE-CONTRACTUAL PROMISES, (2) Promises about the 
tendering process, (b) Thai law. 
84 See Chapter VII Part II, E. USING PROMISE TO ALTER/WAIVE OBLIGATIONS, (1) Promises 
to waive contractual right. 
85 As discussed in Chapter VII Part I, B. USING PROMISE TO CREATE OBLIGATIONS, (3) 





guarantees of products/services to non-consumers86 and marketing offers87. Finally, 
some Scottish commercial practices could form useful models in Thai law e.g. 
collateral warranties.88 These examples also support what has been proposed in this 
thesis: that promise should be recognised separately from contract under Thai law.  
 
(6) Promissory case law and the role of the courts in the application of promise 
 
(a) Scots law 
 
The digest of case law presented in Chapter III and the discussion of case law in 
Chapters V and VI show that promise has been used in Scots law in various forms. 
This ranges from the simple promises used in daily life (e.g. a promise of a gift or to 
give money) to the complex promises used in commercial practice (e.g. an option to 
purchase property contained in a lease). The statistics89 show that the volume of case 
law relating to promise has increased in the past decade. Since 2005, there have been 
more than ten cases in which promissory grounds were relied on by the 
pursuers/petitioners and/or in which the judge discussed promise. This differs from 
the period between 1995 and 2004, when, according to statistics90, there were fewer 
than five cases relating to promise. This suggests that in fact the number of instances 
in which promise is determinative could have increased if the courts applied 
promissory doctrine to these transactions.  Moreover, there are other transactions 
which could have been characterised as a promise, but the court analysed them using 
a contractual analysis. As has been argued in this thesis, a promissory analysis is the 
most appropriate approach in characterising some transactions such as letters of 
credit, promises attached to invitation to tenders and IOUs. In addition, some 
transactions such as cautionary obligations and collateral warranties can arise either 
from an offer or a unilateral undertaking, but the courts tend to regard them as 
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87 See Chapter VII Part II, C. USING PROMISES AS ENTICEMENTS, (3) Marketing offers. 
88 This is proposed in Chapter VII Part II, D. USING PROMISES TO GUARANTEE EXISTING 
OBLIGATIONS, (2) Thai law. 
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contractual in nature. This suggests that in fact the number of instances in which 
promise is determinative could have increased if the courts applied promissory 
doctrine to these transactions. 
 
Moreover, the Scottish courts have also played an important role in the application of 
promissory doctrine. Firstly, the courts have established the rule that an intention to 
undertake a binding promise must be analysed using an objective approach. 91 
Secondly, the courts have developed the approach that the constitution of a 
promissory obligation must be clearly expressed.92  The aforementioned approach 
enhances the application of promissory doctrine by making it clear that a binding 
promise must be clearly expressed so that it can be objectively found that the 
obligation has been created. The lack of such an approach would result in 
uncertainties when the court determines whether a promissory relationship between 
the parties exists or not. Also, a person may easily be faced with liability even if no 
promissory relationship exists. 
 
(b) Thai law 
 
While the case law concerning promises of reward is scarce, there is a large amount 
of case law concerning promises to enter into a contract. This shows that it is more 
common for Thai people to make promises to a specific promisee, rather than to the 
public. However, the legal nature and effect of a promise to make a contract remains 
unclear, as can be seen from the discussion throughout this thesis. Therefore, it is 
necessary to clarify the ambiguities so that applications of the doctrine can be made 
more appropriately. However, the role of the Thai courts in the application of 
promises is not as helpful as in the case of the Scottish courts.  Although there are 
several uncertainties in the law of promise which provide the Thai courts with an 
opportunity to clarify these uncertainties, the promissory rules established by the 
Thai courts offer a rather unsatisfactory outcome. For instance, the Thai courts have 
not clarified that the actual juristic nature of a promise to make a contract is a 
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unilateral juristic act.93 Also, the courts’ position that a promise lapses as a result of 
the death of the promisor and a promise binds the promisor forever are not 
satisfactory.94 
 
(7) Promise from the perspective of the DCFR 
 
The notion of a unilateral undertaking in the DCFR illustrates that the most recent 
model rules of European private law recognise the importance of a unilateral 
obligation.95 This recognises that there are certain situations in which a person 
unilaterally intends his/her undertaking to be bound without acceptance. The notion 
of a contract cannot appropriately deal with this kind of situation, since it requires the 
acceptance of the other party. The difficulty of a contractual analysis can be 
identified from the discussion throughout this thesis when referring to jurisdictions in 
which the idea of unilateral obligation does not exist as a general rule. For instance, 
the English courts have faced problems when dealing with promises attached to an 
invitation to treat.96 The courts wanted such an invitation to be binding in order to 
provide a fair result so they had to apply the concept of unilateral contract to deal 
with the case. However, promises attached to an invitation to treat cannot be 
appropriately characterised as unilateral contracts.  This resulted in criticism that the 
court failed to apply the appropriate legal doctrine. 
 
Moreover, the DCFR offers a clear approach to deal with promissory obligations. For 
instance, it provides that a unilateral juristic act, including a promise, must be 
communicated to the person to whom it is addressed.  This is useful for both Scots 
and Thai law, since whether a promise is required to be communicated is uncertain in 
both systems. Also, like Scots law, the DCFR has the rule that the promisee has a 
right to reject the promise. This rule is useful for Thai law. Under Thai law, it is 
                                                 
93 As observed in Chapter V, B. THEORIES AND DOCTRINES RELATING TO PROMISE IN 
THAI LAW (1) The notion of a juristic act and (2) Promissory theory as explained by Thai writers. 
94 As discussed in Chapter VI, D. LEGAL EFFECTS OF A PROMISE, (2) Thai law. 
95 See Chapter VI, A. THE NATURE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF PROMISE, (3) Comparison. 
96 As discussed in Chapter VII Part I, A. PRE-CONTRACTUAL PROMISES, (2) Promises about the 
tendering process, A. PRE-CONTRACTUAL PROMISES, (2) Promises about the tendering process, 





uncertain whether a promisee can reject a promise or not. In addition, the DCFR also 
uses an objective approach, which is compatible with both Scots and Thai law. This 
reinforces the argument made in this thesis that the objective approach provides a 
fairer outcome. 
 
Furthermore, the recognition of unilateral undertakings in the DCFR shows that 
promise now has an important role to play in the most recent model of European 
private law. . The enforceability of promise originated under the influence of the 
Canon Law.97 It was then used as the core of the explanation of voluntary obligations 
by the late scholastic jurists. This thesis argues that the Grotian tradition ended the 
binding force of a unilateral promise (for most of Europe).98 The fact that the DCFR 
recognises a unilateral obligation suggests that the idea of a unilateral promise, as a 
source of obligations, is an important concept in the theoretical structure of the law 
of obligation. 
 
(8) The binding force of unilateral promise in English law 
 
This thesis considers the binding force of a promise in English law from the 
perspective of the doctrines of promissory and proprietary estoppel.  It has been 
shown that the English courts have changed their attitude towards the binding force 
of a unilateral promise in this situation. Historically, promissory and proprietary 
estoppels could only be used as a defence. However, recent case law suggests that 
they can be used as the basis of a cause of action.  In addition, it appears that the 
English courts have adopted a holistic approach when dealing with estoppel in recent 
cases.99 All of these factors reinforce the importance of unilateral promise in the 
obligational framework.  This is because even the courts in England, where it is most 
difficult to enforce a unilateral promise, have adopted a more flexible approach to 
enforcement of a unilateral promise. 
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98 See Chapter III, A. STAIR AND THE DOCTRINE OF PROMISE, (3) The divergence between 
Scots law and other European systems. 
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B. WHAT CAN BE LEARNED FROM SCOTS LAW? 
 
(1) Restrictions of the doctrine of promise 
 
The recognition of a unilateral obligation in Scots law is wider than in jurisdictions 
where a unilateral declaration of will can only create an obligation in certain limited 
circumstances (e.g. Germany) and where a unilateral promise must be accepted in 
order to be binding (e.g. France). Thus, in theory the binding force of a unilateral 
promise in Scots law is more flexible compared to other Civilian systems. However, 
the theoretical status of the enforceability of a promise in Scots law is limited by 
some factors.  
 
Firstly, in Scots law, the circumstances in which unilateral obligations can be created 
and proved have been restricted since 1771, when the court ruled 100  that a promise 
could only be proved by writ or oath of the promisor, and not by witness. This is 
different from proof of promise under the Canon Law, where the substance of 
obligations is more important than formalities.101 This shows that Scots law adopted 
the canonical approach whereby bare promises are legally enforceable, albeit with 
stricter requirements of proof. Although these rules were abolished later, the law 
continues to control the constitutive requirement of promissory obligations. A 
gratuitous unilateral obligation needs to be in writing, with some exceptions such as 
a promise that is undertaken in the course of business and statutory personal bar. The 
restrictive rules on the proof and constitution of a unilateral obligation illustrate that 
the theoretical status of a promise as a binding obligation is limited by these rules.102 
 
Secondly, the Scottish courts have developed the approach that a promise must be 
expressed in clear terms.103  The development of the court regarding clear terms 
shows similarities to the restrictive rules regarding the proof of a promise that existed 
within the ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Recall that the canonists reasoned that promises 
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should be legally binding irrespective of the necessary formalities. However, they 
were concerned that this could lead to unlimited claims in the Church’s courts. It was 
therefore established that the Church had jurisdiction solely in cases where the 
promise had been accompanied by an oath. What can be learned from the restrictive 
rules regarding the proof of a promise and the court’s approach regarding clear words 
may be that there have always been attempts to limit the scope of unilateral 
obligations. This may stem from the fear that the application of the obligation may 
go too far. If there is no restriction regarding the proof of a unilateral obligation, or a 
requirement for its constitution that it must be in writing or clearly expressed, a 
person may too easily be faced with liability. The law therefore has to find a balance 
between protecting an aggrieved promisee and the party who is alleged to have 
broken the promise. 
 
Nonetheless, it is not suggested in this thesis that the binding force of a promise is 
substantially limited by the restrictive rules discussed above. Firstly, the requirement 
of writing only applies to “gratuitous unilateral obligations”. Therefore, according to 
the preferred approach of this thesis, promises that are not gratuitous are not 
restricted by the writing formality. Secondly, there is also an exception for promises 
“undertaken in the course of business” not to be made in writing.104 The discussion in 
this thesis shows that in Scots law there are a number of business transactions that 
can be analysed using a promissory analysis. Finally, the requirements of writing are 
waived for promises that fall within the scope of the statutory personal bar (ss 1(3) 
and (4) of the Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995).105 It is true that the 
criteria set out in s 1 (4) create a burden for the person who seeks to enforce such 
promises.106 Nonetheless, there will certainly be circumstances in which these 
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criteria are met.107 Therefore, these leave much space for the doctrine of promise in 
practical terms. 
 
(2) Suggestions for Scots law 
 
It is noteworthy, in a jurisdiction where unilateral promise is recognised and has been 
developed very well at a conceptual level, that the preferred approach, in some cases, 
is contractual. The preference for a contractual analysis may be rooted in the fact that 
Scotland is a mixed legal system. Although the reception of the Canon Law and the 
ius commune in Scotland facilitated the development of a promissory analysis, 
English law, where unilateral promise is generally not binding, remains an important 
influence. This illustrates that, although promise originated in part in the Civilian 
tradition, there has still been a strong influence from English contract law. However, 
the adoption of a contractual analysis of a unilateral undertaking is inappropriate in 
jurisdictions in which a unilateral obligation is regarded as being independent. If a 
person intends his/her expression to be legally binding without acceptance, the court 
should apply a unilateral promissory analysis to his/her expression.  
 
Moreover, a conceptual analysis involving unilateral obligations is very useful in 
practice. There are several practical circumstances which can be conceptualised 
under a promissory analysis in order to provide more satisfactory results. 108  
According to the discussion in this thesis, a promissory analysis provides more 
flexibility for case analysis than a contractual analysis. This is because the latter 
cannot appropriately deal with a situation in which a person intends his/her 
undertaking to be binding without acceptance. In addition, a promissory analysis 
provides better protection to the promisee than the offeree in a contractual analysis 
because a unilateral obligation is binding once it has been made and cannot be 
revoked afterwards. 
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Nevertheless, while promise is well developed at a theoretical level, its use in 
practice is weaker than it might be. It often offers a more workable legal solution in 
practice than specifying a contract. Particularly, in commercial contexts, as observed, 
specific promises, e.g. pre-contractual undertakings, firm offers, options, and 
collateral warranties, are used by business parties in situations where they intend to 
make some gain. A promissory analysis provides a wider scope in dealing with 
transactions and can fulfil business functions. The courts and those in legal practice 
should therefore be more aware of the existence of promise as a possible solution to 
commercial problems, particularly because promises given in commercial contexts 
do not require to be constituted in writing. 
 
Furthermore, the Scottish promissory approach can be used as guidance for other 
jurisdictions such as Thai law. Thai lawyers have found it difficult to apply the law 
of promise, at both a conceptual and a practical level. As has been argued in this 
thesis, the adoption of the Scottish approach, which regards a promise as an 
independent obligation, helps to eradicate the problems under Thai law.109 Similarly, 
the DCFR recognises a unilateral obligation as being separate from a contract, which 
is similar to the Scottish approach. These examples illustrate that the promissory 
doctrine is a valuable one, which should be preserved and developed within the 
Scottish jurisdiction. 
 
C. WHAT CAN BE LEARNED FROM THAI LAW? 
 
(1) Lessons from Thai law on the law of promise 
 
This comparative analysis has highlighted some aspects of Thai law which are useful 
to other jurisdictions. Firstly, Thai promissory law is a mixture of the Civilian and 
English legal traditions. This results in confusion over the legal nature and 
application of promise in Thai law. This thesis argues that these flaws occurred 
because, inter alia, the Thai Code was drafted without any clear understanding of the 
                                                 






actual nature of promise within the overall framework of obligations.110 The drafters 
used the term “promise” both in the sense of a unilateral obligation (e.g. promise of 
reward and promise to make a contract) and in the sense of contractual promise (e.g. 
promise to pay remuneration). Moreover, during the period of the drafting of the 
Code, they occasionally used the term “an agreement to buy or to sell” when 
referring to a “promise of sale”, despite the fact that these two concepts were 
different juristic acts. Also, in the cases of promise to pay a penalty and promissory 
notes, the draftsmen translated the word “promise” and “promissory note” as “สญัญา” 
(which literally means contract) and “ตัว๋สญัญาใชเ้งิน” (which literally means “a 
contractual note to pay a sum”). All these illustrate defects in drafting the promissory 
provisions under the Thai Code. They also reflect the fact that the draftsmen could 
not differentiate between the juristic nature of unilateral and bilateral obligations.  
 
Secondly, the fact that the Code was not well drafted causes problems for Thai 
lawyers in terms of the application of the law of promise. For instance, the provisions 
of promise of reward (which is a unilateral obligation) are contained in the Section of 
Formation of Contract. Some therefore regard a promise of reward as a contractual 
obligation, which it in fact is not. Moreover, the fact that a promise to make a 
contract requires acceptance leads Thai lawyers to believe that this type of promise is 
per se an offer. This results in difficulty in distinguishing the two from each other. 
Furthermore, Thai writers have failed satisfactorily to explain some contractual 
principles within the legal framework of contract law such as the case of an offer 
containing a time limit for acceptance that is irrevocable. The draftsmen, again, 
adopted this rule from German law without acknowledging that the binding effect of 
this rule stems from its status as a unilateral obligation. These problems reinforce the 
claim of this thesis that the Thai Code was not well drafted and organised. 
 
What can be learned from the foregoing is that it is important for lawyers to have a 
full understanding of legal concepts when they adopt foreign legal principles into 
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their native systems. The lack of such a clear understanding can result in flaws in the 
reception of foreign law as well as difficulties in its legal application. 
 
(2) Examples of where Scots law could learn from Thai law 
 
Although the concept of promise under Thai law is less clear than that of Scots law, 
there are examples of where Scots law could learn from Thai law. 
 
Firstly, Thai law categorises expressions of willingness along a spectrum based on 
the degree to which a person who makes the expressions desires to bind 
himself/herself.111  A similar approach can also be created under Scots law because 
this categorisation is compatible with the current situation under Scots law. It is clear 
that a promisor has a stronger desire to be bound by his/her expression in comparison 
with a person making expressions which are not obligatory. Also, the extent to which 
the promisor wishes to be bound is stronger than that of an offeror. An offeror can 
withdraw the offer at any time before it is accepted, whereas a promisor cannot do 
so. This illustrates that the intention of an offeror to be bound is weaker compared to 
that of a promisor because the former can change his/her mind as long as his/her 
offer has not been accepted, whereas the latter cannot. It is also clear that the extent 
to which an offer wishes his/her intention to be binding is stronger than that of a 
person who makes an invitation to treat. Nonetheless, there is no need for Scots law 
to adopt the idea of an overture. This is because, as discussed, an overture and an 
invitation to treat can be actually classified as the same kind of expression, given that 
neither of them can be accepted and thus, cannot result in a binding contract.112 
 
Secondly, Thai law has a general theory of juristic acts. This theory helps to clarify 
some ambiguities of the law of promise. First, it enhances the understanding of the 
actual juristic nature of a promise that it is a unilateral juristic act because a promise 
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can be constituted by the will of one party.113 Second, it provides an answer to the 
question whether a promise under Thai law is always gratuitous or not. Although this 
issue has never been discussed by Thai lawyers due to the fact that promise is not a 
main source of obligation, the concept of the gratuitousness of juristic acts helps us 
to analyse the claim that a promise is not necessarily gratuitous.114  Although Scots 
law is familiar with the notion of a juristic act to a certain degree, a general theory of 
this concept is absent. This may be something that Scots law can learn from Thai 
law. Under the wider scope of a juristic act, one can understand the actual legal status 
of promise under Thai law and whether it is always gratuitous or not. Thus, a 
development of a general theory of juristic acts may be beneficial for Scots law to 
deal with some uncertainties in the area of promissory law. For instance, if a theory 
was developed that a unilateral juristic act requires to be communicated to the person 
to whom it is made, this would help to eradicate uncertainties regarding the 
communication of a promise in Scots law. 
 
In short, the Thai approach to classifying these expressions helps to illuminate the 
distinction between promises and other types of expression in Scots law, given that 
this kind of characterisation has already existed in Scots law but is not clearly 
presented by Scots lawyers. Also, the unified concept of juristic acts may benefit 
Scots law in dealing with some legal uncertainties. 
 
(3) Could the Scots approach be adapted for Thai law? 
 
Thailand has borrowed legal principles from both the Civilian and Common Law 
traditions. The reception of these legal principles results in the mixed nature of its 
legal systems. Likewise, the Scots legal system is mixed because it has been 
influenced both by the Civil Law and English Law. The experience of Scots law 
could inspire changes in Thai law. This type of legal influence has never happened 
before in Thai private law. As mixed jurisdictions, they may influence one another.  
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Moreover, the underlying basis of the law of obligations and promissory law in both 
systems shows many similarities to each other. Firstly, both systems recognise the 
notion of a juristic act. Secondly, in both systems a promise is classified as a 
unilateral juristic act. Thirdly, the unilateral nature of promise is similar both in the 
sense that the obligation can be unilaterally created and that only the promisor is 
obliged to perform the obligation. The second and the third similarities are 
particularly important because they concern the juristic nature of promise, and Scots 
law can be very helpful for inspiring Thai law on this point. Although Thai law 
borrowed the notion of unilateral obligation from German law, the origin of this 
doctrine is the Canon Law. As has been argued in this thesis, Scots law is the only 
European jurisdiction that preserves the canonical tradition of enforcing unilateral 
obligation. The notion of unilateral obligation was largely ended in Continental 
Europe by the Grotian tradition, which explains that a promise requires acceptance. 
However, the concept survived in German law in relation to certain kinds of 
obligations that cannot be characterised as contractual in nature, and the German 
approach towards unilateral obligation later inspired Thai law. Therefore, the 
provenance of promissory obligation in both Scots law and Thai law is the same 
because the concept actually originated in the Canon Law. As a result, Scots law, as 
the only European jurisdiction that preserves the canonical approach towards 
unilateral obligation and has a clear concept of the law of promise, can be very 
helpful in resolving uncertainties of Thai promissory law. Fourthly, promissory law 
is consistent with the will theory in both systems.  Finally, according to the preferred 
approach of this thesis, a promise in both systems can be either gratuitous or non-
gratuitous. Therefore, the new approach of regarding a promise as a standalone 
obligation would not be a total change for Thai law. This is because the underlying 
basis of Thai promissory law is fundamentally similar to that of Scots law. Also, 
Thai law is familiar with the notion that a unilateral declaration of will can create a 
binding obligation.  
 
Moreover, regarding a promise as an independent obligation would not affect the 





exchange of promises, but rather as an agreement. In addition, Scots law 
acknowledges the distinction between unilateral and bilateral obligations, an 
approach which has never been acknowledged by Thai lawyers. Furthermore, as 
noted, there would be a number of obvious advantages if Thai law recognised 
promise as a free-standing legal entity. Therefore, the Scots approach of regarding 
promise as a standalone obligation could be adapted for Thai law. The new approach 
would definitely improve the application of this doctrine within Thai private law.  
 
(4) Suggestions for Thai law 
  
This thesis has proposed the new approach of considering promise as a standalone 
obligation under Thai law. Under this proposed scheme, promise will be seen as a 
unilateral juristic act that is separate from contract. Amendments to the Thai Code 
are therefore required. 
 
Currently, the provisions regarding promise are contained in the Book of Obligations 
(Book II), Title of Contract and the Book of Specific Contracts (Book III). 
Accordingly, it is necessary to separate the promissory provisions from the 
contractual ones. Under the current Code, there are four provisions about promises of 
reward contained in the part on the formation of contract (§§362-365) in Book II. In 
order to cause the smallest impact from the amendment, this thesis suggests using 
these four provisions for the promissory provisions so that the change will not affect 
the numbering of contractual provisions. Under the current Code, the contractual 
provisions start from §354 while the provisions which will be used for promise are 
§§362-365. This thesis suggests using §§354-357 instead of §§362-365 for the 
promissory provisions, and then the contractual provisions will begin from §358. 
This will separate promises and contracts. This will cause the smallest impact in 
terms of the numerical changes within the Code Sections. For reasons of clarity, the 
portions of texts which are the author’s own drafting will appear in italics while 











A valid unilateral promise is binding on the promisor if it is intended to be 




The most common way of drafting legislation is to begin with general provisions. 
Therefore, it is appropriate to use §354, which is the first provision on promissory 
obligations, for the general concept of promise.  
 
This provision is mainly derived from Art II.-1:103(2) of the DCFR, concerning the 
binding effect of a unilateral undertaking. There is, however, a slight difference 
between the suggested texts and the DCFR texts in that the latter uses the term 
“unilateral undertaking”. It is more suitable to use the term “unilateral promise” 
because Thai law is more familiar with “promise” than with “undertaking” in the 
context of voluntary obligations. It is also more appropriate to use the term 
“unilateral promise” rather than “promise” in order to emphasise that it is a unilateral 
obligation. 
 
Moreover, the term “undertaking” seems to suggest that the concept is wider than 
“promise”. The Commentary explains that “there is no essential difference between a 
unilateral ‘promise’ intended to be binding without acceptance and a unilateral 
‘undertaking’ intended to be binding without acceptance”.116 Rather, it is merely a 
linguistic difference.117 The term “promise” is more suitable for contexts such as a 
promise to pay a reward, whereas the term “undertaking” is naturally appropriate for 
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other contexts, e.g. the assumption of a security obligation.118 Nevertheless, it is 
suggested in this thesis that the concept of unilateral undertaking could be wide 
enough to encompass a spontaneous act of donation. However, such an act would not 
appear to involve any promise. Hence, undertaking is a wider idea than promise, so 
that it includes but is not limited to promises. Consequently, it is more appropriate to 
use the term “promise” under the general provision of promissory obligation. 
 
The new §354 expresses the fact that a promise is legally binding as a unilateral 
obligation which is binding without acceptance. This is more suitable than the view 
that an acceptance is required. If a promise requires acceptance, it could cause 
confusion with offer, where the latter always requires an acceptance. This provision 
is intended to apply in all circumstances which can be analysed using the promissory 
approach e.g. promises to make a contract, promise to lease, letters of credit, 
promises about the tendering process and marketing offers. 
 
(b) §355 (Gratuitousness and proof of promise) 
 
(i) Text 
A unilateral promise may be gratuitous or non-gratuitous. A gratuitous 
unilateral promise is a unilateral promise that benefits only the promisee.  A non-
gratuitous unilateral promise is a unilateral promise under which both promisor and 
promisee benefit. Benefits may be in the form of payments, properties, interests, 
services, actions or other performances. In cases where a unilateral promise is 
attached to, or connected with, another juristic act, it is also deemed to be non-
gratuitous if the promisor receives benefits from the attached or connected juristic 
act. 
A gratuitous unilateral promise is not enforceable unless there is some 
written evidence of the promise signed by the promisor. 
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Paragraph one is inspired by the experience of Scots law, in which there is a debate 
over whether promises are always gratuitous. This thesis argues that the more 
workable theory is that promises are not always gratuitous. Promise is often used to 
form part of a network of transactions in which the promisor intends to make some 
gain. The definitions of gratuitous and non-gratuitous promises provided are based 
on the idea of the gratuitousness of a juristic act under Thai law. The law is 
determined from the nature of a juristic act or an obligation, rather than from the fact 
that only one party is bound when the obligation is constituted. If each of the parties 
receives benefits, the juristic act/obligation will not be considered to be gratuitous. 
 
It is proposed that benefits may occur in the form of payments, properties, interests, 
services, actions or other performances that are advantageous to the promissory 
parties. Moreover, where a unilateral promise is attached to, or connected with, 
another juristic act and a promisor benefits from the attached/connected juristic act, 
the promise will be deemed to be non-gratuitous. This proposition is significant since 
it makes the interpretation of gratuitousness compatible with a practical feature of a 
promise, namely that promisors often use a promise to form part of a wider series of 
transactions from which they can benefit. There are a number of promissory 
undertakings in which a promisor may not directly benefit from the promise, but 
benefits may be obtained from another transaction to which the promise is attached 
or connected. In these circumstances, promises should be deemed to be non-
gratuitous according to their actual nature.  
 
Paragraph two deals with proof of promise. It is inspired by Scots law, in which the 
binding force of a promise is limited by statutory formalities relating to writing 
However, a different approach from that of Scots law is offered in this thesis. Thai 
law should adopt the idea of “written evidence” rather than “written form” as proof 






As discussed, the idea behind the restrictive rules on the circumstances in which a 
promise can be constituted or proved may stem from the fact that, inter alia, the law 
needs to strike a balance between protecting the aggrieved party and the party alleged 
to have broken the promise. Since the ground of a promise is based on a unilateral 
claim, there must be clear evidence that the obligation has actually been created. In 
Thai law, written evidence illustrates this fact since it has to be signed by the party 
who is liable. Therefore, the idea of “written evidence” in Thai law appears to be 
compatible with the idea behind the restrictive rules on the circumstances in which a 
promise can be constituted or proved in Scots law. Like the case of Scots law, it is 
proposed in this thesis that the requirement of written evidence only applies in cases 
of gratuitous promises. In some circumstances, promissory undertakings in which a 
promisor intends to make some gains are unlikely to contain the signature of the 
party who is liable. For instance, a seller who offers a product guarantee does not 
usually sign the guarantee even if it appears in the form of a document. Also, offers 
from supermarkets of “buy one get one free” products are not usually accompanied 
by a signature. According to the proposed approach of this thesis, proof of a promise 
is subject to “written evidence”, i.e. a promise has to be signed by the promisor in 
order to be enforceable. Hence, it is important to treat transactions, such as 
product/service guarantees and “buy one get one free offers”, as non-gratuitous and 
to provide that the requirement of written evidence (for proof of promise) does not 
apply to non-gratuitous promises. 
 
Moreover, it is proposed in this thesis that Thai law should adopt the Scottish 
approach regarding an exception to the requirement of formal writing to unilateral 
obligations “undertaken in the course of business”. Promises made by businesses are 
usually non-gratuitous. Therefore, in line with the proposed approach of this thesis, 
they are not required to be made in a written form. Nevertheless, business may 
sometimes act for charitable reasons, i.e. the promisor does not benefit from making 
the promise. This suggests that an exception to the requirement of written evidence 
in relation to promises “undertaken in the course of business”, in some cases, is 





undertaken in the business context.119 Thus, it is not difficult for the Thai courts to 
determine whether or not a promise was made in a business context. 
 




A unilateral promise comes into existence when the notice of the promise 
reaches the promisee. If a unilateral promise is made to the public, it comes into 
existence when the promise is made to the public either by advertisement or by 
public notice. 
A unilateral promise made to a specific person ceases to have effect when it 
is rejected by the promisee. 
A unilateral promise made to the public can be withdrawn by the same means 
which are used for advertisements or notices, as long as no person has completed the 
specified act, unless the promisor declared in his 120  promise that he would not 
withdraw it. If a unilateral promise cannot be withdrawn by means of the aforesaid, 
withdrawal may be made by other means, but in such a case the withdrawal of a 
unilateral promise is valid only against those persons who know of it. If the promisor 
has fixed a period within which the specified act must be performed, he is presumed 




This provision deals with the effects of promise. The first paragraph governs the time 
when the promise becomes effective. Current Thai law is uncertain over whether a 
promise requires communication or not. It is therefore necessary to clarify that a 
                                                 
119 For example, §35 bis of the Thai Consumer Protection Act (No 2) 1998 states: “In any business in 
connection with the sale of any goods or the provision of service if such contract of sale or such 
contract of service require by law or the custom to be made in writing, the Committee on Contract 
shall have the power to provide such business to be a controlled business with respect of contract. 
120 The official translation of the Thai Code uses the personal pronoun in the form “he”, rather than a 
compound pronoun in the form “he or she”. Therefore, the author follows the style of the Code for 





promise must be communicated, which is the preferred approach of this thesis. This 
paragraph was inspired by the DCFR provision in relation to the requirement of a 
unilateral undertaking. The rule covers both promises made to the public and to a 
specific individual. This thesis suggests that a public promise takes effect when such 
a promise is made to the public either (i) on publication of the promise; or (ii) notice 
to the public. 
 
The second paragraph indicates that if a promise is rejected, it ceases to be effective. 
This approach is inspired by the rule under Scots law that a promise lapses once it is 
rejected. Additionally, it reflects the policy that a benefitted party has the freedom 
not to accept rights or benefits conferred by a unilateral promise. This rule is 
influenced by the policy regarding the freedom to reject rights or benefits arising 
from unilateral juristic acts under the DCFR (Art II.-4:303).121 An individual should 
have the freedom not to accept a right or benefit which he/she does not want.122 This 
policy is also consistent with the notion of the autonomy of the will in Thai law. 
 
It is not possible for a public promise to be rejected by a specific person because it is 
not made to anyone in particular. This thesis suggests that a promisor has a right to 
withdraw his/her promise made to the public, unless stated otherwise. This policy 
already exists under current Thai law in relation to advertisements of reward. This 
thesis suggests using this rule for the new §356 dealing with public promises in 
general. Therefore, the third paragraph (regarding the withdrawal of public promises) 
can be applied to all types of public promises. It is true that a promise is a standalone 
obligation (which in theory should be irrevocable once becoming effective) under the 
new approach. Nonetheless, when a promise made to the public first comes into 
existence, no specific individual has the right to enforce it. Hence, the promisor is 
justified in withdrawing the promise as long as the specific act stated in the promise 
has not been completed. Promisees are also protected because the withdrawal must 
be made by the same means used for the initial advertisement. If it is undertaken by 
other means, it is only valid against those who know about it.  
                                                 










A person who by advertisement promises that he will give a reward to a 
person whoever who performs a certain act is bound to give such reward to the any 
person who does performs the act, even if such person did not act with a view to the 
reward.124 
If there are several persons who have performed done the act specified in the 
advertisement, only that the one who does it first has a right to receive an equal share 
of the reward. If several persons do perform such act at the same time, each one has a 
right to receive an equal share of the reward. But if the reward is in its nature 
indivisible, or if by the terms of the promise only one person is to receive the reward, 
it is decided by lot. The provisions of the foregoing two paragraphs do not apply, if 
in the advertisement a different intention is declared.125 
A promise of reward which has a prize competition is valid only if a period of 
time is fixed in the advertisement. The decision whether any competitor fulfils the 
conditions of the promise within the period, or which one among several competitors 
deserves the preference, shall be made by the umpire named in the advertisement, or 
in the absence of any such umpire, by the promisor of the reward. The decision is 
binding upon the parties concerned. In case of equality of merit the provisions of the 
former paragraph apply correspondingly. The transfer of ownership of the thing 
produced may be demanded by the promisor only if he has specified in the 





                                                 
123 The texts of this provision are mainly derived from the existing provisions under the Thai Code 
(see notes 124-126- below for details). However, the author makes a number of changes in terms of 
grammar and word uses for reasons of grammatical correctness. Texts which are the author’s own 
drafting appear in italics. 
124 The texts are from §362 under the current Thai Code. 
125 The texts are from §364 under the current Thai Code. 







These three paragraphs replicated the existing provisions of the Code. Although 
under the new suggested approach the Code has §354 as a general provision of 
promise, it is still appropriate to keep the provision on promise of reward. This 
specific provision relates to the general one in the sense that it deals with more 
specific circumstances of promise of reward. 
 
The first paragraph clarifies that a person who performs the specified act is entitled 
to the reward even if he/she is not aware of the existence of such promise. This is 
necessary in order to avoid the question whether a person who completes the act is 
entitled to receive the reward or not if he/she is not aware of the existence of 
promise. This also emphasises the fact that a promise is distinct from a contract on 
the basis that there is no intention to enter into an agreement between parties. The 
second paragraph governs the situation where more than one person has completed 
the specific act, and dictates who is entitled to receive the reward. The last paragraph 
deals with specific details of prize competitions. All paragraphs of this provision 
replicated the existing provisions of the Code. However, under the new approach 
they are no longer classified within the general rules on contract. Instead, they are 
unilateral obligations, which is more appropriate for their actual character. 
 
(e) Promise to enter into a contract 
 
The fact that the Code only makes provision for promises to enter into specific kinds 
of contracts, namely, promise of sale and promise of a gift, has left it unclear as to 
whether individuals can promise to enter any other types of contract. This approach 
also limits promise to specific instances. However, based on the theories of freedom 
of contract and autonomy of will which play an essential role in Thai contract law, 
the general idea should be that individuals are permitted to make promises to enter 
into a contract. This would also provide a wider application of the idea of promise. 
The suggestions of this thesis, i.e. a general provision on promise and cancellation of 





approach, it is certain that individuals can make promises to enter into any type of 
contract. Such a promise is enforceable if the proposed terms are clear. 
 
(i) Promise of sale 
 
As the new Code has a general provision (i.e. the new §354) which covers all those 
circumstances which can be analysed using promise, there is no need to keep the 
existing provisions in relation to promises to make a contract. This is the case with 
promise of sale (§454).  The current §454 should therefore be deleted as this instance 
can be covered by the new general provision on promise.  
§454 
A previous promise of sale made by one party has the effect of a sale 
only when the other party has given notice of his intention to complete the 
sale and such notice has reached the person who made the promise. 
If no time has been fixed in the promise for such notification, the 
person who made the promise may fix a reasonable time and notify the other 
party to give a definite answer within that time whether he will complete the 
sale or not. If within that time he does not give a definite answer, the previous 
promise loses its effect. 
 
However, in the case of §456 para 2127 concerning requirement of written evidence 
of promise of sale of immoveable property, this thesis does not suggest removing the 
idea of “promise of sale” from the current §456 para 2. This is because this provision 
is not directly concerned with the legal nature of a promise of sale, which is different 





                                                 
127 “An agreement to sell or to buy any of the aforesaid property [moveable property], or a promise of 
sale of such property is not enforceable by action unless there is some written evidence signed by the 






(ii) Promise of a gift 
 
The existing §526 concerns the formality of a gift and promise of a gift, requiring 
them both to be in writing and registered. Since a promise of a gift can be covered by 
the new §355, this thesis suggests removing the current §526. The new §355 contains 
the rule regarding proof of promise, stipulating there must be written evidence of the 
promise signed by the promisor. Thus, a promise of a gift under the new approach 
would be enforceable only if the promisor signs the document. This new approach 
would be more practical than the current §526. It is unrealistic to expect parties who 
make a promise of a gift to register their transaction with a competent official. In 
fact, it is not possible to register any promise of a gift of moveable property because 
this kind of property is not governed by the registration system. 
 
In addition, although the current §526 governs the remedies concerning a promise of 
a gift (and provides that the promisee is entitled to claim the delivery of the gift or its 
value, but he/she is not entitled to any additional compensations), this rule is the 
same as the general rule of remedies under Thai law.128 Hence, it is not necessary to 
provide this rule. This thesis therefore suggests that it would be better to remove the 
current §526. 
§526 
If a gift or a promise for a gift has been made in writing and registered by the 
competent official and the donor does not deliver to the donee the property given, the 
donee is entitled to claim the delivery of it or its value, but he is not entitled to any 
additional compensation. 
 
(f) Promise to waive contractual rights 
 
Section 522 of the Code states: “A gift may be made by granting to the donee the 
release of an obligation or by performing an obligation due from the donee.”  The 
current position under Thai law is that a creditor’s proposal to waive a contractual 
right is deemed to be a promise of a gift, which is required to be made in writing and 
                                                 





registered with a competent official. The current approach is impractical because in 
reality a creditor who wishes to waive a contractual right to his/her debtor does not 
register his/her proposal with a competent official. Under the proposed approach of 
this thesis, proof of promise of a gift is governed by the general rule regarding proof 
of promises. A gratuitous promise of a gift is unenforceable unless there is some 
written evidence signed by the promisor. Thus, a promise to waive contractual rights 
(which is normally gratuitous) will be enforceable only if there is written evidence 
signed by the promisor. The suggested approach would be more efficient because it 
would suit the actual practice of parties. Therefore, there is no necessity to make any 
changes to the current §522.  
 
(g) Promise to pay remuneration 
 
The term “promise” in §576 refers to a contractual promise. The nature of the 
promise to pay remuneration is, however, contractual, rather than promissory. The 
law assumes that there is an implied contract between the parties. The employer is 
bound to pay the remuneration, where it cannot be expected that the employee will 
do the work gratuitously. Since under the new proposed scheme promise is 
distinguished from contract, promissory language should not be used in this 
provision, in which the nature of the obligation is contractual. Accordingly, this 
thesis suggests removing the word “promise” from the existing §576. It is suggested 
in this thesis that the term “the obligation to pay remuneration” is used instead of 
“the promise to pay remuneration”. It reflects the actual relationship between the 
parties, namely, that the employer is obliged to pay the remuneration to the 
employee. This obligation, which is not a promise, is implied by the law when the 
parties have not expressly agreed that the employee would be paid for the work. 
§576. 
The promise to pay a The obligation to pay remuneration is implied, if, under 








(h) Promise to pay a penalty for not performing an obligation 
 
The Thai drafters translated the term “promise” in the provisions of promise to pay a 
penalty as “สญัญา” in Thai, but the foregoing term literally means a contract (noun) or 
to contract (verb). Given that in the new proposed scheme a promise and a contract 
are different obligations, this thesis suggests changing the term “สญัญา” (contract) in 
the provisions of promises to pay a penalty for not performing an obligation. In these 
provisions, the term “promises” is used both as a noun and a verb. The former should 
be translated as “ค ามัน่” (which literally means “promise” as a noun). The latter should 
be translated as “ให้ค  ามัน่” (which literally means “promise” as a verb). The new 
proposal is useful because creditors can enforce a stipulated penalty regardless of 
whether the contract has been rescinded.  
 
The proposition offered by this thesis is useful because it means that creditors can 
enforce a stipulated penalty regardless of whether the contract has been rescinded.  It 
will be recalled, Thai scholars explain that a promise to pay a penalty is collateral to 
an existing contract because of the translation of the term “promise” as “สญัญา” 
(which literally means contract), in the provisions of promise to pay a penalty. The 
law states that all contracting parties are restored to their original rights when a 
contract has been rescinded. Therefore, a promise to pay a penalty, which is 
collateral to the rescinded contract, no longer exists. However, this seems to be 
unfair to creditors who have been promised that they would receive stipulated 
penalty if debtors do not perform their obligations. The unfairness lies in the fact that 
Thai lawyers propose that a promise to pay a penalty should be enforceable by 
regarding that a stipulated penalty as being akin to damages. Also, some propose that 
creditors can enforce the stipulated penalty if they reserved the right to do so before 
terminating the contract. This suggests that if a promise to pay a penalty for not 
performing an obligation is characterised as a unilateral obligation, the effect of the 
promise would not be affected even though the contract has been rescinded. This is 






(i) Other changes 
 
As has been suggested, under the new proposed scheme, promise will be regarded as 
an independent source of obligations. It will appear in Book II: Obligations along 
with other independent sources of obligations, namely contract, delict, negotiorum 
gestio and unjustified enrichment. Specifically, it will appear in Title II “Contract” 
(where the current §§354-357 belong to). Therefore, it is necessary to change the 
name of the foregoing title from “Contract” to “Unilateral Promise”. In addition, it is 
necessary to add a new Title for contractual provisions. The new title in which 
contractual provisions (§§358-394) belong should appear as “Title III Contract”. 
Moreover, it is necessary to change the number of title III Management of Affairs 
without Mandates (negotiorum gestio) from Title III to Title IV. Finally, the number 
of title IV Undue Enrichment should be changed to Title V. 
 
Furthermore, there are still references to promise in some provisions in Book III: 
Specific Contracts. Examples are §572 (hire purchase), §825 (promises made by a 
third party to an agent), §848 (promises made by a third person to a broker) and 
§§982-986 (promissory notes). Also, there are legal requirements for specific types 
of contracts and promises which appear in Book III e.g. §456 para 2 (requirements of 
written evidence for an agreement to buy or sell and a promise of sale of immoveable 
property). Therefore, this thesis suggests changing the name of Book III from 
“Specific Contracts” to “Specific Obligations”. This is helpful since specific 
contracts under the current Code such as hire purchase and promissory notes can be 
characterised as promissory in nature under the new proposed scheme. This is also a 
way of reflecting the fact that contract is no longer the only or the main route for 
creating voluntary obligations under Thai law, since unilateral promise is the other 















Index of sources of promise of reward under Thai law 
 
Thai Code129 Japanese Code130 BGB131 
§362 
A person who by 
advertisement promises 
that he will give a 
reward to whoever shall 
do a certain act is 
bound to give such 
reward to any person 
who does the act, even 
if such person did not 
act with a view to the 
reward. 
Art 529 
A person who advertises 
that he will give a certain 
reward to whoever shall do 
a certain act is bound to 
give such reward to any 
person who does the act. 
§657 
A person who by public 
notice announces a reward 
for the performance of an 
act, e.g., for the production 
of a result, is bound to pay 
the reward to any person 
who has performed the act, 
even if he did not act with 
a view to the reward. 
§363 
     In the case of the 
foregoing section the 
promisor may, so long 
as there is no person 
who has completed the 
specified act, withdraw 
his promise by the same 
means which he used 
for advertising, unless 
he has declared in the 
advertisement that he 
would not withdraw it. 
     If a promise cannot 
be withdrawn by the 
means aforesaid, 
withdrawal may be 
Art 530 
     The advertiser may at 
any time before the 
specified act has been 
completed, withdraw his 
advertisement by the same 
means which he used for 
advertising, unless he has 
declared therein that he 
would not withdraw it. 
     If the advertisement 
cannot be withdrawn by 
the mean aforesaid, 
withdrawal may be made 
by other means, but in 
such case it is valid only as 
against those persons who 
- 
                                                 
129 All the texts of the Thai Code mentioned in this table are from The Council of State, Doc No 79 
“การตรวจแก้ร่างประมวลกฎหมายแพ่งและพาณิชย ์บรรพ 1 และบรรพ 2” (Report of the Revised Drafts of the Civil and 
Commercial Code Books I and II) (1925). 
130 All the texts of the Japanese Code mentioned in this table are from L H Lönholm, The Civil Code 
of Japan (1898). Therefore, these provisions are believed to be the genuine original provisions which 
were used as the model for the Thai provisions. 
131 All the texts of the BGB mentioned in this table are from C H Wang, The German Civil Code: 
Translated and Annotated, with an Historical Introduction and Appendices (1907). Therefore, these 






made by other means, 
but in such case it is 
valid only as against 
those persons who 
know of it. 
     If the promisor has 
fixed a period within 
which the specified act 
must be done, he is 
presumed to have 
renounced his right of 
withdrawal. 
know of it. 
     If the advertiser has 
fixed a time within which 
specified act must be done, 
he is presumed to have 




     If there are several 
persons who have done 
the act specified in the 
advertisement, only that 
one who does it first 
has a right to receive 
the reward. 
     If several persons do 
such act at the same 
time, each one has a 
right to receive an equal 
share of the reward.  
But if the reward is in 
its nature indivisible, or 
if by the terms of the 
promise only one 
person is to receive the 
reward, it is decided by 
lot. 
     The provisions of 
the foregoing two 
paragraphs do not 
apply, if in the 
advertisement a 




     If several persons do 
the act specified in the 
advertisement, only that 
one who does it first has a 
right to receive the reward. 
     If several persons do 
such act at the same time, 
each one has a right to 
receive an equal share of 
the reward. But if the 
reward is by its nature 
unsuited to be divided, or 
if according to the 
advertisement only one 
person can receive it, the 
person to receive it is 
determined by lot. 
     The foregoing 
provisions do not apply, if 
in the advertisement a 




     A promise of reward 
which has a prize 
competition for its 
object is valid only if a 
period of time is fixed 
in the advertisement. 
     The decision 
- §661 
(1) A promise of reward 
which has as its object a 
competition for a prize is 
valid only if a period of 
time for the competition is 
fixed in the notice. 





whether any competitor 
fulfils the conditions of 
the promise within the 
period, or which one 
among several 
competitors deserves 
the preference, shall be 
made by the umpire 
named in the 
advertisement, or in the 
absence of any such, by 
the promisor of the 
reward. The decision is 
binding upon the parties 
concerned. 
     In case of equality of 
merit the provisions of 
Section 364 paragraph 
2 apply 
correspondingly. 
     The transfer of 
ownership of the thing 
produced may be 
demanded by the 
promisor only of he has 
specified in the 
advertisement that such 
transfer shall be made. 
any competitor fulfils the 
conditions of the promise 
of reward within the 
period, or which of several 
competitors deserves the 
preference, shall be made 
by the person named in the 
promise of reward, or in 
default thereof, by the 
promisor. The decision is 
binding upon the parties 
concerned. 
(3) In case of equality of 
merit the provisions of 
§659 (2) apply to the 
award of the prize. 
(4) The transfer of 
ownership of the work 
may be demanded by the 
promisor of the reward 
only if he has specified in 
the notice of reward that 




















Index of sources of promise to pay a penalty for not performing an obligation 
under Thai law 
 
Thai Code132 BGB133 
§379 
     If the debtor promises the creditor 
the payment of a sum of money as 
penalty in case he does not perform his 
obligation, or does not perform it in the 
proper manner, the penalty is forfeited 
if he is in default. If the performance 
due consists in a forbearance, the 
penalty is forfeited as soon as any act in 




If the debtor promises the creditor the 
payment of a sum of money as penalty in 
case he does not perform his obligation or 
does not perform it in the proper manner, 
the penalty is forfeited if he is in default. 
If the performance due consists in a 
forbearance, the penalty is forfeited as 
soon as any act in contravention of the 
obligation is committed. 
§380 
     If the debtor has promised the 
penalty for the case of his not 
performing his obligation, the creditor 
may demand the forfeited penalty in 
lieu of performance. If the creditor 
declares to the debtor that he demands 
the penalty, the claim for performance 
is barred. 
     If the creditor has a claim for 
compensation for non-performance, he 
may demand the forfeited penalty as the 
minimum amount of the damage. Proof 
of further damage is admissible. 
§340 
     If the debtor has promised the penalty 
for the case of his not fulfilling his 
obligation, the creditor may demand the 
forfeited penalty in the lieu of fulfilment. 
If the creditor declares to the debtor that 
he demands the penalty, his claim for 
performance is barred. 
     If the creditor has a claim for 
compensation for non-performance, he 
may demand the forfeited penalty as the 
minimum amount of the damage. Proof 
of further damage is admissible. 
§381 
     If the debtor has promised the 
penalty for the case of his not 
performing the obligation in the proper 
manner, such as, not at the fixed time, 
the creditor may demand the forfeited 
penalty in addition to the performance. 
     If the creditor has a claim for 
compensation on account of improper 
performance, the section 380, paragraph 
§341 
     If the debtor has promised the penalty 
for the case of his not fulfilling the 
obligation in the proper manner, e.g., not 
at the fixed time,  the creditor may 
demand the forfeited penalty in addition 
to the fulfilment. 
     If the creditor has a claim for 
compensation on account of improper 
fulfilment, the provisions of 340, par. 2 
                                                 
132 All the texts of the Thai Code mentioned in this table are from รายง าน ก ารป ระ ชุ ม ก รรม ก ารรางกฎห ม าย 
(Memorandum of the Committee of Codification), 8 October 1925 (B.E. 2468). 
133 All the texts of the BGB mentioned in this table are from C H Wang, The German Civil Code: 
Translated and Annotated, with an Historical Introduction and Appendices (1907). Therefore, these 







     If the creditor accepts the 
performance he may demand the 
penalty only if on acceptance he 
reserves the right to do so. 
apply. 
   If the creditor accepts the fulfilment, he 
may demand the penalty only if on 
acceptance he reserves the right to do so. 
§382 
If another performance than the 
payment of a sum of money is promised 
as penalty, the provisions of sections 
379 to 381 apply; the claim for 
compensation is barred if the creditor 
demands the penalty. 
 
§342 
If another performance other than the 
payment of a sum of money is promised 
as penalty, the provisions of 339 to 341 
apply; the claim for compensation is 
barred if the creditor demands the 
penalty. 
§383 
     If a forfeited penalty is 
disproportionately high, it may be 
reduced to a reasonable amount by the 
Court. In the determination of 
reasonableness every legitimate interest 
of the creditor, not merely his property 
interest, shall be taken into 
consideration. After payment of the 
penalty the claim for reduction is 
barred. 
     The same rule applies also, apart 
from the cases provided for by sections 
379 and382, if a person promises a 
penalty for the case of his doing or 
forbearing to do some act. 
§343 
     If a forfeited penalty is 
disproportionately high, it may be 
reduced to a reasonable amount by 
judicial decree obtained by the debtor. In 
the determination of reasonableness 
every legitimate interest of the creditor, 
not merely his proper interest, shall be 
taken into consideration. After payment 
of the penalty the claim of reduction is 
barred. 
     The same rule applies also, apart from 
the cases provided for by 339, 342, if a 
person promises a penalty for the case of 
his doing or forbearing to do some act. 
§384 
If the promises performance is invalid, 
an agreement made for a penalty for 
non-performance of the promise is also 
invalid, even if the parties knew of the 
invalidity of the promise. 
 
§344 
If the law declares the promised 
performance invalid, an agreement made 
for a penalty for non-fulfilment of the 
promise is also invalid, even if the parties 
knew of the invalidity of the promise. 
§385 
If the debtor contests the forfeiture of 
the penalty on the ground of having 
performed his obligation, he must prove 
the performance, unless the 
performance due from him consisted in 
a forbearance. 
§345 
If the debtor contests the forfeiture of the 
penalty on the ground of having fulfilled 
his obligation, he shall prove the 
fulfilment, unless the performance due 











Index of sources of promissory notes under Thai law 
 

















pay sum of 
money to, or 



















pay a sum 
certain in 
money. 
(3) A day of 
maturity. 











by one person 
to another 




demand or at a 
fixed or 
determinable 
future time, a 
sum certain in 
money, to, or 
Art 77 
     The 
following 
provisions 




notes so far as 
they are not 
inconsistent 




     
Endorsement 
(Article 11 to 
20); 




note contains:  
1. The term bill 
as part of its 
wording 
expressed in the 
language in 




promise to pay a 
fixed sum of 
money. 
3. The date of 
maturity. 
4. The place 
where payment 
is to be made.  
5. The name of 
 
                                                 
134 All the texts of the Thai Code mentioned in this table are from K Sandhikshetrin , The Civil and 
Commercial Code Books I-VI and Glossary  (2008). 
135 Convention Providing a Uniform Law For Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes  






(5) The name 
or trade name 
of the payee. 









to the order of, 
a specified 
person or to 
bearer. 
 (2) An 
instrument in 
the form of a 
note payable to 
maker’s order 





until it is 
indorsed by the 
maker. 
 (3) A note is 
not invalid by 
reason only 
that it contains 




sell or dispose 
thereof. 
 (4) A note 
which is, or on 
the face of it 
purports to be, 
both made and 
payable within 
the British 
Islands is an 
inland note. 
Any other note 
is a foreign 
note. 
 
(Articles 33 to 
37); 
     Payment 
(Articles 38 to 
42); 
     Recourse in 
case of non-
payment 
(Articles 43 to 
50, S2 to 54); 
     Payment by 
intervention 
(Articles 55, 
59 to 63); 
     Copies 
(Articles 67 
and 68); 
     Alterations 
(Article 69); 




     Holidays, 
computation of 
limits of time 
and prohibition 
of days of 
grace (Articles 
72, 73 and 74). 











payable at the 
address of a 
third party or 
in a locality 
other than that 
of the domicile 
of the drawee 
the person to 
whom or to 
whose order 
payment is to be 
made.7. The 
date and place 
of issue of the 
note.  
8. The signature 










as regards the 
sum payable 






Article 7, the 
consequences 
of signature by 























30-32); in the 
case provided 
for in Article 
31, last 
paragraph, if 
the aval does 
not specify on 










behalf of the 





     An 
instrument in 













     A 
promissory 
note in which 
no time of 
payment is 
specified is 
deemed to be 
payable at 
sight. 
     If the 
place where 
payment is to 
be effected is 







be the place 
of payment. 
     A 
- Art 78 
     The maker 
of a 
promissory 
note is bound 
in the same 
manner as an 
acceptor of a 
bill of 
exchange. 
     Promissory 
notes payable 
at a certain 
time after sight 
must be 
presented for 
the visa of the 
maker within 
the limits of 
time fixed by 
Article 23. The 
limit of time 
runs from the 
date of which 
marks the 
commencemen
t of the period 











place of issue 
is deemed to 
have been 
made at the 
domicile of 
the maker. 
     If there is 



















Notes in so 










920, 922 to 
926, 938 to 
947, 949, 
950, 954 to 
959, 967 to 
971. 
     In case of 




















     The maker 
of a 
promissory 
note is bound 
in the same 
manner as an 
acceptor of a 
bill of 
exchange. 
     
Promissory 
notes payable 
at a certain 
time after 
sight must be 
presented for 
the visa of 
the maker 
within the 
limits of time 
fixed by 
Section 928. 
The limit of 
time runs 
from the date 
of the visa, 
signed by the 
maker of the 
note. The 
refusal of the 
maker to give 








A cheque is a 
bill of 
exchange 






this Part, the 
provisions of 
this Act 










     The maker of 
a promissory 
note is liable in 
the same manner 
as the acceptor 
of a bill of 
exchange. 
     Promissory 
notes payable at 
a fixed period 
after sight must 
be presented to 
the make for 
sight within the 
time limits 
mentioned in 
art. 1013. The 
presentment for 
sight must be 
confirmed on 
the note by the 
signature of the 
maker thereof 
indicating the 
date. The time 
limit runs from 
the date of such 
confirmation. 
Refusal by the 
maker to affix 
his signature 










by a protest 
the date of 
which gives 
the point of 
departure for 
the limit of 
time from 
sight. 
evidenced by a 
protest (art. 
1015): in this 
case the time 
limit after sight 
begins to run 
































Index of sources of promise to pay remuneration under Thai law 
 
Thai Code German Law Swiss Law 
§576 
The promise to pay 
remuneration is 
implied, if, under the 
circumstances it 
cannot be expected 
that the services are 
to be rendered 
gratuitously. 
1. BGB, §612136     
Remuneration is deemed to have 
been tacitly agreed upon if, 
under the circumstances the 
performance of the service is to 
be expected only for 
remuneration. 
     If the amount of 
remuneration is not specified, 
and if there is a tariff, the tariff 
rate of remuneration, or, if there 
is no tariff, the usual 
remuneration is deemed to have 
been agreed upon.  
 
2. German Commercial Code, 
§59137 
Any person employed in a 
mercantile business to perform 
mercantile services for a 
remuneration (hereinafter called 
a mercantile employee) must, in 
the absence of any special 
agreements as to the nature and 
extent of his services or as to his 
remuneration, perform the 
services and receive the 
remuneration usual according to 
local custom. In default of any 
local custom the services to be 
performed must be held to be 
such as appear reasonable under 
the circumstances of the case. 
 
Swiss Code of 
Obligations, Art 320 
para 2138 
It is in particular 
deemed to have been 
concluded as soon as 
the performance of 
work has been accepted 
for a certain period of 
time and which in the 
circumstances could be 
expected only in 
exchange for a salary. 
 
                                                 
136 The texts are from C H Wang, The German Civil Code: Translated and Annotated, with an 
Historical Introduction and Appendices (1907) 133. 
137 The texts are from The German Commercial Code (translated and briefly annotated by A F 
Schuster) (1911). Therefore, it is believed to be the genuine original provision which was used as the 
model for §576 of the Thai Code. 
138 Author’s translation. The French texts can be found in Recueil Des Lois Fédérales No 18 (19 juillet 







Index of sources of promise to make a specific contract under Thai law 
 
Thai Civil and 
Commercial 
Code 
French Law German 
Law 
Swiss Law Japanese 
Law 
§454139 
     A previous 
promise of sale 
made by one 
party has the 
effect of a sale 
only when the 
other party has 
given notice of 
his intention to 
complete the 






     If no time has 
been fixed in the 




promise may fix 
a reasonable 
time and notify 
the other party 
to give a definite 
answer within 
that time 
Code civil  
Art 1589140 
Promise of 
sale is as 





parties as to 
the thing and 
as to the 
price. 
- Swiss Code of 
Obligations Art 
22141 
A party may by 
contract bind 
himself to enter 
into a future 
contract. Where 
the law for the 
protection of the 
parties 
prescribes a 
certain form for 










     A 
promise to 




effect of a 
sale, as 






     If no 











to give a 
                                                 
139 The texts are from รายงานการประชุมกรรมการรางกฎหมาย (Memorandum of the Committee of Codification), 
21 May 1924 (B.E. 2467) 1176. 
140 The texts are from B Barrett, Code Napoleon (verbally translated from the French (1811, Special 
edition 1983) 326. Therefore, this provision is believed to be the genuine original provision which was 
used as the model for the Thai provision. 
141 The texts are from S L Goren, The Swiss Code of Obligations (as of January 1, 1984) (1984) 245. 
The French texts of Art 338 of the 1984 edition are the same as those of Art 338 of the 1911 edition. 
Therefore, it can be inferred this provision was not amended between 1911 and 1987. This thesis 
therefore uses the English translation from the 1984 edition. It is believed to be the genuine original 
provision which was used as the model for §454 of the Thai Code. 
142 The texts are from L H Lönholm, The Civil Code of Japan (1898)146. Therefore, this provision is 





whether he will 
complete the 
sale or not. If 
within that time 

























If a gift or a 
promise for a 
gift has been 




official and the 
donor does not 
deliver to the 
donee the 
property given, 
the donee is 
entitled to claim 
the delivery of it 
or its value, but 
he is not entitled 




All acts of 













     For the 










n of the 
promise is 
necessary. If 
a promise of 
debt or an 
acknowledge
ment of debt 
of the kind 
Swiss Code of 
Obligations, 
Art 59145 
The promise of 
a gift to be valid 
requires a 
written form. If 
pieces of land or 
real rights in 
such are the 
subject of the 




their validity. If 
a promise of gift 
is fulfilled, the 
situation will be 
considered as a 

















                                                 
143 The texts are from B Barrett, Code Napoleon (verbally translated from the French (1811, Special 
edition 1983) 190. Therefore, this provision is believed to be the genuine original provision which was 
used as the model for the Thai provision. 
144 The texts are from The German Civil Code as amended to January 1975 (translated by I S 
Forrester et al) 112-113. 
145 The texts are from The Swiss Civil Code of December 10, 1907 (Effective January 1, 1912). 
Translated by R P Shick (1915). 
146 The texts of are from C H Wang, The German Civil Code: Translated and Annotated, with an 






780, 781, be 
made 
gratuitously, 
the same rule 






     Any 
defect of 































Index of sources of hire purchase under Thai law 
 
Thai Civil and 
Commercial 
Code 





is a contract 
whereby an 
owner of a 
property lets it 
out on hire and 
promises to sell 
it to, or that it 
shall become the 
property of, the 
hirer, 
conditionally on 




of England 147 
The contract of 
hire-purchase, or, 
more accurately, 
the contract of 
hire with an 
option to 
purchase, is one 
under which an 
owner of a chattel 
lets it out on hire 
and undertakes to 
sell it to, or that it 
shall become the 
property of, the 
hirer, 
conditionally on 
his making a 
certain number of 
payments. Until 
the making, 
however, of the 
last payment, no 
property in the 
chattel passes. 
 
- - - 
§573 





property at his 








     If the 
stipulated use 
of the lease 
thing is wholly 
or in part not 
given to the 
lessee in due 
time, or taken 







of a contract 
of hiring 
takes effect 
















                                                 





the lessee may 




any term of the 
notice. The 
notice may not 
be given until 
after the lessor 
has allowed a 
reasonable 
period of time 
fixed by the 




fixing of such 
a period is not 
necessary if 
the lessee has 
no interest in 
the fulfilment 






     Notice to 
terminate the 
lease may be 
given on 




the use only if 
it is justified 
by a special 
interest of the 
lessee. 
     If the lessor 
contests the 
permissibility 
of the notice 


































that it was 
out of 
repair at 






ground that the 
has given the 
use of the 
thing in due 




of the period, 
the burden of 





may, at any 
time before the 
completion of 
the work, give 
notice to 
terminate the 































(2) Earnest J 
Schuster, The 
Principles of 
German Civil  
Law 
§574 
     The owner 
may also 
terminate the 
contract in case 
of default of two 
successive 
payments, or 
breach of any 
material part of 
the contract; in 
which case all 
previous 
payments are 
forfeited to the 





     In case of 
breach of 
contract by 
default of the 
last payment, 
the owner is 



























Index of sources of third party right under Thai law 
 
Thai Code148 Japanese Code149 
§374 
     If a party by a contract agrees to 
make a performance to a third 
person, the latter has a right to 
claim such performance directly 
from the debtor. 
     In the case of the foregoing 
paragraph the right of the third 
person comes into existence at the 
time when he declares to the debtor 
his intention to take the benefit of 
the contract. 
Art 537 
     If a party by a contract agreed to make a 
prestation to a third person, the latter has a 
right to claim such prestation directly from 
the debtor. 
     In such the right of the third person 
comes into existence at the time when he 
expresses to the debtor his intention to take 
the benefit of the contract. 
§375 
After the right of the third person 
has come into existence in 
accordance with the provisions of 
the foregoing section, it cannot be 
changed or extinguished by the 
parties to the contract. 
Art 538 
After the right of the third person has come 
into existence in accordance with the 
provisions of the preceding article, it cannot 
be changed or extinguished by the parties to 
the contract. 
§376 
Defences arising from the contract 
mentioned in Section 374 can be set 
up by the debtor against the third 
person who receive the benefit of 
the contract. 
Art 539 
Defences based upon the contract mentioned 
in Art. 537 can be set up by the debtor 
against the third person in whose favour the 





                                                 
148 All the texts of the Thai Code mentioned in this table are from The Council of State, Doc No 79 
“การตรวจแก้ร่างประมวลกฎหมายแพ่งและพาณิชย ์บรรพ 1 และบรรพ 2” (Report of the Revised Drafts of the Civil and 
Commercial Code Books I and II) (1925). 
149 All the texts of the Japanese Code mentioned in this table are from L H Lönholm, The Civil Code 
of Japan (1898) 142. Therefore, these provisions are believed to be the genuine original provisions 
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